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CHALGA TO THE MAX!  
MUSICAL SPEECH AND SPEECH ABOUT MUSIC ON THE ROAD BETWEEN 
BULGARIA AND MODERN EUROPE  
 
This dissertation explores a discourse of democratic modernity in EU-member 
Bulgaria, which revolves around a hybrid popular music called chalga. I argue that chalga 
does not function as the name of a defined music genre. Rather, Bulgarians use it as a 
self-reflexive voice of ambivalence regarding the recontextualziation in liberal 
democracy of the socialist language ideology of evolutionary modernization: 
navaksvane—catching up—with Europe. On one hand, chalga indexes musical images 
that resonate with the current zeitgeist of modern European culture: aesthetical and social 
heterogeneity as well as commercial mass media. On the other hand, Bulgarians take this 
Ottoman-derived word as a non-referential index that invokes anxieties of Balkanism—a 
discursive trope of European modernity that has invented the Balkans as its liminal 
incomplete Self. As the ethnographic chapters of the dissertation show, Bulgarians deal 
with their ambivalence to chalga by seeking paternalist figures capable of imposing the 
language regimes of navaksvane when performers and audiences digress too much into 
coded zones of Balkan liminality. Regimenting modern popular music with top-down 
control points also to the political communication implicit in chalga. Cognizant of their 
inferior location vis-à-vis “real modern societies,” ordinary Bulgarians seek paternalist 
leaders who can address them on an intimate level but are powerful enough to impose 
norms and practices circulating to Bulgaria from loci that represent the Occident. The 
expectation to have such leaders is not exclusive to democracy. It defined the political 
culture during socialism and even before. What is special to the contemporary era is the 
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discursive formulation of such leadership, which I define as paternalistic populism. 
Bulgarians regard democracy as working in their country when it is guided from above 
by an authoritarian boss (shef), who knows how to anticipate the popular will, how to ally 
with bigger and external forces in order to overcome the society’s marginality, and most 
importantly, how to act with “barbarous” Balkan aggression so as to put the nation in 
modern European order.  
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  Introduction 
Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna, Burgas 1  Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna, Burgas                      
Chalga to the max—the party is here. Chalga do dupka—kupona e pri nas.  
We will get totally smashed today,  Shte se napiem mnogo zdravo dnes, 
Farewell, no worries, the party is the best!   Sbogom, chista sŭvest, kupona e na shest!  
 
Chalga to the Max (Chalga do dupka)—Tsvetelina and DJ Niki, 20052  
 
Scope  
On January 14, 2008, when Bulgaria celebrated its first year of European 
Union membership, a popular Bulgarian web site (www.dir.bg) published a short 
news item about a survey conducted by the Bulgarian Association of Business and 
Touristic Information. The survey solicited from the public symbols that could 
represent the nation in the EU official institutions. The news item informs readers 
that, as expected, people chose well recognized national symbols, such as the 
monastery of the Rila Mountains, the Cyrillic alphabet, the citadel of Tsarevets, and 
Rose oil. The majority of the votes went to “the Madara Rider,” a rock relief from the 
early medieval Bulgarian kingdom (8th century AD), which meant that it would 
represent the country on Euro bank notes.  
On the following day (January 15, 2008), dir.bg released a follow up report 
that despite its appearance as serious news item seems to mock the survey. The item 
states that the report on the survey received hundreds of comments from readers who 
suggested alternative and much less glorious Bulgarian national symbols.3 The item 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 These are the biggest cities in Bulgaria (respectively). Sofia is the capital. Plovdiv is the second a 
historical regional center of Ottoman Thrace (nowadays southeastern Bulgaria, northwestern Turkey 
and eastern Greece). Varna and Burgas are the largest Black Sea cities.  
2 “Цветелина и DJ Ники Генов - Чалга до дупка / Tsvetelina & Niki Genov - Chalga... (Офиц. 
видео),” accessed October 25, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AJh4OQrS7Mw. 
3 The original report: “What is The Most Bulgarian Symbol?”—“Кой е най-българският символ?” 
January 14, 2008, accessed October 25, 2014, 
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says that “[U]nfortunately…..the majority ‘saw’ Bulgaria through the lens of 
corruption, simplemindedness (prostotiia), Mafiosi, incompetent politicians, broken 
roads and car accident victims.” Readers keyed this contemporary portrayal to local 
cultural imagination with Hitar Petŭr (Shrewd Peter) and Bai Ganio—both idioms of 
Bulgarians’ derogatory self-labeling: “a peasant nation, simpleminded people.” The 
first is the stupid-wise Bulgarian folktale protagonist; the latter is the 19th century 
literary hero-villain created by the writer Aleko Konstantinov (2010 [1895]). A sheep 
was selected as a political metaphor for Bulgarians constantly seeking authoritative 
leaders. Another reader suggested a symbol of garbage thrown all over to denote local 
disrespect for public norms. A picture of a ragged Bulgarian flag among more decent 
looking national flags waving in front of the European Parliament in Strasburg4 
alluded visually to the strong local sense of “Bulgarian exceptionalism,” a case of 
“crypto-colonialism”5 (Herzfeld 2002). The common local historical narrative relates 
to Bulgarians as the first European nation whose five centuries of occupation by the 
Ottoman Empire derailed them from the ‘normal’ European course of historical 
development. As a result, Bulgarians see themselves as if they were delayed in 
developing modernity, constantly lagging behind the rest of Europe. People also 
chose articles of food from the traditional cuisine, such as kebapche (minced grilled 
meatball), rakiia (fruit brandy), shopska salata (a vegetable salad with feta), and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://dnes.dir.bg/news.php?id=2541512&c=1&act=post&error404#sepultura&nt=12. The follow up 
report: “Bai Ganio, Shrewd Peter, Azis, Tripe—the Real BG symbols”—“Бай Ганьо, Хитър Петър, 
Азис, шкембето - истинските БГ символи,” January 15, 2008, accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://dnes.dir.bg/news.php?id=2544926. 
4 “Shabby Bulgarian Flag is on display in Strasburg“—“Дрипаво Българско знаме се вее в 
Страсбург,” December 30, 2007, accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://olddnes.dir.bg/gallery.php?id=2524189&page=0. 
5 Herzfeld defines “crypto-colonialism” as the “curious alchemy whereby certain countries, buffer 
zones between the colonized lands and those as yet untamed, were compelled to acquire their political 
independence at the expense of massive economic dependence, this relationship being articulated in the 
iconic guise of aggressively national culture fashioned to suit foreign models. Such countries were and 
are living paradoxes: they are nominally independent, but that independence comes at the price of a 
sometimes humiliating form of effective dependence.” (2002: 900-901).  
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shkembe chorba (tripe soup), as symbols of Bulgaria’s “unrefined” culinary culture. 
Bulgarians point to tripe soup in particular as a paradigmatic example of how the 
national cuisine might not fit with EU hygiene standards.  
According to the follow up report, most of the alternative votes went to 
chalga—a popular music phenomenon that boomed in Bulgaria in the late 1980s and 
has been dominating the local cultural scene in the last three decades. With many 
sarcastic references, readers linked chalga to the customary symbols of national self-
derogation. The report maintains that “[I]n a way the name of Azis was noticeable; 
and more often the back parts of his body. One reader saw them going well alongside 
the [communist e.l.] red flag with the five-pointed star and the fez (the Bulgarian 
visual reference to ‘Oriental’ Turkey e.l.). In a biblical style another reader envisioned 
the holy trinity: Azis’ a…[ass, e.l], Slavi’s pumpkin [a slang word for bold head e.l.], 
and Boiko’s thug-face [mutra e.l].”  
Let me explain the above references briefly (see selected pictures bellow). 
Azis (figure 1) is the stage name of Vasil Troianov Boianov—the mega-star singer, 
whose carnivalesque-like performance has guided me to the deepest meanings in the 
chalga discourse, above all, ethnicity and gender. My initial intention was to center 
my ethnography on Azis. However, at the early stage of my fieldwork I preferred to 
take a more open-ended approach and let my encounters fashion the research focus. 
 Slavi Trifonov (figure 2) is a prominent singer-producer and a TV host who 
has been one of the first local entrepreneurs who recognized the commercial potential 
of hybridizing Balkan popular musics with Bulgarian socialist folklore and pop 
(called Estrada; see in detail chapter 1) and global pop.  
Boiko Borisov (figure 3) alludes to the political subtext of chalga. The news 
item was published when he was a rising star in the local political scene, then serving 
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as the mayor of the Bulgarian capital of Sofia. In July 2009, the party Borisov 
founded—“Citizens for European Development in Bulgaria” (CEPB)—won the 
parliamentary elections by a landslide and led the country until 2013. At the time of 
completing this dissertation, Borisov heads the parliamentary opposition and builds 
his power toward returning to national leadership. As a prime minister, Boiko Borisov 
continued the pro-EU liberal agenda of almost all Bulgarian governments “since the 
arrival of democracy” (sled kato doide demokratsiiata is the colloquial term for the 
political era after 1989). His political power stems from his populist persona, which 
combines charismatic paternalism, police background (as head of the Police), family 
connections within the former socialist oligarchy (his father, Metodi Borisov, was a 
high official in the Ministry of the Interior), affiliation with the post-socialist shady 
security business (he was the bodyguard for Todor Zhivkov, the legendary leader of 
Communist Bulgaria), martial and soccer masculine sportsmanship, and village roots. 
The word “mutra” (with which Borisov is characterized in the news item) means 
literally “animal face.” In post-socialist Bulgaria it became a slang idiom for Mafia-
thugs with a stereotypical look of wide face, bold/shaved head, small eyes, short neck, 
and protruded lower jaw in the style of Marlon Brando in “The Godfather.” 
Especially during the 1990s, chalga was perceived as celebrating the new money elite 
of mutri (the plural of mutra), who, on their part, sponsored chalga singers and 
producers financially (more in detail chapter 1).  
Interestingly, none of the three men identify themselves publically with 
chalga. They characterize themselves in ways that fit the first news item and refer the 
derogatory item in general to Bulgarians, but not to themselves. Azis usually defines 
his music as popfolk (which is a debated synonym of chalga) with aspirations of 
becoming a global pop star. Trifonov characterizes his musical fusion as ethno-rock. 
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In chapter 2 I will present an item on Trifonov’s late-night TV show (Slavi’s Show, 
bTV), in which he attacks the appearance of a chalga singer in a school musical 
textbook. Boiko Borisov denounces chalga unequivocally. He even expressed many 
times his special hostility to Azis and Slavi Trifonov. Despite this denial Bulgarians 
tend to associate the three men with aesthetics, cultural values, as well as social 
environment of a music-scape, which they call “chalga” and which, according to 
dir.bg’s semi-parodic news item as well as to my fieldwork informants, represents 
most eminently (and regretfully) Bulgarian national identity in the post-socialist 
democratic era.  
 
Fig. 1—Azis (from the front page of “Beauty Coiffure” magazine, Feb. 2010)6 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Picture is taken from “Azis-Азис,” JoyReactor, accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://joyreactor.cc/tag/%25D0%25B0%25D0%25B7%25D0%25B8%25D1%2581.  
	   6	  
	   	  
Fig. 2—Slavi Trifonov7     Fig. 3—Boiko Borisov8 
 
Objectives and Argument 
Emerging from Bulgarians’ references to the three figures above is a double 
voice of collective affirmation countered with collective derogation, which the dir.bg 
news items captured so well. My goal in this dissertation is to explore the social life 
of this double speech, to analyze how it functions within Bulgarian national 
imagination, and to explain why people in Bulgaria invoke this voice particularly in 
regard to music they call chalga. The historical context of my study is the ongoing 
transition from one model of national modernity to another. Bulgarians would most 
likely react to this context with bitter irony because—to paraphrase the words of a 
villager in Gerald Creed’s (1997) ethnography of a post-socialist village—they see 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Picture is taken from the news report “Мистериозни слухове съпровождат липсата на Слави 
Трифонов от екран,” January 31, 2009, accessed October 25, 2014, 
https://frognews.bg/news_10001/Misteriozni-sluhove-saprovojdat-lipsata-na-Slavi-Trifonov-ot-ekran/. 
8 Picture is taken from Kerin Hope, “Bulgaria’s PM Watches His Rating Slide,” Financial Times, 
October 11, 2010, accessed October 25, 2014, http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-
brics/2010/10/11/bulgaria/?Authorised=false. 
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their national life as a never-ending transition, from Ottoman rule to monarchy, from 
monarchy to socialism, and from socialism to democracy. These transitions had final 
points of beginning and end from the political perspective. The country was carved 
out of the Ottoman Empire at the Congress of Berlin (1878) in the aftermath of the 
Russo-Ottoman War (1877-78). It became a fully independent monarchy in 1908. 
Between September 9, 1946 and November 10, 1989 Bulgaria was a socialist country 
allied with the Soviet Union and its satellite countries in Eastern Europe. Since 
November 11, 1989 Bulgaria has become a democratic country that joined the 
European Union on January 1, 2007.  
Exploring the Bulgarian transitions from the cultural perspective shifts the 
language time frame from past and present simple to present perfect and present 
perfect progressive. Bulgarians have been experiencing their national sociality as a 
journey of becoming an organic part of modern Europe, which has never been 
completed. All the political regimes since the foundation of this country in 1878 have 
attempted to gain popular support by promoting nation-building that would transform 
Bulgarians from post-Ottoman Balkan subjects to modern European citizens. The 
keyword in this transformation is navaksvane or “closing the gap.” This means that 
Bulgarians see themselves as a pre-modern European nation that was occupied by the 
Ottoman Empire and therefore did not take part in the development of modernity. 
Hence the goal of national independence is to close the historical gap and catch up 
with “the rest of Europe.” Completing the cultural path of navaksvane has always 
required believing in a future in which modernity would finally be attained. To be 
modern has entailed performing the cultural formulation of the prototype that stands 
metonymically for the “rest of Europe” or, more idiomatically, “real European 
societies.” In the Bulgarian kingdom the cultural formula was ethnic homogeneity like 
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in France, Germany, and UK (unlike the multiethnic Ottoman and Hapsburg empires). 
In the Bulgarian socialist republic the cultural formula was a classless proletariat 
nation. In democratic Bulgaria the cultural formula centers on pluralistic and liberal 
individualism as defined by the EU.  
I argue that the double voice of self-affirmation and self-derogation in the two 
news items expresses more than a comic relief of carnivalesque (Bakhtin 1984). It 
points to a deep social anxiety about the fact that, even though Bulgarians accept the 
current formula of cultural modernization, the goal of becoming a real part of Europe 
has not been realized and most likely will not be realized in the future, just as it never 
was in the past. Ethnographers of post-socialist Bulgaria have all captured the voice 
of disillusionment with socialist modernity coupled with suspicion to the current 
model of national modernity: democracy and capitalism (Buchanan 2006; Creed 
1997, 2011; Ghodsee 2005, 2009; Pilbrow 2001; Rice 1994). Understanding the 
anxiety of the recent transition from socialism to democracy, I argue, requires us to 
open a longue durée perspective to the discourse of transition itself, particularly what 
national modernity and/or being an integral part of modern Europe actually means to 
Bulgarians in their everyday life. This is what I propose to accomplish with my 
ethnography of chalga’s social life. 
 Exploring Bulgarian modernity through chalga follows in the footsteps of 
scholars, who analyze the politics of power and domination underlying the 
epistemology of modernity in Europe (Z. Bauman 1991; Foucault1970; Latour 1993), 
vis-à-vis the West’s immediate Other (Said 1978) and in former European colonies 
(Chakrabarty 2000; Chatterjee 1993). Within this body of literature I mostly engage 
with the Bulgaria-American historian Maria Todorova (1997) whose concept of 
“Balkanism” is fundamental to any study of modernity in post-Ottoman southeastern 
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Europe (or the Balkans), at large and Bulgaria, in particular. Todorova argues that the 
Balkans is Europe’s “incomplete self.” Meaning, modern Europeans invented the 
Balkans as liminal locus of Europe’s “authentic” and “barbarous” ethnicities from 
which modern Western civilization has evolved into a higher form of sociality: the 
nation-state. Similarly to the other regional-political contexts, modernity arrived to 
the Balkans as a mission of civilization and modernization, in which European powers 
endeavored to enlighten the “barbarous natives” by promoting ideologies of 
rationality, national homogeneity, and social evolution. They traveled in one-
directional channel of flow—from the European center to its peripheries—and were 
translated in local cultural contexts under the auspices of local modernity brokers.  
The Bulgarian historian Diana Mishkova (2006) complicates Todorova’s 
argument by suggesting that to understand the circulation of European modernity in 
the Balkans one should analyze the channels through which different ideas about 
“Europe” have been circulated, mediated and represented in Balkans since the mid 
19th century thereby foregrounding local discourses about modern national politics, 
economy, science, and culture. In other words, Mishkova seeks to explore “the 
Balkan perspective of the West and its civilization not (only) in the sense of its 
stereotypes, perceptions and applications, but above all as a contextualized debate 
about modernity and society; a debate that would take into account pragmatic and 
empirical as well as utopian and anti-utopian components” (ibid: 31 f.n 5). This 
perspective which Mishkova ties with “Occidentalism”—a counter discourse of 
“Orientalism” (e.g. Buruma and Margalit 2005)—does not deny that the language of 
communication about modernity was first originated in Europe and then traveled to 
Bulgaria (the locus of Mishkova’s analysis). However, there is neither one monolithic 
picture of Europe nor a defined European center. Narratives and ideas about Europe 
	   10	  
were originated in Russia, France, Britain, Germany and the modernizing Ottoman 
capital of Istanbul; they traveled to the emerging Bulgarian national discourse via 
protestant missionaries, Bulgarian students in Europe as well as via “more developed” 
Balkan brokers, above all Greek, Serbian and, to lesser extent also, Romanian elites. 
In this sense, the first Bulgarian modernizers articulated nation-building not so much 
vis-à-vis an imagined Western center but in regard to those different representatives, 
brokers and mediators of European modernity in the Balkans. Mishkova argues that 
Bulgarians’ stigma of having an “incomplete” national Self—the central perspective 
that underlies the second news report—did not originate through a direct contact with 
“the West,” but was developed within Bulgarian national discourse and circulated 
back to Europe.  
Building upon utopian ideas spread by Greek intellectual circles, Bulgarian 
literati believed in resolving this stigma by becoming or evolving into Europeans: 
modernizing by means of attaining “the principles of enlightenment” (learning, reason 
and rationality). Hence, Mishkova concludes, studying discourses of national identity 
in the Balkans requires us to look beyond the ways in which the European powers 
constructed the Balkans as the “barbarous” or “backward” mirror image of 
“modernity” and “civilization.” Instead she calls for a historical and comparative 
analysis of the ideological function of “Europe”—its normative, symbolic and 
encoded meanings—which is “significant and evident however only as a metaphor of 
modernity rather than by ideological semantics of its own” (ibid: 59).  
Mishkova’s analytical framework helps my study of chalga utilizes to explore 
ambivalent voices Bulgarians express toward the current stage in the project of 
national modernization. I particularly relate to the concept of Occidentalism in 
chapter 1 in which I link chalga with a discursive trope of Bulgarians living on the 
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road between the Balkans and Europe. The other chapters relate to Mishkova more 
implicitly. Chapter 2 examines how Bulgarian intellectuals adapt to democracy their 
role during socialism—brokers of modernization—by debating intertextual links 
between folklore ditties and a contemporary animal tale that connotes with chalga. 
Chapter 3 explores how Bulgarians shift through references to chalga between 
modern occidental and Balkan oriental discursive spaces. Chapter 4 illuminates how 
Bulgarian ethnic minorities, above all Roma, struggle through chalga with a legacy of 
assimilation as the only path of participation in the modern occident. 
The Bulgarian scholar Rumen Avramov (2003) adds an economic historical 
perspective that helps me to tie chalga with a local debate about how to form 
capitalism (which Avramov considers the economic and cultural category of 
modernity) in a society without modern capital. Avramov uncovers the politics of 
inequality that are absent from Mishkova’s analysis of modernity circulation. Shifting 
the focus from European enlightenment to European creditors reveals how texts about 
European modernity have been transfigured9 (Ganokar and Povinelli 2003) through 
powerful mechanisms of exchange rather than being translated via linguistic codes of 
meaning-value into texts about Balkan (and particularly, Bulgarian) modernity.  
Avramov argues that large-scale political changes in Europe have pushed 
small and peripheral European societies, such as Bulgaria, to a state of economic 
crisis, which they could resolve only by entering into debt cycles with major 
European creditors. Throughout the late 19th and 20th centuries Bulgaria’s creditors 
were France, Germany, Russia (later, USSR) and the UK. At the turn of the 21st 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 “[F]ocusing on transfiguration rather than translation—the refunctioning of a text as such for 
different demanding-sites—orients our analysis toward the calibration of vectors of power rather than 
vectors of meaning-value. We will care more about the distribution of power than of meaning, more 
about institutions of intelligibility, livability, and viability than about translation. Indeed meaning 
value, its sovereignty or dissemination, will cease to command our attention in regimes of recognition, 
and instead we might focus on the social forms these regimes demand” (Ganokar and Povinelli 2003: 
396). 
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century those creditors became the EU and global financial institutions, such as the 
IMF and the World Bank. The formula of aid has always been identical: money for 
reforms. In order to receive crucial credit or cash infusion, Bulgarian governments 
were required to build economic forms and mechanisms according to the creditors’ 
economic models. For creditors, “cash for reforms” has provided invaluable 
opportunity to conduct economic experiments on the continent’s periphery; for 
Bulgaria, participating in such experiments has been the sole way to deal with its 
existential state of crisis: the least developed area in eastern European economic 
backwardness in relation to western European capitalism (Chirot 1991). The outcome 
of this dynamics is what Avramov calls “culture of conditionality;” “[T]he formula 
‘money for reforms’ is the basic bargaining principle in economic transactions 
between Bulgaria and its creditors. Hence, financial dependence is the catalyst of 
economic and even societal modernization for a peripheral country. Debt history is 
the core of modernization history. Foreign advisers and institutions are its key agents 
(seemingly inspecting the implementation of reforms e.l).” (ibid: 10).  
Avramov defines this sort of conditionality as cultural in a sense that 
reforming the Bulgarian economy according to creditors’ models produced “its own 
intellectual realm: distinct symbols, ideological and doctrinal orthodoxy, a specific 
language” (ibid: 26). Bulgarian education has been formulated to produce scientific 
knowledge that accords with the current prospect of economic transition: post-
independence national, post-WWII communist, Post-Cold War (neo)liberal. The 
political discourse is divided between the proponents and opponents of the current 
program of modernization, i.e. between Eurocentric-integrationists and nationalists-
xenophobes. Bulgarian public institutions (the National Bank, the judicial system, the 
Parliament, the central and local Governments) have been known both locally and in 
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Europe as “forms without content.” These bodies perform the protocol of European 
civic life in order to fit with debt conditions but in a rigged manner with no “genuine” 
civic engagement. On the subjective level, modern economic identity is built in 
Bulgaria on a paradox Avramov terms “communal capitalism” (2007). Having no 
economic capital of modernity, the Bulgarian nation-state is formally (or poetically) 
independent but in practice is heteronomous to the modernization conditions of its 
creditors. This heteronomy goes down to the social level. The Bulgarian citizen 
formally enjoys individual agency. However, since the overwhelming majority of 
Bulgarians are too poor to practice this right in the market, they can perform the 
poetics of modern individual agency only by belonging to egalitarian collectives run 
by paternalist leaders who hold the material means for performing individualism. The 
concept of “communal capitalism” is central in chapter 1. It helps me to explain how 
poetics of popfolk artificial stardom mediate relationship of dependency between 
singers-clients and patron-bosses, called idiomatically shefs. 
Drawing upon Todorova, Mishkova and Avramov, this dissertation argues 
that, while textual and audio-visual images called chalga are basically not political, 
they provide Bulgarians with special political means to debate, negotiate, identify 
themselves and make sense of the current project of navaksvane—closing the gap 
between Europe and the Balkans. The reason is that, just as Shrewd Peter, Bai 
Ganio,10 rakiia, and kebapche, chalga keys speech to the metadiscursive dialectics of 
Bulgarian discourse of modernity: transition from the incomplete margins of the 
Balkans toward the center, i.e. the imagined domain of occidental Europe. Transition 
from marginality has defined the beginning and the end of the 20th century in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The Bulgarian historian Rumen Daskalov (2001) identifies a similar debate over the evolutionary 
dialectics of Bulgarian national identity in the intellectual discourse surrounding the literary anti-hero 
Bai Ganio. I do see a clear difference between chalga and bai Ganio, who was invented, above all, as a 
critique rather than emancipation of Bulgarians’ alleged “backward” tendencies (e.g. Kraev et al. 1999: 
63).  
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former-Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian dominions in southeast Europe. European 
powers turned the Balkans into “the powder keg of Europe” before WWI while 
“balkanization” became a Western metonym of violent ethnic fragmentation most 
recently broke out during the Yugoslav Civil War. The “threatening” image of the 
Balkans arrived twice to the center of European political discourse during the 20th 
century. The first time was the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), which were shortly 
followed by the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian crown prince in Sarajevo, the 
opening event of WWI. The second time was the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia 
in the aftermath of the Cold War. In both cases the Balkans metaphorically denoted in 
the West the fragility of European modernity (Bjelic and Savic 2005).  
In a time of political transition, when the hegemony of the European-oriented 
elite over national self-imagination has come under question, chalga has emerged as 
an idiom of anxiety regarding the contemporary stage of transition. Buglarians are not 
the only Balkan nation in the region that claim modernity by denouncing the modern 
quality of local pop music that emreges from the margins. For instance, urban Turks 
blame arabesk for the crisis of Kemalist modernism (e.g Stokes [1992] and Özbek 
[1997]); western-oriented Greeks disclaim laiko for resurfacing the nation’s Oriental-
romeic cultural roots under the proto-European hellenic facade (Kalimopoulou and 
Panagiotis 2009; Papageorgiou 1997); former Yugoslavs identify turbo-folk as the 
music of Milosevic’s para-military goons (e.g. Baker 2010, Gordy 1999, Rasmussen 
2007, 2002); and ethnic Romanians draw with manele the border of ethnic tolerance 
as regards Roma (Beissinger 2007; Giurchescu and Radulescu 2011). Exploring the 
discourses of such Balkan popular musics I realized that their performers, creators and 
audiences almost never speak for themselves; their experience barely receives any 
attention. Most often, they will appear publically only as objects of elite’s critiques, 
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reenactors of the modernity scripts (e.g. chagla performers, creators and audiences 
disclaim chalga in press interviews), or play the role of backward trashiness for the 
entertainment media. 
To grasp personal voices, my study investigates how Bulgarians integrate 
democracy into their social reality by debating how chalga fits or does not within the 
maxim of navaksvane—closing the historical gap between the Balkans and Europe, or 
in Todorova’s terminology, becoming a complete part of the European Self. I argue 
that, with the original national symbols in the survey of dir.bg, people reiterate the 
official national voice of Bulgaria’s location of in Europe. The semi-parodic symbols 
do not contradict this celebration but nuance it with an unofficial ambivalent voice, 
which takes Balkan marginality into account. The centrality of chalga on the 
alternative list shows that this music is not just an additional contemporary symbol. It 
is a prime discursive site for making sense of Western democracy.  
In many different ways Bulgarians address through references to chalga 
Katherine Verdery’s (1996) question, “What was socialism and what comes next?.”. 
Developing an ethnographic scope to the way chalga mediates an almost two 
centuries old European discourse of Balkan modernization, I rely on Bauman and 
Briggs (2003:309) in offering an answer that draws upon Jean-Baptiste Alphonse 
Karr’s (1849) epigram: plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose (“the more things 
change, the more they stay the same”). In my mind, the fact that the phenomenon of 
chalga invokes so many anxieties about the state of modernity in Bulgaria does not 
indicate a modernity crisis or a postmodern turn. Just as they did in previous periods 
through other cultural forms, Bulgarians debate through chalga what they need to do 
in order to overcome their experience of marginality, i.e. to close the historical gap 
and finally complete the process of becoming part of Europe’s modern Self. 
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This dissertation connects Verdery’s question with another question I 
encountered oftentimes in many different versions during my fieldwork, “can 
Bulgarians simply be a modern nation without going through another period of 
transition toward the current cultural model of modern Europe?” Inherent in this 
question is the broader issue whether Balkan liminality can open venues of social 
emergence for Europe instead of being only a residual space of marginality. 
“Welcome to Bulgaria” (figure 4) shows a common way of taking chalga as an 
example why the answer to this question is “no.” This is an artistic metal sign that 
was created for an exhibition titled “The Temptation of Chalga” (Izkushenieto na 
chalgata) at the Sofia City Gallery (May 2009), which attempted to reflect upon “the 
experience of post-socialist transition through this bright, shiny, noisy, scandalous, 
kitschy cultural phenomenon” (from the official press release of the exhibition). 
Balkanist liminality is reflected from the wild and empty mountainous landscape to 
which a narrow rural road leads. Reference to the threats of Balkanization appears in 
the gun bullets that pierce the sign as a warning to newcomers of the brutal violence 
hidden in this pastoral landscape.  
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Fig. 4—“Welcome to Bulgaria,” from the exhibition “The Temptation of Chalga,”    
Sofia City Art Gallery, May, 1-31, 2009, picture: Eran Livni 
 
 
Fig. 5—“БГ Сувенири” (“BG souvenirs”) by Alla Georgieva, from the exhibition 
“The Temptation of Chalga,” Sofia City Art Gallery, May, 1-31, 2009, picture: Eran 
Livni 
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The picture above (figure 5) is another example from the same exhibition of 
debating Bulgarian liminality in the era of democracy through chalga. In this picture 
folklore authenticity, a most valued cultural capital of socialist Bulgaria, finds a new 
market in sex-labor and pornography. This reference is a common way of expressing 
protest against the capitalist economic formulation of Bulgarian democracy, which 
has, presumably, forced highly skilled folklore female singers (trained by state music 
schools) to become chalga bimbos (or, more explicitly, prostitutes, see chapters 1 and 
2).  
 My study aims to revisit the prevalent association of chalga only with this 
perspective of self-derogation, which has induced both Bulgarians and Western 
observers alike to regard chalga as a name of music that is essentially backward and 
its popularity indicates essential Bulgarian backwardness. In my opinion, when 
people in Bulgaria relate to chalga as essentially backward, they reiterate the Euro-
centric authoritative gaze, which has identified the Balkans as a locus of 
backwardness in the margins of modern Europe. In other words, Bulgarians tend to 
denounce chalga in public as a matter of performing modern face and avoid being 
looked upon as backward. While not intending my dissertation as mere celebration of 
chalga (of which I consider myself a diehard fan), I show that, when people in and 
outside Bulgaria judge local music images as a priori as backward, label them with a 
derogatory name like chalga and associate them primarily with images of 
pornography, sex-labor, violence, and illicit money, they ignore the complex and 
multivalent social experience of democracy these images and their generic label 
mediate.  
The anthropologist Gerald Creed (1997) dealt with the experience of 
liminality and marginality in rural Bulgarian setting during the last years of the 
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socialist regime and the first few years of post-socialism. He showed how Bulgarian 
villagers domesticated socialism and then attempted to use similar strategies to 
accommodate the arrival of capitalism. He concluded that Bulgarians complied with 
the socialist regime and at the same time sabotaged it, a strategy that he describes as 
“conflicting complementarities. Shifting the scope to urban Bulgarian settings I 
employ Creed’s  “conflicting complimentarities” to analyze how chalga allows 
Bulgarians domesticate Euro-Atlantic regime of modernity in the aftermath of the 
Cold War. Why domestication? Because Bulgarians do not experience European 
modernity as a colonizing force to which they are subaltern. On the contrary, 
modernity represents the promise of becoming a “normal” European nation whose 
people can celebrate themselves with the symbols appearing in the first news item. On 
the other hand, playing the surrogate role of backward Europeans, Bulgarians 
experience modernity from the perspective of the derogatory symbols that appear on 
the semi-parodic list. Each of the four dissertation chapters show from a different 
angle how Bulgarians shift between complying with and sabotaging the post-socialist 
language ideology of modernity. “Conflicting complematarities” frames explicitly 
chapter 3, in which I analyze how chalga’s ethnic register of kiuchek help Veselin 
Karchinski and his social environment both to uphold and undermine the post-
socialist collapse of ideological borders between the traditional/backward village and 
the modern city. This strategy resonates more implicitly in the other chapters as well. 
In chapter 1 I show how poetics of artificially in popfolk stardom help Bulgarian 
singers negotiate hegemonic norms of pop music authenticity. In chapter 2 I examine 
a conflict between two concepts of irony: a digressive one that maintains ambivalence 
of compliance with and sabotage of authoritative narratives and a polysemic one that 
refers ambivalence to inherent ambiguities between signifier and signified. Chapter 4 
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shifts the scope to Roma right activists who sabotage the national legacy of ethnic 
assimilation by organizing a Romani cultural festival around Gypsy kiuchek and 
upholding this legacy by marginalizing this festival from the national public.     
My study is particularly attentive to the personal voice of compliance and 
sabotage in chalga. People in Bulgaria usually agree that it symbolizes the local 
cultural landscape. They deny though that they personally perform, produce, listen to 
or have anything to do with this kind of “backward music” (izostanala muzika). I take 
the challenge posed by the Bulgarian ethnomusicologist and folklorist Ventsislav 
Dimov (2001) who writes that efforts to define and locate chalga remind him of the 
Indian tale about blind people who were asked to describe elephant only by touching 
it. Each person generalized the animal according to the limb he felt; one described it 
as a pillar, another as a big tent, the third as a humongous snake. Dimov’s conclusion 
provides a glimpse to the uncanny (Bhabha 1992, 2004) experience of Bulgarian 
liminality—being almost but not quite European. He likens chalga to a quantum, 
meaning, this music is everywhere but nowhere, because, above all, chalga has 
remediated the role of folklore—the vernacular culture of ordinary days and 
festivities—to global media. I discuss at different points in my thesis chalga’s three 
personifiers mentioned at the beginning of the introduction—the singers Azis and 
Slavi Trifonov as well as the politician Boiko Borisov—to explain why chalga 
mediates such negative meanings about Bulgarian society, to shed light on the actual 
people who perform, produce and consume it, where, and in what ways they do so.  
Chalga, Popfolk, Chalgiia, Ethnopop, Ethnojazz 
 
 The word uncanny (the original German for uncanny is unheimlich) signifies a 
sense of being “out of home.” While this term is most identified with Freud (2003) 
Ernst Jentsch ([1906] 1997) first introduced in the early psychoanalytic discourse to 
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define a state of mind and feeling, which he described as “lack of orientation.” Dimov 
(2001) advocates the term ethnopop to reconstruct his sense of home—being a citizen 
of a modern European nation—which fell in crisis after 1989. He suggests this 
generic label as an etic meta-label of multiple emic musical phenomena, which are 
connected, in his mind, with the experience of a post-Cold War postmodern 
globalized world. I do not use this term for a couple of reasons. First, it has not gained 
currency in the local Bulgarian discourse. Second, and more importantly, the basic 
argument of my study is that chalga is not a postmodern phenomenon but a 
recontextualized speech act (more in detail in a moment) within the Bulgarian 
discourse of modernity, which stems from the metadiscourse of modernity in the 
Balkans, i.e. Balkanism. Hence, I oftentimes use the term “popfolk,” which relates to 
the media industry of the music, in order not to detach my ethnographic 
communication from real life experience while also avoiding embarrassing my 
interlocutors. In this dissertation I use mostly the label chalga because it persists in the 
secondary literature and in the Bulgarian media as well as in the Balkanist 
imagination of my western readers and also because this is the preferred term of my 
interlocutors in numerous information situations. Especially in chapter 1, I explain 
pragmatic and semantic distinctions Bulgarians make between chagla and popfolk.  
All the secondary literature with which I have engaged mentions that “chalga” 
resonates with the Orientalist character of Bulgarian marginality (most eminently 
coined by the historian Mary Neuberger [2004]: “the Orient within”). The word 
originates from the Turkish word çalgı, which means “musical instrument.” Just as 
many Turkisms in Bulgarian, “chalga” indexes Balkan imagination, which is oriented 
to the society’s Ottoman heritage, unlike the modern European one, for which 
European languages are the source of lexical borrowings. My ethnographic account 
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will discuss in depth how Bulgarians employ the Turkism of “chalga” to elaborate the 
political, ethical, esthetic, class, and ethnic meanings of the Ottoman vs. Occidental 
orientation conflict. Beforehand, I need to take on the tricky task of providing a short 
background of this genre with minimal Balkanist essentialisms.  
Historically, chalga has alluded to the traditional Ottoman genre of chalgiia—
music bands of travelling musicians (called, chalgadzhii) who performed a trans-
Balkan hybrid soundscape in multiethnic urban settings (e.g. Buchanan 2006; 
Gaitandzhiev 2000; Levy 2010, 2007; Silverman 2012). During the socialist era, the 
government tried to eradicate chalgiia in its musical project of nation building by 
replacing it with state-produced Bulgarian village folklore (Buchanan 2006; Rice 
1994). The heterogeneous character of this music symbolized to Bulgarians a 
departure point on the course to evolving (proletarian) national homogeneity—the 
political formulation of European modernity. Hence, chalgiia was excluded from the 
Bulgarian public musical culture. It survived nonetheless in the semi-legal marginal 
form of travelling tavern bands and Romani orchestras. The neo-chalgiia trend of 
“wedding music” in the early 1980s signaled the end of the socialist musical regime. 
Eclectic music bands that used to play in private occasions, above all at wedding 
parties, became the prime cultural alternative to the state-run European-style popular 
music genre of Estrada.11 The bands’ popularity signaled the collapse of centralist 
control over the music market and the emergence of a new private commercial one. 
“Wedding music” became synonymous with the clarinet musician Ivo Papazov-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 While there is a growing scholarly interest in Eastern European rock music during the socialist era 
(e.g. Reyback 1990; Zhuk 2010), the showcase genre of socialist popular music, Estrada, is still barely 
researched. The only study thus far is David MacFadyen’s trilogy Estrada in pre-Soviet (2003), Soviet 
(2001), and post-Soviet (2002) Russia. One can find popular publications in Bulgarian from the late 
socialist era on prominent Bulgarian Estrada singers, such as Lili Ivanova and Vasil Naidanov, and 
also on the state-run popular music festival “The Golden Orpheus” (Zlatniyat Orfey, Genov 1992), but 
no comprehensive study on this music genre.  
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Ibriama, who earned world fame during the post-Cold War World Music wave.12 
Both Bulgarian and Western scholars consider Papazov-Ibriama the reviver of 
chalgiia thanks to his cross-ethnic Turkish and Romani background as well as his 
unique improvisation style that he exported globally as “Balkan Jazz” in the 1990s 
and currently promotes locally as “the authentic chalga.”  
While not subscribing to the narrative of authenticity, the Bulgarian 
ethnomusicologist Claire Levy (2005, 2007) uses the generic label of ethnojazz to 
capture the post-socialist chalgiia of Pazov-Ibriama (in addition to other musicians, 
such as “Karandila” brass band and “Ikadem” jazz ensemble), which she identifies as 
an alternative site of national identity that embraces rather than rejects Balkan-
Ottoman multiethnic legacy. Levy’s approach is a very useful alternative to the 
dominant Balkanist formulation of chalga; I rely on it in the following chapters.  
I find, though, the historical link between post-socialist chalga and Ottoman 
chalgiia insufficient to understand the industrial and mass mediated version of this 
popular music genre that has carried since the late 1990s the more commercially and 
politically correct label of popfolk (see chapter 1). My fieldwork centered particularly 
on this form. I found it richer with social nuances since, in addition to traditional 
chalgia, it draws upon popular musics from other Balkan countries (including 
Turkey), Bulgarian canonic folklore, socialist Estrada, as well as global pop 
(especially Arabic shabaiya, Isreali Muzika Mizrahit, Indian Bollywood music, and 
Latin American Reggaeton). I relate briefly to the hybrid character of popfolk in 
chapter 1, though the issue of global musical circulation in Bulgaria is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. The reason is that this issue requires a different track of 
fieldwork, which centers on copyright, business networks, and media technology. I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See, for instance, Ivo Papzov and his Wedding Band on Sunday Night TV music show: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wCweFfcV7Xo, accessed October 25, 2014. 
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see this dissertation as a beginning point of a long-term research project, and therefore 
I decided to leave a more specific and thorough dealing with questions of circulation 
for the next stage of my study.  
Theoretical framework: performance studies, popular music and the nation, 
learning how to ask about chalga 
 
(i) Performance Studies 
At large, my study is located in the ethnographic paradigm of performance 
studies as formulated in linguistic anthropology and folklore. Performance studies 
scholars explore how texts and utterances get situated in actual contexts and how 
performers’ competence and responsibility to enact formal poetic cues create 
communal communication. Bauman writes, “performance calls forth special attention 
to and heightened awareness of the act of expression and gives license to the audience 
to regard the act of expression and the performer with special intensity” (1977:11). 
While centering on the interplay between acts of expression and their formal codes, 
performance scholars are interested in the capacity of heightened attention events to 
transform (or at least to suspend temporally) social structure. This capacity resides in 
the control of performer over the audience afforded “by the formal appeal of his 
performance” (ibid: 16). Turner (2001) explores the impact of expressive cultural 
forms on everyday social life by observing performance as liminal or liminoid events. 
People reflect on, negotiate, contest, and re-enforce their own social structure by 
creating ritualistic or playful sites in which they perform anti-structure. Caton (1993) 
draws upon Bakhtin and Medvedev’s (1985) concept of inner and outer orientation of 
genres to argue that essential to the aesthetic organization of expressive forms like 
Yemenite tribal oral poetry is their practical task, such as to help Yemenite tribes 
communicate with each other as well as state authorities. 
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Seizer’s (2005) analysis of the function of the word “special” in Special 
Natkam (Drama) helps me to look at quantum-like sense of uncanny in the Turkish-
derived word “chalga,” especially when often positioned in speech in reference to the 
Bulgarian-derived word narodna muizka (folklore music). This Anglo-Tamil hybrid, 
Seizer writes, “makes the term special meaning not only a floating signifier with 
myriad referential possibilities but also a nonreferential index (Silverstein 199513). 
That is, the meanings generated by using this assimilated English loan word are not 
limited to referential meanings—a special actor, a special drama, a special genre, and 
so forth, wonderfully diverse and floating as these may be—but also index the 
presence of an indulgent attitude toward the English language itself….Speshal 
Natakam thus links this form of theater to a certain idea of foreign cosmopolitanism 
as desirable, a notion first made available to Indians of a certain class through the 
advent of the British Raj” (Seizer 2005: 29).  
Chalga is not a definite foreign presence in the Bulgarian language, which is 
saturated with Turkish-derived words due to centuries of living alongside ethnic 
Turks and dealing with official matters in the Ottoman language—a hybridity of 
Turkish, Arabic and Persian. However, in a reverse manner to the word special in 
Tamil, change indexes strong anxieties about indulging in nostalgia for Ottoman 
cosmopolitanism, which both European imperial and, consequently, Bulgarian 
national modernizers have classified since the 19th century as essentially non-modern, 
uncivilized and backward. In other words, turning from narodna muzika to chalga 
indexes not closing the gap with Europe but reopening it.  
Mine is not a study of a specific music genre called chalga that has 
distinguishable aesthetic and social characteristics. Rather it is ethnography of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 “Shifters, Linguistic Categories and Cultural Description.” An earlier version (Silverstein 1976) is 
cited elsewhere in the dissertation.  
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Bulgarians who locate themselves personally vis-à-vis a discourse about Bulgarian 
liminality—that is, a post-Oriental nation-state in an ongoing attempt to catch up (i.e. 
navaksvane) with changing models of modern Europe. Chalga is the topic of this 
study because it both provokes and frames a wide field of communicative practices 
performed in direct or metaphoric references to a field of aesthetical musical sounds, 
lyrics and visuals to which people in Bulgaria point with the uncanny 
referential/nonreferential index of chalga.  
Feld and Fox (1994) invite ethnomusicologists and linguistic anthropologist to 
study music through a twofold phenomenology of voice; one voice is “as an 
embodiment of spoken and sung performance, and the other is a more metaphoric 
sense of voice as a key representational trope for social position and power” (26). 
Hanks (1987) suggests a similar perception to studying genre, which he considers a 
field of cultural production as well as a point of social orientation. I prefer discussing 
chalga as voice rather than genre for three of reasons. First, I argue that “genre” 
connotes in Bulgaria with the rational epistemology of modern Europe while chalga 
stands as an anti-genre, as suspense of rationality, which for Bulgarians means also 
lack of identity (see in detail chapter 2). Second, voice emphasizes the pragmatic 
quality of chalga, a self-reflexive speech act (Austin 1975), register (Agha 2005) or 
voice (Keane 2000) Bulgarians perform in direct reference to music but, more largely, 
in regard to a language ideology of European modernity for which Bulgaria marks the 
internal margins. This voice is self-reflexive because it keys communication, musical 
and non-musical alike, to the politics of music in contemporary Bulgaria. Third, voice 
alludes to the question of subaltern representation raised by Spivak (1988), but locates 
the context of the question not in the colonial world but within the margins of Europe. 
Hence, with utterances about chalga I uncover a sort of heteroglossia, which is 
specific to Bulgaria and, at the same time, points to a wider social experience of being 
	   27	  
quite but not completely part of the modern establishment, not being a colonial 
subaltern but also not being a European hegemony.  
Bauman and Briggs provide me with the most immediate theoretical sources 
for exploring how the self-reflexive voice of chalga emerges vis-à-vis European 
voices of modernity (particularly the discourse of Balkanism) and their politics of 
difference and unequal power. My references to Bauman and Briggs particularly build 
upon their argument that language is a third epistemological realm (additional to 
nature and society [Latour 1993]) in the European project of advancing its hegemony 
in the name of modernity (Bauman and Briggs 2003). They particularly point to the 
role of scientists and intellectuals in rationalizing language through the collection, 
classification and purification of texts according to an a-priori metadiscursive binary 
of modernity and its dialectical counterpart, tradition. Bauman and Briggs (1990) shift 
the focus from texts as objective manifestations of the essential and a-historical 
sphere of language and reason to the performance of language ideologies about 
modern vs. traditional society and nature in texts. Texts are always embedded in 
history because the performance of text enacts a triad procedure of contextualization: 
decontextualziation, recontextualization and entextualziation. That is, people claim 
power to relate self-reflexively to language ideologies in everyday life. They do so by 
poetically operating on texts thereby situating them in detachment from and/or 
alignment with other texts, which social hierarchies have canonized to represent 
genres of modern or traditional contexts.  
Politics of power comes into play in acts of alignments or detachment between 
texts and contexts comes from the fact that “[T]he process of linking particular 
utterances to generic models thus necessarily produces an intertextual gap. Although 
the creation of this hiatus is unavoidable, its relative suppression or foregrounding has 
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important effects. On the one hand, texts framed in some genres attempt to achieve 
generic transparency by minimizing the distance between texts and genres, thus 
rendering the discourse maximally interpretable through the use of generic 
precedents. This approach sustains highly conservative, traditionalizing modes of 
creating textual authority. On the other hand, maximizing and highlighting these 
intertextual gaps underlies strategies for building authority through claims of 
individual creativity and innovation (such as are common in 20th·century Western 
literature), resistance to the hegemonic structures associated with established genres, 
and other motives for distancing oneself from textual precedents” (Briggs and 
Bauman 1992: 149).  
Positioning texts and utterances in relation to chalga complicates this picture, 
due to the indexical ambiguity of chalga, its being on the borderline between 
referential and nonreferential signifier. People invoke it oftentimes to denote a context 
that is presumably known and defined. Attempts to articulate the generic rules of 
chalga reveals that Bulgarians use it metapragmatiaclly to cue that a text or utterance 
widens intertextual gaps with respective paradigmatic texts of European modernity. 
The Turkish origin of the word locates this gap with the counter-vector of the 
Bulgarian project of nation-building, navaksvane (catching up) with Europe and, at 
large, with metadiscursive anxieties of Balkanism. I show in the following chapters 
that this sense of widening the gap is invoked when people from different parts of the 
Bulgarian society do not merely digress from generic codes of modernity but create a 
sense of Balkan liminality (i.e. being Europe’s incomplete Self). The ambivalent 
process of compliance attended by sabotage referred to in the previous section takes 
place when people in Bulgaria hybridize poetic devices that canonically index 
European modernity with their own that index the opposite domain of the Orient. This 
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hybridity resembles Bakhtin’s concept of carnivalesque (1984). Yet, pragmatically, it 
is not a comic manner of relief limited to festivities but a strategy of survival, of 
domesticating superimposing macro modern powers onto the micro everyday lives of 
ordinary Bulgarians.  
My study builds on ethnomusicological and pop music studies inquiries about 
the semiotics of music sounds and non-musical meanings, such as resemblances 
between musical structures and ideational or social systems (Rice 2001), 
communicative practices involved in interpretative speech about music (Feld 2005b), 
social and aesthetical systems emerging from sonic resemblances between music and 
its surrounding ecological (Feld 2005c) or business (Negus 1999) environments, or 
the production of emotional effect by musical icons and indices (Turino 1999). I 
locate my study in particular within a body of anthropological scholarship (e.g. 
Askew 2002; Chade-Poulsen 1999; Condry 2006; Dent 2009; Fox 2004; Stokes 1992; 
White 2008) that analyzes the embeddedness of popular music in discourse and the 
ways in which language politics underlie the performance, reception and circulation 
of popular music. In the following chapters I show that classifying music performance 
as chalga has less to do with musical texts than with discursive contexts: when 
popfolk singers lip-sync (chapter 1), when pedagogues locate a contemporary animal 
tale too close to canonized folkloric songs (chapter 2), when a former villager 
celebrates a family occasion with the Gypsy dance of kiuchek in an urban bar (chapter 
3), and when festival attendants do not maintain division of labor between stage 
performers of kiuchek and being part of the audience (chapter 4). Likewise I show that 
people attempt to legitimize musical texts by changing their generic label, calling 
them popfolk rather than chalga and thus keying speech and music performance 
toward navaksvane.  
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Throughout the chapters I often relate to “iconization,” “erasure” and “fractal 
recursivity”—the three semiotic processes “by which people construct ideological 
representations of linguistic differences” (Irvine and Gal 2000: 37). These concepts 
cast light upon Balkanist anxieties that underlie Bulgarians’ classification of musical 
texts as chalga or popfolk—the caution whether an icon or index fits or does not fit 
with modern European musical genres. Holding the notion that their language 
(including music), like all other Slavic languages, is indeed located “on the threshold 
between barbarism and civilization” (ibid: 63 quoted from Müler 1855:65), people in 
Bulgaria recognize the power of words to stir movement to and from imagined 
Europe (or, more precisely, language ideologies that represent European modernity). 
Irvine and Gal write that the invention of the Balkans was a recursive act. Starting in 
the 18th century, European political figures, intellectuals and missionaries began 
imagining Western civilization by producing a contrast image of a backward orient in 
the southeastern margins of Europe (see also Bjelic and Savic 2005). Bulgarian 
nation-builders attempted to shake off this image with a language reform, specifically, 
cleansing from the language icons of recursivity—that is, Turkish-derived words—
and replacing them with either Slavic words or words borrowed from Western 
European languages.  
The nonreferential index to Turkish is what widens the intertextual gap of 
musical texts labeled as chalga with paradigmatic texts of modern music genres. This 
is also what keys the register of chalga with risk, which comes from the fact that, 
when Bulgarians utter explicitly or imply indirectly the word “chalga,” they suggest 
dissonance between musical utterances and modern social structure. They do so not 
by framing an expressive event in genre, but by calling into question the very 
existence of genre as a faculty of modern rational thought. People in Bulgaria 
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evaluate the rational quality of communication by asking whether its symbols are 
organized in genre or whether they lack genre, i.e. whether they are chalga. In regard 
to music, chalga indexes sound and visual images, which arguably have no form and 
hence do not qualify to be called music but mere noise (Atali 1985). The dichotomy, 
Atali writes, between music and noise resonate with the division of the world in 
Ancient Greece between civilization and barbarians. Greeks considered themselves 
civilized because they spoke an intelligible language. “Barbarians” is a nonreferential 
index that heightens the common sound of non-Greek languages that come to Greek 
ears as animal-like growl br-br-br.  
My analysis explores what aesthetic qualities and judgment value people 
ascribe to music in contrast with chalga. Additionally I look at the ways in which 
distinctions between “real” music and chalga aim to accomplish tasks and comment 
on actual issues in Bulgarian social life. To be a chalga performer, I argue, does not 
involve simply playing or singing music to audience; rather such a person has to 
create scenes of encounter in which people carry cultural responsibility and 
competence to suspend different Bulgarian social structures by framing musical or 
non-musical utterances as chalga.  
Observing speech act events of chalga as “scenes of encounter” highlights risk 
as a metapragmatic device of performing dual voice of transparency and gap with 
speech genres of modernity. Conceptualized by Keane (1997), “scenes of encounter” 
relates to highly stylized ritual exchange of couplets and objects that takes place in 
public between representatives of affined groups in Anakalang, Eastern Indonesia, 
and whose goal is to reaffirm group identity, authority, power and agency through the 
performance of mutual recognition. The ritualized symbolic exchange of recognition 
is intended to be stable and predictable but also to open the possibility of failure. In 
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order to be real the ritual is not only supposed to control risk but also to instigate it. 
The performance of exchange is hazardous because the formalized texts and objects 
mediate webs of iconicities that index present and past tensions, relationships and 
contingencies within Anakalang society (including the living and the dead) and 
between Ankalangese groups and the outside world, mainly Dutch colonizers and the 
Indonesian state. The emergent quality of the ritual, then, stems from the dependency 
of identity and agency in recognition and the risk that invoking those webs would end 
with failure to attain it; “[i]f a round of exchange constructs the identity of the 
transactors, and serves to recognize the other, slippage represents the possibility of 
denial and shame. Conversely, success is conceptualized not in the orderly or the 
mechanical working of reciprocity but in gamble won” (ibid: 91). 
What is most relevant to my study in “scenes of encounter” is the distinction 
Keane defines between voice and agency. He explains that voice means the 
competence as well as responsibility of negotiators to animate ritual speech, which 
stands as a symbolic alternative to fight and always carries the risk of turning into 
actual fight. Agency is performed on two levels. First, it is embedded in the ritual 
itself whose “performance structure groups together the persons in whose name the 
event takes place along with others who benefit from it, who direct it, or whose 
intentionality it mediates” (ibid: 140-141). Second, people perform agency in their 
“capacity to motivate, respond to, and resolve authoritative, recognizable actions and 
events” (ibid) that come up in regard to the ritual. Importantly, Keane stresses that, in 
contrary to the common Western view of voice and agency, Anakalangese do not 
establish locate relate them to any human individualistic subjectivity, but attribute 
them performatively to supernatural subjects. 
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Shifting the ethnographic location to Bulgaria, I argue that, as a self-reflexive 
speech act or register, chalga keys scenes of encounter to exchange of words and 
things that represent intentions, powers, authorities, interests, and persuasions about 
the liminal location of Bulgaria vis-à-vis voices of modern Europe. This exchange, I 
argue, starts from the fact that imagining music called “chalga” indexes highly 
sensitive (and oftentimes tabooed) fields of social meanings and relations that stem 
from the language ideology of modernity and its respective debate over what it means 
to catch up with Europe after the fall of socialism. The explication of these meanings 
and relations puts people at actual risk of losing face, social ties and even life. At the 
same time, invoking risks through utterances of chalga is attractive because no other 
word can heighten attention to the basic idea of shared Bulgarian sociality that 
emerges from the dialectics of evolution from the perceived Balkan margins to the 
core of Europe.  
Chalga scenes of encounter are not explicitly formulaic; they do not have 
ritualistic script and course of actions. However, being present in many such scenes, I 
learned their implicit semiotics and pragmatics of negotiation. Over the course of my 
ethnography I figured out the specific verbal and material associations with chalga 
which could heat or calm debates in particular circumstances as well as the specific 
contexts in which people can utter “chalga” explicitly or invoke it indirectly via 
metaphors, hints, avoidance, and allusions. Drawing upon my extensive experience, I 
construct the ethnographic chapters as four scenes of encounter, in which the risk of 
chalga prompts Bulgarians to negotiate with each other different aspects of social 
agency, namely political economy (chapter 1), education (chapter 2), class (chapter 
3), and ethnicity (chapter 4).  
 Locating social formation in hazardous performed scenes of encounter goes 
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against distinctions of traditional collectivity whose social life center on repetition, 
predictability and the reduction of risk vs. modern collectivity established on 
unpredictability and risk. This distinction is fundamental to the European concept of 
national folklore that represents pre-modern social life in which time was cyclical and 
organized in a unified space (this is what Bakhtin [1981] calls “pastoral” or “idyllic” 
chronotope). Giddens (1990) and Beck (1992) point to the disembodiment of time 
from space as the shift from traditional to modern future-oriented societies, which 
turned the basis of collectivity from shared predictability to shared risk. Beck calls 
modern societies “risk societies” because, above all, dealing together with 
unpredictable future constitutes the social contract.  
Using Keane’s concept of “scenes of encounter”— agency constructed via 
performances of hazard communal negotiation—I avoid associating risk with 
individualistic agency, the ideological faculty of modern European subjectivity. As I 
will discuss in chapter 1, one of the anxieties that chagla invokes is a perceived failure 
of Bulgarians to imagine themselves as a society of individuals. For Bulgarians, this 
presumed failure indexes a failure to become modern. In “real modern societies,” as 
Bulgarians tend to call Western Europe, people have emotional and material 
constitution to see collectivity of individuals. Citizens perform agency by taking risks 
and responsibility for their own actions. In Bulgaria, on the other hand, individuals 
can exist only within authoritarian collectives. The Bulgarian economic historian 
Rumen Avramov formulates this notion crudely in regard to what he considers as 
Bulgarians’ failure to adopt the individualistic value of capitalism: “Bulgarians are 
individualist when it comes out to appropriate gains or collective wealth, but they are 
fierce collectivists when the issue is distribution of losses” (2003: 6). The cultural 
ideal, he maintains, is a pseudo-individual who lives in “a risk-free, passive, non-
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innovative, egalitarian economic world” (ibid). I will relate to his observation 
particularly in the first chapter in regard to a sort of political economy that emerges in 
the production, performance, and consumption of chalga. 
The scenes of encounters in the dissertation chapters take Avramov’s notion of 
failure into consideration while complicating the link between risk and agency. 
Chalga mediates a dual risk of performance. One is a risk in the sort defined by Butler 
in regard to gender (1990), a risk of failing to perform modern European norms of 
individualistic agency. The second risk is the constructive one defined by Keane. This 
risk is embodied in rituals of communal agency, which Bulgarians call into play with 
speech acts of chalga. These rituals require of Bulgarians to explicate implicit present 
and past tensions and affinities within Bulgarian society and between Bulgaria and the 
language ideology of modern Europe.  
I link Keane’s ideas of voice and agency with Briggs’ (1996) concept of 
discursive authority. The case of chalga reveals how popular music does not only 
function as instrument for political discourse of nation building nor does it expose 
only national crises. Popular music is also a prime site for contesting the power to 
voice images of national modernity and to draw continuities or discontinuities 
between socialism and democracy. The mass mediation of popular music prompts 
society members to debate semiotic meanings, communicative practices, and 
normative codices of living in a modern nation-state. This debate is hazardous 
because it invokes longstanding tensions regarding the politics and language ideology 
of modernity that underlie metanarratives of national imagination. In the case of 
Bulgaria, chalga arouses questions of who holds the power over closing the gap 
between the Balkans and modern Europe.   
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(ii) Popular music and the nation  
Drawing upon studies of music and politics in Bulgaria,14 a nearly decade of 
research (2003-2012), as well as more than two years of ethnographic fieldwork 
(2007-2009) me to narrate present-day Bulgarian voices, which comment about the 
transformation of their nation from Soviet-style socialism to liberal democracy within 
the EU. On one hand, people tend to accept liberal democracy as the sole political 
model of national post-socialist sociality. On the other hand, they usually relate to this 
political organization as a top-down order that has replaced totalitarian socialism 
rather than as a bottom-up system of freedom. Chalga calls this ambivalence to 
attention. Oftentimes chalga keys speech to an equation of democracy with national 
decay. By this I mean that people give chalga as an example of how democracy led to 
the collapse of the regime of values between public and private, high and low, and 
explicit and implicit. Ironically, by expressing such opinions openly in public and 
over mass media, people consciously exercise their democratic right to criticize, not 
only to hail, the new political order (which they could not do before 1989). This dual 
approach to chalga prompts me, then, to explore how Bulgarians envision local 
democracy when claiming that their nation, unfortunately, has no capabilities to 
develop grassroots democratic culture, according to Western standards.   
 Edward Said’s two methodological devices of “strategic location” and 
“strategic formation” (1979: 20) allow me to develop a critical perspective that avoids 
essentializing any particular formulation of West against the Orient in regard to 
chalga, on one hand, but also takes the “Balkanism” into account, on the other. The 
ethnographic support for this critical perspective comes from Michael Herzfeld 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Buchanan (2006, 2007, 1996), Dimov (2001), Gaitandzhiev (1990), Kraev et al. (1999), Kurkela 
(2007, 1997), Levy (2007, 2005, 2002), Peicheva (2008, 1999), Rice (2002, 1996, 1994), Silverman 
(2012, 2007, 1996), Statelova (2003, 1993) and others. 
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(1989) who finds in the discourse of modern Greece—another post-Ottoman Balkan 
nation-state—the anthropological self-reflexive perspective in which marginality 
functions as a looking glass at the dialectical conflict between “the exotic” (or 
“primordial”) and “the modern European.” This dialectics is basic to Bulgarians’ 
experience of chalga as failed democracy. At the same time, chalga provides 
Bulgarians with exclusive communicative means of domesticating democracy, both 
sabotaging and accepting this top-down order, thereby negotiating local terms of 
European integration as agents rather than as inferior objects of Western power.  
 
The questions animating this study began developing long time ago, many 
years before I knew anything about Bulgaria. I am first generation born in a recently 
founded country of post-holocaust immigrants, Israel. Since early age, my being-in-
the world was cultivated with Hebrew-speaking pop music (mainly rock), which, as I 
understood later, mediated to me and to my social environment a language ideology 
of modern Israeli nation that erased our families’ recent memories of dislocated 
Jewish refugees. Thus, I discovered only as a mature adult other musical cultures in 
Israel, above all Jewish liturgy, Romanian music—my parents’ place of origin, and 
Arab music of the native population of my town (and country) whose existence I was 
trained to ignore. On the other hand, “my music,” the music that represented my self 
and my social surrounding (Turino 2008), replicated what was going on in the “true” 
land of pop music, the US and Western Europe. As an adolescent I was absolutely 
sure that Hebrew-speaking Western-style pop was the most “authentic” Israeli culture. 
I listened to English speaking popular music, but I took it for granted that US-UK 
English speaking pop was the universal standard of any local popular music. I bought 
LPs, collected posters of Israeli music stars, went to rock concerts and listened to top 
chart radio shows. To me Kaveret and Tamuz were as important as the Beatles and the 
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Rolling Stones. There were Hebrew-speaking popular musics of other Israelis (or 
more precisely, Israeli Others). Most prominent was a Hassidic music that hybridized 
Jewish klezmer and American folk-pop. Additionally there was music that had no 
defined generic name but sounded and looked like a mishmash of oriental musics 
between the Arab world and Greece. Religious pop seemed ridiculous and harmless to 
the environment that shaped me as well as to myself; the oriental one was more 
intimidating. It had commercial life of modern pop but aesthetics of the Middle East. 
My Western musical environment completely dominated the national public sphere so 
we could learn how not to pay attention to oriental musics. I did not know then that 
the Israeli popular music to which I listened was part of the nation-building project 
(Regev and Seroussi 2004). Created by the cultural Ashkenazi (Jew from European 
countries) establishment it was aimed to mediate that Israel was a modern nation part 
of the global Occident thereby silencing the majority of Sepharadim (Jews from the 
Muslim or post-Ottoman world) whose music reminded the inconvenient truth about 
the location of the newborn country within the Arab Orient (Saada-Ophir 2006).  
The change of the Israeli musical climate in the 1980s announced most 
prominently that something had changed in the country (e.g. Horowitz 2010). This 
“oriental” music suddenly received public attention. The media began covering the 
emergence of oriental music stars defining them generically as belonging to “central 
bus station music” or “cassettes music” (allusion to the liminality of its media and site 
of dissemination). The talk about oriental music expressed worries about the 
musicians’ perceived low quality but greater commercial popularity than any of my 
“normal” pop music star. That was the first time I understood that I felt at home with 
my surrounding musical culture, because I was a product of the Ashkenazi 
establishment of the nation that marginalized the Sepharadim as well all other Jews 
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who did not come from Europe. Being part of the establishment meant that our 
segment of the Israeli nation ruled the discourse of genre. Pop music fits with our 
Western-oriented perception of what it meant to be modern. The emergence of what 
became known as Israeli Oriental or Mediterranean music signaled to me that this 
establishment was not so powerful anymore. This understanding prompted me to 
begin dealing with my own feeling of being at home, including the inferior position of 
Romanian Jews within the Ashkenazi establishment. The political implications of this 
musical change were explicit. The music I grew up on propagated the secularist ethos 
of the nation’s founders; Oriental music was associated with the neo-traditional 
Zionist ideology of the rightwing party that became the political home of all those 
who felt rejected by the Ashkenazi establishment. Reflecting back on this Oriental 
music, I realize that it was not completely different in style from my Israeli music. I 
received Oriental music as the Other because, as a field of cultural production, it 
developed outside the cultural discourse of the Ashkenazi establishment. Even at the 
time of the Oriental music revolution, most singers still sought recognition though 
assimilation. For instance, the emblematic star, Zohar Orkabi erased his Yemenite 
origin by taking the Russian-sounding family name of Argov. Shimshon Tawil 
became “a pure” Hebrew by turning into Shimi Tavori. Even a more recent star like 
Eyal Biton preferred to take his mother’s maiden name, Golan, to access more easily 
the mainstream.  
Musical memories from my Israeli past came back to me when I read 
Ventsislav Dimov’s simile of quantum, that is, chalga being simultaneously 
everywhere and nowhere. Especially after developing in person dialogue with this 
Bulgarian music scholar, whose investigations aim at deconstructing self-
consciousness formed by the socialist language ideology, I understood that his 
	   40	  
uncanny feeling of chalga’s absence-presence was indeed a product of a political 
change which threw him to the realm of experience of being “out of home.”  
To complicate the story, I tried to reconstruct my sense of home, my feeling of 
being at home, by familiarizing myself with Israeli Oriental music. To provincialize 
my European musical indoctrination I went to study the music of the Orient (the 
Mediterranean, The Muslim world, and India). Again, this decision was political not 
less than cultural. I did not believe anymore in the socialist Zionist ideology on which 
I was brought up. I went further to the political left seeking a post-Zionist Israeli 
immersion in the Middle East. This path introduced me to a popular Jewish liturgical 
tradition (called piyyutim), particularly of Jerusalem Jews whose origins was in 
Aleppo, Syria. I learned this musical tradition with a tutor from this community and 
attended synagogue musical gatherings. Gradually, I learned that its musical 
repertoire consisted entirely of covers from the classical era of Arab popular music 
(1920s-late 1960s), mainly from Egypt. The genre of piyyutim was invented still in 
the Arab lands. Community elders wanted to keep young men from violating the 
Sabbath by going out Friday night to Arabs’ coffeehouses, so they decided to bring 
coffeehouse music to the community. I learned this music genre in the way every 
member of that community accessed it; I listened to the Arabic original songs and 
learned how to imitate the singing with the Hebrew lyrics. People knew Arabic 
originals by heart and always judged each other’s performance in regard to the Arab 
model singers (Umm Kulthum, Abd al-Wahab, Farid al-Atrash, Abd al-Halim Khafiz 
etc.). In recorded and live performance, though, people were careful never to sing in 
Arabic, but only the liturgical Hebrew translation. Singing in Arabic was completely 
inappropriate. On one occasion a professional paytan (singer of piyyutim) who was 
performing in a concert was so drawn by the excitement of his singing (the Arab term 
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for musical excitement is tarab, enchantment, e.g. Shannon 2009) that he violated this 
unwritten rule and turned to sing the Arab original on stage. The audience 
immediately recognized the reference and reacted with such great anger that the 
singer had to apologize for his act publically and receive the pardon of the major 
Rabbi of Israeli Sepharadim. Looking back at this incident I understand that 
especially because Jews from Muslim societies had not erased the strong cultural ties 
of Jewish Israel with the Muslim Arab world, they were much more aware of the 
language ideology of Zionism in regard to which they stood ran the risk of feeling 
uncanny, being “out of home.”  
Going in further detail into this experience is too much beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. A study of the politics of Israeli music, especially piyyutim, will have 
to wait for another time. I brought it up because these two musical memories from 
Israel guided my research journey in Bulgaria as well as the writing process. My 
personal and communal sense of being a modern Israeli emerged from my 
communication with music culture whose politics and language ideology were 
invisible to me until I began deconstructing my own feeling of home. More precisely, 
my way to feel “out of home” in Israel came from deciphering the politics and 
language ideology of the musics on which I was brought up. I failed reconstructing 
my sense of home when I confronted the politics and language ideology of my 
adopted Oriental music. The same analytical operation I do with chalga. I ask how my 
research subjects deconstruct and reconstruct their personal and communal sense of 
being modern Bulgarians by debating the politics and language ideology of an “out of 
home” musical phenomenon, which they connect through the register of chalga with 
the discourse of navaksvane with modern Europe, and more immediately, with the 
transition from Soviet to Euro-American political systems.   
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My ethnography is informed by scholars who investigate the special role of 
seemingly non-political popular music in mediating modernity formation as well as 
modernity crisis (or at least cracks) in national societies in the margins of “modern 
Europe.” In this sense I go beyond the paradigm of East and West and look at the 
Balkanist case of Bulgaria as part of a larger experience of being on the playfield 
between competing hegemonies of modernity. A common trope of such studies is 
that, throughout the second half of the 20th and early 21st centuries, popular music has 
indexed similar dialectics of modern globality and locality (or authenticity, essence or 
roots). First name Condry’s (2006) study of Japanese hip-hop reveals the forces that 
taking part in the formation of Japanese glocalization. Applying his 
phenomenological approach to the context of my study (particularly in chapter 1), I 
explore through chalga the global and local political forces that have shaped 
Bulgarian nation building and subject formation. Indices of locality vary from Slavic 
and Turkish-derived words to poetic references to religious, ethnic, and traditional 
practices; globality is performed through instruments and images used in Western 
musics as well as Western idioms of musical performance and reception. Not less 
importantly, mass media and commercial means of production, consumption and 
circulation are essential markers of participation in one of the two forms of post-
WWII modern economy: liberal capitalism and etatist socialism.  
Danielson (1998) helps me link voice and nation building. Her study shows 
how Umm Kulthum and a circle of Egyptian music modernizers hybridized the 
Egyptian asil (root) culture (Quranic recitation, village songs, Arab classical poetry, 
and modal [maqamat] Tarab music) with modern European idioms of musical 
performance (stage concerts, films, radio broadcasts, studio recorded LPs, Western 
instruments, and formal European outfit). The popularity of this hybrid music went 
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beyond musical fandom. Egyptian nationalists saw in it the image of a post-colonial 
nation-state, whose citizens’ consciousness emerges from the tie between the 
traditional Muslim village and the modern secular city. Gamal Abd al-Nassir, the 
leader of the republican revolution appropriated Umm Kulthum to propagate a vision 
of Egypt as a leader of a pan-Arab socialist nationalism, a modern version of Muslim 
Arab empires. Nassir’s political program collapsed after Egypt’s defeat by Israel in 
1967. Nevertheless almost 40 years after her death, Egyptians still relate to Umm 
Kulthum’s music as the core of their national imagination. Danielson’s star-centered 
approach is implicit in the first chapter. However, I shift the analytical focus from 
voice as a representation of authenticity (like Umm Kulthum) to voice as a device of 
performative personality—a discourse of self that comes into being through 
interaction with other people and in regard to relevant ideologies of selfhood.  
White (2008) presents a case in which the Rumba music scene in Zaire, which 
emerged through hybridity of village music, urban and global pop music, provided 
Mobutu Sese Seko with a powerful venue to establish his narrative of nationhood 
based on his paternal authority. Creating a network of financial patronage over singers 
and bandleaders, Mobutu instrumentalized musicians’ ability to reach diverse and 
dispersed groups in order to implement his populist policy of animation politique—a 
system of mobilizing masses through dancing in music concerts funded by the state. 
This study is highly relevant to the case of chalga from two aspects. First, in the early 
post-socialist period, chalga denoted sounds that entered to the vacuum left by the 
socialist realist versions of political mobilization through music: folklore and Estrada 
(socialist pop). After the 2009 general election that brought Boiko Borisov to power 
Bulgarians who opposed him blamed his government for selling its neoliberal populist 
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rhetoric by “stupefying” the people with chalga. I will relate to this perception 
specifically in the conclusions.  
Music mediates national crisis or cracks, for instance, in Stokes’ (2010) study 
of how three popular music personalities (Zeki Müren in the 1950s, Orhan Gencebay 
in the 1970s-1980s, and Sezen Aksu since the 1990s) created sites of cultural 
intimacy, or more precisely love, with symbols and tropes erased from Turkish public 
culture. Particularly arabesk music (Stokes 1992)—a hybridity of Turkish folklore, 
Egyptian popular music and Western pop—created a vernacular public sphere that 
drew upon the modernist principles of Kemalism (secularism, republicanism, 
nationalism, revolutionism, etatism) but without the language of evolution of official 
Kemalism thereby exposing the politics of power and difference implicit in 
Kemalism’s rational positivism. Three perspectives of cultural intimacy language help 
Stokes to capture a popular musical voice that does not correlate with its equivalent 
political one. This voice is equally personal and national, subjective and communal, 
not an obvious nexus to Bulgarians (see the previous section).  
Stokes links musical hybridity to sentimentality which nation-state secularized 
thereby turning it into an “unwarranted discourse” (Brathes 1979) spoken by 
uncountable number of people by warranted by no one; “it is disparaged, or derided 
by them, severed from authority but also the mechanisms of authority (sciences, 
techniques, arts)” (ibid: 1, quoted from Stokes 2010: 32). Barthes writes that by this 
reversal of values to the secular rational language of the nation-state “it is 
sentimentality that today constitutes love’s obscenity (Barthes 1977: 175)” (ibid). 
Berlant and Warner (1998) provide Stokes a second perspective to the social economy 
of cultural intimacy; who marginalizes affect, how, and to what ends. They argue that 
intimacy is not a private space outside the realm of the public but a realm through 
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which hegemonic heteronormative public establishes itself. This is the role, for 
instance, the heterosexual nucleus family plays for the nation; “[N]ational 
heterosexuality is the mechanism by which a core national culture can be imagined as 
a sanitized space of sentimental feeling and immaculate behavior, a space of pure 
citizenship” (ibid 549). Debates around popular music, then, are vantage point for 
Stokes to the “wide currents of anxiety that surround intimacy, the ever-intensifying 
efforts to secure its meanings and repetitious evocation of threats to it” (Stokes 2010: 
37). The third perspective to cultural intimacy is Herzfeld’s (1997) “community of the 
flawed,” or “communal dirty laundry.” That is, “aspects of social identity that are 
considered source of external embarrassment but that nevertheless provide insiders 
with their assurance of common sociality…”(ibid: 3). Embarrassment and rueful self-
recognition— Herzfled’s key markers of cultural intimacy—are particularly relevant 
to the case of arabesk. They prompt its prime inventor, Orhan Gencebay, to perform 
this music but to struggle to change its generic name to a more “respectable” one. 
Stokes’ threefold concept of intimacy is central to chapter 3. Shifting the ethnographic 
focus from music performers to the post-socialist class of urbanized peasants—above 
all a fruit and vegetable street vendor named Veselin Karchinski—I show how chalga 
frames zones of intimacy in which people communicate a sense of communal failure 
to live up to the official ideals of Western-style national modernity. This sense of 
failure is so painful that any intimate communication exposes individuals to very high 
personal risks.  
Dent’s (2009) study of country music in Brazil argues that cultural intimacy is 
not a space of communal digression from global modernity to a primordial locality 
but a performative voice with which nation-state members negotiate their place in 
history, such as Brazilian rural and urban identities in the post-dictatorial era of 
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neoliberal democracy. Dent explains that people in Brazil sometimes express 
embarrassment of country sometimes because of its rural poetics that do not fit with 
national ideology of urban progress mostly represented by samba, sometimes they 
deem it unseemly for men to wail about love, and sometimes because people judge 
the music as too much imitating the American global hegemon. “But at other 
moments, Música sertaneja (the more commercial Nashville-style country e.l) 
becomes the single truest and most perfect encapsulation of the Brazilian “heart” 
(coração)” (ibid: 12). In other words, country hybridity mediates experience of 
neolibralism, which does not appear in economic or political discourses, as the music 
allows people comment upon the economic and social changes since the return of 
democracy. The embarrassment of ruralty that comes up from this mediation indicates 
that free, despite neoliberal promises of freedom, free market has not freed Brazilians 
from the long-standing national preoccupation with class divisions “marked along 
financial, racial and gender lines” (Dent 2009: 241). Dent concludes that studying the 
performativity of cultural intimacy means to analyze shame and embarrassment as 
modes of self-identification enabled by particular genres that key self-identification to 
a world beyond those genres. “In order to address the experience of accountability to 
the audience inherent in all human interaction (including rueful communal self-
recognition e.l), participants must make use of structures of voicing grounded in 
locally instantiated horizons of communicative practices (Hanks 1996). These 
horizons are crosscut by generic possibilities that carry with them incumbent role-
inhabitances” (ibid: 13). Dent’s approach to intimacy is particularly relevant to 
chapter 3, in which I discuss how, by cuing his chalga utterances with shame 
countered with affinity, Veselin Karchinski and his social environment domesticate 
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the refashioning of the post-socialist social base from national peasantry to globalized 
ethnicity. 
(iii) Methodological considerations: learning how to ask (Briggs 1986) about 
chalga  
 
 Stemming from the risk involved in the chalga register, I had to be very 
cautious how and when to invoke it in my ethnographic scenes of encounter. 
Questions crucial to conducting ethnography of such a sensitive topic as chagla were 
where to locate my research sites, how to discuss chalga with my Bulgarian 
interlocutors, how to explore it over the media, and how to access the chalga 
production, performance, and media circles. The first question, the question of 
location is, of course, essential to ethnographers of media who trace the flow of 
localities over virtual world systems (e.g. Ginsburg et al. 2002). What I found special 
in chalga is that Bulgarians use it as a device of orientation in their post-socialist 
social landscape organized around the same discursive binaries that define the 
socialist period (Buchanan 2006: 8), such as European vs. “Oriental,” modern vs. 
traditional, urban vs. rural, homogeneous vs. multiethnic, classless vs. class, consumer 
vs. producer, elitist vs. populist, authentic vs. hybrid etc. Historically, chalga strikes 
Bulgarians with the loss of the state’s capability to fit the actual cultural landscape to 
the official vision and genres of cultural purity.  
 Back to Catherine Verdery’s question of “What was Socialism and What come 
next” I ask, has chalga destroyed Bulgarian post-socialist locality by “orientalizing” it 
(as most local intellectuals maintain), or has chalga democratized this locality by 
making it more inclusive? Also, what does chalga indicate about the traditional 
tendency of Bulgarian society to rely on top-down paternalist hierarchies? During the 
first decade after the democratic changes, Bulgarian intellectuals traced the new 
national locality in reference and/or analogy to the locus of chalga. The journalist 
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Martin Karbovski (1999), for instance, describes Bulgaria as “chalgaria”—a land of 
lost “civilized” locality transformed into a barbarous terrain. The literary scholar 
Aleksandar Kiossev (2002) identifies in chalga the return of schizophrenic “homo 
Balkanikus,” which socialism failed to integrate (i.e. to “civilize,” “modernize,” 
“Europeanize”). Dimov (2001) attempts to imagine through chalga Bulgarian locality 
with no clear organic basis. Chalga reminds him of many festive and mundane 
practices of Bulgarian local life, at the same time as its mediated character breaks the 
familiarity with an unattainable notion of a globalized world. Different approaches 
come from US scholars, who identify in chalga either neo-Ottoman cosmopolitanism 
(Buchanan 2007) or attenuated nationalism (Rice 2002). I will illuminate a less 
discussed aspect of this academic discourse; that is, through chalga Bulgarians 
experience modernity not as a defined locus but as competing ideologies of location 
that prescribe them different paths of moving from the Balkans margins to different 
European centers (Berlin during WWI and WWII, Moscow during the Russo-
Ottoman war and the Cold War, EU Brussels after 1989 etc.).  
 Location takes more corporal articulations in definitions of chalga as a 
lowbrow culture locate. Following Bakhtin (1984), Kraev et al. (1999: 20) and 
Statelova (2003), for instance, relate it metaphorically at the lower stratum of the 
social body associating it with carnal pleasures in contrary to intellectual pleasures of 
modern art forms. Following this perception, Bulgarians usually associate this music 
with the Balkan tavern (zavedenie, kruchma)—establishment for social drinking and 
eating—in which Bulgarians can cast off restrains of modernity and socialize in an 
intimate Balkan manner (see chapter 3). My methodological decision was to 
illuminate the ideological underpinnings of location by not looking for chalga in any 
particular space, but exploring the multiple perspectives to the regional and global 
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location of post-socialist Bulgaria from different associations of chalga with place. I 
explored the discourse of place that emerges from the interplay between chalga texts, 
performances, economy, and reception. Specifically I examined how designations of 
chalga in space and speech helped interlocutors to explain how democracy has both 
changed and maintained existing divisions of public and intimate communications. I 
found, for instance, that people defined their intimate space according to where they 
would listen to chalga with pleasure, while public space was defined as places where 
listening to musics associated with chalga would cause irritation and embarrassment, 
like in school class (chapter 2), high class neighborhood (chapter 3) or outside the 
ethnic Gypsy ghetto (chapter 4). People within the popfolk media and music industry 
commonly protected their modern dignity by elaborating an opposite division 
between modern European and intimate Balkan spaces. They were professionally 
engaged with producing audio and visual images that connote with chalga but utterly 
disclaimed it as a matter of personal taste. Even popfolk performers testified that they 
performed this music because this was what the audience demanded, but by no means 
they would listen to it for fun, but to more “sophisticated” pop genres like Greek, 
Turkish, or Serbian pop or American R’n’B.  
 The second question—how to communicate chalga with interlocutors—stems 
from the question of location and power, particularly (but not limited to), the ways 
people define through chalga intimate Balkan and modern European spaces. To 
address this question, I had to learn idiomatic codes of Bulgarian modern and intimate 
communication. For instance, in my pre-dissertation fieldwork I paid attention that 
people became very suspicious when they saw me recording speech or taking notes. 
In some cases people refused to speak; others limited their speech to basic clichés 
about chalga (it is crude, cheap, and kitsch music. This is not a Bulgarian music, “I 
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never listen to chalga” etc.). Gerald Creed (1997) explains this reaction as a defense 
mechanism against the police state that monitored the citizens in attempt to catch 
subversive speech. His methodological solution worked for me very well. Like Creed, 
I trained my memory to retain field data without relying on any external device. 
Assuming that my mind was intuitively tuned to registering relevant information, I 
maintained a methodological separation between reflection and documentation. I 
reflected upon my actions in real-time. Not to forget details I used to find an 
opportunity to write a few words in my notepad. After returning from an intensive 
field experience I used to take some rest in order to let the memory sink in. On the 
following day I used to transfer the data from my memory to my journal. To reduce 
mental control in favor of an associative and introspective stream of consciousness, I 
always sat in a public place, usually a café, and handwrote my memories in Hebrew 
(my native language). Journal writing sessions usually took 3-4 hours.  
I found that people felt more comfortable with non-verbal documentation. In 
particular, my camera was an effective documentation tool. Chalga is a mediated 
form, which highlights visuality not less than sound. Going to the field with DSLR 
designated for me a role in chalga’s field of cultural production. I could record small 
visual details with it. Documenting with my camera led to a job offer as a stills 
photographer in one of the popfolk record labels. This role allowed me to shoot 
pictures in most sensitive situations and use my camera as an ethnographic recording 
device. My pictures were also effective prompts when discussing chalga with my 
informants. I learned, for instance, what kind of visual depictions of singers were 
attractive or unattractive to the audience, which pictures were sensitive, which ones I 
could give to my colleagues as souvenirs, and which pictures I had to keep to myself. 
My communication with Iordan, A Roma-rights activist, over pictures of the audience 
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in a Romani music festival called Romfest (chapter 4) is the only case in the 
dissertation, in which I discuss my visual ethnography. Otherwise, this experience 
remains implicit in my analysis. A more in-depth discussion of my photographer-
ethnographer work will wait for the next incarnation of this project.  
Another issue that remains mostly implicit in my study is that to earn my 
interlocutors’ trust I had also to avoid formal interviews, which, as I was told, people 
associate with police interrogation and the socialist secret services. Spending a few 
weeks in a popfolk radio station I saw how cautious studio guests were when 
speaking on-air. The difference between formal and informal speech was pretty 
significant, both in terms of content (how far one would be ready to go away from the 
common derogatory narrative of chalga) and poetics (standard vs. dialect Bulgarian, 
crude vs. educated lexicon). I established a close relationship with a PR person in the 
popfolk record label where I worked, who told me that singers, backstage 
professionals, the media, and the audience relate to interviews about chalga only as 
advertisement texts; they never expect them to mediate real or sincere information. 
This PR person explained to me how she used to prepare singers for interviews by 
dictating to them answers, which they had to learn almost by heart. Customarily, she 
used to speak in first person instead of singers for interviews published in print. 
My way of avoiding formal interviews was, first, never to initiate contact with 
potential field informants. I always asked people, who already trusted me, to 
introduce me and guarantee that I was not going to abuse any piece of information. 
Then, I avoided handling one-on-one meetings in form of question-answer about 
chalga but developed an open-ended unfocused conversation. The flow of 
conversation usually indicated the sort of engagement with chalga people were ready 
to express, which oftentimes was different from what I would expect. For instance, 
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the common stereotype of popfolk lyrics writers is that they write songs en masse as a 
matter of fact (i.e. in 5 minutes on a napkin) by relating always to the same topics 
(such as love, material goods, and entertainment) with a poor colloquial vocabulary. 
Despite my undeniable temptation I avoided raising this stereotype with a prominent 
popfolk lyrics writer (who is also a publishing poet) with whom I held a few café 
meetings. Instead, we talked about the professional life in the music firms. Gradually 
our discussions developed toward the practice of song writing. This poet revealed to 
me that she used to spend substantial time in web forums following young 
Bulgarians’ discourse, learning how to address their topics of interest with the right 
words and expressions. Another piece of information that this poet disclosed to me 
was about an intimate feminine rapport she had for a few years with one popfolk 
singer. Many hours of personal conversations between these two women led to a 
series of love hits, which built the singer’s stardom. 
My emphasis on informal conversation is visible in all the chapters. 
Particularly chapter 2 and chapter 3 are centered on two informants (Gencho 
Gaitandzhiev and Vesko Karchinski, respectively) with whom my communication 
went beyond ethnographic interests. My close relationship with these two Bulgarians 
allowed me to hold question-answer sessions with them, in which I was more their 
cultural disciple than interviewer. In general, my ethnographic narratives very rarely 
depict voices attained in formal interviews. I tailored my authorial voice from 
encounters between my own perspective and perspectives of people with whom I 
traveled, met on the road, or met for a few unstructured conversations.  
The third question— how to explore chalga over the media—helped me to pay 
close attention to two separate yet intersecting worlds of the popfolk music and the 
register of chalga. It was fairly easy to follow the popfolk music scene since it is fairly 
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small and formalized in gigs (chapter 1). Popfolk media consists of four record labels 
(Payner, Ara Music, Diapason Records, and Sunny Music), two TV stations (Planeta 
Televizia and Fen TV), two nationwide radio stations (Radio Veselina, Radio 
Veronika) in addition to regional ones (in Sofia, for instance, Radio Signal+ [1993-
2011] and Radio Romantika; Ultra in southwestern provinces), one print magazine 
(Nov Folk [1998-2013]), “Folk” newspaper sections (e.g. Weekend and Noshten trud), 
and a number of websites. Non-generic media in principle does not broadcast popfolk 
songs. “Everything but chalga” is the unwritten code of “mainstream” TV and radio 
channels. On the other hand, I witnessed during my fieldwork that popfolk singers-
celebrities have increasingly become essential component of entertainment shows and 
magazine items (for instance Azis’ picture on the front page of “Beauty Coiffure” 
magazine, figure 1). Slavi Trifonov exceptionally has a dual media life of a popfolk 
singer and a nationwide media persona holding his late-night talk show “Slavi’s 
Show” (Shouto na Slavi, bTV) since 2000 (see chapter 2). Azis also had for a couple 
of years a failed attempt to hold a similar TV talk show (Azis’ Evening Show, TV2).  
Exploring chalga on the non-generic popfolk media was a more difficult task 
since it is deeply embedded in the large media discourse of Bulgarian post-socialist 
democracy. Periodically I could observe news items with direct reference to chalga, 
usually scandalous news items about the malfunctioning of Bulgarian democracy. 
Following newspapers and magazines on daily basis provided me with rich 
ethnographic material. One such scandal is at the center of chapter 2. More often I 
used to encounter media references to chalga as short ephemeral comments, jokes, 
and epithets. Building semiotic fluency of chlaga’s related discourse helped me 
identify indirect references, which aimed at provoking negative reactions by relating 
to problems Bulgarians associate symptomatically with the music (such as artificial 
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capitalism [chapter 1], corruption [chapter 2], class segregation [chapter 3] and ethnic 
discrimination [chapter 4]) without violating the current language ideology of 
European modernity.   
Finally, I knew that resolving the fourth question of how to access chalga’s 
production, performance, and media circles was most crucial for my research. It 
aimed to provide me with an alternative point of view to the dominant public voice in 
Buglaria, which, from its modern position, classifies this music as the antonym of 
European nationality, culture, civil society, progress, in short essentially backward 
Balkan. The result of this discourse is that chalga backstage professionals as well as 
performers are extremely suspicious and distrustful especially of academics and 
journalists, whom they immediately perceive as haughty and sensation seekers 
(respectively).  
I defined a couple of strategies of overcoming such suspicions. Firstly, the rule 
of not initiating contacts independently had to be stricter in this context. I developed 
connections incrementally, being careful not to show too much excitement (in other 
words, not to disclose that I was a diehard chalga fan). In a few cases, people 
distanced themselves from me when I was too eager to widen my connection network. 
On the other hand, my need to be patient and careful with initating contacts was an 
invaluable point of self-reflection. Secondly, to develop relationships of long-term 
trust I offered communications on the basis of  “favor-for-favor” (usluga za usluga). 
My initial idea was to provide writing and translation jobs, which I did a few times. 
As I mentioned above, having DSLR camera was more effective; without planning I 
found an access to chalga’s field of cultural production when I was invited to work 
(for money or barter) as a stills photographer. This role was extremely powerful. 
Being a hired observer made sense of my presence on video clip shooting sets, 
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recoding studios, clubs, public gatherins, and conerts. Chapter 4 narrates my 
ethnographic observations which I experienced as the photographer of Romfest 2008 
(chapter 4). My camera also gave me license to move freely between different social 
spaces (such as chalga and popfolk, private and public, and the stage and the 
audience). For instance, the role of popfolk photographer allowed me to take pictures 
in music clubs, which oftentimes host semi-criminal audiences. I was usually 
instructed ahead of time about the sections of the club I should avoid photographing. 
Such instructions led to developing internal information about the business and 
political ties of the popfolk network. I could also develop new connections with 
people whose trust I earned by emailing them files with their pictures. The mediation 
of camera in my communications was for me an invaluable resource of self-reflection 
on my position as a modern academic ethnographer. As I mentioned above, my 
reflections are embedded in my analysis.  
 Overview of the dissertation chapters 
The first chapter is titled “The Same Thing but Totally Different: Marta and 
Reni Performing Artificial Popfolk Star Personage.” I analyze how two singers, Marta 
and Reni, perform personage of popfolk star with poetic devices of artificiality, 
particularly lip-syncing. Artificiality, I argue, has two opposing indexical values: 
fakeness and authenticity. As a key of fakeness, it invokes nostalgia to a lost socialist 
modern culture. As a key of authenticity, it recontextualizes this culture in the current 
political order. Singers perform artificiality to communicate to the audience that they 
are real pop stars. They are tied with network of dependency to record label of other 
business sponsors, called shefs.  
In the second chapter, titled ““I Beg Your Pardon, My Children are Learning This:” 
Bulgarian intellectuals Legislating and/or Interpreting Chalga” I discuss a public 
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scandal over musical textbook for 3rd graders, which was allegedly “contaminated” 
with chalga. The head author of the textbook, Gencho Gaitandzhiev, attempted to 
cultivate pluralistic consciousness, which would tolerate multiple and even 
contradicting meanings. Without intending, he ended up inviting the wrath of 
academics and journalists and ultimately prompting the publisher to stop the textbook. 
Analyzing a few scenes of encounter that revolved around the musical textbook, I 
explore how Bulgarian intellectuals recontextualize in democracy the role of socialist 
intellectuals: the cultural legislators and safeguards of the regimes language ideology 
of modernity.  
In the third chapter, “Marina’s Prom, or the Hazards of Dancing Kiuchek,” I 
turn to the dialectical counterpart of the intellectual elite: Bulgaria’s social base, the 
narod. I ask how non-elite Bulgarians both reject and reaffirm the socialist discourse 
of evolution from traditional peasantry to modern urbanity when negotiating what 
they see as hazards of modernity corruption and pseudo-modernity. At the center of 
the chapter stands Veselin Karchinski, a native of the village of Goritsa and current 
resident of Sofia. I explore how he negotiates his inferior class position as an 
“urbanized peasant” with expressions of shame and affinity with chalga. Associating 
chalga with urbanized peasants is a common discursive device of protesting against 
the alleged devolutionary course of the society—modern Bulgaria devolves into a 
traditional village. Chalga is formulated as an antithetic indicator of corrupted 
peasantry; people who listen to this music in the city run the risk of being marked not 
just as peasants (selyani), but even worse as Gypsies. 
The fourth and closing ethnographic chapter, titled “Romfest 2008: Between 
Ethnic Assimilation and Multi-Ethnicity” analyzes how Bulgarian-Roma perform the 
stereotypical category of Gypsy kiuchek when seeking ethnic recognition, on one 
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hand, and simultaneously disclaiming it when seeking communal access to the 
Bulgarian nation. My scenes of encounter are related to Romfest, a national festival 
for Romani music and dance, which I attended in 2008 as the festival’s photographer. 
I analyze the dilemma of the festival organizers, who were all assimilated Roma-
rights activists. On one hand, they avoided associating the festival with Gypsy 
kiuchek in order to maintain the modern framing of the event. On the other hand, they 
centered the festival on kiuchek performances because, for them, it was the most 
effective medium of breaking the segregated walls of the Gypsy ghetto. In avoiding 
associations with chalga they sought the endorsement, funding, and support of the 
nation-state, which, on its behalf, does not recognize Romani ethnicity as a political 
category and prompts Romani integration only through assimilation in the Bulgarian 
majority. At the same time, the organizers marginalized the festival from the public 
eye in order to make it attractive to Roma people, who presumably would not gather 
in a public event unless it includes kiuchek. 
The conclusive chapter—“Democracy or the Return of Paternalistic 
Populism?”—outlines an imagination of democracy, which I witnessed in chalga 
music before it arrived to the official political field. My fieldwork has informed me 
that Bulgarians can tolerate chalga voices if they are subjected to paternalist musical 
figures, who would impose the language ideology of modernity when performers and 
audiences digress too much into performance of Balkan liminality. In the same 
manner I found throughout my research that ordinary Bulgarians seek a paternalist 
leader, who can communicate with Bulgarians on an intimate level but is powerful 
enough to impose on Bulgarians hegemonic norms and practices of European 
modernity. The expectation of such leader is not exclusive to democracy. It has 
defined the local political scene since the foundation of nation-state Bulgaria. What is 
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special to the contemporary era is the cultural formulation of such leadership, which I 
define as paternalistic populism. This definition goes back to the semi-parodic news 
report with which I opened the introduction, specifically the “holy trinity” of the 
chalga stars Azis and Slavi Trifonov and the political leader Boyko Borisov. What I 
learned from chagla is the reason plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose (“the more 
things change, the more they stay the same”) is my answer to Katherine Verdery’s 
question—what was socialism and what comes next?. Throughout an almost decade 
of researching this reflexive speech act about music, I realized that people in Bulgaria 
expect of functioning democracy to be guided from above by an authoritarian boss 
(shef), who knows how to anticipate the popular will, how to ally with bigger and 
external forces in order to overcome the society’s marginality, and most importantly, 
how to act with barbarous Balkan aggression to put the nation in a modern European 
order.  
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Chapter 1  
 
The Same Thing but Totally Different: Marta and Reni Performing 
Artificial Popfolk Star Personage 
  
 
 
Fig. 1—Zvezdi (“Stars”) 2004-2005 by Adelina Popnedelva, pictures are media 
release by PR exhibition “The Temptation of Chalga,” Sofia City Art Gallery, May 1-
31, 2009 
 
There is, there is money   Ima ima pari 
There are also big shots   Ima i tuzari 
There are champions    Ima shampioni  
Who spend millions    Harchat milioni  
….. 
My shef (boss) is such a stud    Shefŭt mi e egati picha  
My shef, everybody him loves  Shefŭt mi vseki go obicha  
The shef pays salaries with fun  Shefŭt s kef zaplati plashta  
No other firm like ours   Niama druga firma kato nash’ta  
 
Nencho’s firm is number one   Nash’ta firma e nomer edno  
It carries profit and isn’t under leasing Oborotna i ne e na lizing 
 
The tax authorities dig us   Danŭchnite kefiat ni se zdravo  
And from Social Security we often have “bravo!”  
A ot NOI redovno imame “Bravo!” 
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Perfect boys are the colleagues  Tochni momcheta sa kolegite  
No need to tell you about the women colleagues  
Da ne vi razpraviam za kolezhkite  
Our eyes are closer    Ochite ni sa po-blizki  
And they are prettier than all other chicks  I po-krasivi ot vsichki miski  
…… 
This year I will makе     Taz’ godina shte napravia az  
Hundred, two hundred, three hundred, million 
Sto, dvesta, trista, miliona  
Then, darling, I will go after you  Posle, mila, she te gonia az  
Hundred, two hundred, three hundred, to Barcelona    
Sto, dvesta, trista, v Bartselona  
 
“The Best Firm” (Nai-dobrata firma)—Toni Storaro ft. Dzhamaikata, 201215 
    
 
On the road with Marta  
I scheduled with Marta, a veteran popfolk star-singer, to observe her gig in the 
southeastern town of Sliven.16 She came to pick me up in her small private car with 
which she traveled to performance events all over the country. As in our previous 
travels, she arrived with her longtime assistant, whose role was to share the driving, 
carry suitcases full of clothes and makeup, coordinate with the organizers onsite, and 
operate as Marta’s electronic band. Popfolk singers rarely perform with live music. 
They either lip-sync (called in Bulgarian playback) or sing over recorded instrumental 
tracks (called in Bulgarian sinback). There are singers who travel to gigs with their 
song tracks on CDs or USBs. Others carry mixer consoles with their entire repertoire, 
which allows singers to decide on the spot which songs to sing.  
My travel with Marta to Sliven took place on October 26, St. Dimitŭr’s Day 
(Dimitrovden). Despite the religious resonance of this day, Bulgarians mostly 
celebrate it in relation to mundane life occasions. People, whose given names are 
either Dimitŭr or derivatives of that name celebrate their name day. Bulgarians also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 “TONI STORARO feat. Djamaikata - Nai-dobrata firma,” accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=40XvMY_pEis. 
16 The identifying information of the event (except the occasion of St. Dimitŭr’s Day) is changed to 
protect the anonymity of the participants.  
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mark this date as the seasonal turning point from Fall to Winter. St. Dimitŭr’s Day is 
also a day of celebration for all Bulgarians who work in the construction sphere. In 
1996 the Bulgarian government designated this day as celebration of tradition. 
Dimitrovden is also celebrated locally as the “City Holiday” (Praznik na Grada) in 
three Bulgarian cities: Sliven, Vidin, and Aitos. The Bulgarian calendar has numerous 
similar festive days that simultaneously relate to Orthodox Christian saints, 
agricultural seasons, folkloric practices, professions and locales, as well as personal 
names. Some saints’ days involve big festivities with traditional food and rituals; one 
of them—St. Georgi’s Day of the Victorious (Gergiovden, May 6th)—is also a 
national holiday honoring the Bulgarian Army whose patron saint is St. Georgi. Most 
saints’ days, though, are regular workdays in which people celebrate the name day of 
a person by congratulating him/ her. S/he, in turn, is expected to treat (da pocherpiat) 
family, friends, colleagues, neighbors, etc. with food and drinks (quantity, quality, 
and variety depending on the means of the person).  
For popfolk singers, the fall and spring holidays are generally times of open-
air public gigs. The month of May also brings gigs in high school graduation parties 
(usually indoors). A few important saints’ days in December and early January as 
well as Christmas and New Year’s are times for big indoor gigs. This is the time also 
to release new folkloric songs and ballads in the style of socialist pop music called 
Estrada.17 Summer brings gigs in Black Sea resorts. This is also the time for new hits 
for dance parties. Election seasons are busy times as well. Political candidates know 
that there is nothing like a free show of a popfolk singer to attract a crowd to their 
rallies. Throughout the year singers are invited to perform in weddings, engagements, 
birthdays, baptismal celebrations and other private parties. Additionally, they perform 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Estrada had different pop music discursive formulations in different socialist states. Bulgarian 
Estrada was created according to the Soviet model (e.g. MacFadyen 2001).  
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as guest artists in zavedenia—the general name of any establishment for social 
drinking and eating: tavern (krŭchma), restaurant, casino, hotel, bar, disco club, café 
etc. 
As we did a few times before, Marta picked me up at a meeting point that was 
on her way out of Sofia. This time we agreed on the large bus station on Tsarigradsko 
shose—the boulevard leading to the highway that connects Sofia with southeastern 
Bulgaria and, symbolically, with Istanbul—Bulgarians’ political and cultural point of 
orientation during five centuries of Ottoman imperial rule. The old Bulgarian name of 
Istanbul, Tsarigrad, literally means “The city of the King” (i.e. the sultan). Bulgarians 
oftentimes portray the creation Bulgarian nation-state in 1878 as a turn of orientation 
from the backward Orient to the modern West. Mishkova (2006) complicates this 
picture arguing that Ottoman Istanbul was one of the major channels of circulating 
ideas and concepts of European modernity with which Bulgarian intellectuals crafted 
the discourse of national modernity.   
Normally the trip from Sofia to Sliven by car takes almost four hours. It took 
us barely three hours since Marta drove much above the speed limit and passed 
slower cars. After travelling with other singers I learned that this sort of driving was 
common in the popfolk business. Singers drive thousands of miles weekly. “Our job 
is a nomadic job” (nashata rabota e chergarska rabota), said to me Marta once with 
laughter. Singers can travel one day to a gig in a mountainous ski resort at the Pirin 
Mountains (southwestern Bulgaria), from there to a gig at a village in Dobrudzha 
(northeastern Bulgaria), then sleep somewhere on the road and, on the next day fly to 
Brussels for a gig in an expatriate disco club.  
The word chergar Marta used for “nomad” comes from the word “rug” 
(cherga). Cherga is the metonym of the fate of Bulgarians: poor Balkan people who 
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are ready to pick up their rug and go wherever they can find an opportunity to earn 
some money. Calling a person chergar articulates the economic and cultural 
inferiority with which people in Eastern Europe, at large, and Bulgaria, in particular, 
see themselves reflected from Western eyes (Neuberger 2006). This colloquialism 
keys speech to two socio-cultural identities. The first is of guest-worker—the lowest 
social strata of illegal or seasonal émigrés from poor countries in the margins of 
Western Europe, who earn access to the West by taking agricultural, construction, and 
cleaning jobs. The second is the image of Gypsy nomads—the ultimate signifier of 
Balkan recursivity to modern Europe and the only identity below guest-worker. The 
ethnic name of “Roma” is currently more politically correct than “Gypsy.” In chapter 
4 I expand on how I shift between the two names. For now, let me state that “Gypsy” 
relates to the role of otherness this ethnic group plays within the Balkanist discourse. 
“Roma” relates to actual people who identify with this ethnicity. When alluding 
themselves to Bulgarian guest-workers and Gypsy nomads, popfolk singers often 
admit with embarrassment that both expatriate communities have been a profitable 
market for gigs.  
The word chalga keys this sort of low class labor travel to the Ottoman Orient. 
During the 19th century, chalgadzhiia was the professional name of hired band 
musicians, who used to travel throughout the Ottoman Balkans in search of gigs in 
urban zavedeniia (Buchanan 2006). After the transition to Balkan nation-states, the 
profession of chalgadzhiia became synonymous with traveling Romani musicians 
who performed in public and private events in the margins of the modern society 
(Buchanan 2006; Silverman 2012). The colloquial professional name of popfolk 
singers—folkadzhiia (for males) and folkadzhiika (for females)—alludes to 
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chalgadzhia by adding the Ottoman-Arabic suffix of ia to the colloquialism of 
popfolk—folk.  
Upon reflecting on the economy of gigs, Marta acknowledged that the main 
problem of making commercial music is that the Bulgarian music market is small, poor, 
and thrives on low professional standards.18 For her and most other popfolk singers 
Greece represents the most immediate modern pop music market. This immediacy means 
also that the Greek music genre of laiko is one of the most popular sources of covers. 
Marta shared with me her impression that “in Greece, when you go to bouzouki taverns 
(called also Magazi e.l.) you see, the stage is huge, every evening there is a 
performance…everybody plays with notes, there is no such coincidental performance 
with improvisation, there are light effects, moving stages, (female) singers get out from 
down somewhere, in kind of shells, above the piano, they sing, switch between different 
decors, all of that is extraordinarily expensive, for which here it’s impossible to pay, the 
standard is totally different. Over there one bouzouki (tavern), 1000 people, 50 Euro per 
person, is full every evening for this performer, on every table nearby the stage there is a 
bottle of whiskey that costs $200 and the consumption is compulsory. Make a calculation 
about what measures we are talking there and what we are talking about here. Simply 
everything is ehh, in such a way, the market, the market makes this opportunity to…and 
they [the singers] are every evening there. They don’t travel like us. Here it is another 
type business, unfortunately so, nomadic work, today here, tomorrow there.”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Bulgaria (together with Romania) stands at the bottom of the European Union’s list of income per 
capita. According to the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute, in December 2008 and 2009 the 
average individual monthly salary in the country was 366.53 leva, around $220. Information from 
“ПАРИЧЕН ДОХОД НА ДОМАКИНСТВАТА ПО ИЗТОЧНИЦИ НА ДОХОДИ 
ЗА ДЕКЕМВРИ 2008 И 2009 ГОДИНА.” Република България, Национален Статистически 
Институт, last modified February 15, 2010, accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://www.nsi.bg/bg/content/3228/%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%B5%D1%87%D0%BD%D0
%B8-%D0%B4%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BD%D0%B8 
(http://www.nsi.bg/bg/content/3228/%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%B5%D1%87%D0%BD%D0
%B8-%D0%B4%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BD%D0%B8.  
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Marta concludes that, in order to be profitable, Bulgarian popfolk singers need to 
create the impression of a pop star show at minimal cost and with basic facilities. The 
constraints of this condition are that singers cannot hold live commercial concerts. The 
only concerts in which they take part are annual concerts arranged by their contracting 
record labels. Otherwise, popfolk singers come in regular, direct contact with their 
audience only in gigs (uchastiia). The form of the gig means that popfolk singers are 
expected to participate for 40-60 minutes on the program of zavedeniia, public and private 
events such as birthdays, name days, high school graduation parties, holiday celebrations, 
and weddings. Minimizing cost requires gigs that rely on an infrastructure exterior to the 
locus of performance. This demand is countered with a conflicting demand: the audience 
expects singers to perform live exactly as they appear and sound in their video clips on 
TV.  
Bulgaria is a fairly small country, more or less the size of Ohio (Buchanan 
2006:6). However traveling around is not an easy task at all. During my fieldwork 
there were only two half built highways (no more than 200 miles each), whose 
construction began and stopped still in the socialist era. In everyday speech, the 
highway situation is a metonym of government corruption and disfunctionality. For 
this reason, Boiko Borisov, the Prime Minister of Bulgaria (2009-2013) defined the 
completion of the partially existing highways and building a new trans-Balkan 
highway system as a top priority of his tenure. As a shrewd politician, Borisov never 
denied that in addition to economic advantages, building highways is a sign of power 
in Bulgaria. That is, Borisov showed himself as so mighty that he could even 
overcome the well-established culture of corruption. 
Most intercity roads in Bulgaria have only two lanes passing through villages 
and small towns. Additionally, the country’s topography is mountainous, and so 
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singers often drive through curvy roads that are oftentimes pierced by holes as a result 
of heavy snow, low asphalt quality, and lack of maintenance. The image of SUVs and 
other fast Western cars driving on roads paved for socialist cars like Lada, Moskvich, 
Trabant, and Vartburg is a popular metonym of how superficial Bulgaria’s adaptation 
to Western capitalism is. With this image people stress the failure of the state to 
support the developing Western consumer culture with Western infrastructure. The 
miscorrelation between the quality of cars and the quality of roads has made traveling 
a real hazard. The bigger and faster a car is, the greater the chance that its driver is 
part of the post-socialist money elite, which means that in a case of an accident the 
driver would survive both the accident and the law enforcement authorities that are 
notorious for their corruption.  
Marta and other singers shared with me horror stories about near-death driving 
experiences especially when driving through heavy snow. Two famous singers—
Rumyana (d. 1999) and Reyhan (d. 2005)—died in car accidents on the road to gigs. 
The singer Johnny was gravely injured in the early 2000s forcing him to quit 
altogether his performance career. Traveling with popfolk singers to gigs, I quickly 
developed my own collection of horror stories. In one case I visited a former shef of a 
chalga band. As suggested in the opening epigraph, this term, shef, is salient to this 
chapter. It means the boss or leader of any social event, from focused interaction to 
teams and groups. We spent the evening in a local tavern in the company of his friend 
from out of town drinking a fairly large amount of rakiia (Bulgarian fruit brandy). I 
had a ticket for the last night train to Sofia and, so, close to the hour I asked to leave 
for the train station. My host insisted that I stay a bit more. I knew that one should not 
refuse a shef and the meeting was important to me, so I agreed to delay my departure. 
When I saw that I was about to miss my train I insisted that I should go. My host gave 
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his car keys to the person at the table who was the least drunk. He asked that friend to 
drive him, first, home and me, afterward, to the station. Only after we left the home of 
my host, the driver realized that no one in the car knew how to reach the train station. 
We rushed back to the shef’s apartment, pulled him back to the car and let him in a 
drunken drowsiness to guide our way. We drove through the streets in high speed to 
catch my train at the moment it entered the station.  
My worst experience was on the way back to Sofia from a week of video clip 
shooting at the Black Sea in the car of a record label shef. The road from the Black 
Sea to Sofia usually takes about 5.5 hours. We drove the distance in less than a three 
hours. At some point the speedometer showed that we drove at 125 m/h. Tarikat 
(reckless) driving is commonly perceived in Bulgaria as a male trait. Popfolk female 
singers cross this gender code and perform driving aggressiveness as part of their 
professional skill set. Marta drove always much above speed limit and passed cars 
even in mountainous two-way one-lane roads. Oftentimes she remained on the left 
side of the road pulling back to the right only not to crush in cars that were coming 
from the opposite direction. She taught her assistant how to recognize police traps 
from afar, however she did not deny using her celebrity charm to avoid fines when 
police cars pulled her over. 
Contrary to the low image of “rug” traveler, chergar, traveling indexes power 
and carries the capital of social mobility. European travelers in the Balkans were the 
first who transmitted ideas of modernity among local peasants. During the 19th 
century and throughout the first part of the 20th century (until the communist 
“revolution” of 1945), a thin crust of Ottoman-Bulgarian and then Bulgarian national 
elite began circulating different images of the modern Occident. The major agents of 
circulation were young Bulgarian students who received education in France, 
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Germany, Britain, Russia, and Western-oriented colleges in Istanbul (Mishkova 
2006). Additionally, local Bulgarian literati followed modern European trends that 
developed first in Serbia and Greece (which Bulgarians perceived as their more 
“modern” Balkan neighbors). 
The socialist regime maintained the link between physical mobility and the 
mediation of modernity by controlling the movement of people and ideas as well as 
channels of circulation between Bulgaria and the rest of the world. The more people 
fit with the official ideals of socialist modernity the more they were allowed to move 
within Bulgaria (from villages to towns, from town to big cities, and from everywhere 
to Sofia, to the Eastern bloc countries and, occasionally, to the West. Buchanan 
(2006) writes that the privilege of traveling was part of the social capital of 
professional folklore musicians during socialism. Musicians from villages and small 
towns were allowed to relocate once admitted to one of the state ensembles. Ensemble 
musicians frequently represented Bulgaria at international festivals. 
The hybrid music sound that earned the name chalga emerged in late 1970s as 
an alternative channel of mobility, circulation and mediation, part of the informal 
economy that, according to Verdery (1996), provided goods that the state failed or 
was not interested to supply. Truck drivers, who crossed the land border, smuggled 
LPs and cassettes of Yugoslavian novokomponovana narodna muzika (newly 
composed folk music), Greek laiko, and Turkish arabesk. People in villages, towns, 
and cities close to the border listed to the radio stations and watched television 
channels of neighboring Balkan countries. The regime restricted this music from 
being performed in public except in liminal spaces, such as neighborhood taverns, 
vacation resorts and provincial fairs. Gradually, Romani band chalgadzhii like Ivo 
Papazov-Iriama, and later pioneering chalga singer-stars like Hisarskiiat pop (the 
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Priest from Hisar), Rado Shisharkata, Tosho Todorov and others created a new 
channel of generic mobility, which undermined the socialist regime of musical 
circulation. The first chalga sounds mixed Balkan and Western pop, local ethnic 
traditions and the socialist genres of folklore and Estrada. Ivo Papazov endeavored to 
make free musical movement a trademark of local originality, which he introduced to 
the World Music audience after 1989 as Balkan Jazz—an allusion to the possibility of 
pursuing the US path of modernity circulation in the aftermath of the Cold War. The 
presence of multiple channels of circulation became the trademark of popfolk singer-
stars, whose repertoire often consists of covers of Balkan, Middle Eastern, Indian, 
Western European and even Latin American hits. 
Marta narrates the biography of her career in terms of movement, being constantly 
on the road between spaces and musical genres. She began pursuing music in the socialist 
era, when in order to be considered a professional musician (of classical, folklore, and pop 
music), one had to be part of the state’s cultural apparatus (music school, conservatory, 
musical guilds, professional ensembles etc.). In contrast to this model, she developed her 
engagement with music in the traditional way of learning through practical experience. 
Marta says that she was drawn to art from an early age, especially to drawing. She also 
loved singing very much. But this activity was more connected to her life routine. 
Spending substantial part of her childhood in her grandmothers’ village, Marta learned the 
folklore music that people in her village used to sing. Performing music on stage 
happened to Marta coincidently during high school. Representatives of local amateur 
folklore ensembles used to attend occasionally high school artistic activities to scout out 
talented singers and dancers. Friends who knew about Marta’s musical talent pushed her 
to perform for such scouts. However she did not impress them very much the first time. 
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They told her to try her luck next time they come. This rejection boosted Marta with 
motivation.  
“During my entire free time I stood by [folklore] ensembles and singers and just 
absorbed what they sang, what they taught, everything they did. In the following year,” 
Marta says with laughter, “they took me without problem, without a test.” The ensemble 
consisted of 4-5 instrumental musicians and 2-3 female singers, among them Marta. They 
performed a folklore repertoire during holiday celebrations in Marta’s hometown. 
Performances were usually short, around 20 minutes. The word she uses for these 
performances is haltura, meaning work with fairly low professional standards. The 
example with which Marta illustrates the halturistic character of her first performances 
with the ensemble is that they performed only live, without technical sound equipment. 
 Marta shifted from amateur to professional performance when she was accepted 
to sing in a tavern (zavedenie) in her hometown. She performed live with a band the 
folklore songs that she had learned in the village. Meanwhile she also began travelling to 
international folklore festivals in other East European socialist countries, such as 
Yugoslavia and Poland. Marta traveled abroad for the first time in 1988, a year before the 
fall of the socialist regime. The fall of the socialist regime in 1989 opened new work 
opportunities for her. In 1990 and 1991 she travelled to Yugoslavia to sing in Serbian 
kafana (taverns) 19; “you know,” she explains, “money here (in Bulgaria e.l.) and there 
(Yugoslavia e.l.) was incomparable. That was the simple reason for going abroad, just as 
it is nowadays.” Through contacts in Yugoslavia, Marta and the band with which she 
performed in Serbia was invited to work in a kafana owned by Bosnian immigrants in 
Istanbul.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Kafana is an establishment for social drinking with musical program, typical to Serbia, Macedonia, 
and Bosnia Herzegovina (e.g. Hofman 2010).  
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Marta says that when she began traveling to Yugoslavia she did not think that 
there was any need to widen her repertoire beyond Bulgarian folklore. That was the music 
on which she was raised, and therefore she saw in this music her artistic expression. The 
musicians with whom she performed advised her to listen to other kinds of music if she 
wanted to pursue the career of a singer. So she had to develop the capability of traveling 
between genres in order to appeal to her diverse audience. Marta followed this advice 
willingly. She says that she was especially impressed by Serbian and Greek music. Once 
she began understanding the languages in which the lyrics were sung, she found them 
poetically beautiful. Marta returned from Yugoslavia and Greece with many albums of 
local singers and gradually added them to her own repertoire. She emphasizes that her 
connection with Serbian and Greek music is not merely instrumental or responsive to 
market needs. The music genres to which she was introduced in her performances abroad 
changed her professional identity. She developed her own style and own voice by 
adopting from them motives that fit her character.  
After returning to Bulgaria, Marta found a job in a zavedenie out of her hometown. 
She was the singer in a form called “repertoire show” that ran every evening. This 
“repertoire show” included a magician, a singer, a dancing group, and other attractions. 
She used to sing about four songs as transitions between other artistic numbers. In her 
performance Marta included Bulgarian folklore songs together with songs that she had 
learned in Greece, Serbia, and Turkey. The benefit of participating in the “repertoire 
show” was that Marta could live and work in the same place without being required to 
travel. After working for six months in that zavedenie, Marta decided to quit her singing 
job. She wanted to take some time to think about whether she wanted to continue 
performing music. Her career break was very short. Soon after resigning from the 
zavedenie she was invited to begin working in a newly opened zavedenie in Sofia. Marta 
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says that moving to Sofia was a scary decision for her. Sofia was then a very unsafe place 
for a young woman from the provinces. She recalls that “these were exactly the years 
(1994-1995, e.l.) of the gangster-thugs (mutrenskite), lots of money, mafia groups began 
to rise.” The person who invited Marta convinced her to arrive only for the opening night 
of the zavedenie. However, this night extended into days and weeks. Marta admits that the 
clientele in that zavedenie consisted of the new and infamous post-socialist shefs: mafia 
goons, thugs, businessmen, and politicians. Singing in front of the most powerful people 
in Bulgaria gave Marta an indication that, career-wise, she was doing pretty well. She 
managed to integrate in the big city and make a good living from her musical occupation. 
Just as in her previous working places, Marta performed together with a live band. The 
musical repertoire at the zavedenie was very diverse; “we sang everything, folklore, 
Kristal was then very popular with Toni Dacheva,20 Serbian music, Greek music, folklore, 
everything that comes to mind.” 
Formal education of popfolk music does not exist, and so Marta and all other 
popfolk singers, with whom I communicated, consider the zavedenie their formative 
experience of becoming professional performers. The role of the zavedenie as a substitute 
to formal training invokes also the derogatory voice of chalga. The socialist regime 
institutionalized the doctrine that modern music is learned in a formal way, practice 
grounded in theory and literacy.21 Singers could become performers of socialist folklore 
and Estrada only if they studied these genres in state music schools and were accepted to 
work in one of the state music organizations (e.g. Buchanan 2006). Popfolk, on the other 
hand, relies neither on theory nor on literacy. Singers learn it only through on-site 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Kristal band with Toni Dancheva are perceived in Bulgaria as the founders of popfolk music as a 
commercial culture industry. The band emerged as cultural icons whose career was based on 
commissioned gigs, concerts, and the release of homemade audiocassettes produced by the band’s 
leader Krasimir Hristov (e.g. Dimov 2001).  
21 Stokes (1992) identifies a similar pattern in Turkish folklore music. Formal training with notes 
indexes high quality of modern European art.   
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practice, in the traditional manner of rural and low class urban artisans (zanaiatchiia). 
This is the case even for the many singers in the genre, particularly females, who are 
actually graduates of folklore music schools. There are also rare cases of popfolk singers 
who received Estrada training (Esil Diuran, for example). However, Marta told me that 
only one of her colleagues entered the genre directly from music school without going 
through the initiation period of singing in zavedeniia (the plural of zavedenie). I heard 
rumors that this particular singer skipped the zavedenie stage on the way to becoming a 
star thanks to close connections between her family and the shef of the record label that 
contracted her.  
Marta says that the most important lesson she learned at the zavedenie was that 
singers do a service job that is not very different from waiting on tables. This job requires 
maximum flexibility, adaptability, and caution not to superimpose one’s presence. At the 
zavedenie singers come in contact with many sorts of people who have different kinds of 
musical taste, from folklore to rock. To satisfy so many tastes, Marta says, she had to 
learn how to orient her show according to the immediate feedback (in Bulgarian, obratna 
vrŭzka) she received from her audience. In Marta’s view, this diversity of expectations is 
a unique Bulgarian phenomenon that does not exist in neighboring Balkan countries.  
Her perception that Bulgarians have an assorted musical taste reiterates the 
language ideology equation of purification with rational modernization (Bauman and 
Briggs 2003). Hybridity stands as a counter vector to modernity according to this 
ideological equation. The more hybrid people see a cultural form the less rational and 
modern they judge it; insufficient purity in cultural expression indicates primitive social 
forms and stigmatizes performers (Seizer 2005). Based on her work experience abroad, 
Marta claims that Serbians, for example, listen almost only to Serbian music, and are not 
interested so much in genres beyond their local music. As a result, the Serbian equivalents 
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of popfolk—turbofolk and novokopnovana narodna muzika—has a recognizable sound 
because they maintain very close ties with Serbian folklore genres. Slavi Trifonov tends to 
express an opposite approach to popfolk. He claims that this music is so mixed that it has 
no (modern) character, no (modern) identity.22 Similar circumstances prevail, according to 
Marta, in Greece. The local taste in Bulgaria, on the other hand, is “diluted,” (in 
Bulgarian, razvodnen) “10% our music (folklore), 10% Greek, 10% Serbian, 10% 
Turkish, 10% Ishtar, 10% MTV, and 10% rap.” Her job, then, is to satisfy all these 
elements.  
Marta did not mention it, but I assumed that she avoided saying that the rest 30% 
of singers’ repertoire is based on kiuchek—oriental belly dance style commonly perceived 
as the ethnic (i.e. Gypsy) register of chalga (more in detail in the next chapters). She 
referred to kiuchek when explaining that, in terms of repertoire, she never knows 
beforehand what she will sing. Marta has a tentative song program with which she goes to 
gigs. She makes changes on the spot both according to the information about the event she 
collects upon arrival and according to the reactions of the audience she senses while 
singing. Marta says that the local taste is so “diluted” that she always needs to figure out 
as quickly as possible in what kind of performance her audience is interested. “In one 
performance people can tell you that they want kiuchetsi (plural of kiuchek e.l.). If this is 
the need, kiuchetsi we’ll sing,” She concludes with laughter.  
The time I traveled with Marta to gigs—the 2007 local elections—revealed to me 
that, above all, she had to orient her performance to the satisfaction of the shef of each gig 
event. Marta was invited to sing in many election campaigns of candidates from different 
parties. This practice is common in election campaigns in Bulgaria. I was told that since 
people were not so interested in politics (or are very cynical about it), there’s nothing like 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Seizer (2005) writes that the basic derogatory approach to Tamil Special Drama is that it is “too 
mixed,” i.e. it does not fit with Tamil language ideology of modernity.   
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a show of popfolk star free of charge to draw a large crowd to election rallies. When we 
arrived to the designated location, Marta would inquire about the identity of the party and 
the name of the candidate. In front of the audience, she endorsed the candidate 
enthusiastically. For instance, if the candidate represented the Bulgarian Socialist Party 
(BSP, the former Communist party), Marta concluded her show with the song Edna 
bŭlgarska roza (“A Bulgarian Rose”), which is commonly identified with socialist 
nostalgia.”23 
On the way to the gig in Sliven Marta informed me that a local construction 
firm had ordered her performance. She had no further information, except that it was 
supposed to be a big event. Usually she gets basic information about her gigs from the 
impresario of her contracting record label. She gathers more specific details once she 
arrives to the event. Later I learned that the commissioners of the gig were Sliven’s 
Chamber of Commerce. Together with the municipality and the shefs of local big and 
small construction firms, the Chamber of Commerce produced a festive lunch on St. 
Dimitŭr’s Day to honor construction employees, according to the tradition. The poster 
advertising the event read, “…a constellation of stars from the record label ____, 
among them Marta and Yulia (a pseudonym of another popfolk star) will take care of 
the good mood of the party….”  
We arrived around noon to a large open industrial compound. Marta had 
already fixed her makeup and glued artificial eyelashes on the road, while her 
assistant was driving. The only thing left was to put on her performance gown. Once 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 “A Bulgarian Rose” is a patriotic song in the style of socialist pop (Estrada) performed by Sasha 
Pasheva (“Pasha Hristova - Edna Bulgarska Roza,” accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gbsVHU0Ig1Y). The song was composed especially for Zlaten 
Orfei 1970 (“the Golden Orpheus”)—the annual Estrada music festival—and won first prize. This 
song has a post-socialist remix version performed by the popfolk singer Zara (“Zara-Edna bulgarska 
roza [remix],” accessed October 25, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GCTxLCogN5Y).  
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we arrived she disappeared quickly behind an improvised stage. Meanwhile her 
assistant took care of hooking up the mixer to the amplifying system of the event.  
I went around and observed the performance site. The celebration was already 
under way. More than 1500 workers were invited to the event. I saw mostly men and 
a minority of women sitting by long rows of tables loaded with traditional treats for 
social occasions: grilled meat, sausages, cheese, salads, beer, and rakiia. I recognized 
the shefs as they all sat in a special section on an improvised stage covered with green 
carpet and ornamented with red and white balloons. The workers set on bar benches 
and simple metal chairs. The shefs sat on wedding hall-style chairs ornamented with 
white covers by round tables covered with white tablecloths and ornamented with red 
fabric napkins and flower arrangements. Waiters dressed with formal clothes served 
the shefs from a special buffet stand. The shefs dined from china plates with metal 
silverware and drank from glasses. Other waiters, less formally dressed, delivered 
shared plates of food for the workers’ tables. The workers loaded the food on their 
individual plastic plates, dined with disposable plastic silverware plates and drank 
from plastic cups. The shefs were dressed in suites while the workers wore casual 
clothing (anything from inexpensive clothes in the latest fashion to worn out and 
ragged clothes).  
It was a very hot fall day. What Bulgarians call “Gypsy Summer” (Tiigansko 
Liato), the equivalent of Indian Fall. Only the tables were protected from the sun. 
Yulia, a young popfolk rising star, was already singing. She wore tight black pants, 
black tang top, and a short sleeveless fur coat. At some point she took off her coat and 
remained only with the tang top. Yulia walked between the tables while singing over 
sinback (the recorded instrumental track). From time to time she stopped by people 
and danced kiuchek with them. She raised her hands up and moved her thighs. At 
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some point she took off her fur coat and exposed her décolleté and the bottom part of 
her belly. Yulia let the people kiss her and take pictures hugging her. One person went 
down on his knees in front of her to express his admiration. She sang her own 
repertoire: an mix of her popfolk hits and a few folklore songs. The audience reacted 
to Yulia’s singing with both kiuchek and folklore circle dances (horo). Yulia sang 
with a wireless microphone, which from time to time went out the reception zone of 
the sound system. When her voice disappeared one could hear her recorded voice in 
the sound system. This thing immediately caught my attention. It disturbed me. I 
experienced it as a failure and felt disregard to what I experienced as Yulia’s low 
professional quality. She did not seem to be disturbed by the sound problem, neither 
was the audience, especially those who could get so close to this media star, take her 
pictures with cell phones, touch her, and invite her to a kiuchek dance.      
At some point Marta showed up from behind the scene and went to arrange 
the order of songs with her assistant who stood by the sound system. Now she was 
ready to meet her audience as a gleaming popfolk star. She wore a long bright 
turquoise satin dress and silver high-heeled shoes. The dress was striking in 
combination with her long (dyed) blond hair. The dress had deep décolleté that 
emphasized her silicon-enhanced breasts. For over an hour Marta sang while walking 
between the tables, greeting people, giving autographs, and taking notes with greeting 
requests, letting them hug her and take pictures, dancing with them momentarily, 
exchanging kisses, signing autographs, receiving flowers. A few men tried to initiate a 
more aggressive physical contact; a few others followed her trying to catch her 
attention. Gently but assertively she rejected these men. Unlike Yulia, Marta was a bit 
more reserved in her physical contacts. She was older and more established star than 
Yulia and could demand more respect. Marta sang her trademark popfolk hits and a 
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few folklore songs. People stood up and danced kiuchek to her popfolk hits and circle 
folklore dances to her folklore songs, but with greater excitement than the way they 
danced to the previous singer. Marta did not dance kiuchek at all, neither with the 
audience nor alone. At one point she also crossed the invisible line between the 
workers’ and the shefs’ section. She approached the tables, greeted the guests with 
eye contact and smile, and stopped for a minute or so by those whom she recognized 
as the shefs giving them special attention as if she was singing personally to them. 
I learned later that multiple functions make people the shefs of gigs. Above all, 
these are people who order and pay for the gig. Hence singers need to elevate them with 
aura of pop stardom. Additionally, singers are tuned to recognize and provide special 
attention to the guests whom the event shef designated as VIPs or who are known 
themselves as shefs. This skill is important because in order to pursue a longstanding star 
career a singer needs to build a wide network of connections within the money elite. I 
heard from many different sources that there are female singers who boost their demand 
by being available for sexual service to shefs after or outside gigs. Singers enter the 
market by signing a contract of dependency on the shef of one of the record labels. Since 
the market demand is for young singers, for new faces, and singers need to pay by 
themselves for the production of songs and video clips, veteran singers are expected to 
secure their star status by marrying a rich man and giving birth to his child (in case of 
separation he may provide financial support to mother and child). In return the husband 
becomes the sponsor of the singer’s star career freeing her from dependency on the record 
label shef and the exhausting job of frequent travel to gigs.  
I walked all over the compound during Marta’s number observing the 
performance, documenting it with my video and stills cameras, and trying not to 
disturb the show. I walked freely in the workers’ section but did not dare enter the 
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shefs’ section. I sensed intuitively that it was inappropriate. Once our ways crossed. 
Marta made a brief eye contact. She rolled her eyes and blew her cheeks. I understood 
it as frustration with the difficult conditions. I smiled back to show my solidarity. I 
was flattered that she used me to quit her stage persona for a moment and relate to me 
with her off-stage personality. The entire interaction took a second or so. Then she 
quickly turned back to her star persona.  
The gig went well and the people looked pleased. As her number ended Marta 
ordered us to enter the car and be ready to leave the place for the next gig—endorsing 
a candidate for the mayor of a small village. There was still time, so we stopped on 
the way at a gas station. Marta entered the restroom followed by her assistant. She 
carried her clothes and the assistant carried the makeup box. Within a few minutes 
Marta changed back from a popfolk star to an ordinary urban woman.   
Artificial popfolk star and artificial modernity 
The ethnographic narrative about Marta frames the scope of this chapter in 
which I analyze how, by performing artificial star personage, popfolk singers 
intertextualize in the democratic present the role of Estrada singers—the pop music 
genre which the socialist regime designed in order to popularize its mediation of 
European modernity. Two premises tie artificial star personae with modernity 
mediation. The first is that modernity is exclusively a Western European cultural 
property, which cannot grow naturally in marginal European countries like Bulgaria. 
The second is that, to modernize, Bulgarians need to follow cultural forms and 
practices of Occidentalism imported and implemented by the local representatives of 
external modern powers. In this sense, Estrada stars were deliberatively created to 
popularize Soviet modernity brokered by the Bulgarian Communist Party. Directing 
my focus particularly to the poetics of artificial individuality I show how popfolk star-
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singers have inherited from socialist Estrada singers not only the role of modernity 
popularizers but also its underlying politics of inequality between the two discursive 
domains of the Balkans and Europe and the consequent protectionist culture of 
modernity mediation. Poetic devices of artificiality, like lip-syncing (on which I will 
expand later), allow singers to remediate aura of modern stardom, as seen on TV, in 
face-to-face performance sites, i.e. in gigs (in Bulgarian, uchastie, from the verb 
uchastvam “to take part,” “to participate”). This aura comes from the fact that singers’ 
star personage indexes dependency on a shef—a patron boss who has means to 
replicate artificially the appearance of modern reality that presumably exists naturally 
in another European locus (but not in Bulgaria).  
The two premises composing the semiotics of artificial pop star and modernity 
mediation are prior to socialism. They are part of the Balkanist metadiscourse that 
formulates the image of the Balkans both in Europe and in Bulgarian nation-
building—the Balkans is Europe’s incomplete Self, the prime locus of pre-modern 
European nostalgia and fears, Europe’s cradle of traditions and barbarism (or more, 
idiomatically, backwardness). As Diana Mishkova (2006) argues, Balkanism frames 
also the larger discourse of Bulgarian modernization. Since the 19th century, 
Bulgarian nation builders (she mainly deals with intellectuals) have advanced 
modernization by following in the footsteps of “more modern” (but still marginally 
European) neighbor societies, above all Greece and Serbia. These routes of 
modernization, however, have always led to modern empires that turned the Balkans 
into a contested field of influence.  
Bulgaria was created during the late 19th and early 20th century as part of the 
competition for power in the Balkans between Russia, the Ottoman Empire, France, 
Great Britain and Germany. The US and the USSR decided the Bulgaria would be 
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part of the Soviet block after WWII. After 1989, Bulgaria shifted to the Western 
block by joining NATO, taking loans from the IMF and joining the EU. The way 
from the Balkans to Europe in evolutionary terms represents the direction to 
modernity while the way from Europe to the Balkans shows the devolution from 
modernity to tradition, and worse to backwardness and barbarism (Neuberger 2006).  
 Both the evolutionary and devolutionary paths encapsulate a common local 
historical view that Bulgaria was created and has emerged as a field of 
experimentation with different economic models of capitalism (for Bulgarians, the 
form of modern economy). The history of this Balkan nation-state is the history of 
competing local power-holders handling their debt to global creditors. During 
socialism there was one creditor, the USSR, and one explicit line of credit—being a 
field of experimentation with socialist modernization. Bulgarians identify the 1989 
regime change with the collapse of this line followed by constant attempts to 
construct a new relationship of exchange—experimenting with forms of capitalism in 
return for credit.  
I connect this historical view with popfolk by arguing that poetic devices of 
artificiality key local communication to the experience of dependence on external 
capital. Such devices are prevalent in local speech beyond the pop music context 
allowing Bulgarians to call attention to what they see as inherent intertextaul gaps 
(Briggs and Bauman 1992) between being Bulgarian and being European. Be that 
music, be that literature, be that film, be that everyday speech, Bulgarians identify 
representations of Bulgaria as modern as long as they are transparent with images 
from societies that metonymically stand in Bulgaria for Europe (which in Bulgaria 
stands metonymically for modernity and the global world). At the same time, people 
judge representations of Bulgaria as authentic as long as their transparency with 
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equivalent representations of Europe is an admitted mimicry (Bhabha 1994). 
Bulgarians judge economic power according to the material ability to perform cultural 
forms that replicate closely “original” modern European societies. Being able to 
replicate an appearance of European pop stars means that a singer is sponsored by an 
affluent shef who is linked in a chain of patronage that goes outside Bulgaria.   
Keying speech to artificiality leaves a noticeable gap between “the original 
thing” that presumably comes from Europe (wherever its location may be) and its 
local Bulgarian replica. Tracing sources of imitation is a way to track the point of 
departure and route of modernity on the move to Bulgaria. Thus, for instance, the jazz 
and pop singer Vasil Petrov has earned his acclaim after 1989 as the Bulgarian Frank 
Sinatra, the Romani singer Dzhago is proudly presented as the Gypsy Pavarotti, the 
socialist rock group Shturtsite (“the Crickets”) are revered as the Bulgarians Beatles 
and the popfolk singer Toni Storaro has established his status as the Bulgarian 
Vassilis Karras (a Greek laiko mega-star). “The same thing but totally different” 
(sŭshtoto no sŭvsem razlichno) is the idiomatic self-ironic phrase with which 
Bulgarians authenticate these pop music stars and other cultural replicas.   
Scholars of Bulgarian music have analyzed the making and breaking of the 
socialist path to musical modernization by usually drawing links between folklore and 
chalga. Dimov (2001), for instance, defends the legitimacy of chalga music 
explaining that it has inherited the cultural function of folklore during socialism. He 
stresses that folklore was designed to be a meeting place between Bulgarian 
vernacular traditions and modern national life. Buchanan (2006) writes that the 
socialist authorities engineered folklore to represent a dialectical flow of tradition 
from an authentic local source or spring (in Bulgarian izvor) to modernity. Dimov 
argues that chalga (or as he prefers to call it, ethnopop), on the other hand, has 
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emerged from and mediates the local position of Bulgarian culture within a 
worldwide network of capitalist cultural circulation, which hybridizes global pop with 
ethnic Balkan music traditions.  
The opening ethnographic narrative as well as the one that will close this 
chapter point to another link with socialist musical culture. Popfolk singers perform in 
gigs the reconstitution of modernity in post-1989 Bulgaria by abandoning the 
improvisational character of chalga in favor of artificial star persona as developed in 
Estrada. Both aesthetically and economically the process of decontextualizing 
Estrada’s poetics of artificiality and recontextualizing it in chalga gave birth to 
popfolk. Linking chalga with Estrada addresses an important point, which Dimov 
leaves outside his folklore-chalga intertextaul line. Being an adherent of the 
postmodern vision of World Music, he does not pay attention how the post-1989 
transformation of the political economy of modernity circulation to Bulgaria (from 
dependency on the USSR to dependency on the EU and the US) circumscribes his 
recontextualization of one invented tradition—folklore—in another—chalga (and its 
synonyms, popfolk and ethnopop). I do accept though Dimov’s emphasis on global 
circulation rather than on teleological flow from tradition to modernity, since it 
depicts very well the life reality of singers, who testify that they would ideally like to 
perform folklore or pop music but had to turn to chalga in order to survive. This is 
one of the reasons I think popfolk is a safer generic term for singers to communicate 
with their audience. Popfolk resonates with the same vision of Estrada: replicating the 
same pop music culture like “real modern societies.”  
Socialist Estrada and post-1989 chalga and popfolk 
Estrada was created in the 1960s in response to the local popularity of foreign 
pop. In accordance with the regime’s loyalty to the USSR, cultural officials 
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engineered music that replicated aesthetically Soviet Estrada—an entertainment stage 
music that draws upon Russian pre-Soviet circus music (MacFadyen 2003), German 
Schlager, Italian Canzone and French Chanson. Just as in Soviet Estrada, singers 
were supposed to perform an image of modern personality (lichnost), that is, pop 
stars. MacFadyen (2001) writes that the aura of pop star personality in Soviet Estrada 
came from the perception of gap between singers’ stage persona and their “authentic” 
artistic self. Especially during the stagnant Brezhnev era, this gap allowed Russians to 
imagine some individual agency under tight state control. While I have not researched 
Bulgarian Estrada yet, I suspect that in Bulgaria the aura of lichnost was located in 
another perception of gap, that is, the gap between singers’ performance of stardom 
and ordinary people’s experience of individual limitations and dissatisfaction as a 
result of top-down imposed communality.  
Estrada stars were state-employees in the most profound sense. They stood in 
the showcase of Bulgarian socialism performing the claimed success of the regime to 
generate modern pop culture. Unlike folklore musicians who could claim vernacular 
musical roots, the entire career of Estrada singers depended on the state. Singers 
received training at state music conservatories and academies, recorded songs at the 
state-owned record label Balkanton, appeared on state electronic and printed media 
and gave concerts and gigs organized by the governmental impresario agency. While 
local literati did not consider Estrada a “revolutionary” musical form in socialist 
realist terms (like folklore, e.g. Buchanan 2006)—it aimed at entertaining not at 
educating—they recognized the ability of Estrada to promote a “refined” popular 
taste.  
People usually name Lili Ivanova, Emil Dimitrov, Vasil Naidenov, Kichka 
Bodurova, Orlin Goranov, Kristina Dimitrova, Toni Dimitrova, Bogdana 
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Karadocheva,	  Silviia Katsarova, Lea Ivanova and Duet Riton among the classical 
stars of this genre. Very few Estrada singers still perform and release new songs to 
these days. There is a small but fairly steady market demand for concerts and gigs by 
top Estrada stars. There is also the exceptional case of Estrada singer Veselin 
Marinov who became a star after 1989, allegedly by creating close ties within the 
local business and political circles. However, overall, Estrada is not a living genre, 
but a cultural relic with which Bulgarians usually both express nostalgia for the 
socialist past and reservations about the democratic present. 
 The fact that Estrada singers oftentimes lip-synced rather than sang live does 
not prevent Bulgarians from expressing high esteem for singers’ vocal qualities. This 
fact might be surprising, since, just as Partan (2007) writes in regard to Soviet 
Estrada, voice is the most prominent characteristic with which Bulgarians recognize 
singers’ stardom. I was told that singers had very heavy performance schedule and so 
they used to preserve their voice by switching to lip-syncing in less important jobs, 
like gigs in seaside restaurants. Another reason for lip-syncing was that in festive 
concerts singers needed to perform perfect voice that would sound more modern 
thereby creating a sense of heightened formality. Attending myself Estrada concerts 
during my fieldwork, I witnessed that many singers lip-synced when they appeared as 
guest performers in non-musical occasions or in the concerts of other singers. In their 
own concerts, singers would sing over their sinback (recorded tracks). Only once I 
attended an Estrada concert that was performed with live band. This fact prompts me 
to argue there is also an implicit positive aspect in devices of artificiality like lip-
syncing. As I wrote earlier, Estrada was created as a socialist realist form; its 
designers aimed at changing “life as it is” (the “backward” Balkans) by propagating 
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an artificial archetype of “life as it ought to be.”24 In other words, Estrada mediated a 
futurist communist reality by bringing it artificially to the present and advertising it to 
the masses thus creating an entertainment affect. Lip-syncing was one of the poetic 
devices, which mediated this sort of reality. Singers did not fabricate their live voice 
but performed the gap that still existed with Bulgaria’s promised future.  
Chalga echoed the collapse of this promise. Once Bulgaria lost its Soviet 
creditor, “life as it is” took over “life as ought to be.” For ordinary Bulgarians, this 
break of division between vernacular and official (i.e. mediated) levels of social life 
signals that the nation lost its ability to emulate modern European reality. With no 
state control and external conditions for credit, Bulgarians had no model of modernity 
to catch up with and, hence, they were left to regress back in the backward Balkans. 
Historically, this music emerged in the early 1980s signaling the end of state 
monopoly over local popular culture production. As I wrote earlier, chalga invokes 
associations of the post-socialist music sounds with modernity crisis. Bulgarians are 
suspicious of an eclectic music style that has emerged from the consumer market 
rather than from the cultural elite (which, at large, still maintains socialist realist 
aesthetics). This suspicion connotes with a common local notion that the masses 
cannot generate spontaneously culture that is at the same time popular and modern; 
only the state can direct it from above.  
The repertoire of songs depicting the post-socialist transition as modernity 
crisis is vast.25 One of them, Tiger Tiger” (Tigre tigre), I do want to present now, 
since it connects crisis with the shift of shef position from the paternalist state to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 For the “is” vs. “ought” formula of socialist realism see Taylor 1998. Slavoj Zizek (2009: 174-175) 
analyzes the archetype, i.e. “the typical,” as a symptom of hegemony. For a theoretical analysis of 
socialist realism, see Mozheiko 2009. 
25 For a comprehensive discursive analysis of chalga song lyrics, see Dimov 2001. 
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paternalist Mafiosi and thugs. The song, performed by Rado “the Pinetree Cone” 
(Shisharkata) and “The priest” is a cover of the Romani traditional song “Fikre, 
Fikre;” it is a top “classical” chalga hit. One of the comments to the song’s clip on 
YouTube26 claims that “Tiger Tiger” is the anthem of Bulgarian Mafiosi in the 1990s:  
(A secretary voice) Hello, boss, someone is looking for you on the mobile 
phone      Alo, shefe, tŭrsiat te po mobifona  
 
(A 1st male voice) Hello, who’s there?  Alo, koe be?	  	  
 
(A 2nd male voice)  
Hey, bro, stop with these pyramids (money schemes e.l.), pharons  
Abre, brato, stiga ctia piramidi, 
faroni bre.  
Give money to do business    Dai pari da pravim bisnes 
 
  (1st male voice)     Ya pa toa….  
 
Oh Tiger Tiger, do you have money?  O, Tigre Tigre, imash li pari? 
Do you have money? Pretty women  Imash li pari? Hubavi zheni 
Oh Tiger Tiger, don’t you have money? O, Tigre Tigre, niamash li pari? 
Don’t you have money? Old Nannies  Niamash li pari? Stari babichki 
 
Refrain: Ahh, hopala, hey wrestlers27 give me money 
Ahh, hopala, haide bortsi daite 
mi pari  
Give me money, stupid women  Daite mi pari, glupavi zheni 
Ahh, hopala, hey wrestlers give me money Ahh, hopala, haide bortsi daite 
mi pari  
Give me money, songs to dawn  Daite mi pari, pesni do zori 
 
Oh Tiger Tiger, do you have money?  O, Tigre Tigre, imash li pari? 
Do you have money? Western cars  Imash li pari? Zapadni koli 
Oh Tiger Tiger, don’t you have money? O, Tigre Tigre, niamash li pari? 
Don’t you have money? Old Zhiguli28 Niamash li pari? Stari Zhiguli 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  “popa i rado - tigre, tigre,”	  accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p2Ls6HPT0-g.	  
27 “Wrestlers” (bortsi) is a reference to the former sports elite of socialist Bulgaria. After 1989, 
particularly wrestlers and weight lifters became symbols of the new illicit money elite by working as 
strongmen for Mafiosi-thugs [e.g. Ivanova 2002], who oftentimes owned insurance, security, and 
money exchange and lending firms. In chapter 1, I will discuss the role of Mafiosi’s and wrestlers’ 
music clubs in the popfolk business model. 
28 Zhiguli was a model of the Soviet Russian car brand “Lada” produced between 1970-1985. The 
video clip juxtaposes Zhiguli with what one of the comments on youtube identifies as a 1991 model of 
BMW E30. 
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Refrain: Ahh, hopala, hey wrestlers give me money 
Ahh, hopala, haide bortsi daite 
mi pari  
Give me money, Western cars  Daite mi pari, zapadni koli 
Ahh, hopala, hey wrestlers give me money Ahh, hopala, haide bortsi daite 
mi pari  
Give me money, songs to dawn  Daite mi pari, pesni do zori 
 
Oh Tiger Tiger, do you have money?  O, Tigre Tigre, imash li pari? 
Do you have money? You have no worries Imash li pari? Niamash kahŭri 
Oh Tiger Tiger, don’t you have money? O, Tigre Tigre, niamash li pari? 
Don’t you have money? Your hair is white Niamash li pari? Beli ti kosi 
 
Refrain: Ahh, hopala, hey wrestlers give me money 
Ahh, hopala, haide bortsi daite 
mi pari  
Give me money, you have no worries Daite mi pari, niamash kahŭri 
Ahh, hopala, hey wrestlers give me money Ahh, hopala, haide bortsi daite 
mi pari  
Give me money, songs to dawn  Daite mi pari, pesni do zori 
 
 
The thirst in Bulgaria for grassroots popular music was so big in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s that the new music industry to which people refer as chalga provided 
unparalleled money profit opportunities to Bulgaria’s first business entrepreneurs. 
And since only the former socialist elite and black market operators had available 
capital to begin private businesses, most big post-socialist entrepreneurships operated 
as schemes of stealing and laundering illicit money (i.e. money stolen from the state 
or money accumulated from black market trade). For instance, Georgi Stoev, a 
Bulgarian mobster who crossed the lines and became an anti-crime journalist, 
published (until his assassination in 2008) a series of books about the local organized 
crime pointing out the close ties of the leading producers of the genre (above all, Slavi 
Trifonov) with mafia-run firms. The journalist Georgi Stoianov (2008) adds 
information particularly about the 500,000 German Marks, which the Mafiosi 
brothers Vasil (assassinated in 1995) and Georgi (assassinated in 2005) Ilievi donated 
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to the Viktor and Nencho Kŭsŭmovi, the two founding brothers of “Ara Audio-
Video,” the second largest chalga record label.  
The Finish ethnomusicologist Vesa Kurkela (1997) provides a fascinating 
account of how Mafia-run insurance companies, rather than the police and legal 
systems, eradicated the market of pirated chalga music recordings thereby enforcing 
copyright observation norms in Bulgaria during the early 1990s. The manner of 
eradication was brutal and simple. The production of chalga hits began with low-tech 
recording of live performances on audio demo cassettes. Gradually the production 
technique was upgraded to recording in studio and to the format of commercial 
cassettes and CDs. Street booths (sergii) were the most common sites of distribution. 
A fact that Kurkela does not mention was that street booths functioned as more than 
vending points, but also as the first enterprises of popfolk record labels. The most 
famous example is Mitko Dimitrov, who was a factory engineer during the socialist 
era. After 1989 he quit his job and opened a music cassettes booth in the open market 
of his hometown, Dimitrovgrad. Within less than a decade the booth developed into 
Payner Music the biggest popfolk record label, which owns also a music TV station 
(Planeta Televiziиa) and a nationwide chain of music discotheques (Planeta Payner 
Club). Informants praised to me Dimitrov’s great business skills, but in the same 
breath shared with me rumors that his music business was a channel for laundering 
“privatized” former state money. Kurkela writes that, to protect their commercial 
products, producers used to register them with one of the mafia-run insurance 
companies, which sent the company’s strongmen—the legendary bortsi (wrestlers) 
from the song “Tiger Tiger”—to patrol the streets in search of pirate recordings. 
Vendors who were caught selling such products were beaten with no mercy and the 
recordings were confiscated. Within a very short time, pirate commercial chalga 
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recordings disappeared altogether. Meanwhile the market of pirate foreign pop music 
still prospered to such an extent that Bulgaria was for a while the biggest global 
exporter of pirate music CDs. A popfolk music producer once illustrated to me his 
success as the owner of a pirate foreign pop CD factory with a story that Bill Clinton, 
on his first presidential visit to Bulgaria, asked his hosts to make special effort to 
close this factory down. 
Lip-syncing is not a component of the early chalga wave, first of all because 
Bulgarians mostly received chalga aurally (through audiocassettes), only later visually 
(live performance and video clips). Also, the mediated soundscape of chalga 
replicated spontaneous live performance rather than polished studio recording. Since 
the state controlled the entire local broadcasted media, pioneering chalga musicians 
could record their gigs only on homemade audiocassettes that were sold by street 
vendors. The first chalga star-singer was a mysterious persona called “The Priest from 
Hisar” (Hisarskiiat pop) whom people recognized solely by his recorded voice 
accompanied by a simple synthesizer.29 Interestingly, the addition of face and real 
name (Dimitŭr Andonov) to this persona weakened rather than invigorated his star 
status.  
Wedding bands, most famously Papazov-Ibriiama’s “Orkestŭr Trakiia,” used 
to record cassettes in village weddings that could attract tens of thousands of people. 
Such weddings were de-facto the first popular music concerts that were not organized 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 A few of Andonov’s emblematic hits are:  
“Give Your Heart” (Dai si sarceto), accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hpdW8DClIm8. 
“A Cigarette” (Edna cigara), accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UsZf8duDBMo&feature=related. 
“It Hurts Me” (Tejko mi e), accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7xLKWyVpg4U&feature=related. 
“Nine Mountains” (Devet planini), accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UZyU7Fb8vUs&feature=related. 
“I Love You” (Obicham te), accessed October 25, 2014,  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CwSk8oeN7xA&feature=related. 
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by the state. While this sort of chalga—wedding bands—is more instrumental than 
vocal, the sound of liveliness came from the emphasis of wedding bands on 
improvisation and fusion of acoustic and electrical instruments. Finally, Toni 
Dacheva the most famous singer of post-1989 chalga did not earn her stardom on her 
own. She was hired to add the vocal component to “Kristal band,” a musical 
entrepreneurial project of Krasimir Hristov, a Turkish-Bulgarian musician from the 
southeastern town of Yambol. The band acquired fame with their cover of the Serbian 
hit “The Stones are Falling Down” (Kamŭnite padat), sang by Andon Sŭbev.30 The 
singer Toni Dacheva, who joined the band in 1987 until quitting to pursue an 
independent career in 1998, shaped the model of popfolk singer-star, which defines 
the genre at present.31 Performing without a band required Toni Dacheva to shift to 
singing with sinback or “full playback” (i.e. lip-sync).  
The development of commercial musical industry and media in Bulgaria 
(since the early 2000s) led to the emergence of popfolk as a generic term and the 
marginalization of the register of chalga. Bulgarians usually use the Romani dance 
music of kiuchek as a referential index of chalga. Popfolk (or in its diminutive folk), 
on the other hand, signifies an industrial form produced in the cartel of a few record 
labels and performed by contractor star-singers. Aesthetically, popfolk does not 
consist of live instrumental music but of the performance of lip-syncing or at least 
sinbacking singers. In this sense, gigs or concerts do not define the locations of 
liveliness anymore, rather the studio recording and the video clip set do.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 “Камъните Падат - Андон Събев. Супер Качество," accessed October 25, 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fKZay5X5TRs.	  
31 Among Toni Dacheva and “Kristal” band’s greatest hits are:  
“Chocolates Candies” (Shokoladi bonboni) (together with the socialist Estrada star Mustafa 
Chaushev), accessed October 25, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YjDlqj39fAs. 
“Three Kilos of Bananas” (Tri kila banani), accessed October 25, 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vr_C_rCcsbQ. 
“Poor and Rich” (Bedni i bogati), accessed October 25, 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BsTvf6UySeg. 
	   92	  
This aesthetics of emphasized artificiality point to the return of the political 
economy of Estrada modified to private economy. This time singers can seek stardom 
by entering the production line of those record labels owned by shefs (and allegedly 
sponsored by bigger mafia shefs, who are themselves sponsored by foreign shefs). 
The cartel of labels monopolizes the performance and media market in a way that 
provides their singers with a protected business environment. If the shef wills it, a 
contractor singer will become a star; she will record songs, shoot video clips, be 
invited to gigs and receive media exposure. The gender hierarchy of this dependency 
is fairly explicit. Singers are predominantly women while all shefs are men. Women 
singers can gain some individual agency over their star career by securing for 
themselves a private shef, i.e. rich man who, in return for marriage and child, would 
release them from the need to link performance of stardom with market revenue. 
 The return of the Estrada structure of patriarchal dependency adapted to 
capitalist economy might sound grim to readers who seek the “authentic” voice of an 
individual artist. MacFadyen (2002) writes that this expectation has preserved the 
relevance of prominent Soviet Estrada stars even after the disintegration of the USSR. 
Partan (2007) summarizes this expectation of artistry behind stage artificiality when 
lamenting that post-Soviet Russian pop music (called popsa, the equivalent of 
Bulgarian popfolk) “has gradually pushed aside the other genres that existed in Soviet 
Estrada, making them unprofitable or unmarketable. Today’s pop stars can be roughly 
divided into two groups: old voices with new faces [Estrada stars e.l] and new faces 
with no voices [popsa stars e.l]” (ibid: 493). I often encountered similar distinctions 
made by older Bulgarians who reflected with nostalgia on socialist modernity. 
Younger Bulgarians, on the other hand, did not share this opinion. From them I 
usually heard that chalga was too crude and too simplistic. Popfolk, on the other hand, 
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was more modern; it replicated global pop music trends, similarly to the way Estrada 
was when it was a living genre.  
The groove of artificiality 
Keying Balkan musical elements to artificiality, I argue, is what infuses 
popfolk live shows with groove. I relate to this term—groove—as defines by Keil and 
Feld (2005). It is pleasure generated from experiencing worldview encoded in musical 
time feel. With indices of artificiality, singers turn music that otherwise connotes with 
chalga into Balkan music on the way to become Western pop. Popfolk artificiality is 
more ambivalent than the artificiality of Estrada, which was designed to mediate an 
unequivocal evolution. The question whether popfolk performers mediate evolution 
or devolution always remains open for debate. The role of singers is to convince that 
their performance indeed mediates evolution. The audience should be guaranteed that 
they observe a real star and not (what a TV commentator once called a famous 
popfolk singer) “a village prostitute.” Singers do so by ornamenting their gigs with 
many indices of artificiality that indicate how, indeed, this singer is backed by a 
strong shef. 
The phenomenological concept of genba in Japanese hip-hop (Condry 2006) 
is relevant to my ethnographic narration of the client patron relationship between 
popfolk stars and shefs. Condry writes that genba (literary, “place where actually 
something happens, appears, or is made,” ibid: 89) originated in Samurai martial arts 
and later circulated to Japanese self-imagination. Genba formulates location or locale 
(Gupta and Ferguson 1997)—that is, social interactions in which people perform 
Japanese identity through rhetoric of Samurai-type combat. He suggests employing 
genba beyond concrete situations but more as a speech event in Japan that “can be 
applied broadly to sites that become a focus of people’s energies and where 
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something is produced” (Condry 2006: 6). In the context of Japanese hip-hop, Condry 
maintains that genba keys this music to a dialectical combat of glocalization. Japanese 
performers, producers and consumers localize in their social reality idioms of 
African-American racial struggle imported to Japan via channels of global music 
commerce by keying those idioms to Samurai martial tradition. 
Applying Condry’s phenomenological approach to popfolk scenes of 
encounter, particularly gigs, I argue that lip-syncing and other features of star 
artificiality organize Bulgarians’ attention to another experience of global-local 
interaction, which is not combative but transitive. All conversations about popfolk 
singers lip-syncing on stage almost always started by taking this practice as a sign of 
crisis. People complained to me that, after democracy came, nothing remained real in 
Bulgaria. Only longer conversations and closer observation revealed to me the other 
aspect of artificiality—its mimic transparency with Western pop. It took me some 
time to link the derogatory and affirmative lines with a motive of “catching up” 
(navaksvane) that underlies the groove of intertextual gap with modern Europe. 
Bulgarians take it as a matter of fact that being one of the last Balkan dominions to 
attain national independence from the Ottoman Empire means that modernity has 
arrived to Bulgaria at the end, after all other European nations (except Albania, 
maybe). Bulgarians see their tardiness as chronic; they perpetually fall behind the 
“natural” pace of modernity (i.e. modernity as reflected from any of the locations of 
Occident). Artificiality is a manner of accelerating modernization, or more 
idiomatically, compensating for Bulgarian tardiness.  
The strong self-perception of falling behind the Occident is what makes the 
performance of popfolk star artificiality a risky business. Successful performances 
allow singers to appear as models of almost in step with contemporary pop music 
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trends in Europe. Failed performance runs the hazard of becoming subject of practical 
jokes. People derogate failed performance with idioms of Balkan backwardness, such 
as villager, Gypsy, simpleminded, and link them with classical literary satires of 
modernity failure. Singers explained to me that the audience derogates and mocks 
them while at the same time admiring them as pop stars for being so explicitly 
artificial on stage. Singers-informants were cognizant of their need to satisfy these 
contradicting expectations in a way that will enhance their demand for gigs. I learned 
that making artificiality seem original did not determine success or failure of 
performance. Convincing artificiality had to do with economic and political 
capabilities to produce visual and vocal appearance of contemporary Western pop 
stars. As I mentioned above, being able to take the risk of performing artificiality is 
the first step toward embarking on a professional popfolk music career. Lip-syncing 
in live shows is one of the main ways whereby singers call attention to the fact that 
they represent a shef with capital of circulating particular imagination of modern 
Europe to Bulgaria.  
On the road between the Balkans and Europe 
Diana Mishkova (2006) writes that, although Bulgarian national imagination 
can be defined as an unequivocal quest for Occidentalism, this quest has been 
turbulent because the Occident has never arrived to Bulgaria through one path and in 
a clear-cut form. Competing ideologies of European modernity have formulated what 
the Occident means, where it is located, which roads leads to it and where they pass. 
The mutual point of all these ideologies is a perception of the Balkan Peninsula as 
liminal to European modenrity, particularly the former Balkan dominions of the 
Ottoman Empire (the metonym of the Orient in European discourse of modernity). 
These lands are in Europe but their people are not real Europeans, i.e. not modern. 
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France, Germany and Britain have been standing as quintessential European loci, 
whose residents Balkan people should emulate in order to modernize. Russia is a 
more ambivalent location of European modernity. On one hand, Bulgarians recognize 
it as the national “liberator” from the Ottoman rule. On the other hand, historically 
Russia is not included within Occidental Europe but is considered more a Eurasian 
imperial power. Seeing themselves as the furthest eastern frontier of the Balkans (“the 
last hole on the caval” as the colloquial proverb goes),32 in the twilight zone between 
liminality and complete otherness to Europe (the Muslim Middle East stands in 
Bulgaria as the metonym of complete otherness), Bulgarians have been seeing the 
road to and from Europe as going through other more modern Balkan countries, 
above all Greece and Serbia, but also Ottoman Istanbul and Romania—all of them the 
most immediate sources of popfolk cover hits.  
Bulgarian literature, the popular media and everyday speech are saturated with 
phrases and narratives about Bulgarian personage living on a road between Europe 
and its liminal southeastern margins. The anthropologist and ethnomusicologist Carol 
Silverman told me that, when villagers in the Rhodope Mountains (southeast 
Bulgaria) go to Plovdiv (the second largest city in Bulgaria and the regional capital), 
they say “I am going to Europe” (Otivam do Evropa). An excerpt from Bulgarian 
newspaper dated 1995 reveals how being on the way to Europe enfolds strong local 
anxieties of liminality on the verge of complete otherness:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 This proverb is part of a practical joke from the socialist era, when Bulgarians used to add their 
professional titles on door nameplates, for example Eng. Dimitrov and Dr. Petkova. On one apartment 
appeared the name P.D.K Hristov. After many speculations one of the neighbors knocked on the door 
to ask Mr. Hristov for the meaning of his title. The answer was that the three letters were initials of 
poslednata dupka v kavala (the last hole in the kaval), meaning Mr. Hristov’s ultimate marginality was 
the only professional expertise he could add to his name. The joke ironizes Bulgarians’ apparent 
pretense of performing modernity (being engineer or doctor) vs. the reality of being the last stop before 
the Orient.  
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“Europe is a dream. You see yourself in France, you move on to Holland, by 
the well-lit roads you know you are in Belgium, a moment later you are in Germany, 
you hear Mozart and ask yourself, are you still in Germany or in Austria, when a 
grain of sand gets in your eye, you wake up and realize that you are in Slovakia, hey 
brother, there's a problem, says the customs agent, who blackmails you into giving 
him 100 marks, no problem, says the agent, as you approach Hungary you get sand in 
your other eye, your eyes start to water, hey brother, there's a problem-your clothes 
aren't the right size for the Hungarian customs officer, but that's no problem, brother-
your shoes fit him just fine, above the sand like graveside crosses stand the spires of 
cathedrals, but even these marks of civilization gradually disappear, the sand has 
buried the border with Romania, but some uniformed scorpion explains that Romania-
that's him, and that you have to take your shirt off in Romania, you wish you could 
fly, but you crawl across the desert towards Bulgaria” (Kulekov 1995: 11, quoted 
from Pilbrow 2005: 125). Important to mention, deserts do not exist in the physical 
Bulgarian landscape, but more than a couple of thousand miles further east.   
The 19th century fictitious hero-villian Ganio Balkanski (Konstantinov [1895] 
2010), a small-scale rose oil salesman, authored by Aleko Konstantinov (1863-1897) 
is the quintessential personification of Balkan liminality in Buglarian self- 
imagination. The travelogue of this “modern Bulgarian” (as Konstantinov calls him 
ironically, if not oxymoronically) throughout Europe and then back in Bulgaria is 
composed as short tragic-comic incidents. The better-known European section of 
Ganio Balkanski’s travelogue is narrated from the viewpoint of Europeanized 
compatriots: Bulgarian students abroad. The leitmotif of those incidents is Bai Ganio 
(the colloquial diminutive of Ganio Balkanski) shaming them in front of local 
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Europeans (who represent the quintessential modern civilized gaze) by exhibiting 
stereotypical boorish Balkan behavior. 
Roumen Daskalov (2001) argues that this clash between Bai Ganio’s “savage” 
national pride and the shame of his educated compatriots echoes a local debate 
between Bulgarian elitist literati and populist nationalists; the first camp sees in Bai 
Ganio the inherent inferiority of Bulgarian society to European civilization while the 
latter identify in him either the new local bourgeoisie which misunderstands 
modernity or local frustrations with unfulfilled promises of Bulgarians’ becoming an 
integral part of Europe. Mary Neuberger (2006) locates Bai Ganio’s trade of rose oil 
within Western tendencies of appropriating cultural objects from its colonialized 
peripheries thereby turning them into commodities that index exotic traditions. 
Buchanan (2006) points to this dynamics of appropriation and commodification in 
regard to the post-socialist World Music scene. The State and Radio Female Vocal 
Choir earned international acclaim for performing its socialist engineered form of 
modernized folklore (obrabotki) under new label, Le Mystère des Voix Bulgares.  
Similarly to these examples, the profession of popfolk singer (as Marta 
testifies) requires constant life on the road from one gig to the next in Bulgaria or in 
Western Europe and the US to perform for Bulgarian émigrés. The difference is that 
singers shift the course of the travel. They do not turn local Bulgarian culture into 
commodities of exotica in the modern world but turn European culture into 
commodities of occidental modernity in Bulgaria. Singers are commissioned to 
generate a momentary dream that the road has been completed. As media celebrities, 
their role is to bring audio-visual images of the modern world, as shown on the 
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screen, to social events Bulgarians associate with real life Balkan locality (which is by 
definition recursive to modernity).  
Bulgarians call this real life locality as bitie, mundane life of struggles for 
survival (similar to the Russian concept of byt that stands as an opposite realm to the 
sublime soul, e.g. Lemon 2000). The art of popfolk music singers is to perform a 
convincing illusion of arrival but to limit it with registers of bitie that remind the 
audience that arrival is only a dream, by no means an accurate reality. The reason is 
that both audience and singers see one main difference between Bulgarian and 
European bitie. My informants told me that European societies are modern by the fact 
that the state provides ordinary people with material means to choose how to live as 
individuals. In Bulgaria, on the other hand, a thin crust of money oligarchy that runs 
business organizations holds those means. During socialism the party oligarchy built 
its business conglomerate within the state. The post-socialist oligarchy privatized this 
conglomerate and adapted it to the private market economy. Both during the socialist 
state economy and afterward, I was told, to survive individually one needs to enter 
into client-partron relationship with a boss-owner of (at least) one organization in 
order to survive.  
The intertextual lines of continuity between Estrada and popfolk disclose that 
the patron-client relationship between shefs and star-singers underlies the semiotic 
associations between artificial voice and artificial individual personality during 
socialism and afterwards. Bulgarians receive vocal artificiality as a prescription for 
“healing” Bai Ganio’s spontaneous “abnormality.” Both in his derogatory and 
affirmative interpretations, Bai Ganio reminds Bulgarians that Europe is the goal to be 
attained at the end of a modernization road rather than a state of being. And since this 
goal is not about to be achieved, Bulgarians can perform modern European personage 
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only in artificial manner. Associations between artificial voice and modern local 
personage are not unique to music. They appear in many realms of Bulgarian social 
life. The ethnographic narrative about lip-synching, to which I turn later, aims to 
highlight a question that Bulgarians frequently express with deep frustration: why in 
Bulgaria, to be normal always requires entering in protectionist relationship with an 
authoritarian shef. 
Chalga shefs dominated the music scene during the 1980s through second half 
of the 1990s. They were charismatic musicians, similarly to Rumba music chefs in 
Zaire (White 2008). Those shefs had both artistic skills of leading male instrumental 
ensembles in live performance and business skills of competing in the market of gigs. 
The most famous representatives of this wave are Ivo Papazov-Ibriama who led 
Orkestŭr Trakiia, Krasimir Hristov—the leader of Orkestŭr kristal and Slavi 
Trifonov—the leader of Ku-Ku Band. Occasionally these bands hired female singers. 
Informants pointed to the mid-1990s as the time the shef leadership passed to the 
hands of record labels boss-owners, above all: Mitko Dimitrov from Payner, Viktor 
and Nencho Kŭsŭmovi from Ara Audio-Video/Diapazon music and Krum Krumov 
from Sunny Music. The mid-1990s is also roughly when people started talking about 
popfolk rather than chalga. The emergence of record label shef brought about the 
marginalization of instrumental male live ensembles. Female singers contracted with 
record labels became the trademark of the popfolk music scene. Earning a contract 
with a record label meant that singers could have access to audio and video 
infrastructure. The label also provided impresario services of gigs and the guarantee 
that singers would receive their honorarium. The label bosses created a monopoly of 
music media, and so only singers contracted in the respective labels could enter media 
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circulation (above all, Planeta TV for singers contracted in Payner and Fen TV for 
singers contracted in Ara or Diapason).  
Slavi Trifonov is maybe the only chalga shef who developed a hybrid business 
model with popfolk. He continues performing with Ku-Ku Band both live and on his 
longstanding latenight TV show “Slavi’s Show” (Shouto na Slavi). At the same time 
he is the owner-boss of a media label (7/8 production) that, in addition to this TV 
show, produces singers on the twilight generic zone between popfolk and Western 
pop.  
Communal capitalism—the political economy of modernity brokership  
The Bulgarian economic historian Roumen Avramov (2001, 2003, 2007) 
provides a longue durée perspective to the shef-singer relationship when analyzing the 
role artificiality and protectionism have played as local politicians, economists, 
intellectuals and artists have attempted in the last two-centuries to “heal” the nation 
from its perceived incompatibility with European capitalism. This healing project 
begins with “the national revival” movement in the 19th century, which “recalled” a 
“forgotten” medieval Bulgarian nation lost in time due to its “enslavement” by the 
Ottoman Empire. The project of healing arrives to its climax with the “liberation from 
the Turkish yoke”—the local rendition of Bulgaria’s creation following the Russo-
Turkish War (1877-78) and the Congress of Berlin (1878). Attempts to constitute this 
recalled nation in modern times have gone through four major political 
configurations: autonomous principality, independent monarchy, Soviet-style 
socialism, and EU-style liberal democracy. 
Avramov points to one anxiety that has formulated all attempts to close the 
perceived gap between modern Europe and the traditional and/or backward post-
Ottoman Balkans. Regardless of their ideological differences, Bulgarian nation-
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builders have understood the problem of catching up (navaksvane) with modernity as 
one of trying to construct capitalism (or a modification of capitalism in the case of 
communism) in a post-Ottoman peasant society without capital. Avramov’s starting 
point is that capitalism is more than an economic ideology; it is the organizing 
principle of modern social life. Regardless of its different political configurations 
(liberalism, monarchist etatism, communism, neo-liberalism etc.), capitalism 
organizes private and public life around individual agency, responsibility and risk 
taking—the presumed values of “genuine” (Western European) modernity. This 
approach to capitalism reveals the underlying anxiety of Balkan liminality. Bulgarians 
see themselves as incapable of modernizing independently and so they perpetually 
depend on creditors and lenders who would provide them with capital to perform 
individuality, artificially.  
“Communal capitalism” stems from a scholarly perspective that was dominant 
during the Cold War era, which considered capitalism foreign to Eastern Europe, in 
general (e.g. Chirot 1991), and Bulgaria, in particular (e.g. Gerchenkorn 1962). 
Avramov adds a perception of artificiality to this paradigm by drawing upon the pre-
WWII Bulgarian economist and historian Stoian Bochev who argued that “capitalism 
is unsympathetic to Bulgarians. If capitalism in the other countries, at least in its 
beginnings was considered as a source of social welfare and had the energetic public 
and state support, [in Bulgaria] it was considered as an artificial addendum to the 
economic structure of the country’” (Bochev 1931/1998: 102, original italics).  
Avramov stresses that this nation did not earn its independence thanks to the 
agency, responsibility and risk taking of its individual members. Just like other 
contemporary peripheral nations, he maintains, Bulgaria was formed by 19th century 
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European powers as a playground for their economic experiments. He maintains that 
to study Bulgarian history, one should analyze how creditors infused it with capital 
demanding in return compliance with their terms of modernization. As a result, 
Bulgarians cannot imagine national modernity as a civic contract of free individual 
agents but only as a collective that executes en mass a top-down imposed program of 
modernization, in which Bulgarian society would finally become “truly European.” 
“Communal capitalism,” Avramov concludes, signifies a culture of conditionality. 
The organizing principle of Bulgarian personal and public life entails shifting between 
cooperation with and sabotage of whatever model of modernity an exterior power 
imposes as a prerequisite for relieving Bulgarians’ chronic shortage of capital. Creed 
(1997) calls this organizing principle “conflicting complementarities.” Cooperation 
complimented with sabotage is how Bulgarians domesticate changing modernization 
projects in their local social life. They act in this manner to for compensate their 
inferior position vis-à-vis their “modernizers.” 
On the socio-political level, Avramov maintains that the culture of 
conditionality has formed Bulgarian mentality oriented to paternalism, etatism and 
conformism. This orientation comes from the fact that an “[E]ntire social strata is 
missing. The middle class and liberal professions are extremely weak—the state is 
systematically stronger than the citizen. Thus the national bourgeoisie (as well as 
‘intellectuals’) developed a close, opportunistic dependence on the state” (Avramov 
2003:6). He concludes that cooperatives define public life and “pseudo-
individualism” defines life in private. “Bulgarians are individualist when it comes out 
to appropriate gains or collective wealth, but they are fierce collectivists when the 
issue is distribution of losses” (Avramov 2003: 6). By no means does he see 
cooperatives as a local form of capitalism beyond mechanisms of imitation. Bochev 
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provides the rationale for this perception when writing that “[W]e want to skip ... the 
capitalistic stage of economic development, to obtain the fruits of the bourgeois and 
capitalist regime, but without the capitalism itself, without the capitalistic 
organization of enterprises…While everywhere else cooperatives are considered as 
capitalism’s correctives [in Bulgaria] they are seen as antipodes, as ways out, as 
deniers of the capitalistic stage of economic development” (Bochev 1928: 253, quoted 
from Avramov 2003:5). 
Comaroff and Comaroff’s (2001) argument regarding different ethnographic 
context—South Africa—helps me locate Bochev’s and Avramov’s equations of 
capitalism with autonomous individualism in the colonialist and domineering self-
formation and self-imagination of European societies. While such equations exhibit 
personality among the achievements of modern European societies in contrast with 
the presumably collectivist character of presumably traditional societies, “neither in 
Europe, nor in any place to which [personality as individual autonomy e.l.] has been 
exported, does it exist as an unmediated social reality” (ibid: 267). Hence, I do not 
take artificial personality as the negative counterpart of natural one but as a form of 
being-in-the world which encapsulates an experience of trying to implement imported 
concepts, narratives, images and, at large, ideologies of what European modern is and 
what Bulgarian modernity “ought to be” (if to use the socialist realist formula).  
Overall, when Bulgarians equate capitalism with modernity they implicitly 
distinguish between individuality and individualism. People see individualism as the 
driving force of “real” modern (i.e. capitalist) societies whose identity depends on 
people’s political and cultural persuasions. Social autonomy comes from individual 
interpretations of what it means to be an autonomous person. Such interpretations 
circulate to Eastern European countries, like Bulgaria, as authoritative models that 
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teach people how to be modern individuals. Here I recall again the duality of 
transparency and gap in performances of replica as expressed in the proverb “the 
same thing but totally different.” I add another idiom to it with which Bulgarians 
communicate what they experience as second hand European modernity with a 
metaphor of filtered coffee. Modern forms that originate in the Occident arrive to 
Bulgaria as vtora tsedka (second strainer)—a metaphoric allusion to the infamous 
practice of local cafes (especially during socialism) to save on coffee by reusing the 
grains.  
 This metaphor reveals a local perspective on artificiality as a manner of relating 
to modernity not as a state of being but as a goal of becoming, which cannot be 
achieved in a “natural” way without cyborg dependency (Haraway 1991). Lip-
syncing, bleached hair, silicon implants, cover songs etc. are communication devices 
that prompt popfolk singers and their audience to accept as a matter of fact that 
national modernity is not natural to their society but artificially transplanted. Both in 
the musical context and beyond it, Bulgarians perform with indices of artificiality the 
success (or failure) of the transplanting operation of changing powers (and their 
paradigms of modernity: monarchism, communism, and liberal democracy). People 
maintain that they can modernize only if they rely on technological prostheses 
imported to Bulgaria from Europe by patrons whose financial and technological 
means endow them with the power to be shefs. Meaning, they can impose their will 
on the society by behaving simultaneously as benefactors and oppressors;33 they can 
provide for people’s needs but condition provision with compliance.  
Dyer (1979) argues that while Western stars perform images of ideal 
individuality their power of performance depends on commercial entertainment 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 This is how Buchanan (2006: 177) characterizes the relationship between Bulgarian professional 
folklore musicians and state cultural authorities during socialism. 
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industry that produces stars. Bulgarians tend to see a different sort of dependency in 
local stars. I was told many times that the local entertainment industry is too weak and 
poor to produce star-singers who could match the Western “originals.” And so, to 
perform stardom, Bulgarian singers need to rely on shefs, who provide them with the 
means to produce symbols of stardom. The closing part of this chapter centers 
specifically on the performance of popfolk star-shef dependency with lip-synced 
replication of live singing voice.  
Voice and Agency 
Ervin Goffman (1981) writes that speech is not an act done by an individual 
person, a speaker, rather it is a social event in which there are three participant-roles: 
principal, author and animator. “Principal” is the one in whose name words are 
uttered and who is accountable for their consequence. Author is the one who 
composes the content of an utterance. Animator is the person who actually performs 
an utterance. Paying attention to convergences and divergences among the three 
participant roles, according to Goffman, can teach us about the social dynamics of 
every speech event; specifically, people’s abilities to compose speech, to take 
responsibility for it and to perform it to indicate their social position (or, in Goffman’s 
terminology, the footing).  
Keane (1997) uses this triad participant role model to criticize the association 
of voice with modern individual rationality. Western mind, he argues, does not 
recognize the ability of other, more collective sorts of agencies to be communicated, 
performed and negotiated. Studying rituals of negotiation among Indonesian 
Ankalangs, he explains that voice means the competence as well as responsibility of 
negotiators to animate formulaic speech, which stands as a symbolic alternative to 
fight and always carries the risk of turning into actual fight. Agency is performed on 
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two levels. First, it is embedded in the ritual itself whose “performance structure 
groups together the persons in whose name the event takes place along with others 
who benefit from it, who direct it, or whose intentionality it mediates” (ibid: 140-
141). Second, people perform agency in their “capacity to motivate, respond to, and 
resolve authoritative, recognizable actions and events” (ibid) that come up in regard to 
the ritual. Importantly, Keane stresses that, contrary to the common Western view of 
voice and agency, Anakalang people do not relate these faculties of animating voice 
to any human individualistic subjectivity, but attribute them performatively to 
supernatural subjects. In the case of Bulgaria, I argue that European creditors play the 
role of such transcendent actors whose agency popular singers animate when lip-
syncing on stage.  
As the poster announcing Marta’s gig in Sliven indicates, it was important for 
the organizers to remind the audience the record label with which Marta is contracted. 
On the other hand, while the name of the label’s shef is familiar to the public, people 
in Bulgaria would most probably not recognize his face. The reason is that he (as well 
as his colleague shefs) tends to avoid media exposure. Informants oftentimes took this 
tendency as a proof that popfolk record label shefs served the business interests of 
bigger more invisible chains of shefs that extends beyond Bulgaria.   
Weidman (2006, 2003) develops a similar perception of communal agency 
(without the transcendent aspect though) performed in individual feminine voice: 
professional women singers of Indian classical music. The traditional line of the 
profession, Weidman writes, belonged to Devadasis, hereditary women singers and 
dancers from non-Brahmin classes, who were not regarded as modest women. Since 
the early 20th century, they have been classified as prostitutes to distinguish them 
from a new style of upper-class women singers, who performed a “clean,” “modest” 
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and “educated” form of the same music thereby voicing modern middle-class Indian 
private and public spheres. Weidman stresses that poetics of natural voice index 
middle class values. My study shows that in Bulgaria the same values are signified by 
natural voice that is mechanically controlled. Marta was very proud of her vocal skills 
that spanned many different genres, from Bulgarian folklore to Estrada ballads. 
Nevertheless she was aware that singing over the studio recordings of her voice 
signaled her rise from a chalga tavern singer (krŭchmarska pevitsa) into a popfolk 
star.  
Weidman, Keane as well as my study build upon Briggs and Bauman (1992), 
who, as I wrote earlier, argue that texts become part of discourse through a procedure 
of intertextual calibration; close or distant relations to other texts that stand for a 
defined genre (which Briggs and Bauman see as speech regimented by language 
ideology). According to Bauman and Briggs (ibid; 2003), intertextual gaps, 
homogeneity and hybridity reveal more about the ideology of distinction than about 
the utterances (musical and others) themselves. As I will show in the next section, a 
seemingly failed lip-synced duet prompts Bulgarians to classify Estrada as 
transparent with modern pop music while chalga and, to lesser extent, popfolk, as pop 
hybridity. Bulgarians identify purity and homogeneity in Estrada because it replicates 
sound and visual images that Bulgarians imagine as modern European pop. Chalga, 
on the other hand, is classified as hybrid, because it does not fit with any modern 
model but adapts vernacular culture to modern media. Popfolk, on the other hand, 
provides Bulgarians with a way to imagine a process in which they can gradually 
minimize the wide intertextual gap of hybrid chalga. Tendencies of popfolk singers to 
lip-sync resonate to Bulgarian audience with Estrada. This manner of voice 
artificiality indexes that the music performed on stage will replicate (i.e. be 
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homogenous with) whatever pop music voices are currently fashionable in Europe, 
just as Estrada voices were until 1989. 
I am turning now to narrate how the performance of popfolk artificial star 
personage keys notions of “second strainer” modernity to a sense of stability and 
normality by examining two events in which popfolk singers performed star 
personality. My discussion revolves around what I judged as failed performance event 
in a festive concert titled “Bridge to the Balkans.” The Serbian singer Miroslav Ilich 
did not keep the appearance of liveliness when lip-syncing the duet “Tempt and Run” 
(Zavedi i Beži) with the Bulgarian popfolk singer Reni. Comments I collected after 
the show revealed to me that Bulgarian viewers actually approved of Reni’s 
performance because she uniquely had the means to produce her own artificial voice 
as a free agent, without dependency on local musical shef. I learned that thanks to this 
independence as well as her close ties with the Serbian music business allowed her to 
present herself beyond popfolk, being an almost European pop star.  
“Tempt and Run” 
My friend-informant Veselin Karchinski, his daughter Marina, her boyfriend 
Zhoro (all pseudonyms and the main protagonists of chapter 3) and myself went 
together to the music concert “Bridge to the Balkans.” Miroslav Ilich and Shaban 
Shaulich, the two icons of 1970s Yugoslav novokomponovana narodna muzika 
(newly composed folk music, e.g. Rasmussen 2012) performed alongside the 
Bulgarian popfolk singer Reni. The concert took place at Hall no. 1 (Zala 1) of the 
National Palace of Culture (known in Bulgarian as NDK, Natsionalen Dvorets na 
Kulturata). This castle-like modernist monument located at the center of Sofia and 
surrounded by a big public park is Bulgaria’s official national concert hall. Opened in 
1981, its construction was the project of Liudmila Zhivkova, the daughter of the late 
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socialist leader, Todor Zhivkov and self-appointed patron of Bulgarian culture. To 
these days, NDK hosts the most important foreign and local concerts, festivals, 
congresses, and exhibitions in Bulgaria. Its prestige has remained so high after 1989 
that the state’s official protocol still maintains the requirement from the socialist era: 
at the end of every performance in Hall no. 1, the performers should receive a basket 
of flowers from the office of the president of the Republic of Bulgaria, regardless the 
genre of the performance. 
Tickets to the concert were not cheap by Bulgarian standards, 20-60 leva ($15-
40, the average monthly salary in 2008 was around $300). Nevertheless, I did not see 
any empty seat (3380 people is the maximal capacity). The visual outlook of the 
attendants suggested that they were ordinary Sofia people, by no means the post-
socialist money elite, one of the stereotypical local audiences of Serbian music. 
People from this elite usually consume Serbian music in expensive “folk clubs” 
(taverns specializing in Bulgarian popfolk and its Balkan equivalents). On the way to 
NDK, I heard people talking with excitement about the two Serbian music icons. 
Former Yugoslav music has high prestige in Bulgaria. Lepa Brena, the Bosnian music 
diva from Ilich’s and Shaulich’s generation, holds the record of the most attended 
concert in Bulgarian history. More than 80,000 people packed the National Stadium 
in her historical concert in summer 1990, the first public performance of a foreign 
music star in post-1989 Bulgaria.34  
Oftentimes informants stressed to me their fandom of Yugoslav music by 
recalling with pride their firsthand memories from that concert. People especially 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 LEPA BRENA - KONCERT, SOFIJA BUGARSKA, 1990, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_BxTVG025zQ, accessed October 25, 2014. 
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remembered the famous scene from this concert: Lepa Brena landed on the stadium 
with a helicopter that flew her all the way to the stadium field while her band was 
already playing on stage. While Serbian music stars are already regular performers in 
the local music scene, they are still regarded as greater stars than their Bulgarian 
colleagues. This perception is not limited only to music. As I wrote earlier, Mishkova 
(2006) argues that, historically, Serbia has been a prime channel of circulating the 
modern Occident in Bulgaria. Indeed, I saw how this channel works from both sides 
of the border. Yugoslav goods invoke in Bulgarians memories of contact with the 
West, which was closed to them during communism. Many of my Serbian 
acquaintances tend to relate to Sofia not as a city but as an urbanized village.  
Reni was scheduled to sing second, after Miroslv Ilich but before Shaban 
Shaulich. I asked Vesco (the diminutive of Veselin) about the reason for this singing 
order. He said that it was intended to guarantee that people would not come late or 
leave early to skip her part. I told him that Reni was after all a prominent singer in the 
local popfolk scene. On the program she was presented as equal to Ilich and Shaulich. 
Vesco insisted that the audience did not take this façade of equality seriously. He said 
that Reni could present herself on the program however she wanted because she 
produced the concert and paid to the two Serbian stars’ honorarium.  
Vesco reminded me of rumors that Reni managed to fulfill the stereotypical 
goal of a popfolk female singer: to marry a rich man and bring him a child so that he 
would finance her entire career and release her from dependency on record labels. I 
told Vesco that I was familiar with the rumors about Reni. I knew the stories that 
Reni’s husband allegedly had close connections with the post-Yugoslav shady 
business circles in Serbia. Building on these connections (and her husband’s money) 
Reni released a few albums and often performed in Serbia. She also collaborated with 
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top Serbian popular singers from the Serbian music conglomerate Grand Production. 
Vesco said with conviction that Reni’s financial backing was stronger than that of all 
other popfolk singers. He emphasized to me that she worked independently outside a 
popfolk record label and produced concerts in NDK; particularly the latter no other 
popfolk singer could even dream to do. 
I have no idea whether the rumors that Reni’s stardom depended on her 
husband’s ties with the shady Serbian money elite have any truth in them. The fact 
that I have never met or communicated with Reni allows me to write about her 
concert at NDK in a way I could not do had I known her personally. From my other 
communications with popfolk singers, I know that they are highly sensitive to 
associations with the derogatory voice of chalga. Particularly moments of 
performance failures, as the one I am about to narrate momentarily, put singers at risk 
of losing their celebrity face. The Bulgarian popfolk scene is so small that it is so 
difficult to write ethnographically about singers without drawing gaps between the 
“real life” persons and their artificial stage personae. As I explained above, such an 
exposure of artificiality does not invoke an aura of an “authentic” artistic soul. On the 
contrary, the difference between the stage and everyday personae signifies for 
Bulgarians their gap with modern Europe. It implies that singers imitate western 
forms of pop stardom; however too much exposure shifts the attention from the stage 
(“life as it ought to be”) to everyday reality (“life as it is”).  
Marina and Zhoro ran a bit late. Vesco and I waited for them in front of the 
building. I observed the stream of people who were coming inside. As I mentioned 
earlier, the audience was diverse though I saw mostly mid-age people who were 
young when novokomponovana muzika was illegal or semi-legal in socialist Bulgaria. 
Quite a few of them carried bouquets of flowers. Once our companions arrived we all 
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entered NDK and hurried in the corridors to take our seats. The concert had already 
begun. From within the concert hall we heard Miroslav Ilich singing with his 
powerful alto voice. All of us were very excited to see Mioslav Ilich and Shaban 
Shaulich live, especially Vesco who as a matter of fact considered Serbia the land of 
high quality Balkan pop music, better than what he called “our cheap Bulgarian 
imitation.”  
 It was Vesco’s first time at the concert of any Serbian mega-star. He still 
lived in his native village when Lepa Brena gave her legendary concert. I observed 
Miroslav Ilich onstage half a year earlier. It was again at Reni’s concert at Hall 1 of 
NDK, which she produced to celebrate “20 Years Onstage, 10 Years of Reni’s Hits.” 
That was a big spectacle with dancers, pyrotechnics, and guest singers. Ilich sang 
there a couple of songs as a guest alongside with Neda Ukraden, another Yugoslav 
novokomponovena diva and the Serbian young performer, DJ Krmak. The Bulgarian 
guest singers were the socialist Estrada stars, Duet Riton and Orlin Goranov. The 
concert was documented and broadcasted later on bTV, the first nationwide private 
channel.  
At that festive concert Reni and Miroslav Ilich sang together their (then) new 
duet “Tempt and Run” (Zavedi i beži35), which ran frequently on popfolk radio 
stations during 2008. I love this song. It has this powerful groove that earned the 
name “turbo” to Serbian pop and folk fusion. The melody does not have dramatic 
darkness typical of Turbo-folk songs. It tends more to popfolk’s light cheerfulness 
combined with trumpets and trombones, the common characteristic of Serbian 
Romani music, which Goran Bregović, the Boban and Marko Marković Trumpet 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 “Reni & Miroslav Ilic - Zavedi i bezi - live in concert,” 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mgTNHgNPEXI, accessed October 25, 2014. 
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Orchestra, DJ Shantel, Gogol Bordello, Emir Kusturica and the No Smoking 
Orchestra as well as Esma Redžepova turned in the 1990s into a World Music 
emblem of Balkan carnivalesque (Hofman 2014). 
I was disappointed, though, at that concert when I saw that Ilich and Reni lip-
synced the duet. The artificiality of their singing was not hidden; there was nothing 
extraordinary in it. All the popfolk shows I attended in Bulgaria were either lip-
synced or performed with live voice over recorded tracks. As I mentioned earlier, the 
professional term in the Bulgarian music business for lip-sync is playback and for live 
singing over recorded tracks is sinback (probably a modification of sing-back). 
Popfolk singers are not the only ones who rely on playback or sinback; Estrada 
singers do as well, especially when they perform at NDK. The official explanation is 
that Hall 1 was designated to host the congresses of the Bulgarian Communist Party 
and therefore acoustic quality for music performance was not taken into 
consideration. Since I observed so many concerts at NDK I knew that while this hall 
indeed does not have the clearest acoustics, it is still good enough for music 
performance, particularly pop music. 
I was happy to see that in “Bridge to the Balkans” Ilich performed live with no 
playback or sinback. He sang his trademark hits followed by a band consisting of a 
drum set, percussions, two accordions, two synthesizers, bass guitar, clarinet and 
flute. He was dressed with a black suit, white shirt, and black shoes. The audience 
was excited. People stood up and danced to the music; others clapped and sang out 
loud. I saw a few people dancing kiuchek. Others danced variations of Bulgarian folk 
dances which center on shoulders, hands and legs but skip the hips (which indexes 
kuichek). Vesco was on his feet dancing during the entire show. He lifted his hands up 
and twisted his hips in kiuchek moves.  
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I enjoyed the music performance very much, but did not feel desire to stand up 
and dance. I usually prefer to sit and listen, to let the music mesmerize my body and 
soul with groove. This is the reason I cannot really enjoy popfolk music performance, 
despite my love for the music. I was brought up on rock and classical music aesthetics 
and so I am not used to getting the groove of live performance when a computer plays 
synthetic music sounds instead of real players who produce them in real-time on 
stage. 
As is common in Bulgaria, people from the audience approached the stage and 
handed flower bouquets to Miroslav Ilich. One man gave him a soccer ball as a 
present. The practice of people from the audience handing flower bouquets to singers 
is common especially to socialist Estrada, whose singers still hold occasional live 
concerts (sometimes with live music, sometimes with playback and sinback). Usually, 
bouquet keys the show to an artful concert. 
 Miroslav Ilich’s number ended after forty-five minutes. The audience clapped 
and a new song began: Reni’s and Ilich’s duet “Tempt and Run.”36 I immediately paid 
attention that the instrumental music switched from live to recorded performance. 
Except the difference between recorded and live sound, the song starts with an 
instrumental introduction of brass band, which was not present on stage. After 
spending some time in Bulgaria I got used to this quick switching between live 
performance and lip-sync. My emotional reaction was to instantly switch off my 
expectations of pleasure and remain in my observation mode. The following events 
surprised me. I had never seen such a failure of performance in Bulgaria before.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 “Рени Концерт 16.10.08 Мирослав Илич,” accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://vbox7.com/play:abafb0b1. 
	   116	  
Reni came on stage during the instrumental introduction. She wore a long red 
ball gown with no sleeves and deep décolleté. Ilich greeted her entree with hand 
gestures. He took Reni by the hand and escorted her to the front of the stage. They 
greeted the audience. Ilich’s singing part began, however he did not animate his 
recorded voice, but continued the greeting ceremony. Then, when Reni sang her line, 
he kneeled down, lifted his soccer ball, the one he received from a fan in the audience, 
waved to the audience and left the stage quickly. Reni turned to his direction and 
waved at him as if she was calling him back. He did not react and she returned 
quickly to lip-sync her part in his absence. Within a very long half a minute, Ilich ran 
back to the stage. He held his microphone, however he did not lip-sync his lines. He 
hugged Reni’s shoulders, went down on his knees and followed her singing part with 
hand gestures. From time to time he lip-synced, most of the time he improvised with 
body gestures to his recorded voice that was heard from the sound system. The band 
onstage lip-synced the instrumental track of the duet during the entire duet.  
This lack of synchronicity between the lips with the playback hit me with 
embarrassment. I really blushed. I felt that these two performers lost their face. I was 
waiting to see how the audience would react; whether people would protest against 
what I experienced as exposed fakeness of live performance. From time to time I 
looked at Vesco curious to see how he received this failure. He continued to dance to 
the song. I assumed, though, that he had paid attention to the breakdown of the live 
singing illusion. The duet ended. The audience clapped with excitement and cried 
“Ilich, Ilich, Ilich.” Reni and Ilich greeted each other, this time with their live voices. 
Then Ilich left the stage and Reni’s singing part continued. 
I was disappointed with Reni. In my view she had destroyed the show. Why 
did she have to lip-sync the duet? I held her responsible because Ilich performed his 
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number live. Also, I was accustomed to observing Serbian singers singing in concerts 
with live music, while Bulgarian singers using playback and sinback. After the show I 
asked Vesco what he thought about that failed lip-syncing. He smiled and said that 
there was nothing special about it. He paid attention but didn’t really care. The 
switching to lip-syncing only reaffirmed to him what he already thought, i.e. that 
Bulgarian singers were essentially inferior to the their Serbian colleagues. Vesco 
maintained that in Serbia people knew how to make a real musical show. In Bulgaria, 
all musical shows were low quality products, like all what we buy here in the stores. 
He concluded that a person who lived in Bulgaria needed to accept being in an 
inferior position to real European countries as a fact of life.  
Some media reports on the “Bridge to the Balkans” mentioned the 
asynchronicity of voice and lips in this duet performance. They mostly blamed 
Miroslv Ilich rather than Reni. Reni was cited explaining that Ilich did not learn his 
lines for another duet and so she had to lip-sync this song in the last moment. 
Journalists applauded Reni who, when Ilich failed to follow even his recorded voice, 
kept lip-syncing her part and thus showed her professionalism.  
Online commentators were more ambivalent. One person blamed Ilich for 
“destroying such a beautiful song.” Another commentator mocked Reni by stating 
that Ilich refused to lip-sync. A third person derogated altogether this concert that, in 
his mind, had too much chalga and kiuchek. The incident of failure did not seem to 
impact Miroslav Ilich or Reni negatively. In a newspaper interview shortly after the 
concert, for instance, Reni boasted with her insistence on live performance and 
denounced the prevalence of lip-syncing among her popfolk singer colleagues. 
Rolling the failure on Ilich, suggesting that he was so backward that he even 
cannot lip-sync properly only sing live, might carry an implicit ironic line of self-
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celebration. Maybe for the first time in its history, EU-member Bulgaria was now 
substantially closer to Europe than Serbia, which during my fieldwork was still 
negotiating with the EU its terms of candidacy. “We are Part of Europe,” stated 
posters at the front of the Bulgarian consulate in the Serbian city of Niš reminding the 
Serbians, who waited in long lines for visas, that the location of Europe had moved. It 
was now further east of Serbia and not anymore further west of Bulgaria. Serbians 
with whom I stood in line cursed the Bulgarian authorities with sarcasm blaming them 
that, since the country’s accession to the EU, they have been doing everything 
possible to make any occasional need to go to Bulgaria feel like an immigration to 
Europe. I met a Bulgarian-speaking Serb on the bus back from Niš to Sofia. He 
dismissed completely the appearances Bulgaria was making to be considered a 
European country. It was a pathetic pretense for him. Unlike Bulgaria, we have 
always been independent, he said, both during the time of Yugoslavia and afterward. 
Bulgaria, he uttered, is a miserable village that once was the puppet of the Ottoman 
Empire, after that of the USSR and now of the EU. I met this person again when I 
came to pick up my new visa from the Bulgarian consulate in Niš. He told me with 
excitement about his vacation at the Bulgarian Black Sea. He even went to a concert 
of the Estrada diva Lili Ivanova. He wanted so much to see the popfolk megastar Azis 
who had a gig at a nearby folk club, but unfortunately it did not worked out.  
Conclusion: Queer Europeanness 
The way Reni, Vesco and myself denounced lip-syncing resonates with a 
basic Western equation of “authentic” individual voice with modern individual 
agency. In the context of music, a singer is expected to be the sole natural producer of 
the voice she or he performs, otherwise that performance is inauthentic. I see 
Adorno’s critique of cultural industry (2001) as underlying the common wisdom in 
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the West that lip-syncing is one of “the maladies” of late capitalism, namely 
commercial culture industry and the loss of originality and authenticity to counterfeit 
and simulacra. A more emancipating approach relies on Walter Benjamin’s theory of 
mechanically produced art (1969). People in the West identify lip-synced 
performance as a feature of consumption rather than of ritual-style elevation.  
The Milli Vanilli scandal from the early 1990s is a famous example of both 
the detracting and tolerating approaches. Milli Vanilli was the name of the German 
duo, Fab Morvan and Rob Pilatus, which the German producer Frank Farian created 
in 1988. Their immediate commercial success was recognized with a Grammy award 
for the Best New Artists of that year. However, shortly after, the duo lost the award 
when their producer admitted to the press that Morvan and Pilatus never performed 
with their own voices. They did not only lip-sync on stage but were impostors of 
other musicians who were hired to sing in recordings. Analyzing this scandal, 
Auslander (1998, 1996) Milli Vanilli’s consumer popularity grew despite their 
disgrace among music connoisseurs. He explains these conflicting receptions with the 
fact that televisual media shifted the ideology of liveliness in popular music from the 
authentic interaction between performers and their audience (characteristic to rock) to 
market consumption of pre-produced synthetic images, which, in his mind, is a prime 
characteristic of pop.  
The two lip-syncing incidents in Barack Obama’s presidential inauguration 
lend validity to Auslander’s argument even beyond commercial pop. They show how 
our reception of musical liveliness is already habituated (or, in other words, 
remediated) in televisual performance. In 2009 cellist Yo-Yo Ma, violinist Yitzhak 
Perlman, pianist Gabriela Montero and clarinetist Anthony McGill pantomimed John 
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Williams’ “Air and Simple Gifts;”37 4 years later, in 2013 Beyoncé lip-synced the 
American national anthem.38 In both incidents, the performers explained that, due to 
the freezing temperature (2009) and lack of rehearsal time (2013), they could not 
produce high quality music sound that would create an experience of successful live 
performance that could be broadcasted globally. In both cases, the performers were 
required to save their artistic face by paying dues to the equation of “authentic” voice 
with individual agency. In the first case, the musicians highlighted their prestige as 
classical music artists; in the second case, Beyoncé reminded her vocal qualities in a 
press conference ten days later: she sang the national anthem in front of the media a 
cappella.39   
Milli Vanilli, the presidential inauguration and the performance in NDK 
prompt me to ask, why do the performing artists, Vesco and most of the voices I 
brought in the chapter ideologically denounce lip-syncing in speech while tolerating it 
in practice?  
Queer studies scholars (e.g. Kaminski and Taylor 2008; Newton 1979, Taylor 
and Rupp 2004) offer a unique perspective that helps me decentralize my habituated 
resistance to lip-syncing and see its value to Bulgarians. Building upon Fraser’s 
(1990) feminist critics of the politics of exclusion hidden in the concept of the rational 
subject (i.e. the bourgeois man, the basis of Habermas’ public sphere) and Haraway’s 
(1991) attention to the politics of gender domination underlying body “naturalness,” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 “Inauguration: Air + Simple Gifts By John Williams,” accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lBI6c4yBJAU. 
38	  “Beyoncé Sings the National Anthem at the 2013 Obama Inauguration,” The New York Times, 
accessed October 25, 2014, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z-DSFrGnQrk.  
39 “Beyonce sings national anthem at press conference, admits she lip-synced at inauguration,” [FOX 
411], January 31, 2013, accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/2013/01/31/beyonce-to-face-media-for-first-time-since-lip-
sync-scandal/. 
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such scholars study how lip-syncing alongside clothes, wigs, dance, body posturing, 
perfumes and other features of artifice and kitsch allow camp performers to 
carnivalize, resist or at least highlight gender heteronormativity (another language 
ideology realm of European modernity). A short scene in Pedro Almodovar’s film 
“All About my Mother”40 (1999), called Al Agrado’s monologue, deconstructs 
eloquently the metanarrative of naturalness and authenticity. Arroyo (2000: 260) 
describes the scene in the following way:  
“Agrado is transvestite who has left prostitution to become an assistant to 
a famous actress in Tennessee Williams’ Streetcar Named Desire. One 
day the star cannot make it to the performance and Agrado takes the stage 
to announce the cancellation of the play and offers a monologue about 
the story of her life, how she made herself into what she now is. In other 
words, she presents herself as an alternative production: ‘They call me Al 
Agrado because I have always tried to make everyone’s life more 
pleasant,’ she says, ‘Aside from being pleasant I am very authentic.’ She 
then runs through the full list of surgical operations she has undergone in 
order to be so authentic, and the corresponding financial costs, before 
ending with the key sentence. ‘It cost me a lot to be authentic. But we 
must not be cheap in regard to the way we look. Because a woman is 
more authentic the more she resembles what she dreams herself to be.” 
 
Garlinger (2004) argues that the camp sincerity of Al Agrado establishes 
affective connection between the object and its spectator. “What makes Al Agrado’s 
camp spectacle an intervention of sincerity is that by vindicating artificiality and 
authentic in terms of sentiments, Al Agrado raises the viewer’s awareness of the 
affectionate investment the camp spectator has in the camp figure. The sincerity of 
her intervention begets sincerity on the audience: we don’t laugh at Agrado, we laugh 
with her” (ibid: 103, italics in the original).  
Agrado’s monologue undermines most brilliantly Western definitions of 
natural vs. artificial personage. Naturalness signifies homogeneity in modern 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 “Todo sobre mi madre - El monólogo de La Agrado,” accessed October 25, 2014. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s11D4G7WyTc.  
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European imagination; it is coded as an attribute of bourgeois male rationality. 
Artificiality, on the other hand, stands for hybridity; it is coded in its deviation, typical 
to queer others like Al Agrado, whose performance of artificial feminine personage is 
supposed to be received (by the heteronormative audience) as kitsch. The sincerity 
with which Al Agrado describes her monetary investment in fitting visually with 
heterosexual gender codes turns her personal speech into a communal confession 
which reflects to the audience the artificiality of their own heteronormative 
performance. The only difference between Agrado and the heteronormative audience 
is that they invest much less money and effort in plasticizing their own personal 
outlook. In other words, Agrado was even more authentic, sincere and, hence, natural 
than her audience in performing gender artificiality. Such a performance requires of 
her much more will, capital and pain in order to be “normal.” On the other hand, the 
audience laughed with her, not at her, because her monologue made clear that we are 
all queer participants in the same social engineering project of complying with 
modern heteronormativity.  
I see Marta’s successful performance in Sliven as well the “failed” lip-syncing 
of “Tempt and Run” both as a similar case of queer “normality.” This artificiality 
revolved around gender (even though, of course, gender heteronormativity was 
performed onstage) as much as around individual agency and individual 
subjectivity—the two cultural traits of modern European capitalism, which, according 
to Roumen Avramov, exclude peripheral (or liminal) societies like Bulgaria (one of 
the most eminent symbols of Balkan, and, some may say also, Eastern European 
backwardness). Neither Agrado nor Reni or Marta hid the artificiality of their 
performance. There was nothing to hide. The audience in NDK probably knew that 
Reni was a lip-syncing pop singer in the same way the theater audience at the movie 
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supposedly knew that Agrado was a transsexual woman. What mattered more was the 
economic capital both women attained in order to look and sound “real-life” personae. 
Their initial marginality is not hidden. Agrado paid for her surgery with male 
prostitution; Marta and Reni earned it by playing the stereotypical role of a bimbo-
starlet in a popfolk record label (which Bulgarians connote with post-socialist 
nouveau-rich prostitution). Economically, Agrado keys her prostitution to the Spanish 
sex consumer market; Reni keys her role to a communal organization ran by a 
paternal oppressor-benefactor shef. Both women grew out from their dependency: 
Agrado became an aspiring actress and Reni a self-employed trans-Balkan star. The 
shadow of the past still raises questions regarding how genuinely these two women 
managed to transform their economic capital into a cultural one—to be received by 
the audience as “real” (just as the lip-syncing musicians in Obama’s two inauguration 
ceremonies). They gained applause when emphasizing rather than denying the 
artificiality of their performance. Agrado’s transsexual hybridity did it by prompting 
her Western audience to reflect upon its own liminality to heteronormativity—how 
they put money and pain to look as “normal” men and women. Marta’s and Reni’s 
hybrid individuality did so by reminding their Bulgarian audience (in a non-ironic 
manner, though) that they are liminal to European modernity—they constantly need 
to comply communally with internal and external shefs in order to sound like 
“normal” Western (capitalist) individuals. If they wish to save face and avoid the 
shame of backwardness, they should keep performing their artificial role of live music 
audience, in the same way these two popfolk stars maintained their artificial role as a 
live music singers.  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
“I Beg Your Pardon, My Children are Learning This:” Bulgarian intellectuals 
Legislating and/or Interpreting Chalga 
 
A Mitsubishi jeep is coming up   Ot dolu ide dzhip “Mitsubishi” 
with a fancy bumper, with dark windows  S iaka bronia, s prozortsi skrishni 
It is passing everyone on the road   Vsicki po pŭtia toi izprevaria. 
—But whose is it? Who is driving it?   —No na kogo e? Koi li go kara? 
—Wolfy is driving it. He is honking and running everyone over!  
—Vŭlcho go kara. Sviri i gazi! 
— And who is inside the car?    —A v kolata koia e tazi? 
—Vixy41 is inside. And she wants so much  —Liska e vŭtre. I mnogo iska  
to become Miss beauty pageant.    Na Mis-Konkursa da stane miska. 
—Drive on, Wolfy, and make a bid   —Davai, Vŭlcho, i naddavai  
 golden coins are ringing—    Zlatna para zvŭnka— 
Miss-beauty to become your Vixy,   Mis da stane tvoita Liska, 
pretty and slim!     Gizdana i tŭnka! 
 
The opening epigraph is quoted from a didactic exercise in a music textbook 
(Gaitandzhiev et al. 2005a, see figure 1, p. 136), whose objective is to prompt 3rd 
graders to experience Bulgarian folklore interactively, as part of a culture of everyday 
life (in Bulgarian bitie, see chapter 1) rather than as an authoritative national canon. 
An explicit political goal underlies this exercise. Its authors aim to cultivate a new 
national identity that emerges from a pluralistic and open-ended dialogue in place of 
the socialist one, which consisted of authoritative canon and doctrine. During the 
winter of 2008, this exercise became an object of a short-lived but consequential 
public scandal. Media broadcasters and a council of academics stirred the scandal by 
condemning what they presented as a typical abuse of democracy: a group of authors 
with “low professional standards” sold “corruptive” chalga to young children 
packaged as “authentic” folklore. The front page of the newspaper Ekspres announced 
with a big bold headline that “Little Girls Learn about Mobster chicks” (Uchat 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Vixy is my translation of the Bulgarian word Liska, which is the nickname of Lisa (Vixen). I am 
aware that such a word does not exist in English, however “Vixen” does not convey Liska’s affect of 
cuteness. 
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momichentseta za mutresi, February 12, 2008). The picture beneath the headline 
showed a couple of schoolboys sitting by the famous street statue in Sofia of Petko 
and Pencho Slaveikovi (two formative father and son intellectuals from the early 
national era, late 19th early 20th century) and reading from another musical textbook 
by the same authors and publisher. The report in the interior pages related to a similar 
example of chalga-under-the-cover-of-folklore song in the textbook “Music for 4th 
grade” (Gaitandzhiev et al. 2005b).  
This sort of news story was scandalous but not extraordinary. Claiming that 
young children, particularly girls (I will explain the reason for this emphasis later) 
learn chalga dressed as folklore resonated well with widespread notions that social 
life in Bulgaria had deteriorated and even deformed “after democracy came” (sled 
kato doide demokratsiyata as the colloquialism for the political era after 1989 goes). 
When I raised this case in my field encounters, I usually received comments like 
“nowadays everything in Bulgaria is deception (izmama) and fraud (dalavera).”  For 
Bulgarians with whom I spoke, the musical textbook case was one of many other 
circulating stories about salami and sausages containing sawdust, luxurious cars 
running on perforated roads, newly built Nuevo riche neighborhoods without basic 
street infrastructure, business sector controlled by Mafiosi, politicians who are 
nothing but crooks, and so on. Such stories in conversations and media reports are 
usually followed by nostalgic references to how well social life functioned during the 
socialist era. When discussing the school textbooks specifically, people stressed to me 
that during socialism the state enforced high cultural standards. People could not 
publish whatever they wanted; for every discipline there was only one authorized 
textbook, and, above all, intellectuals were real intellectuals. 
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In the aftermath of the scandal, the publisher (Bulvest-2000) heeded the 
critiques and cut out the exercise from new editions of “Music for 3rd graders” 
textbook. It also cleansed “too colloquial words” (bitovismi from bitie, everyday life) 
from other textbooks from the same music series. Additionally, Bulvest-2000 
terminated plans to publish future music textbook publications by the same authors. 
The head author of the musical textbook series, Gencho Gaitandzhiev, then an 
emeritus professor of musical pedagogy at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, paid a 
higher professional price. In addition to the termination of his textbooks project, his 
university courses, taught on an almost pro bono basis, were suspended indefinitely 
(with an official explanation of budget cuts). This forced retirement affected him 
personally; it broke his life spirit, which, shortly after, ended with his death. 
The adapted animal tale in the music textbook and the scandal ensuing from 
the inclusion of the tale in the textbook are the ethnographic context of this chapter in 
which I discuss how Bulgarian intellectuals—a fairly small but highly influential elite 
of academics, media broadcasters, authors, artists and publicists—employ the chalga 
register to recontextualize in democracy the role of socialist intellectuals: the cultural 
legislators and safeguards of the regimes language ideology of modernity. Stemming 
from the metadiscursive gap of the Balkans with modern European this language 
ideology held modernity as a goal to be achieved through an evolutionary process (i.e. 
modernization). The state created and authorized an elite of musical and literary 
intellectuals whose role was to foster this evolution by modernizing Bulgarian 
folklore while protecting its “authenticity.” As I will show in this chapter, Bulgarian 
intellectuals struggle how to adapt the language regime of socialist modernity to the 
new political regime that materially does not support the old language regime.  
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 The theoretical question of this chapter builds upon Bauman and Briggs 
(2003), who ask how politics of authority and inequality are embedded in discourses 
of modernity, even in those whose participants attempt to dismantle the Foucauldian 
nexus of knowledge-power (and its subsequent distinctions of modern, traditional, 
national, ethnic, high and low cultures). I address this question by focusing on the 
ways Bulgarian intellectuals, who took part in the textbook scandal, linked their 
perceived duty of either banning or emancipating texts that connote with chalga to 
their position vis-à-vis their socialist role of cultural modernization. References I 
collected in regard to the textbook scandal show a debate between two camps. Most 
Bulgarian intellectuals with whom I spoke or followed over the media uphold their 
previous legislative role. By attacking chalga they present themselves as the only 
capable defenders of Bulgarian culture (in its socialist formulation) against “the 
masses,” which, due to their presumed lack of modern morals and education, take 
democracy as license to create their own purifications and hybridities of modernity 
and tradition. These intellectuals emphasize the urgency of their defense when 
criticizing the state for withdrawing from its previous obligation to enforce modern 
culture leaving them alone in the battle. My ethnographer’s perspective is located 
within the minority camp of revisionist intellectuals—most vocal among them is my 
late informant Gencho Gaitandzheiv—who judge the socialist ideology of evolution 
as totalitarianism. Especially the textbook authors made the effort to change the 
negative value of chalga in order to advocate a new model of intellectuals who 
interpret Bulgarian culture instead of legislating it to fit with hegemonic standards of 
European modernity. 
The two italicized terms—legislators and interpreters—do not come from my 
ethnography but from Zygmunt Bauman (1987), whose model of new intellectuals 
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free of power is at the center of Bauman and Briggs’ (2003) critique. He formulates 
interpreters as a postmodern adaptation of (rather than a break from) the longstanding 
model of modern intellectuals (legislators) who, since 16th century, have served 
political hegemonies by turning postulates of universal rationality into cultural 
canons. According to Zygmunt Bauman, postmodern intellectuals (interpreters) 
recognize the irrational political ramifications of rational universalism and so they 
turn universalism into open dialogue between multiple cultural traditions while 
limiting rationality to internal systems of truth relative to particular cultural traditions.  
Bauman and Briggs identify the operation of unequal power in the basic 
premise of this dialogue: brokers of modernity (interpreters) provide pre-modern 
communities with a security the latter cannot produce for themselves in the modern 
world. Zygmunt Bauman argues that communities can protect themselves from risks 
as longs as they remain in their “traditional setting”—relatively confined territories 
and solid networks of solidarity relations fixed over “a protracted stretch of time” 
(1987: 39, quoted from Bauman and Briggs 2003: 306). He stresses that this sort of 
security gets destroyed in modern life together with the destruction of definite space, 
time and social boundaries. In contrast with the oblivious stability and continuation in 
traditional communities, he concludes, people in the modern world develop high 
reflexivity, a result of constant confrontations with unexpected risks. This reflexivity, 
then, should be utilized for the benefit of those who lack it.  
“New social theories are often founded on very old notion,” write Bauman and 
Briggs in response to this idea, “[E]ven as we become increasingly critical of all terms 
that stem from the root ‘modern,’ the category of the traditional still seems—even to 
critical and left leaning scientists—to be stable and transparent, to be excused from 
the need of deconstruction. This is, of course, the founding modern move—positing a 
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category of tradition, making it seem autonomous, and then creating new hybrids that 
contain tradition by virtue of being defined in opposition to it” (2003: 307). They 
stress that, indeed, there are theories, which draw not two distinct units of tradition 
and modernity but processes as well as coexistence of “detraditionalization” and 
“retraditionalization.” “Nevertheless, a more nuanced opposition continues to inform 
notions of (post)modernity, and the logic of temporality continues to structure 
imagination of difference and social inequality” (ibid).  
UN global initiatives of “protecting” and “safeguarding” “at-risk” traditional 
cultures under laws of intellectual property and creating mechanisms of enforcement 
exemplify how modern political authorities exercise their power by making tradition 
their object. “As in Herder’s day, the supposedly unconscious or unreflexive nature of 
traditional knowledge justifies the creation of specialists and specialized regimes” 
(ibid: 308). Now as before, political power-holders authorize intellectual-experts to 
conduct scientific research, collect, classify, register, standardize, archive and thereby 
to save, safeguard and preserve fragile traditions that otherwise would have not been 
survived industrial modernization. Here again, Bauman and Briggs argue, 
intellectuals-interpreters work “as a most conspicuous attribute” of the modern 
marriage of knowledge-power, “namely, the intellectual as ‘legislator,’ authorized on 
the basis of claims to superior knowledge to make authoritative statements about ‘the 
maintenance and perfection of social order’ in the service of state power” (ibid: 308-
309). 
Building on Latour (1993), Bauman and Briggs argue that modern and 
postmodern intellectuals equally hold language as a third ontological realm (in 
addition to nature and society), which they subject to “rational” operations of 
purification and hybridization. Such operations take place through decontextualization 
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and recontextualization of texts. Authorized experts conduct “what counts as the 
legitimate way of extracting discourses from persons, communities, nations, contexts, 
genres etc. (all of these being social constructs)” (2003: 312) and then modifying 
those texts to represent the essential and primordial past, i.e. tradition. A-historical 
past appears in tradition in manner of canonical genres and urtexts vis-à-vis which 
intellectuals measure intertextual gaps (Briggs and Bauman 1992). They calibrate fit 
or lack of fit between actual (hybrid) texts and paradigmatic texts that represent the 
“pure” tradition. According to Bauman and Briggs, every intellectual work of 
purification and hybridization, even an emancipatory one, produces metadiscursive 
regimes that shape modernity, science and politics. It authorizes “particular practices 
of imagination, marginalize or eliminate others, and distribute control over this 
process in very unequal ways” (ibid: 312).   
In the case of socialist Bulgaria, Buchanan (2006) shows that state-authorized 
folklore music experts—professional performers, authors, producers and scholars—
stood at the forefront of the regime’s enterprise of executing the dialectics of 
evolution from traditional to modern European narod (people, nation). In accordance 
with the emphasis of European folkloristics on authenticity (Bauman and Briggs 
2003; Benedix 1997), these cultural state officials distilled texts and styles 
presumably expressing the “pure” izvor (source, water spring, essence) thereby 
codifying the canon of national Bulgarian tradition. The most important aspect of this 
task was the cleansing of this perceived essence from centuries of intermingling with 
the other groups of the pre-national multiethnic society. This act of cleansing is not 
foreign to the Balkans, in which since the early 19th century nation building has 
usually included processes of ethnic homogenization, sometimes through massacre 
(most recently the Yugoslav civil war), oftentimes through minority discrimination 
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and sometimes through treaties of population exchange (e.g. the Lausanne Treaty 
[192] that authorized a large-scale population transfer between Greece and the newly 
founded Turkish Republic). In the Bulgarian context, cultural purification is 
associated with the rhetoric of liberation from the “Turkish Yoke.” The local common 
wisdom sees Bulgarian folklore songs and tunes as historical documents that “prove” 
the successive line of a viable Bulgarian nation before and throughout the Ottoman 
“occupation.” By “reconstructing” this canon purified from its “foreign” influences, 
socialist intellectuals aimed at drawing the Ur-cartography of the Bulgarian nation.  
Obrabotka (arrangement) was the hybridization counterpart of purification 
(extracting from the izvor). Buchanan points to the etymological roots of the term 
from the verb obrabotvam (to work, to cultivate, polish, fashion), which connotes 
with the cultivation of the land and “the processing, working, or polishing of physical 
materials such as metal, glass, and leather” (2006: 196). Interestingly, Buchanan adds, 
the word obrabotka turned during socialism to index the regime’s emphasis of 
industrialization. In my mind, this emphasis expresses the evolutionary trope of 
socialist modernization: industry is an improvement of agriculture; it transforms 
peasant life into something better—proletariat. “In musical terms,” Buchanan writes, 
“obrabotka is a cultivated, polished treatment of a village melody or a 
song…obrabotki (the plural of obrabotka e.l.) are understood as improvements on the 
lore which is their basis…As a generic category, obrabotka encompasses a range of 
arrangement genres and at least three other related concepts: harmonizatsiya 
(harmonization), razrabotka (elaboration, development), and avtorska or 
kompozitorska muzika (authored or composer’s music)” (ibid: 196-197). The work of 
Bulgarian academic folklorists was to purify the textual canon of tradition. 
Simultaneously, the state trained and authorized Bulgarian composers to hybridize 
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this canon in modern life by arranging and composing folklore melodies (narodni 
melodii) “’in the naroden spirit,’ ‘in a naroden tone,’ ‘for the new (socialist) village,’ 
or ‘with contemporary themes.’ Such newly composed forms were labeled ‘authored’ 
or ‘composer’s’ music to distinguish them from those employing material extracted 
(i.e. purified, decontextualized e.l.) from villagers themselves” (ibid: 197).  
In other words, the socialist state and its legislator intellectuals modernized 
Bulgarian tradition by defining and regimenting intertextual gaps between texts that 
represented the pure izvor and texts that represented hybrid obrabotka. Widening the 
gap with European poetics of harmonization and polyphony indexed evolution and 
improvement of Bulgarian folklore—the cultural showcase of socialist modernization; 
widening it by combining “authentic” instruments and texts with electrical pop or, 
even worse, oriental ones fell outside the socialist discourse of modernity. It signaled 
the anti-modern Other—chalgiia in the early socialist period and chalga, in the later 
one—both signifiers of Balkan recursivity (Irvine and Gal 2000).  
Let me turn now to analyzing the verbal strategies intellectuals from both 
camps used when widening or minimizing intertextual gaps between popular music 
texts, on one hand, and others that index canonized Bulgarian folklore, on the other. 
Above all I will show how the people who took part in the textbook scandal dealt with 
the risk of violating the socialist canon of folklore and pop (as purified genres as well 
as their hybridities). As I pointed out in the previous chapter and the introduction, 
people run the risk of suffering grave sanctions if they lose modern face and get 
stained with indices of Balkan backwardness. The participants in the debate around 
the textbook invoked this risk both to establish their discursive authority (Briggs 
1996) as well as to undermine the authority of their rivals. The legislating camp did so 
by speaking against “inauthentic” hybridization of Bulgarian modernity and tradition, 
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which cause dangerous loss of rational conduct. The interpreting camp countered by 
associating claims of authenticity with totalitarianism. The connection between 
intellectual discursive authority and risk is central to the performance of modernity. 
Both legislators and interpreters sought power by showing their ability to use rational 
reflexivity in the service of their “endangered” non-modern fellows. And in the case 
of the textbook, the debating camps designate these fellows as school children, 
especially girls.  
The ethnographic discussion in the chapter takes the following course: after 
these introductory pages I present the animal tale exercise and the pedagogical 
considerations the textbook authors employed to cultivate what they saw as a 
pluralistic imagination. I then move on to a gender analysis of the socialist realist 
cultural ideology in which the state authorized intellectuals to employ their virile 
rationality to modernize the masses. Socialist intellectuals did so by formulating 
representations of “reality as ought to be” which aimed to prompt people to evolve 
from “reality as is” (in Bulgarian bit or bitie). This is the reason the textbook’s 
detractors emphasized its danger to girls. I argue that the socialist discourse of 
evolution underlies Bulgarians’ perception of chalga as a feminine counterforce of 
seduction away from modern Europe back to the Balkans. Subscribing to the socialist 
realism epistemology legislating intellectuals promote a distinction between two 
collective identities of “the people:” the narod and the folk. Bulgarians perceive the 
first as pure and thus possessing authentic identity; they consider the latter as 
quintessentially hybrid and hence corrupted and lacking in identity. I suggest that, for 
Bulgarians, the inability of the state after 1989 to regulate distinctions between 
rational and irrational hybridizations of modern music and folklore is what signals the 
collapse of the socialist cultural regime. In this sense, people expect rational 
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hybridizations to prompt evolution toward modern culture; they see irrational ones as 
texts that corrupt people with chalga.  
The second part of the chapter will open with a narrative about Gencho 
Gaitandzhiev and his attempt to deconstruct with the animal tale the politics of 
totalitarian power, which he identified in the distinction between the narod and folk 
(and consequently between folklore and chalga). He did so by identifying monosemy 
(called in Bulgarian kazionno) as the language regime with which the previous regime 
cultivated a totalitarianism syndrome. He argued that Bulgarians were habituated to 
think in a crude positivist manner. They are convinced that modern rationality means 
that every signifier had only one and definite signified. Irony, in this sense, comes 
only from digressing from the “right” (serious) way of thinking. His suggested 
remedy for this syndrome was an antidote of irony that comes from polysemy; that is, 
encountering multiple, ambivalent or even contradicting indexical relations between 
signs and meanings. The opposition between these two ideological associations of 
irony and democracy will frame the following ethnographic narrative about an 
academic meeting as well as a couple of TV items about the textbook in which the 
opposing camps of legislators and interpreters clashed over the textbook. The gender 
inequality in the socialist discourse of evolutionary modernity becomes evident in 
regard to the risk male and female intellectuals can take in invoking digressive irony. 
Males in the two items hold discursive authority to minimize “wrong” intertextual 
gaps between popular and folklore texts to emphasize their role of protecting women 
and children from chalga. Women, on the other hand, avoid irony; they key their 
performance of modern face to moral judgment and worry.  
The consequence of the scandal alludes to Bauman and Briggs’ (2003) 
argument that power and knowledge underlie postmodern interpretation, just like 
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modern legislation. The debating camps shared the expectation from “real 
intellectuals” to safeguard the purity of tradition as well as to define its “correct” 
hybridizations in contemporary life. They disagreed over the meaning of “real 
intellectual”. While I cannot say definitely why Gaintadzhiev and his allies lost the 
debate, I suggest that their pluralist agenda failed to earn support because they, like 
their rivals, established discursive authority on rhetoric of risk, but unlike their rivals, 
left the “traditional” masses to resolve this risk by themselves and avoided using their 
modern reflexivity to propose any sort of protection.  
The didactic musical exercise 
The lyrical text in the opening epigraph of this chapter was composed 
especially for this exercise. Gaitandzhiev and his co-authors, Maria Popova and Penka 
Mladenova, all of them veteran musical pedagogues (whose careers go back to the 
socialist era), invited the Bulgarian children author Diado (Grandpa) Punch (Pancho 
Panchev) to take an “authentic” folklore ditty from its “original” rural context and 
adapt it to the urban reality of contemporary Bulgarian children. Grandpa Punch 
chose to write his adaptation via the form of an animal tale. And these are two 
versions of the folkloric ditty to which his parody reacted:   
1) Colorful Wheels are Coming Up (fig. 1) 
A version from the Montana region (Northwestern Bulgaria) 
Colorful wheels are coming up. 
And who was in the carriage? 
—Raina was in the carriage. 
And who drove the carriage? 
—Gosho drove the carriage. 
 
After every line singing: 
Shi-ri-li, bi-ri-li, bi-ra, bi-ra-boi, 
Shoi-la-ga, boi-la-ga, bo-en-da. 
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Fig. 1—at the top the ditty version from Montana. At the bottom the contemporary 
adaptation (“Music for 3rd grade” Gaitandzhiev et al. 2005a) 
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2) A Hay Carriage is Coming Up (fig. 2) 
A version from the Yambol region (Southeastern Bulgaria) 
 
A hay carriage is coming up. 
And who is driving the hay carriage? 
—Enio is driving the hay carriage. 
And who is sitting in the hay carriage? 
—Rada is sitting in the hay carriage. 
And they are going to the fair 
To buy gifts for the wedding 
 
After every line singing: 
You are, Enio, dark Enio, a grey bulbul, 
you, Rada, you, a slim sampling 
 
Fig. 2—at the top the ditty version from Yambol, at the bottom discussion 
questions, see translation next page (Gaitandzhiev et al., ibid)  
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As I mentioned earlier, the intention of the exercise is to prompt children’s 
interactive learning of Bulgarian lyrical folklore. The political goal behind this 
pedagogic intention is to produce irony, which the authors consider an effect of 
possessing a democratic imagination. Irony intends to emerge from the polysemic 
interpretation and consequent laughter of the intertextual dialogue (Bakhtin 1981) 
between the contemporary and canonical texts (and discursively, between the 
imagination of modern and traditional Bulgaria). To achieve this goal, the textbook 
authors asked schoolchildren to reflect upon their heterogeneous social experience 
without subjecting it, as older Bulgarians have been automatically doing (in the 
authors’ view) to the serious purist ideology of the nation-state (which the official 
folklore canon represents). The authors employed the contemporary animal tale and 
its juxtaposition to the two ditty versions to provide children with a model of how to 
invent, reinterpret, and recreate what older Bulgarians are habituated to receive as a 
closed codex of their national imagination.  
The authors solicited interpretations of the parodic adaptation in three 
discussion boxes alongside the lyrical texts. The teachers were also instructed to 
invite students to sing the contemporary animal tale with the melody of the folklore 
ditty. In the first box under the ditty from Montana and beside the parody, the authors 
ask the students (see bottom figure 2): “what is most interesting for you in the ditty?” 
The authors suggest three optional answers: -“the unusual and senseless words in the 
refrain;” -“that Raina sits like a queen and Gosho sweats to pull her;” and –“I wonder, 
who is the artist who painted the carriage?” In a second box beside the ditty from 
Yambol they ask students: “Have you been to a wedding? Do the people at the 
wedding dance only Horo and Rŭchenitzi (two Bulgarian folklore dances e.l.) or also 
other dances? Who can say what dances he saw in a wedding celebration?” A third 
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and conclusive discussion box includes an illustrated map with the road from 
Montana to Yambol. Students are asked: “Did you see where Yambol is? And 
Montana? It is almost at the other side of Bulgaria! However, both here and there 
people sing almost the same ditty, when they decide to tease a maiden and a bachelor 
who like each other…and if they like each other, they might wed! Do the ditties seem 
funny to you? And how otherwise? Weddings are always happy – regardless whether 
they are around Montana or somewhere around Yambol…”  
In the teacher’s instruction booklet (Gaitandzhiev et al. 2005c) accompanying 
the textbook, the authors explained that the three texts and the following discussion 
boxes direct attention to the tendency of folkloric texts to appear in different versions, 
interpretations, and nuances in different places and with different melodies. 
Regarding the contemporary animal tale, the authors write: “[w]e hope that many 
classes will receive with pleasure also our wink at an extraordinary actual 
contemporary, present-day theme. The popular children’s literature writer Grandpa 
Punch made with his typical sense of humor a joyful parody, which could help third 
graders sense better the generic specificities and social meaning of the tale. We hope 
also that, as we experienced, children will try to sing Grandpa Punch’s ‘tale,’ many of 
them, without intention, will use the melody of ‘Colorful Wheels Are Coming Up.’ 
The versification of the last four lines (refrain) of the contemporary ‘tale,’ however, 
do not coincide with the rhythm of the folkloric ditty – excellent opportunity for 
children who wish to improvise on the lines any kind of ‘version’ of the of the ditty’s 
melody” (ibid: 13-14). 
Let me explain in detail what pedagogical considerations stood behind the 
exercise and instructions to the teacher. By defining the contemporary tale as a 
parody, the textbook authors keyed the exercise to Bakhtinian carnivalesque—a joyful 
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experience of ambivalent double speech: derogation coupled with affirmation 
(Bakhtin 1984). In this sense, the authors prompted school students to revisit the 
canonic authority of “authentic” folklore with the contemporary animal tale. A 
specific example of carnivalesque ambivalence appeared in the fact that both 
Gaitandzhiev and his critics read the contemporary animal tale as a humoristic sexual 
teaser. Gaitandzhiev’s critics described such sexual connotation as abusive and 
corruptive. Gaitandzhiev, on the other hand, insisted that the vast majority of 
Bulgarian “authentic” folklore songs were actually saturated with metaphors of sex. 
Reconnecting folklore with sex was for him a prime way to revive the “authentic” 
nature of folklore as culture of bitie (everyday life). While Bulgarians usually admit 
that folk songs often had sexual innuendo (for instance the implicit sexual symbolism 
of pepper in the song Dilmano Dilbero [Buchanan 2006: 422]), they also tend to 
restrict associating folklore with sex to intimate settings. Their sense was that relating 
folklore to sex sounded “dirty,” i.e. backward. Informants commonly distinguished 
between chalga and folklore by pointing to the explicit “hyper-sexual dirt” of the 
former versus the heightened artistic purity of the latter. Only in informal 
communications would people reiterate Gaitandzhiev’s view with many examples of 
folk traditions alluding to sex, usually claiming with a smile that Bulgarians are after 
all “backward-dirty” people. Gaitandzhiev used to comment on the distinction 
between folklore and chalga with his discursive authority of a well-respected 
academic. He claimed that the dichotomy between sexually explicit chalga and chaste 
folklore showed Bulgarians’ ignorance of their tradition rather than good moral 
conduct. He dismissed claims that the animal tale was improper for children insisting 
that folklore helps children express sexual imagination rather than repressing or 
denying it. In his mind, the notion of a-sexual “clean” folklore came from the puritan 
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imagination of totalitarian communism, which emphasized serious chasteness as 
decorum of modernity. Seriousness, he maintained, was euphemism for compliance.  
There is another duality of subversion-affirmation, which was actually 
invisible to Gaitandzhiev, his detractors, as well as to myself during the time of my 
communications with Gaitandzhiev: the patriarchal subtext of the animal tale. 
Gaitandzhiev and his co-authors intended the animal tale to widen the intertextual 
calibration (Briggs and Bauman 1992) with the ditties by changing the goal of the 
driving. The male villagers in the two folklore ditties took their women to wedding 
ceremony; the Wolf in the contemporary context drove his to a beauty pageant. Thus 
they parodized the a-sexual “purity” of canonic folklore, in which marriage tames 
“dirty” sexual drives. Meanwhile, the animal tale maintains a narrow intertextual gap 
with the ditties in regard to gender roles. Both the contemporary and the canonic texts 
deploy women as passive (driven) objects whose beauty holds power over active 
(driving) men. In this hidden point I see Gaitandzhiev not acknowledging his 
legislating power. Whether girls are driven to their marriage or to contest in beauty 
pageant, they play the role of “unreflexive” traditional people who need the protection 
and mediation of modern reflexive men. As a result, Gaitandzhiev and his intellectual 
allies shared with their detractors the same purifying and hybridizing practices 
Bauman and Briggs (2003) find in the cultural work of modern European legislators 
(such as Lock and Herder), “…they accorded a type of consciousness to the elites that 
they denied to subalterns, and they promoted particular types of literacy practices, 
imbued them with value, and provided access to aristocratic and bourgeois men 
respectively” (312).  
Neither Gaitandzheiv nor his opponents (or myself) found fault with the 
depiction of women as males’ objects. Opponents addressed their critique to the fact 
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that the Vixen tempted the Wolf to exploit her beauty in an immoral manner: 
marriage or relationship as instrument of earning easy money (which Bulgarians 
commonly associate with fraud and deception). In the context of chalga, the two 
animal protagonists connote the stereotype of popfolk singers-bimbos, whose musical 
carrier is targeted to catching a rich husband (see chapter 1). The textbook authors 
indeed sought to ironize the entire interaction in the folklore ditties. However, their 
eye was not tuned to criticizing gender hierarchies, and so while opening up the 
canonic morals of gender relationships (sexual desire legitimized in marriage), they 
kept intact the canonical gender roles (the desirous male and his female object) in 
their attempt of intellectual interpretation.   
The gender of Bulgarian modernity 
This chapter does not revolve exclusively around gender. However, this is a 
central perspective to analyzing the verbal strategies intellectuals deployed when 
intertextaulizing their legislative role from socialism to democracy. My fieldwork has 
taught me that Bulgarians, at large, equate modern Europe with “rational virility” and 
the Balkans with “seductive femininity.” This equation is not particular to Bulgaria. 
Fraser (1990) argues that, in principle, it is inherent to the modernist formulation of 
the public sphere as the locus of the bourgeois man. Bulgarian socialists endeavored 
to erase gender as a social category. Gender differences together with class, ethnicity, 
and religion were associated with the maladies of bourgeois society. Yet, Verdery 
(1996) shows that Eastern European socialist regimes did not eliminate gender from 
social life but shifted their location from the patriarchal family to the paternal state. 
Women gained more access to the public, but needed to carry a double responsibility 
of national citizens and “natural” mothers. Ghodsee (2009, 2005) criticizes the return 
of gender politics in post-socialist democracy. In contrast with the official liberal 
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ideology, actual social life has reintroduced gender as a factor of exclusion, inclusion, 
discrimination, affiliation and solidarity.  
Building on this gender critique, I argue that when Bulgarians relate with 
nostalgia to socialist modernity they express expectations that the state would retake 
its former paternalist role of protecting ordinary people (i.e. the narod). Within this 
expectation, intellectuals are supposed to play their previous role of brokers, who 
channel the official protocol of modernity to the people. Chalga is a metonym of such 
expectations. Bulgarians denounce chalga’s sexual texts while valorizing the alleged 
sexual “decency” of socialist culture, especially socialist-realist folklore. People told 
me that “authentic” folklore is modest because, unlike chalga, it connects gender to 
many realms of social life, not only to romantics and sex. Over and over again people 
recalled with fondness the time in which rearranged folklore (obrabotka, “right 
hybridity”) defined Bulgarian national culture, not chalga (“false hybridity”). The 
textbook authors aimed to deconstruct this perception. They endeavored to create a 
new national culture that emerges from everyday life (bitie) reality of contemporary 
Bulgarian people (rather than from the ideological narrative of the ideal Bulgarian 
people—the “authentic” Narod). To do that, they erased the generic differences 
between folklore and chalga. They brought to the public an existing vernacular 
reading of Bulgarian folklore, which sees sexual meanings hidden in many 
presumably a-sexual metaphors.    
Why was this act of bringing this vernacular reading of folklore to the nation 
so explosive? Why was teaching schoolchildren to recognize gender and sexual 
meanings in folklore stained as chalga? Because Bulgarians perform modern (virile) 
face by presenting themselves as endangered by (feminine) Balkan backwardness. 
Balkan backwardness does not carry any definite meaning. It can be anything that 
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reiterates Bulgarians’ sense of gap with, digression from, or (if to emphasize the 
language ideology perspective) recursivity from perceived forms and practices of 
modern European life: from corrupted officials, low quality consumer culture, 
smalltime fraud, public impoliteness, and neglected public space, to nouveau 
rich/Mafia elite, peasant lifestyle, “Oriental” minorities (namely Gypsies and Turks), 
and, of course, “seductive” chalga music. Relating to backwardness in public does not 
mean that one immediately loses modern face. Modernity, just like heteronormative 
sexuality (Berlant and Warner 1998), is a category of encoding evolution in public 
and private life through practices of purification and hybridization. To protect their 
modern face people are expected to claim victimhood by distancing themselves from 
such manifestations with verbal gestures of denouncement, mocking and most often 
by ignoring them with silence. In any case, one is supposed to fear the danger and 
shame of their proximity with acts and utterances that index Balkan backwardness. 
Gaining pleasure from indices of Balkan backwardness, on the other hand, 
runs the risk of being stained with the harsh stigma of failure, called prostotiia 
(“boorishness,” “simplemindedness”). People whom I discuss in this and the next 
chapters encounter this risk in many different ways as well. Prostak is the name of a 
person who loses face because of indulgence with shameful acts (bezobrazie), i.e. 
someone whose bitie (everyday life) is totally divorced from any poniatie (essence, 
concept) of modernity.  In this sense, prostak cannot feel shame and fear of 
backwardness, because by not grasping the essence of modernity, this person 
supposedly cannot reflect upon his or her own bitie. Following this perception, 
Bulgarians often claim that chalga cannot be considered cultural genre. It is not a 
genre because it arguably has no essence (sŭshtnost, meaning also “self”), no concept 
(poniatie, also “ideal”), and no face except indulgence in prostotiia. It also cannot be 
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characterized as “cultural” because it reflects reality as-it-is (everyday life, bitie) 
rather than reality as-it-ought-to-be (art, izkustvo). This is a socialist realist concept to 
which I will relate in greater detail later. Indeed, oftentimes people employ chalga as 
a metonym of the entire field of Balkan backwardness, which gives a concrete sense 
of its dirty, noisy, and kitschy, and, as I will show momentarily, also femininely 
irrational and seductive qualities. 
Associations of chalga with femininity are more implicit. I heard from men 
and women alike that chalga is corruptive, because it tempts Bulgarians to abandon 
the current route to European rationality, i.e. adhering to norms and practices of 
liberal democracy. For instance, “The Temptation of Chalga,” the artistic exhibition 
to which I referred in the introduction, attempted to reflect upon the experience of 
post-socialist transition through this “bright, shiny, noisy, scandalous, kitschy” 
cultural phenomenon (from the official press release of the exhibition). Both the male 
and female artists who participated in the exhibition depicted mostly either women as 
sexual objects (see introduction), the “bimbo” female stars—folkadzhiiki—whom I 
discussed in the previous chapter (figure 1), and effeminate popfolk male stars (figure 
2). 
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Fig. 3—Zvezdi (“Stars”) 2004-2005 by Adelina Popnedelva, from the exhibition “The 
Temptation of Chalga,” Sofia City Gallery, May 1-31, 2009, picture: Eran Livni 
 
 
Fig. 4—Tri zvezdi (Three Stars), 2000-2001 by Georgi Bogdanov and Boris 
Missirkov, from the exhibition “The Temptation of Chalga,” Sofia City Gallery, May 
1-31, 2009, picture: Eran Livni 
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When Bulgarians relate to chalga’s power of “temptation,” they actually 
ascribe agency to the signified objects of their speech act. I learned that people often 
experience chalga as a non-human feminine power, which threatens to destroy the 
archetype of enlightened mastery: the rational man. Testament to this danger is the 
colloquial relation to chalga as “she,” tia, with which modern Bulgarian men and 
women ascribe to “her” many of Bulgaria’s post-socialist maladies. This is also the 
common standpoint of Bulgarian intellectuals. For instance, the Bulgarian 
ethnomusicologist Rozmary Statelova (2003) charges “her” with seven sins of 
detachment from Europe. Statelova maintains that chalga has created an archetype 
character “the chalga person” who, in radical opposition to the archetypical “ideal 
Bulgarian,” is not purely Bulgarian but mixed soul with Gypsies and Turks; the 
geographical border of this person are regional-Balkan rather than circumscribed by 
the Bulgarian nation-state; the Orient rather than the Occident is this person’s point of 
cultural orientation; the consciousness of the “chalga person” is the cultural emptiness 
of pre-independent Bulgaria under the Ottoman yoke; and this person’s pleasure 
comes from contaminating the corpus of “authentic” folklore music (narodna muzika) 
by making it an object of erotic vulgarity under the pretext of modernity. 
Additionally, the journalist Martin Karbovski (1999) defines through “her” a state of 
national stupidity, the classical musician and conductor Emil Tabakov declared that 
“she” was the only reason he would consider emigrating from Bulgaria, another 
famous Bulgarian classical musician, Haigashot Agasian, stated that he would vote 
for the party that would ban chalga by law (Dimov 2001). Rejecting the temptation of 
chalga is an arête of virile (rational) modernity; that is, all men and women who hold 
the capacity to conquer slavery and develop mental and intellectual capabilities to 
become masters. 
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 “Authentic” Narod vs. “corrupted” folk  
Let me now turn to how the arête of virility is elaborated in the distinction 
Bulgarians hold between two cultural forms: “authentic” folklore (narodna kultura) 
and “seductive” chalga. Bulgarians usually perceive the first as the quintessential 
culture of the modern Bulgarian nation; they see the latter as threatening the nation 
with “oriental” corruption. Liberation from slavery toward rational mastery is central 
in the popular historical narrative of nation-state Bulgaria. It stems from an outdated 
official narrative, which is still promoted usually by ultra-nationalist groups. As this 
narrative goes, Balkan backwardness is Bulgarians’ “collective trauma” of being torn 
from Europe during 500 years of enslavement to the “Turkish yoke” (Turskoto 
robstvo), the derogatory name for the period of Ottoman rule. Meanwhile popular 
nationalist narrative considers Bulgarians the first European nation, which emerged 
during the First and Second Bulgarian Kingdoms, 681-1018 and 1185-1396 
respectively. The most important cultural significances of that period are, first, the 
Cyrillic alphabet, which was invented by the two brothers Cyril and Methodius, and, 
second, the autocephalous Bulgarian Orthodox Church. As the narrative goes, 
Bulgarians lost their national identity and turned into the Sultans’ slaves, after the 
Ottomans conquered the Bulgarian lands. As a result, Bulgarians have remained 
outside the reach of European modernity. People in Bulgaria believe that national 
identity during the Ottoman time continued to exist only in the folklore traditions of 
Bulgarian villagers as well as in Bulgarian Orthodox Christianity. Only in the turn of 
the 19th century was Bulgarian nationality re-born, inaugurating the so-called “the 
Revival Period” (Vŭzrazhdane) that culminated in the establishment of the 
Principality of Bulgaria (1878). Thanks especially to modern Bulgarian 
revolutionaries and/or authors and intellectuals, most prominently Hristo Botev, Ivan 
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Vazov, and Vasil Levski, Bulgarians regained their national memory and managed to 
revolt against the Ottoman domination. In the aftermath of the Russo-Turkish war 
(1877-1878) the Principality of Bulgaria was created out of the Ottoman Empire. The 
nation-state of Bulgaria received its full independence in 1908 after its unification 
with the autonomous province of Eastern Rumelia.42 
As I wrote in the introduction, even more than a century after gaining national 
independence Bulgarians still maintain that they lag behind modern Western Europe, 
the prototype of rational mastery, because they need to “catch up” (navaksvane) with 
what they missed during the dark era of living in the “Orient.” European modernity is 
the goal of Bulgarian nation building: closing the gap of modernity and thereby 
returning to Europe. Whether via socialism or via democracy, for Bulgarians, 
catching up with Europe means following synthetic doctrines of how to mobilize 
Bulgarians so as to heal them from the habitus of slavery (Bulgarians prefer to relate 
to it in a psychological manner, “slave mentality”) and adopt the rational lifestyle of 
modern European masters.  
The dialectics of evolution appears also in the colloquial distinction 
Bulgarians make between two sociocultural categories: “the Narod” and “the folk.” 
Obviously, this distinction is a local version of Herder’s definition of the “Volk” and 
“the rabble in the alley” (e.g. Benedix 1997: 47). However the Bulgarian definition is 
wider than the distinction between “authentic peasants” and the new urban lower 
class. Both categories signify the same social stratum: the basis of Bulgarian nation. 
Modern Bulgarians distinguish between the “authentic” (i.e. ethnically homogeneous, 
pure, organic) social basis, “the Narod,” and the “contaminated” (hybrid, multiethnic) 
one, “the folk.” “The Narod” is the Slavic equivalent of the German term “das Volk,” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 For a scholarly study of Bulgarian national discourse, see Crampton 2007.  
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in which Bulgarians identify the ideal people of modern nation-state Bulgaria. “The 
folk,” on the other hand, is the nation’s lowest common denominator, the actual and 
essentially backward, social base of Bulgaria’s everyday life (see in detail chapter 3). 
This base consists, at the top, of the post-socialist Money elite: corrupted politicians 
and civil servants, Mafia goons (mutri, “stupid animal face”) and their chicks 
(mutresi), illicit businessmen, bimbos, and nouveaux riches. At the bottom, it includes 
“primitive” peasants, urbanized peasants, urban poor, and Gypsies. This association 
reiterates Herder’s argument that the rabble in the alley “never sing or compose, but 
only scream and mutilate” (ibid, in direct relation to chalga, see Statelova 1993).  
Bulgarians consider the ideal people (the Narod) as more “real” than the 
counterpart category of “the actual people” (the folk). The reason is that that the “real 
Bulgarian people” are allegedly those who are ostensibly closer to their generic 
essence. Thus “authentic” folklore is the historical evidence of real Bulgarians—the 
Narod; folklore is also the Narod’s cultural canon that encapsulates the essence, the 
independent self-consciousness of Bulgarian identity (the concept of izvor, Buchanan 
2006). Chalga, on the other hand, contaminates the “authentic” essence in the 
everyday life of the Balkans (i.e. “fakelore” 43) whose multiethnicity has resulted from 
Bulgaria’s role as a historical buffer zone between world empires. At present, Gypsies 
are the stereotypical performers and audience of chalga (see in detail chapter 4). 
Unlike other sections of the society who can potentially turn into Narod, Gypsies are 
confined to a stereotypical role of seductive siren, whose singing tempts Bulgarians to 
forget their national goal and digress back into the traumatic Ottoman past. When 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 The term “fakelore” coined by Richard Dorson (1976) became obsolete in US and Western European 
scholarly discourse under the impact of the “invention of tradition” paradigm. This term still makes 
sense in Bulgaria. I realized that both scholars and ordinarily people still at large ascribe factual 
authenticity to their folklore canon.  
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they listen to chalga, Bulgarians “run the danger” of turning into Gypsies—the 
quintessential rabble, “the folk,” “effeminate” slaves. 
 
This distinction between “the Narod” and “the folk” is significant in Bulgarian 
socialist realist reading of the Bakhtinian dialectics of high and low cultural practices 
(Bakhtin 1984). Under the influence of Socialist Realist philosophy (specifically 
George Lukács, e.g. Tikhanov 2000; Mojeiko 2009), artistic practice (izkustvo) stands 
for high culture while everyday life practice (bitie)44 stands for vulgar esthetics (of the 
rabble, slaves). In socialist ideology this division classified aesthetic practices that had 
or lacked class-consciousness.  
More than two decades after the fall of socialism, people in Bulgaria have 
already accepted Western democracy as the ideological basis of everyday life. 
However, they still expect all aesthetic expressions, including folklore and popular 
arts, to perform reality as it was during socialism—reality not as it is (the reality of 
everyday life, the reality of “effeminate” slaves), but as it ought to be (reality of class 
consciousness, the reality of” virile” masters). Art is supposed to present an 
evolutionary model of modern progression from slavery to mastery. Artists are a type 
of intellectuals whose role is to comment upon everyday reality but in a positive way, 
as defined by the state, which offers operative course of change. Generic canons are 
supposed to provide artists with the essential basis of reflecting on their artwork and 
judge its aesthetic (i.e. evolutionary) value.  
This perception is eminent in the contemporary local scholarly discourse. For 
instance, the Bulgarian folklorist Georg Kraev (2009) conceptualizes a folklore 
dialectics between the upper-ruling masculine world and the lower-laboring feminine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 My analysis here draws upon Lemon (2000), who explores the relationships between the image of 
Russian Roma in art (particularly literature and theater) and everyday life (byt). 
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world, which compose Bulgarian selfhood (his term is “the classical folklore 
person”). Statelova (1993) emphasizes that the Bakhtinian definition of high and low 
culture distinguishes not only between the upper and lower social strata but also 
between the upper and lower parts of the body, the loci of high-quality intellectual 
and low-quality carnal esthetic pleasures. In this sense, Bulgarians usually see chalga, 
and particularly kiuchek (the Balkan belly dance associated with chalga and invoking 
stereotypes of backward Gypsy ethnicity) as phenomena of lower body-lower quality 
carnal pleasure. Another scholar doubted my basic ability to study Bulgarian music 
when I argued once in our conversation that the popfolk star Azis adopted the vocal 
style of folklore female singers. This scholar stopped the conversation and quizzed 
me: “Mr. Livni, could you please list to me the regional map of Bulgarian folklore 
music?” I managed to escape the quiz when I lied that this was what Bulgarian 
informants told me. This explanation sounded plausible to this scholar. It reaffirmed 
the notion of post-socialist deterioration. That is, the “chalga person” (Statelova 
2003), a cruder version of “the folk”, reflects the life reality of people in present-day 
Bulgaria much more than “the Bulgarian narod.” 
What is essential in the socialist-realist dialectics is not so much the 
proletarian doctrine but the ideal of evolution toward modernity, elevating everyday 
life toward “reality as it ought to be.” In public, Bulgarians identify the realm of art—
“reality as it ought to be”—with forms that stands for European modernity; they 
identify the realm of everyday life—“reality as it is”—with inability to perform these 
forms, which provoke judgments of Balkan backwardness. Both during socialism and 
afterwards, the locus of this ideal reality has been the everyday reality of modern 
European nations, as reflected through the Bulgarian gaze. During socialism the 
center of this locus was the USSR and the Eastern bloc; after 1989 this center shifted 
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to the European Union (and, to lesser extent, the US). The common opinion in 
Bulgaria is that the function of all arts and artists in Bulgaria is, then, to prompt 
evolution. In order to be considered culture, artists should produce aesthetic 
expressions of European modernity, which all Bulgarians would be able to emulate. 
Art is also expected to reject actual reality—what people see as life in the Balkans—
in order to guide Bulgarians how to adopt modern lifestyle. One informant, for 
instance, told me once that Romanians made the best music in the Balkans. The 
reason was that it sounded and looked so Western that one could not even imagine 
that it was produced in Romania.  
Stemming from this socialist-realist dialectics is that Bulgarians judge the 
performance of aesthetic genres according to how successfully performers materialize 
the concept—poniatie, meaning also generic conventions—and attributes of 
evolution. This formulation of platonic mimesis entails that performers are supposed 
to replicate canonical performance of each genre. For instance, the American 
musician and ethnomusicologist Angela Rodel, who graduated from a Bulgarian 
folklore music conservatory (an institution that was founded during the socialist era) 
in the early 2000s, told me once that in singing exams students were asked to imitate 
the way various model singers, who represent the "authentic" style of each region, 
perform "canonized songs." Thus Vаlkana Stoyanova45 served as the model for 
“authentic” Thracian singing in such exams, Boika Prisadova46 stood for “authentic” 
folklore from the Rhodope Mountains. Rodel learned in school that successful 
emulation of model singers was a sign of professionalism.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 “Бълка Стоянова,” accessed October 25, 2014, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LaHSEdHhCJI. 46	  “Родопите. Бойка Присадова - Личко льо,” accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_VZety5Q6lY. 	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Other informants expressed the notion that interpretation of folklore singing 
was improper, a sign of haltura (“low quality work,” see chapter 1). Knowing the 
generic conventions means that a performer—another form of musical intellectual—
does not sing out of mere talent, just like Gypsies (whose performance 
paradigmatically represents haltura). A modern folklore singer is supposed to 
materialize abstract values with her voice—she should have the intellectual capacity 
to reflect on what she does. Being a product of shkola (school, doctrine) means that 
she has internalized the generic consciousness of the musical practice. The feminine 
pronoun is not coincidental. Bulgarian folklore singing is canonically a feminine art, 
an art of temptation rather than contemplation. Hence, informed emulation indicates 
for Bulgarians that a singer is a real artist with “high professional standards.” She 
does not grasp only the practice of art but also its abstract concepts, its poniatiia (the 
plural of poniatie). This is the reason why the poetics of popfolk mimetic artificiality, 
which I analyzed in the previous chapter, sounds so live to Bulgarians; it reiterates the 
same logic of performing pre-defined poniatiia of Western pop. 
The tension between “the narod” and “the folk” underlies also the distinctions 
Bulgarians make between “chalga” and “popfolk.” Nobody could offer me a clear 
way to distinguish between the two generic signifiers though I realized that people did 
not use them interchangeably. I realized that “chalga” signifies “wrong” hybridization 
of tradition and modernity in a manner that does not signal evolution. Its only 
characteristic is that it deviates from “right” hybridizations of folklore and modern 
musics. This deviation invokes the historical narrative of inherently wide calibration 
between Balkan-Bulgarians and modern Europeans. In the context of the evolutionary 
myth, chalga represents the seductive “folk,” i.e. the sirens’ temptation to surrender to 
backwardness. Popfolk is also derivative of “the folk” and so it also carries 
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derogatory meanings of lowbrow culture. However it also presents Bulgarians with 
the possibility to evolve voluntarily from “the folk” to being Western consumers (“the 
pop”). They do so by rejecting “dirty” chalga in favor of a “cleaner” form of 
popfolk.47  
Gencho Gaitandzhiev—a modernity heretic  
Gencho Gaitandzhiev (1935-2010)—the head-author of the music textbook 
that invoked the scandal—was a rare informant who was absolutely not apologetic 
about the popularity of chalga hybridities in Bulgaria. On the contrary, he actually 
welcomed its non-canonized and seemingly spontaneous character as a sign of a 
grassroots democratic culture. Presenting himself as a modernity heretic, he utterly 
rejected the myth of evolution from the “Turkish yoke” to Occidental Europe. This 
myth and its respective negative rendering of chalga as destructive temptation to 
backwardness indicated to him that despite the current democratic political structure, 
present-day Bulgarians still maintained what he called “the totalitarian mentality” of 
the communist era. In his mind, totalitarianism was Bulgaria’s national trauma, not 
the Ottoman past (which he refused to recognize as the “Turkish yoke”). 
Gaitandzhiev’s pedagogical goal was to deconstruct what he saw as the politics of 
domination underlying the dialectics of (socialist realist) national culture. He argued 
that this dialectics promised a utopian Western reality if people rejected their 
autonomy in favor of submissiveness scripted by national authorities. However, this 
script perpetuated traditional power structures of class (urbanity) and ethnicity-
religion (Bulgarian Orthodox Christianity). Particularly villagers and Roma (and in a 
more ambivalent manner also Turks) played in the evolutionary myth the same old 
role of the Other, i.e. Balkan slaves. The issue of male patriarchy skipped our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 See similar attempts to “clean” “dirty” popular music in Algerian Rai (Schade-Poulsen 1999) and 
Turkish Arabesk (Stokes 1992) as well as chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
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attention. I admit that we did not discuss how the equation of masculinity with 
rationality and femininity with temptation implicate Bulgarian distinction of national 
modernity. This idea came to my mind later, while I was writing this chapter. 
Gaitandzhiev’s criticism of modernity prompted him to claim that Bulgarians 
were caught in fear and shame over their imagined trauma of backwardness, and 
therefore they could not tolerate cultural symbols unless they had official and final 
meanings fixed in definite generic taxonomy. Against the grain, Gaitandzhiev 
identified chalga with the ideal of folklore—culture emerging grassroots from 
ordinary people’s lives. That was the reason he advocated music classified as chalga; 
that was also the reason why his perception stirred such antagonism. Gaitandzhiev 
maintained that people in Bulgaria were drawn to chalga’s musical openness because 
it related so much to their heterogeneous bitie, i.e. real-life experience. But at the 
same time, people were also ashamed and afraid of their own attraction because if 
they did not follow the generic doctrine of modern culture, they ran the risk of being 
tagged as the folk. 
Gaitandzhiev addressed his critique primarily to academics, urban 
intelligentsia, politicians, and journalists, who, in his mind, have been fostering 
totalitarianism while pretending to fulfill the role of the intellectual elite—directing 
ordinary Bulgarians away from the Balkans. He maintained that, both during 
socialism and afterwards, Bulgarian intellectuals have willingly conveyed doctrines of 
imagined evolution toward European modernity, which ordinary Bulgarians have 
been expected to follow. In so doing they helped the political regime to delude people 
that compliance was the successful evolution. Gaitandzhiev did not oppose 
ideologically either communism or democracy. He was actually a faithful adherent of 
the utopian communist ideal of popular democracy. In this sense he reminded me 
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Eastern European leftist intellectuals like Slavoj Žižek and Václav Havel, who 
embraced democracy, as a system of self-determination not as a new top-down 
imposed model substitutive of communism, whose slogans and rituals people are now 
required to chant and practice (Žižek 2002: 89-90). 
Gaitandzhiev was particularly motivated to reveal to me what he considered as 
the “satanization” of chalga—the allegations against “her.” Oftentimes he came to our 
meetings with newspaper clippings, whose authors mocked popfolk singers, related to 
chalga as a metaphor for all local social maladies, or blamed the music for destroying 
the nation. He asked me to photocopy and read carefully these clippings, because, as 
he said, they were highly valuable documents of Bulgarians’ “totalitarian syndrome.” 
He stressed that Bulgarians explicate this syndrome in local social life with 
intertwined anxieties of fear and shame regarding the self-perceived trauma of Balkan 
backwardness.  
Shame in particular is a central theme in local public culture. Since the 
Vŭzrazhdane Bulgarian literati have defined their goal as cultivating a modern 
national consciousness in order to release the people from their historical shame of 
slavery (e.g. Daskalov 2001). Modernization aims also to resolve the self-perceived 
emotional complex of Bulgarians; that is, as a nation, they suffer from low self-
confidence.  
Gaitandziev told me that fear and shame have driven Bulgarians to see 
democratic freedom as a risk of national deformation and disintegration. What he 
meant was that people in Bulgaria preferred totalitarianism to democracy because 
they constantly lived in fear and shame of being caught in performing backwardness. 
Hence they felt more comfortable when an authoritative power told them how to 
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think, i.e. when the regime provided them with a fixed prescription of indexical 
relations between signifier and signified.  
He taught me that Bulgarians acknowledge this sort of cultural rigidity with 
the colloquial phrase “the Bulgarian doesn’t have plan B” (Bŭlgarinŭt nyama vtori 
plan), meaning, there is only one single way to do and think about things. I inquired 
other informants about this phrase. I was mainly told that the reason for this 
monosemic rigidity was Bulgarians’ inherent peasant mentality, which confines their 
ability to think flexibly (see chapter 3). According to this perception, the Ottoman rule 
is to be blamed for this mentality. The Turks tore “the first European nation” from its 
organic land and did not let it develop. When the rest of Europe developed modern 
urban life, Bulgarians were held as a mob of peasants. 
Irony was a central point in which Gaitandzhiev positioned himself against the 
evolutionary discourse of modernization. Both sides regarded irony as a rhetorical 
power that upholds democracy. They disputed over whether irony was supposed to 
affirm or subvert the socialist realist dialectics of evolution. As I wrote earlier, 
Gaitandzhiev identified humoristic polysemy as a vernacular terrain of democracy, 
which countered the serious dogmatism of totalitarianism. Ironic laughter, the sensual 
reaction to the multiplicity of a sign’s optional meanings, stimulates imagination that 
grasps plurality of political meanings. He especially valorized laughter that reacted to 
double voice. His idea was radical not only to the intellectual elite but also to ordinary 
Bulgarians. Ordinarily, Bulgarians consider humor as risky because it digresses from 
seriousness—the presumed prime affect of modern episteme. Irony, in this sense, is a 
humoristic utterance that claims playful suspension of seriousness without aiming to 
replace it. Usually, people in Bulgaria express irony when they purposefully mimic 
what they see as backward behavior. Exaggeration indexes mimicry, and audience 
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laughter indexes the existence of a Bulgarian public—a community of receivers, 
which keys mimicry to digression from modern decorum. Bulgarians are accustomed 
to keying speech to modern forms by exhibiting controlled digression to practices 
they recognize as backward. They are familiar with social practices habitual in the 
Balkans, but this familiarity is beyond temptation; people know how to mimic 
backwardness as if they were communicating with people from Europe.   
Gaitandzhiev taught me the colloquialism kazionno, with which Bulgarians 
mocked, during the socialist era, performances that mechanically depicted the official 
protocol. This is what Žižek defines as the socialist realist concept of the “typical:” an 
officially codified phenomenon “which enabled us truly to identify the truly 
progressive forces active in the social situation.” (2000: 175) Gaitandzhiev stressed, 
though, that this sort of mocking is half-hearted. With all its mechanical character, 
performing the official protocol is, for Bulgarians, a modern safe ground, while 
digressive humor, particularly sexual humor, runs the danger of performing 
backwardness. 
The satirical play “Misunderstood Civilization” (Krivorazbrana Tsivilizatsiia) 
by Dobri Voinikov (published in 1871 [2006], 7 years before Bulgaria’s autonomy 
from Ottoman rule) satirizes the ways in which Bulgarians reveal their backwardness 
when trying to mimic modern lifestyle. The concept of irony in this play is 
foundational to the Balkanist metadiscourse of modernity. Unlike Gaitandzhiev’s 
irony that highlights double speech derived from polysemy, the play identifies irony 
with failed mimicry of European modernity. Failure comes from the fact that people, 
who are essentially backward, mimic exterior manners of modern behavior without 
having basic understanding of what modernity actually means. In this sense, chalga is 
a judgmental label of such failed mimicry. It symbolizes attempts to perform pop 
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music decontextualized from the socio-cultural environment of “real” modern pop: 
the Western world.  
The dominance of the digressive over the polysemic irony was the reason why 
Gaitandzhiev preferred to advocate folklore and pop music hybridities without 
labeling them as chalga. He attempted to advocate vernacular soundscapes of Balkan 
heterogeneity, however he knew that any reference to chalga would immediately 
associate them with noise and dirt. In this sense, he had to be much more careful than 
just avoiding the “ch” word. Associating music with Balkan heterogeneity was 
enough, since all political hierarchies of nation-state Bulgaria have marginalized such 
musical imagination. Bulgarian intellectual legislators (the camp that opposed 
Gaitandzhiev’s musical pedagogy) stressed that they had to conquer their temptation 
to chalga. For them, ascribing cultural value to the sort of polysemy called chalga was 
anti-modern. It denied the founding charter of the Bulgarian nation-state.  
How did Bulgarian intellectuals counter Gaitandzheiv’s concept of polysemic 
irony with accusations of fraud and deception? And how did they reclaim their role of 
modernity brokers and gatekeepers by stirring the scandal against his textbooks? My 
discussion turns now to answer these questions in detail. 
Academics and TV Broadcasters attacking Gaitandzhiev’s textbooks 
 
I left Bulgaria for a few weeks trip to the US in January 2008. Upon my return 
I called Gaitandzhiev and scheduled a coffee to touch base. I found him in a bad 
mood. He said that he was highly upset with a new anti-chalga attack that broke out 
during my absence. He showed me the exercise from the music textbook for 3rd 
graders and explained to me how his attempt to stimulate an interactive experience of 
folklore as a cultural practice of everyday life received an image of fraud, deception, 
and abuse.  
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I knew that this was not the first time that Gaitandzhiev was condemned for 
corrupting children with chalga. I learned beforehand that from time to time, 
education officials tried to remove discussions of popfolk performers from his 
textbooks on pedagogical pretexts. Usually such attempts were not explicitly 
addressed to chalga but to considerations of modesty and musical quality. For 
instance, once he was asked to remove a picture of the popfolk singer Sofi Marinova. 
Apparently this demand was not because she was folkadziika (a popfolk female 
performer, see chapter 1) nor was it also because she was Romani. The education 
official, who raised this issue, only hinted to Gaitandzhiev that Marinova’s Romani 
ethnicity was the real reason. Explicitly, though, he complained that Marinova’s dress 
had inappropriately low décolleté. When Gaitandzhiev pointed to other pictures in the 
textbook of female singers who wore more exposing clothes than Marinova, the 
official just insisted that those singers were a different case. 
The appearance of the Romani popfolk singer Sofi Marinova in another of 
Gaitandzhiev’s textbooks had been at the center of a public scandal a few years 
earlier. In the fall of 2004 a committee of parents from the city of Stara Zagora 
(Southeastern Bulgaria) protested against the decision of the municipality to 
implement the usage of a musical kit by Gaitandzhiev and his team in the city’s 
kindergartens. The protestors especially directed their critique to the music kit 
“Colorful Music” (Sharena muzika, Gaitanzhiev et al. 2004) for being an “apology for 
Romani songs.” What trigged their anger was a picture of Sofi Marinova with her 
young son as well as a recording of a song sung by Marinova in Romani and 
Bulgarian (the song was included in the CD accompanying the kit). Gaitandzhiev told 
me that he and his team indeed had a political goal in their mind. They intended to 
show through the song that Bulgarians and Roma could live in multiethnic harmony 
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instead of clash and conflict. However, the protesting parents and the media that 
covered the protest did not accept this message. They interpreted the presence of 
Romani musicians in the kit as a counter-educational act that corrupts rather than 
cultivates modern musical taste (as well as modern behavior). This interpretation was 
rendered in the rhetorical question that appeared in the Bulgarian press: “is it the 
pureblooded Bulgarian children who need to integrate in the Romani minorities or the 
opposite?” (Peicheva and Dimov 2005: 121)48 
Gaitandzhiev informed me that this time there were two lines of attack against 
his textbooks. The first came from the media and the other from a group of 
academics. He believed that they were interconnected; he angrily said to me that they 
spun slanders against him in the same way people were terrorized during the socialist 
era. He explained that, back in the time of the previous regime, people used to live in 
constant fear that someone might contrive slanders that would circulate and 
subsequently hit the slandered person. I learned that such slanders commonly 
revolved around disloyalty to the regime. Nowadays, slanders are either about alleged 
informers of the National Security Service (Dŭrzhavna Sigurnost, the internal secret 
police of the socialist state), or about people who allegedly indulge in prostotiia. Both 
during socialism and after, though, the motives for slanders have remained the same: 
power, revenge, greed, and envy. Both Gaitandzhiev and other people told me that in 
Bulgaria one needed to be very cautious not to disclose any sort of success. Once 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Sofi Marinova tends to shy away from being associated with Romani ethnicity, although she does 
not deny her identity. Her ability to walk the fine line between integration and ethnicity has earned her 
status of an “integrated” (i.e. assimilated, see chapter 4) Romani. For instance, she was elected to 
represent Bulgaria in the 2012 Eurovision in Baku, Azerbaijan. Her song “Love Unlimited,” which 
celebrated regional multiculturalism, was not very successful. It did not qualify to the final after taking 
only the 11th place in the II semi-final. That was her fourth Eurovision attempt after three unsuccessful 
duets with the Bulgarian singers Slavi Trifonov and Ustata in the local annual pre-Eurovision 
competition.  
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people think that someone else is too high up in a field, there is an immediate urge to 
crush this person so that s/he “won’t boast” (da ne se pohvali).  
Gaitandzhiev shared with me that someone had told him that an academic 
group, to which I will refer with the pseudonym “Council for the Humanities,” filed a 
complaint against his musical textbook for 3rd grade with a high official in the 
Bulgarian Ministry of Education and Science. Gaitandzhiev learned about the 
complaint from a friend who saw a copy of the letter, which the Council circulated 
within limited academic circles. The letter was supposedly a follow up on a 
conference the Council held about the language style of textbooks used in Bulgarian 
schools and universities. The declared goal of the conference was to encourage 
scholarly and educational literature written “not only in a correct literary language, 
but also in a language, that is cleansed of excessive specialized terminology, 
accessible, and clear, i.e. language and style, which allow easier processing of the 
scholarly material.”49 The chair of the Council, Prof. Dochka Ivanova (pseudonym), 
who signed the letter, pointed her critique to the humoristic exercise in Gaitandzhiev’s 
musical textbook for the 3rd grade. In the Council’s view, the exercise was a 
paradigmatic example of incorrect language style. Prof. Ivanova cited one of the 
speakers in the conference who disqualified the pedagogical professionalism of the 
textbook, because it presumably encouraged negative social behavior, such as 
“aggressive driving, bribery, and ruthless effort of some young people to realize by 
any means their baseless sick ambitions” (ibid). Following this critique, the “Council 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 This is a quotation from a letter by Prof. Dochka Ivanova (pseudonym), the director of the “Council 
for the Humanities” section to a high official at the Bulgarian Ministry Education and Science (Spring 
2008). The topic of the letter was, “clarifying comment on letter [omitted identifying details] from the 
“Council for the Humanities.” The letter from which I quote was part of the agreement between 
Gaitandzhiev and Prof. Ivanova, in which she apparently withdrew a previous letter of critique against 
his musical textbooks.  
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for the Humanities” recommended to the Bulgarian Ministry of Education to ban 
Gaitandzhiev’s musical textbook for 3rd graders from the Bulgarian education system.  
The letter did not provide specific explanation about what in the language of 
the exercise encouraged socially degrading behavior. Narrowing the intertextual gap 
between the contemporary animal tale and the canonic folklore ditties without cues of 
denunciation hit the cultural buttons of fear and shame of prostotiia. Not specifying 
the problem in the exercise followed the ethical code of modernity: ignoring 
digressions to backwardness. Prof. Ivanova only pointed to the problem without 
mentioning chalga explicitly. 
 Gaitandzhiev acknowledged that the Council’s letter endangered his 
reputation. It played the game of turning people against him by spreading slanders 
behind his back. However, he felt confident to stand for his name in the academic 
environment. He sought support from two opposing images of the Bulgarian 
academia. The first was the negative image of academics as fossilized relics of 
socialism. Gaitandzhiev turned to his male pedagogical authority to reiterate the 
gender stereotype of the former socialist academia as a stagnate place for “old 
nannies” (stari babi). The second was the old socialist positive image of academia as 
the forefront of national evolution. Gaitandzhiev was also a product of the socialist 
academia. He was a professor of music pedagogy at the Bulgarian Academy of 
Science (BAS) until retiring in 1992, 3 years after the democratic changes. His 
professional authority was so established during the socialist era that he could hold an 
oppositional attitude to the mainstream musical academe. 
 Claire Levy, a senior ethnomusicologist at BAS and Gaitandzhiev’s widow, 
told me that he initiated a new approach to studying music in Bulgarian schools. 
Instead of aiming to teach schoolchildren music literacy, i.e. to sing musical notes, he 
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advanced teaching music as a medium of social communication. This agenda included 
introducing local and Western popular musics alongside more politically correct 
genres (namely, classical music and folklore). As the director of BAS’ musical 
publishing house Muzika (1975-1988), he initiated the first academic publications in 
Bulgaria of books about socialist popular music (Estrada) as well as Western pop, 
rock, blues, and jazz (until then considered capitalist decadence). Gaitandzhiev was 
also a central figure (legislator, in Zygmunt Bauman’s terminology) in the formation 
of popular music in socialist Bulgaria. He was among the founders of “The Golden 
Orpheus” (Zlaten orfei, 1965-1999) the international popular song contest—the prime 
event in the Bulgarian Estrada (socialist pop) industry.50 He also participated in the 
well-known initiative “Flag of Peace” (Zname na mira), an international youth 
festival led by Liudmila Zhivkova, the daughter of socialist Bulgaria’s leader Todor 
Zhivkov. Additionally, Ministry of the Interior officials used to consult with him on 
musical issues. For instance, in the 1970s he recommended to neighborhood 
municipalities in Sofia to let rock bands practice in public cultural centers 
(chitalishta). In the 1980s he recommended to the Ministry of the Interior not to 
suppress the growing wave of heavy metal bands. In both cases his way to support 
popular music trends was to convince the authorities that Western music would be 
less subversive to socialism if it were legal rather than “forbidden fruit.” 
Gaitandzhiev’s reaction to “Council for the Humanities” seemed to be 
successful. He informed me that he contacted Prof. Ivanova to let her know that he 
was planning to sue her for libel, since the letter attacked his professional integrity 
(and source of income) without any factual basis. They agreed to meet. Apparently he 
managed to threaten her. He told me that she came to the meeting with a bouquet of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 About the history of this festival, see Genov 1992. 
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flowers and a box of chocolates (bonboniera) apologizing for the misunderstanding 
and promising to write a letter of withdrawal to the Ministry of Education. She also 
invited Gaitandzhiev to speak about his pedagogical ideology in the next meeting of 
the Council. Gaitandzhiev was pleased with his victory. He was satisfied especially 
with what he understood to be the reason he managed to threaten Prof. Ivanova. 
Apparently the police had accused one of her close family members, a medical doctor, 
of taking bribes from hospital patients. Prof. Ivanova was ready to pay lips service to 
Gaitandzhiev just not to get her family involved in another lawsuit. He concluded that 
the only way to seek justice in Bulgaria was to turn slanders back to the offender.  
I followed Gaitandzhiev to the reconciliation meeting with the members of 
“Council for the Humanities.” Maria Popova, is colleague on the writing team, also 
joined us. He knew that his speech would not change anybody’s mind. He had no 
faith in the intellectual integrity of the Council’s members, whom he considered to be 
nothing more than mere apparatchiks. For him, these people represented the 
totalitarian syndrome of Bulgarian society; their only intellectual capacity was to trace 
deviations from the official concepts of modernity. He decided to go to the meeting 
because he wanted to use the opportunity that Prof. Ivanova felt vulnerable and had to 
invite him. He thus could show these people who tried to destroy his work that he was 
not afraid of them; they could not stain his name with slanders. He warned me not to 
talk with anybody. If they know that you are a foreign scholar researching chalga they 
will only try to drag you into an argument in order to patronize and abuse you, he 
said.  
The meeting began with an anti-climactic introduction of Gaitandzhiev. Prof. 
Ivanova announced to the nearly 30 people in the room that Prof. Gaitandzhiev would 
substitute the scheduled speaker for the gathering, a known academic folklorist, who 
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was sick and had to cancel his participation. I understood later that Prof. Ivanova did 
not inform the Council members about her previous communication with 
Gaitandzhiev. They did not know that his speech was part of their agreement. To the 
best of my knowledge, the participants in the meeting knew that he was the author of 
the music textbook they criticized in the conference. The attitude in the meeting room 
was respectful but inimical. I sensed that people disliked him not less than he disliked 
them; however they made an effort to hide their mutual antipathy and receive him 
with professional formality. Gaitadzhiev broke the formal politeness with an opening 
disclaimer. He stated that he did not intend to lecture about his pedagogical credo but 
wanted to say in a few words about why he thought that no music should be censored 
out of Bulgaria’s educational curriculum. He also announced that he would not stay 
for any further discussion after his talk because he was already tired from this kind of 
debates. 
In the speech that followed Gaitandzhiev repeated a short version of a 
narrative I heard from him in our one-on-one meetings as well as in one university 
class that I observed. He also delivered his speech with the same typical voice of 
Bulgarian educated male, which he used both with me and in the classroom: slowly, 
low pitch, accentuated diction, straight from his head without any notes. In all other 
occasions his speech could go on for a few hours. At the meeting he spoke for about 
half hour. He mentioned his long-standing campaign against Bulgarians’ “totalitarian 
mentality,” which, in his words, began during the socialist era. He brought his usual 
examples, how he learned in school that (modern) cultural forms had to follow strict 
aesthetic rules and knowing these rules was the prerequisite enabling listeners to 
experience culture (in a modern manner). He brought his favorite musical example, 
that it was incorrect during socialism to compose melody in which subdominant 
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followed immediately the dominant. Another visual example was the rule that his art 
teacher, Hristo Boiadzhiev, instructed class that blue and green could not go together, 
since their pairing generated kitsch. He brought up another story from the same class 
that subverted the authoritarian socialist modernity with humor. A classmate of his 
asked the teacher, “so why did the good Lord put blue sky above green fields?”51 
Both examples led Gaitandzhiev to conclude that all aesthetic value judgments were a 
matter of the ideology of their time.  
He maintained that forty years ago the Beatles were denounced as garbage, 
nowadays they are valorized as cultural classics. The same thing happened also with 
Bulgarian pop music. Lili Ivanova and Vasil Naidanov, two emblematic Socialist pop 
(Estrada) singers, hold nowadays status of cultural icons (Naidanov even suggested 
once to the Bulgarian parliament to pass a bill that would ban chalga). However, 
Gaitandzhiev reminded the audience that only in the second half of the 1960s such 
pop music became legal in Bulgaria and it took more than a decade until (in the early 
1980s) he could include Estrada in his school music textbooks. The same thing 
happens now with chalga, he said. People now say that Azis is garbage, however 
within a decade or two everyone will regard him as the classics of this period. The 
coda of Gaitandzhiev’s speech explicated his opinion about his audience. He said that 
the intellectual elite is to be blamed for the cultural rigidity of ordinary Bulgarians. 
People could not conceive of plurality of opinions because they learned that to be 
modern meant to be obedient, to follow cultural conventions as if they reflected 
absolute and eternal truths. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Interestingly, the international Romani flag is a horizontal blue stripe above a horizontal green stripe 
(with a wheel in the middle). In Romani imagination the color combination represents the connection 
with nature while the wheel represents the Romani legacy of nomadism. For Bulgarians, this color 
choice might affirm the stereotype of “Gypsy kitsch,” which I discussed above, called also shareniia 
(mishmash of elements that do not match). See, “File: Flag of the Romani People .svg.,” Wikipedia, 
accessed October 25, 2014, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Roma_flag.svg. 
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Gaitandzhiev stayed for a follow-up question-answer session despite his 
introductory statement that he would leave immediately after his speech. In the 
informal setting of the follow up session, which presumably was not supposed to take 
place, Gaitandzhiev and the members of the Council expressed more freely their 
opposition to him. This informal exchange was also more suitable for the participants 
to make direct references to chalga (as denigration) and popfolk (as a kind of 
normalization). Evidently that was not merely a clash between two intellectual 
horizons, but a dispute about regimes of hybridization, what modern popular music 
texts and images went along with Bulgarian folklore without risking its “true” spirit. 
The members of the Council maintained the socialist model of hybridization with 
adaptations to what they regarded as “pure” Western pop. Gaitandzhiev held a 
different form of Bulgarian tradition, whose locus of purity was invisible. He 
imagined multiethnic dialogue being the “true” spirit of Bulgarian folklore. In his 
mind, unlimited hybridization freed Bulgarian tradition. He did not see, though, that 
this approach played the same game of authority—Gaitandzhiev used his power to 
shift the regime of hybridization from state officials to the “invisible hand” of the 
private music market (whose political economy of patronage led by the shady shef 
was at the center of the previous chapter).  
One young academic invoked Adorno’s critique of popular music in order to 
defend “modern” distinctions between high and low culture. He claimed that the role 
of intellectuals was to maintain high cultural standards according to objective, 
absolute, and supra-historical values. This opinion reiterated Statelova’s (1993) 
critique of Gaitandzhiev. She considers the concept of music as culture of “reality-as-
it-is”  (bitova kultura) “a turned-over pyramid” thus arguing that popular music 
should meet rational concepts of aesthetic quality, not only satisfy “crude” popular 
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tastes. Needless to say, Bulgarians receive Statelova’s perception more favorably than 
Gaitandzhiev’s. 
Another academic stated that she was in favor of pluralism of ideas, but this 
pluralism should not lead to relativism in values. Meaning, there was place in 
contemporary Bulgaria for cultural phenomena such as popfolk music. Yet, it should 
be clear that this aesthetic pleasure is for the lower stratum of both the body and the 
society; by no means could popfolk be tied together with highbrow genres such as 
folklore and Western pop. Gaitandzhiev dismissed his critics. He equated democratic 
pluralism with post-modernist relativism, in which there was no a priori taxonomy of 
high and low. Particularly, he insisted that the taxonomy of Bulgarian music reflected 
imposition of modernist authoritarianism rather than Bulgaria’s actual cultural reality. 
He thought that the existing generic concepts of folklore and pop music represented 
cultural ideology enforced by the elite and preferred to base his intellectual definitions 
on the cultural tastes and practices of ordinary Bulgarians. 
The disagreement escalated to explicit hostility when Gaitandzhiev raised his 
experience as a musical authority in the socialist state. One participant tried to refute 
Gaitandzhiev’s claim that the socialist regime censored Western pop. She recalled 
having LPs of the Beatles at home. Prof. Ivanova, who sat by Gaitandzhiev during the 
entire session, intervened and backed him by saying that she was old enough to 
remember how it was illegal to own Western LPs. Then another participant 
confronted Gaitandzhiev that he could not come to lecture to them about such things. 
After all it was also his fault that the Beatles and others were forbidden; “we thought 
that they were bad because you told us to think in such a way,” she concluded angrily.  
I don’t know why Gaitandzhiev did not reply to this accusation. He could 
inform her that he was actually responsible for the emancipation of Western pop in 
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Bulgaria. I had the impression that he saw himself so much above these academics 
that he felt it beneath his level to defend himself in front of them. He ignored the 
accusation and reiterated his comparison between the Beatles and Azis. He said that 
just back in the 1960s people “satanized” the Beatles by attributing to them all sorts of 
social deviations and dismissing their musical quality; nowadays we do the same 
thing to musical artists such as Azis. People don’t know, however, he continued, that 
Azis is actually a decent person, formally trained musician, and a highly skilled 
singer. This statement was not well received. At this point the participants stopped 
taking Gaitandzhiev seriously. For them, it was absolutely ridiculous to compare Azis 
with the Beatles—one is a disgusting chalgadzhiia while the others are the herald of 
modern Western culture. A few tried to protest but the rest began to laugh at 
Gaitandzhiev. He kept on reminding them how the media blames popfolk singers for 
seducing youngsters to immoral and dangerous behaviors. His favorite example was 
Ivana’s song “Something Untypical,”52 in which she asks her lover to get wild with 
her; among other things she wants him to get drunk, drive aggressively, and rush with 
his car through red light. He reminded the audience how the media used the song as 
evidence that all bad things in Bulgaria arrive from chalga. A mid-age woman said 
with a smile that she actually liked this song; it was a rare case of a popfolk song that 
actually wasn’t bad at all.  
Gaitandzhiev thanked the audience sarcastically for “the patient listening” and 
said that he wanted to end the conversation. He went to the back of the room and 
approached his colleague Popova and me. Popova sighed and told me that even 
hundred Gaitandzhievs wouldn’t change these people’s closed minds. We got up and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 “Ивана - Нещо нетипично,” accessed October 25, 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FS6abD2M5YA&list=PLIY14qx7iNJ_WjafW1tM2nVW0xcpn2s_
x. 
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left the room. Prof. Ivanova followed us. She shook our hands and thanked 
Gaitandzhiev for his participation. She apologized for the negative attitude of her 
colleagues. She seemed supportive of his position. She characterized the Council 
members as being overly conservative. Then she departed from us and went back to 
the room to chair the continuation of the Council’s meeting program. 
“This Morning”—bTV 
Gaitandzhiev was less successful in dealing with the media’s line of critique 
against the musical exercise. In this channel he found much less power to exercise his 
musical expertise. Gaitandzhiev sent letters to the media venues that attacked his 
textbook, in which he tried to reclaim his discursive authority by reminding his long 
list of journalistic publications as a public intellectual. However, he found the media 
environment vastly different than the one he knew during socialism. For young 
journalists, who were tuned to rating, he was a “mothball” (naftalin)—the slang 
nickname of socialist-type outdated intellectuals. For the more elitist journalists, he 
was too radical, too out of touch with the current formulation of national evolution.  
There was another factor that, if true, severely harmed his case. I bring up this 
factor because, for me, it shows that Gaitandzhiev did not understand the unequal 
powers by which the “invisible hand” forms music tastes, just like public opinion. 
Gaitandzhiev received information that the whole scandal was actually spun by a 
well-connected publisher, who competed with his publisher (Bulvest-2000) on the 
same market segment of school textbooks (a rarely profitable business in the printed 
media [alongside with tabloids]). The competing publisher tried to push 
Gaitandzhiev’s publisher out of the market by juxtaposing chalga with one of the 
most sensitive fields of national evolution: education. The implied allegation of such 
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keying was that, for crude commercial purposes, Bulvest-2000 reduced its school 
textbooks to the level of tabloids.  
Obviously, I could not verify this claim. I tend to be suspicious to conspiracy 
schemes, which are highly popular in Bulgaria. However, interlocutors with whom I 
discussed this case insisted that, in Bulgaria, such schemes were plausible manners of 
seeking money benefits and power. Bulgarians take it as given that there is no fair 
competition. If somebody wins it is because this person is a crook or has the right 
connections (this is one of the reasons why people are cautious “not to boast” [da ne 
se pohvali], see above). These notions prompt a common conclusion that the entire 
economic, political, and judicial systems of the country are rigged to benefit Mafia 
barons. I believe that this is one of the reason people tend not to take Gaitandzhiev 
seriously when he described the private music market as a reflection of the 
spontaneous popular taste. For Bulgarians, it is obvious that Mafia organizations 
control all local private and public businesses. I did witness illicit actions in my 
fieldwork. In many cases people admitted also connections with Mafia elements. 
However most people related to corruption as a fact of life in kleptokracy—both 
academic and popular term of post-socialist Eastern European economies, such Russia 
and Bulgaria, which are arguably based on protectionism and theft and so are less 
adaptable to capitalism, as opposed to central Eastern economies such as Hungary, the 
Czech Republic and Poland, which seem more modern both locally and in Western 
Europe (e.g. Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley 2000).  
In late January 2008, the show “This Morning” (Tazi sutrin) broadcasted half 
an hour-long item titled “mistakes, errors, and misunderstandings in school 
textbooks.” The item began with a report followed by a live discussion with a music 
teacher for the 3rd grade. Thereafter the show’s host, Anna Tsolova, led a studio 
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debate with four participants: Miron Krumov—the scriptwriter of two popular shows 
on bTV, Sblŭsŭk (“Clash”) and Tova go znae vsiako hlape (“What Every Child 
Knows”),53 Tsveta Brestnichka—a representative of Roditeli (“Parents”), a parents 
NGO, Veneta Hristova—the editor-in-chief of Bulvest-2000, the publisher of 
Gaitandzhiev’s music textbooks, and Maria Popova—the co-writer in Gaitandzhiev’s 
team, with whom we attended the meeting with the “Council for the Humanities.” 
Gaitandzhiev told me that he wanted to go to speak on the show, but when the 
producers contacted the publisher and asked for representatives of their side, they 
insisted that the publisher could send anyone in the studio except Gaitandzhiev. He 
interpreted this condition as an intention of the show’s producers to locate the 
publisher’s side in an inferior defensive position. He insisted that he was an 
authoritative musical pedagogue, and so, his presence in the studio could undermine 
the agenda of presenting his textbook as a paradigmatic example of “mistakes, errors, 
and misunderstandings in school textbooks.”  
In the rest of the chapter I will propose a gender reading of the transcription 
that shows how the participants in the item (as well as in the next TV case, “Slavi’s 
Show”) key their intellectual identity to legislation or interpretation by evaluating the 
potential risks that arise from minimizing the intertextual gap between folklore and 
chalga texts. The majority of legislators criticize the textbook by widening the 
intertextual gap between the adapted animal tale and the canonic ditties. Men do so by 
confronting the risk and judging the tale explicitly or implicitly as chalga. Two pairs 
of females perform the two poles of victim-slaves of backwardness. On one hand, the 
show host Anna Tsolova and Tsveta Brestnichka, the representative of the parents’ 
association (and herself a literary author), perform the role of “righteous-victim 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 “Clash” is a Sunday morning debate show, “What Every Child Knows”  is the Bulgarian version of 
the TV show “Are You Smarter Than a 5th Grader?.” Both shows hosted popfolk singers. “Clash” also 
dealt with popfolk as one of the social problems of Bulgaria.  
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mothers” who spoke on behalf of the conscience of the Bulgarian narod. The editor 
Veneta Hristova and the textbook co-author Maria Popova take the opposite side of 
“erroneous women”, who, due to lack of modern values, “abuse” their pedagogical 
duty to teach the right-conduct of modern freedom in contrast to backward 
licentiousness. The moderating third side, Miron Krumov, performs the role of the 
“rational man.” He is not a professional pedagogue but a young educated professional 
employed by bTV as a scriptwriter of an educational show (“What Every Child 
Knows”). Krumov does not hide his pleasure of the “chalga” text he read. However, 
his “virile rationality” (or his work as a rower in bTV’s media business) allows him to 
control the temptation of chalga. He can draw a strict normative line between modern 
digressive irony and backward pleasure. My reading suggests that the exclusion of 
Gaitandzhiev from the item allows Krumov to hold the authority of virile rationality 
thereby emphasizing the agenda of disclaiming the textbook under the pretext of 
risking small children, particularly girls with chalga. 
Tsveta Brestnichka from the association “Parents” keys the item to victimhood 
with a rhetorical question she raises toward Popova and Hristova, the “erroneous” 
women.” The dialogue that ensued from this question reveals the dynamic of 
gendered rationality in regard to chalga, in which females constantly fall in the self-
contradictions of esthetic pleasure and moral denunciation while males manage a 
rational balance between them.  
The rhetoric of pleasure highlights a need that school textbooks would be 
attractive and meaningful to children. The rhetoric of denunciation reiterates an 
obligation that attracting children would comply with generic standards of 
seriousness. These two rhetorical tracks collide in the debate over the question 
whether children could distinguish between aesthetic and moral reading of the 
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contemporary animal tale; whether they could recognize it as a parody rather than as a 
celebration of licentious behavior.  
I point to the interplay between the rhetorical tracks in the transcribed portion 
of the item by marking with bold claimers of virile rationality; underlined words 
disclaim feminine seduction; italicized words index the polysemic irony of the 
textbook authors. Underlined and italicized words index the more common digressive 
irony. 
The show host Anna Tsolova introduces the item. She frames its agenda of 
disclaiming the humoristic exercise in the musical textbook for 3rd graders:  
Hello again. Mistakes, errors, and misunderstandings in the textbooks from which 
Bulgarian school students study. We will talk about this until 9 (the item began 
around 8:30 am and was designed to last half an hour e.l). We have concrete 
examples. We expect to hear more examples from our guests. 
 
Then Tzolova introduces the participants in the debate. She starts with Miron Krumov 
hinting at his role of balancing between the two feminine poles. Tsolova says: 
“Anna Tsolova: Miron Krumov, surrounded only by women, good morning 
Miron Krumov: Good morning 
Anna Tsolova: he is by me, the scriptwriter of “Clash” and “What Every Child 
Knows,” In his capacity as…Because thanks to him and the team that prepares the 
broadcasting every evening go…many mistakes, I assume, in textbooks. 
 
Miron Krumov reiterates his middle ground position with one of the metonyms 
of Bulgarian intellectuals: professionalism. He keys his professional authority to an 
alliance between commercial TV as the powerbase of (capitalist) democracy and 
pedagogues who represent the generic canon of European modernity. With this 
position he seconds Tsolova’s metanarrative against the textbook. Krumov opens with 
a statement:  
“First I want to make a clarification that is necessary for people. The questions in 
‘What Every Child Knows’ are not written by the scriptwriter (Topic subheading: 
Errors and Misunderstandings in the Textbooks e.l.). But by people, professionals, 
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who deal only with that. And because the issue is the distribution of money, these 
people, we don’t show them too much 
 
Anna Tsolova: so that.....no.... 
 
Miron Krumov: I now spoke with them. They told me that from morning to evening, 
when they read all kinds of textbooks, they see all sorts of mistakes in them” 
 
The position of rational man also allows Krumov to take the risk of performing 
chalga later in the item. Tsolova intends to introduce the animal tale that stands at the 
center of the item by reading it out loud from the textbook. Krumov volunteers to read 
it loudly. He might have done so to protect Tsolova from the danger of prostotiia by 
reading such a text live on air; he might have done so because as an educated male he 
has the internal power to invoke chalga without losing his modern mindset (just as 
Slavi Trifonov, whose satirical critique of Gaitandzhiev’s textbook follows this 
section). Krumov secures his association with a chalga text by exaggerating his vocal 
and facial expressions. This exaggeration keys his reading to a digressive irony as if 
he mocks the animal tale. He earns a compliment from Tsolova after completing his 
reading. She smiles with seeming embarrassment and says: “Thank you very much, it 
was very expressive.” 
Then Tsolova introduces Tsveta Brestnichka “from the association ‘Parents,’ an 
association that is particularly active when there is a need to defend the rights of 
Bulgarian schoolchildren.” Toward the end of the item, Tsolova allies herself 
explicitly with Brestnichka when she said that “but look what, I don’t want my child 
to sing years after that song, do you understand? This is my wish, I don’t want it.” 
These words alluded to Brestnichka’s earlier protest, “I beg your pardon, my children 
are learning this (pointing to the textbook e.l).” The argument Brestnichka raises in 
the debate was that textbooks did not require the approval of parents. Children are in 
the hands of adults, whose intellectual quality no one inspects. She suggested that 
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“righteous” parents should be such inspectors. They are the conscience of Bulgarians 
who carry the responsibility of cultivating modern rational freedom. 
Lastly, Tsolova introduces the “villains” of the item: Veneta Hristova (“A 
publisher of one of the biggest, I think, publishing houses.... that publishes Bulgarian 
textbooks”) and Maria Popova (“who is a musical pedagogue 
and the co-author of one textbook that is with me here”). These figures stand in 
opposition to the parental conscience of Anna Tsolova and Tsveta Brestnichka; they 
stand also in opposition to the rational authority of Miron Krumov. Hristova 
represents the negative values of cheating and fraud (dalavera). Popova is construed 
as a “pseudo-pedagogue;” she represented the Bulgarian failure of only mimicking the 
façade of rational freedom, without grasping its implicit meanings. 
 The agenda of the item is that the authored animal tale confuses freedom with 
licentiousness, because children could not distinguish between aesthetic pleasure of 
the parody (Wolfy drives his girlfriend Vixy in a Mitsubishi Jeep to a beauty pageant) 
and its presumed manifestation of immorality. The participants specifically point to 
the Mitsubishi and golden coins as immoral. By no means do they find fault in the 
role of females as competing objects in a beauty pageant (see transcription below). At 
least once in the item, an interviewed teacher boasts that a girl in her class won a 
regional pageant (see transcription below). This agenda was further established after 
the initial introduction with a news report about the “scandalous” animal tale and the 
ensuing live discussion with a music teacher for the 3rd grade. Only in the report the 
classification of the tale as “chalga” becomes explicit. Otherwise, throughout the item 
people only imply associations of the tale with chalga. Such implications employ the 
strategy of avoidance. The participants maintain modern face by referring only 
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indirectly to the “ch” word, which is normatively inappropriate to be said on a live 
TV broadcast.  
 A video report preceded the studio conversation. It was later broadcasted 
again in the primetime edition of bTV news. The report addresses the impact of 
contradictions between present democratic education (in which rational freedom is 
confused with licentiousness) and past socialist education (which emphasized this 
distinction). Throughout the verbal report, “Sing, Jump the Fingers” (Peiat, skachat 
paltsite, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vFzuT01Qxtc, accessed November 1, 
2014), a socialist didactic song about the names of the fingers, is played in the 
background.  
The reporter Ivan Georgiev directs the responsibility of the corruptive animal tale to 
pedagogues. He foregrounds the context of the scandal—democracy and elementary 
education—at the opening of the video report:  
“Each school chooses the textbooks that students will use” 
 
 Then he introduces:  
“This is the song that 3rd grade students study, whose teachers have chosen the music 
book published by the publishing house ‘Bulvest’” 
 
The reporter demonstrates the “absurdity” of the tale with a group of 3rd 
graders, 3 girls and 2 boys, who read it out loud to the camera. Then the reporter turns 
the spot to the seductive danger of the tale: children gain pleasure without 
understanding its sexualized and materialist subtexts. 
“Many children say that the song from the 3rd grade textbook is entertaining and 
different” 
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The camera shows two girls who give their commentaries with an amused smile. One 
girl says: 
“in my opinion very cool. The text is nice” 
Another girl describes the Vixen and Wolf:  
“Aaah, I imagine a terrific car. I imagine the Vixen with a very beautiful dress and all 
made up (smiling). And the Wolf with some sort of suit. They go to the pageant”  
Then the reporter turns to the adults’ reactions hinting that the children get an 
immoral pleasure. He alludes to the context of capitalist democracy with reference to 
“Japanese cars:”  
“The modern musical version of a tale about the Wolfy and the Vixen evidently 
contains information that children find interesting. But for sure this is not the story of 
the Japanese automobile industry” 
Todor Stoev, a schoolteacher comments by claiming his role as an intellectual 
legislator. As a male educator he was safe enough to explicate associations with 
chalga:  
“Well, I think that it’s not very appropriate for a textbook in general in schools 
аfter all, a bit reminds one of chalga this text in my opinion”  
A young woman leafs through the textbook and reacts with evasion:  
“No, no, you, you, made made some kind of a joke. This can’t be the textbook.” 
An aged woman looks at the animal tale in the textbook and comments with maternal 
rationality:  
“well, I think that it is very stupid (laughing e.l.). Simply not for children” 
A man with a small child comments: 
“well, isn’t normal. At all, isn’t normal” 
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  A couple of young males look at the textbook and laugh. One of them 
explicates the chalga association, but, as older Bulgarians would suspect of 
youngsters, leaving it ambiguous whether he is entertained or scandalized:  
“Eeeh hardcore chalga” 
Ivan Georgiev, the reporter, concludes emphasizing sarcastically the alleged 
absurdity of the musical exercise:  
“It becomes clear that the sooner 3rd graders learn the song about the beauty pageant 
miss, bride Vixen, who is being driven in the expensive car of the well-dressed, 
groomy Wolfy, the faster they will receive a good grade” 
His conclusive words key to digressive irony. He ties the animal tale with the 
normative context of “the folk:” opportunism, deception, and fraud. 
Then he changes the tone of his speech to a serious critique, in which he switches to a 
castigating tone:  
“Just as teachers, parents often get shocked by the textbook’s contents. In such cases 
what comes to one’s aid is the dark sense of humor. The problem is that these jokes 
are always at the expense of children” 
The report ends with the last lines of the socialist didactic song “Sing, Jump 
Fingers,” meanwhile the camera shows again the man with the little child. The child 
cries and the man tries to calm him down saying: 
“nothing scary, nothing scary”  
 The next part in the show presents a conversation between the host, Anna 
Tsolova (in the transcription AT) and Katerina Miteva (KM), a 3rd grade music teacher 
in a Bulgarian village, Poleto, who spoke with Tsolova during class time. The 
conversation points to the “corruptive” effect of the exercise, especially on young 
girls, who are “naturally” more prone to sexual seduction. Tsolova makes the 
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transition to the conversation by referring to the crying child, the symbol of 
victimhood, at the end of the report with an utterance of digressive irony:  
“Nothing scary…the child got scared of, of, the text….of the little song” 
 
Then she turns to introduce her interlocutor, an educator who herself was 
confused by the pleasure of the textbook. Two allusions to gap with modernity imply 
the reason of the confusion. The teacher is a woman and a villager: 
 
“Ahh, now I would like to include Katerina Miteva who is an elementary school 
teacher teaching with this textbook in a school in the village of Poleto. We will 
include her briefly, so that she will tell us what she thinks about this text, generally 
about the textbooks from which she teaches. How do children look at this text. Do 
they like it? Do they not like it? What do they understand from it? So that we will 
give the word to the guests in the studio.  Mrs. Miteva hello 
 
Katerina Miteva (speaking from class, children sitting as if they are during lesson): 
hello 
 
 AT: ahh, and you are in the middle of class even 
 
KM: yes we are at school in class (laughing) with the schoolchildren with whom we 
learn this little song 
 
 AT: and how exactly, how exactly do you teach them this little song? What did the 
schoolchildren understand from it? 
 
Mrs. Miteva first aligns herself with “authentic” Bulgarian folklore. This 
claimer allows her to distance herself from her students who might identify 
themselves in the humoristic tale. It also allows her to congratulate her rationality by 
fetishizing one girl from class: 
“Thus, look what, this is one ditty, which is given additionally after a ditty from the 
Montana region. And the schoolchildren had alone to choose a way in which they 
would sing it. Ahh, some, some of them liked the text, because for every girl, a tiny 
dream is to become a beauty miss. Even in our class there is one girl who won  
 
AT: and every boy to have a little jeep 
 
KM: (laughing e.l.) Ahh, indeed, and every boy to have a little jeep. And one of the 
girls to win a pageant to become a beauty miss in the municipality here. And for them 
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it is interesting, they want to sing the little song. Hmm, for them it is interesting” 
(coughing e.l.) 
 
I see Mrs. Miteva’s cough as a metadiscursive sign of intellectual authority. 
She distanced herself from the danger of being stained with chalga by, first, claiming 
that she did not like the animal tale: 
“However, as a content, I don’t especially like it “ 
 
And, then, using her discursive authority of a music teacher to widen the 
intertextual gap between the animal tale and the folklore ditties:    
“Aa, the melody that they have to sing by choice on the basis of the other little 
song, which is above the ditty. It is a little folklore song, the other. And on the 
basis of this melody they need to sing this, which you read already on-air” 
 
Then to Anna Tsolova’s request, the teacher performs her footing in folklore 
also melodically:  
“AT: and what was the melody your schoolchildren chose, Mrs. Miteva? 
 
KM: so, I can sing just a… 
 
AT: yes, please, do sing 
 
(KM sings the first line of the ditty from Montana) so, “colorful wheels are coming 
up” 
 
Would the teacher follow the textbook instruction and apply this melody to the 
contemporary animal tale, as she expects her students? In my opinion, Mrs. Miteva 
avoids running the risk of being blamed of performing chalga on air. Her refusal 
conceals her alleged failure. Mrs. Miteva refuses to perform on TV what she expects 
her students to do in the more secluded space of school. The teacher rejects the 
alleged failure by stating that: 
“On the basis of this melody they needed to sing the other text, which is below (the 
Mitsubishi Jeep poem e.l). But it didn’t, did match, because the one is folklore 
ditty. And the other is a kind of invention to me. 
 
(AT breaks in laughter, KM smiles and looks down) 
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AT: and what? Did somebody sing this little song, from your schoolchildren? Did 
someone succeed? 
 
KM: the children, the children tried to sing, but 
 
AT: the ditty 
 
KM: yes, but, it didn’t come out as it needed 
 
AT: well now, you have been teaching little children music for many years, you 
teach, how different texts, different times, are reflected in the music textbooks?” 
 
Anna Tsolova shifts the judgment back to Miron Krumov, the representative of 
male rationality in the studio. Mrs. Miteva allies with Krumov thereby defending her 
and her students’ educational practice: 
“Because, just as Miron said very cleverly, this is a contemporary fable 
 
MK: exactly, yes, it is a clever contemporary fable. Ahh, I, as a teacher for many 
years, by the way also in middle school, a music teacher and in the elementary 
class teach. The schoolchildren handled well the material, which was provided 
for them in the textbook. But this is something new, which, and for me actually is 
new” 
 
 
The teacher, though, does not manage to fit perfectly with the agenda of the 
studio. She shifts the moralizing tone back to an amused identification with her 
schoolchildren: 
 
“As text, ahhh, to the children it is interesting. They are present-day little children, so 
that they are interested in jeeps, in ahhhh, in pageants for beauty miss 
 
AT: and already in the 3rd grade are they interested in jeeps? And already in the 3rd 
grade are they interested in jeeps and in pageant for beauty miss? 
 
KM: well” 
 
Thereafter, the focus of the conversation between Tsolova, the broadcaster, and 
Miteva, the village schoolteacher, shifts from reflecting on immorality to simulating it 
with digressive irony. The teacher presents to the viewers a girl called Simona, who 
participated in a regional beauty pageant. As I mentioned earlier, the pageant itself 
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does not carry meaning of moral failure. It reiterates the normative association of 
women with esthetic pleasure of backward slave rather than rational deliberation of a 
rational master. Moral failure comes from the fact that the girl lacks the means of 
subordinating her pleasure of being an appreciated fetish to modern normativity. In 
the following section of the transcription I will point to what I read as the moral 
failure of Simona (feminine child), and more severely, the failure of the (feminine 
adult) teacher, whose temptation to boast (da se pohvali) is seemingly stronger than 
her obligation to provide her 3rd grade students with intellectual means to limit her 
satisfaction with her own physical beauty:  
 
“KM: yes, yes. Even the girl who goes to the beauty beauty miss. I can show her to 
you here. She is by me. 
 
 AT: oh, yes, show her to me 
 
KM: if you want 
 
AT: …a handsome little child 
 
 KM: (approaching a girl sitting at a table by the wall e.l.) (to the girl e.l.) get up, (to 
AT e.l.) here is the girl, (to the girl e.l.) say what is your name  
 
The Girl: Simona 
 
KM: Simona won a pageant. Say what a pageant you won 
 
Simona: mini miss and mini mister, the city of Simitli (the regional town of the 
village of Poleto e.l) 
 
AT: ehh, ehh, bravo. Congratulations Simona (KM laughs e.l.), do you like, do you 
like this…  
 
KM: (to Simona) do you like this little song? 
 
Simona: yes, very much 
 
AT: (to Simona e.l.) what do you understand from the little song? Wolfy, is he a good 
hero or a bad hero? 
 
KM: (mediating the question to Simona who does not hear the studio e.l.) what do you 
think about the little song? Are Wolfy and Vixen good heroes or not? 
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Simona: they are good” 
(Pause, AT nodding her head) 
 
To conclude, I argue that the dialogue between the studio and the village class 
reassess the line of the previous report showing that not only schoolchildren but also 
teachers get confused, misled, and consequently, corrupted by chalga. The triangle of 
three female intellectuals—Tsolova, ambiguous Miteva, and the “victim” child 
Simona—invokes the common rendering in Bulgaria of women as slaves: even if they 
are conscientious of their “seductive nature” they still “lack” rational concepts 
(poniiatia) that allow them to translate their emotive morality into either rational 
reflection or practical action. Tsolova, the show’s host, enacts this conception by 
playing the role of worried mother (which she held throughout the item). Miteva 
enacts the narrative by playing the role of a caring teacher, who is well immersed in 
Bulgarian folklore however, as a woman, is unable to protect its generic purity. The 
result was ill-educated girl (Simona), who lacks the basic conscience to distinguish 
between rational values and their digressions. 
  In addition to the gender featuring of rationality vs. temptation conflict, the 
dialogue between bTV’s studio in Sofia and the school in the village of Poleto alludes 
also to Bulgarians’ division between the city, the locus of modern rationality, and the 
village, the locus of Bulgarian roots, a locus of “authenticity,” i.e. of the folkloric 
izvor (source) coupled with backwardness. I will expand on this division in the next 
chapter. Let me state that, in principle, Bulgarians valorize village people as those 
who are fluent practitioners of the “Bulgarian national spirit” (bŭlgarshtina), which is 
most essentially encapsulated in Bulgarian folklore. At the same time, also, people 
often say that villagers lack the intellectual capacities to reflect upon it and maintain 
its generic purity and “correctness.” In other words, Bulgarians hold the perception 
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that villagers can express the basics of the national spirit but cannot defend it from 
absorbing lifestyles of local others, namely Roma and Turks. This is the role of the 
city whose modern educators and intellectuals might be removed from the practice of 
the “Bulgarian national spirit,” however they both share it with villagers and have the 
capacity to reflect on it rationally, or more precisely generically, that is, to modernize 
“Bulgarians’ national spirit” by explicating its essence, convention, and genetics.  
Simona’s reply seems to affirm the items’ agenda that the textbook is indeed 
harmful to children, particularly to girls. Tsolova concludes the interview: 
“Well, so, Mrs. Miteva, I thank you for this participation. We won’t interrupt your 
lesson any more 
 
KM: yes 
 
AT: Continue to do your work. Thank you very much for this participation, really. 
Katerina Miteva, a music teacher in the elementary school in the village of Poleto” 
 
Then Tsolova turns to the studio participants to solicit their reactions. In my 
opinion, the textbook’s co-author Popova and the editor Hristova cannot deliver their 
perspective to polysemic irony, that it is a stimulus of pluralistic consciousness. The 
previous news report and conversation with the village teacher already foregrounded 
Popova’s and Hirstova’s guilt. They were supposedly responsible for Mrs. Miteva’s 
and Simona’s inability to recognize their role in the patriarchal power hierarchy of 
modernization: to direct female seductive power to becoming “righteous” mothers not 
“erroneous” bimbos (who distract males away from their driving duty toward 
modernization). 
First Tsolova addresses the co-author Maria Popova and the publisher’s editor 
Veneta Hristova: 
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“And now to the people who included this song in the music textbook for 3rd grade. 
Why did you decide to do that? Who, who actually wrote this little text? 
 
Maria Popova (MP): this, this is not so important. I am really happy that Mrs. Miteva 
some things actually said that this is not a song. Especially text, especially for song. 
But this is a, variant, a contemporary variant for what children sing. And it, it is not 
for studying in class this song. 
 
AT: but it is already in the textbook 
 
MP: it is so that children will make an attempt with this melody, so that they will try to 
sing with a more contemporary text 
 
AT: can’t we confuse children when they are in the 3rd grade. And clearly we have 
already confused them I don’t know if because of the textbooks but clearly we have 
confused them that Vixen and Wolfy are good heroes 
 
Tsveti Brestnichka (TB): absolutely we have confused them 
 
AT: but whether it is that we confuse them or that that the textbook reflects everything 
that is going in...the families? 
 
MP: exactly, the humor 
AT: musically…. 
 
 TB: excuse me, but this, in my opinion is extraordinarily not a clever tale. There 
are two heroes, who are going to the pageant, where Wolfy would count money 
ringing, so that a beauty miss would become his Vixy. What exactly are we 
educating the children with this text? 
 
MP: now, yes, I will tell you, Ahh, you see that present-day children are totally 
different from yesterday’s. By yourself you saw that they accept this text, there is 
nothing scary nothing bad. The humor, the metaphors, everything is necessary, for the 
child 
TB: of course 
 
MP: With the textbook they make the language, everything, more lively, for children 
 
TB: of course, I agree that the humor and metaphors are necessary, but explain to me 
exactly what does this text educate children? 
 
MP: what things, what do you want to educate? Not to become beauty Mss.? Really? 
Here is the child who already took part in a pageant 
 
 TB: nothing bad 
MP: this is around him, is it bad to…. 
 
TB: nothing bad that the child took part in a pageant. The bad thing, ehhh, the 
idea which teaches children this text. We count money and become a beauty Miss 
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MP: but this is not education, this is a fact 
 
TB: but excuse me, how do you say that this is not education. Everything that 
children touch educates them 
 
 MP: naturally, naturally 
 
TB: and when such things are in the textbook, and the textbook is an institution 
children accept such things as norm. What is the norm to which we introduce them? 
 
MP: what is the norm to which we introduce them? In, all the textbooks 
 
AT: the question is whether children understand the metaphor just as… 
 
MP: of course, of course they understand 
 
AT: they don’t understand it 
 
TB: they don’t understand it, absolutely clear that they don’t understand it? 
 
AT: Wolfy is a good hero according to this child 
 
Veneta Hristova (VH): and why won’t he be presented as a good hero? 
 
MP: now, are they?... 
 
VH: why should we fixate that Wolfy is necessarily bad hero? 
 
TB: because they act through bribery and corruption 
 
VH: (posturing doubt with her face e.l.) where exactly? 
 
MP: where exactly bribery and corruption here? 
(speaking over each other e.l.) 
 TB: (to AT e.l.) quote please… 
 
MP: you are going so far 
 
TB: (receiving a copy of the textbook from AT e.l.) of course that we go far 
 
MP: so much that you catch one text which is funny 
Which is interesting 
 
TB: but for us it is not funny at all 
 
MP: maybe for you it isn’t funny, but you are not the same age as these children” 
 
This dialogue displays the common conclusion I encountered regarding the 
textbook. “Low quality” pedagogues do not only create a chalga text—the 
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contemporary animal tale—but also drive a professional village teacher to teach it in 
class. The teacher was too passive to resist and so taught the “inauthentic” hybridity 
of modernity and tradition to the children even though personally she disapproved of 
it. As a result, children’s’ theoretical and practical knowledge of “the Bulgarian 
national spirit” degenerates rather than evolves. As Miron Krumov uttered later in the 
studio debate, the animal tale was inauthentic because in order to be folklore, texts 
need to include truthful historical representation of the Buglarian Narod: 
“Please let me interrupt, in their fragile age…they are too small for such kind of 
metaphors. The metaphors that need to be in textbooks especially in elementary 
school classes need to bear the test of time. Like for example, the fables of La 
Fontaine. Like, for example, the tales of Elin Pelin (a classical Bulgarian writer from 
the early national period 1877-1949 e.l.) etc. This thing, not only that it is not a 
contemporary fable. It is also a bad example of a contemporary fable. This 
resembles….This is an interpretation of real-life in a way that one can write in yellow 
newspapers for example. Do you understand? Textbook cannot be, cannot be 
newspaper. This is an interpretation for you, this is a fact that Wolfy drives Mitsubishi 
and that they pay money to win the pageant. This is not a fact, this is an 
interpretation. A fact is that Bulgaria was founded in the year 681 (referring to the 
reign of Khan Asparukh, the founder of the first Bulgarian Kingdom e.l). This is a 
fact” 
 
A conversation I had once with a couple of Bulgarian friends in a bar 
illustrates the issue of historical truthfulness. One of them, an amateur historian, 
claimed that archival documents contradict the national myth about the Bulgarian 
medieval kingdom—the first nation of Europe that was occupied and subjugated for 
centuries to the “Turkish yoke.” He insisted that the Bulgarian nation actually 
emerged from the multiethnic Ottoman-Balkan society. The other person dismissed 
this perception altogether. She argued that documents were unreliable historical 
source because people could fabricate in them whatever fit their needs. “When I want 
to know our history, I listen to folklore songs,” she stated. They provide the most 
reliable evidence about the Bulgarians narod. She did not deny the ethnic 
heterogeneity of the Ottoman Empire. She also agreed that social reality of the 
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Ottoman Balkans was much more complex than the nationalistic binary between the 
oppressed narod and their Turkish imperial oppressors. However, for her, the picture 
of the narod, as it appears in folklore songs, of a former medieval kingdom that 
declined into a weak rural society was the historical truth on which her modern 
Bulgarian identity was based. 
Krumov emphasized that the goal of folkloric truthfulness was moral:  
“Let’s speak as a whole, in principle. The purpose of textbooks is to shape, the 
consciousness, the child…the moral guidance, so that children will grow up as 
quality members of the society, as good people” 
 
In my mind, the answer of the schoolchild Simona to the question whether 
Wolfy and the Vixen are good or bad heroes: “they are good” “proved” Krumov’s 
argument that teaching fakelore as folklore destroyed the ability even of young 
females to distinguish between morally good and bad. 
 But what was so immoral in the parodic animal tale? Why were Wolfy and 
Vixy obviously bad heroes? And what exactly made this contemporary poem to be 
“hardcore chalga”? The participants in the items raised issues of sexual and material 
licentiousness when explaining the immorality of chalga. Maria Popova and Veneta 
Hristova, seconded Gaintadzhiev’s point of view. They defended the quality of such 
songs whose lyrics he considered clever humoristic capturing of the everyday life 
reality of contemporary Bulgaria. However, all the other participants dismissed this 
argument reiterating the common expectation of the cultural elite in Bulgaria, 
especially pedagogues, to offer to the “non-educated” masses models of emulation, 
i.e. texts that represent modern reality “as it ought to be” rather than reality “as it is.” 
The next appearance of media critique against the musical textbook, with which I 
close this chapter, shows the veteran popfolk performer, Slavi Trifonov (the pumpkin 
head component of “the chalga unholy trinity” in the introduction) performing 
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modern face by countering the polysemic irony of the textbook with irony of 
digression. Just like Gaitandzhiev, Trifonov minimizes the intertextual gap between 
contemporary pop and canonized folklore in a manner that alludes to chalga. 
However, he frames his act with cues of grotesque, which stress to the audience his 
disapproval of this proximity. Meaning, he proposes a “wrong” hybridity of folklore 
as a legislating intellectual, who knows how to hybridize pop and folklore in the 
“right” way and whose satire aims to warn the public against the risks of chalga 
temptation—forgetting the rules of “rational” purification, or in other words, losing 
orientation with modernity.  
“Slavi’s Show”—bTV 
As I mentioned earlier, Slavi Trifonov is an emblematic chalga figure. 
Bulgarians see him as one of the inventors of popfolk music. Trifonov is a patriarchal 
owner-manager of a media production firm (“7/8 Production”), who employs his own 
professional music band (“Ku-Ku Band”)—a unique phenomenon in the Bulgarian 
music business. Meanwhile Trifonov denounces both chalga and popfolk, which, in 
his view, have nothing to do with “real” Bulgarian music. He points to the prevalence 
of popfolk cover songs to claim that this music only reflects the loss of Bulgarian 
identity. His goal is to develop a new genre of Bulgarian ethno-rock, that is, “right” 
hybridity of Western pop with Bulgarian folklore motives. Despite this goal, 
Trifonov’s repertoire is not free of cover songs taken from the same channels of 
circulation of popfolk hits.54  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 For instance, Trifonov’s song “Open Wound” (“Слави Трифонов и Ку-Ку Бенд - Жива рана,” 
accessed October 25, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CnEf9Y71avk) is an adaptation of the 
Israeli oriental duet “Everyone has” (“Shlomi Shabbat And Lior Narkis Singing Lekol Echad Yesh” 
accessed October 25, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b6vsgK1bBAg).  
	   193	  
Let me explain how Trifonov defended his choice of producing and 
performing popfolk in an academic conference “Chalga Pro and Con” (New 
Bulgarian University, June 25-26, 1999). In his speech, Trifonov locates his own 
modern identity in his classical music background, which has armed him with moral, 
intellectual, and mental capability to confront seductive chalga, to conquer and 
gradually modernize her. This is what Trifonov said in the academic conference 
(Kraev et al. 1999: 64-65): “I thought a lot, but I have no one to tell it to—neither the 
press nor the radio will be interested. I collected a team of super-professional 
musicians (“Ku-Ku Band” e.l), to do that (chalga e.l) highly professionally. The only 
way out is that—I tell you. I love Mahler very much, the 6th symphony—tragic, if I 
play it for you, I will put you everybody to sleep—exactly in 10 minutes. We can’t 
tell everybody to listen to Mahler and Tchaikovsky from tomorrow. It won’t happen. 
Really, this one who says ‘to fuck his mother’ (an idiom of prostotiia e.l)—the driver 
(an idiomatic prostak [person who indulges in prostotiia] e.l), he wants to listen ‘All 
the Pigs for Appetizers.’55 The only way out, believe me, because I am inside these 
things, is to make things professionally. This will take between 8 and 15 years so that 
people get used to this music. Tarkan (a Turkish mega pop star e.l) is chalga. The 
Bulgarian language explains a large part of (Bulgarian) folklore with Turkish terms. 
Tarkan sings a song, which becomes a hit in Bulgaria and everywhere in the world, 
but it is made professionally. God willing, a Bulgarian Tarkan will appear and will 
become famous, not like Vasko Krŭpkata (a Bulgarian singer who imitates 1960s and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 “All the Pigs for Appetizers” (Vsichkite praseta na mezeta) is a “classical” chalga song. The singer 
is Ruslan Mainov, who was discovered and produced by Slavi Trifonov. The following homemade 
youtube clip demonstrates vividly the semiotics of prostotiia performed in the song: “Всичките 
прасета на мезета :-),” accessed October 25, 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2V9A_DczSaI. The lyrics of the song go in the following way: 
This is the time to chase the pig with a bottle of “Dom Perignon”/I love pork meat/I run after the 
pig/With a knife like a razor/Stay, stay, catch it/Pigs, Pigs/All the pigs for appetizers/Pig, Pigs/All in 
jars in the basement/Moist Black pudding/Spiral nadenitsa/Bahur and lukanka (all the four are types of 
local pork sausages e.l)/Give, give, give wine! 
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1970s rock e.l), not like Dzhandema (a Bulgarian socialist rock group, e.l), but in the 
condition that he plays Bulgarian music professionally. Neither Pancho Vladigerov 
nor Petko Stainov (both famous Bulgarian classical music composers e.l) did like 
Gershwin, to make a symphonic orchestra, they used Bulgarian music. This is what I 
wanted to say.” 
Slavi Trifonov performed his virile power as a musical legislator in regard to 
Gaitandzhiev’s musical textbooks in mid- February 2008, nearly a month after the 
outbreak of the public scandal over Gaitandzhiev’s textbook. Trifonov commented on 
the newspaper report I cited at the beginning of the chapter (“Little Girls Learn about 
Mobster chicks”) on his late night TV show, “Slavi’s Show” (on bTV as well).56 This 
report criticized another textbook by Gaitandzhiev and his writing team, “Music for 
4th grade.” Trifonov mocked the presentation of a contemporary folklore-style song 
“Get Up Dear Stoian”57 as if it was an “authentic” folklore. Without labeling it 
explicitly as chalga, Trifonov denounced the (fakelore) “inauthenticity” of the song in 
the textbook by pointing to the fact that the song’s lyrics were written by Peio Peev, a 
text-writer of a popfolk music label, and the singer was Vesela, a former popfolk star. 
Trifonov made clear in his speech that he did not think that such a song was 
appropriate pedagogical material. The item began with a comic introduction that keys 
the item to digressive irony. Then Trifonov metadiscursively claims his modern 
position vis-à-vis the item by reminding the audience that he is professional musician, 
a graduate of the state Conservatory and a director of a professional music band (“Ku-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 “Slavi’s Show” is a unique popular culture institution in Bulgaria running 5 times a week since 
2000. It is exceptional in Bulgaria that a commercial TV show, which includes a live big music band 
“Ku-Ku Band”, survives on the screen for such a long time.  
57 “ork kanarite i Vesela liube Stoqne,” accessed October 25, 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MHfNef5ADM4. The singer of the song is the popfolk and 
folklore singer, Vesela. For the lyrics, see “Весела-Любе Стояне,” Mp3 Muzika, accessed October 25, 
2014, http://www.mp3-muzika.eu/Весела-Любе-Стояне-texts-158136.html. 
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Ku Band”), who, despite his engagement with chalga, is well versed in “pure” genres 
(classical music, folklore, an Western pop music).  
In the following transcription of the item, I show how the claimers of 
modernity allow Trifonov to perform a role of legislator who defends Bulgarian 
modern culture while performing chalga. Underlined words mark his warnings against 
perceived seductive backwardness. Italicized and underlined words mark his 
utterances of digressive irony. And bolded words mark claimers of virile rationality.  
 “And what do we read, we, children (yelling). What do we read, we, children, 
I’m asking. Here, look at what we read in the music lesson for fourth grade 
…………..Learn Girls About mobsters (showing on the computer monitor a news 
report about Gencho Gaitandzhiev’s textbook for the fourth grade). Now I’ll read it. 
Published in a music textbook for the fourth grade is a piece of the popfolk singer 
Vesela. So, fourth grade, published in a music textbook (turning to the band). You 
studied all music here, Ku-Ku band 
Godji (the leading musician of “Ku-Ku Band” e.l.): yes, yes, yes 
Slavi Trifonov: Published in a music textbook for the fourth grade a piece by 
the singer Vesela. She is a (pop)folk singer. Which pretends this song to be 
folklore. This is, however, folk art. Different. One of the most honorable, to put in 
quotes, text writers of Payner (the biggest popfolk record label e.l.) Peio Peev. The 
song is called ‘Hey Get Up, Dear Stoian’ (Ya stani libe Stoiane). In it, a maiden 
exhorts her lover Stoian to buy her this and that so that she will give him some 
(laughter). I quote part of the so-called folk art: 
“Hey get up, dear Stoian 
to go early to the market 
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for a little maiden to buy 
for a white face—face powder 
for a slim torso—a belt 
for a white neck—a necklace 
for  every finger—a ring 
for a slim figure—a waistcoat 
then with you I will come 
and only yours I will be” 
 
How lovely that said the Narod’s genius Peio Peev. Sing Peio (a wordplay with the 
Bulgarian verb peia [to sing] e.l). Sing that song, folklore artist. This song, as you 
see, dear TV audience, teaches real contemporary virtues. What does a maiden 
need? Rich brother (figuratively, a young guy older than the maiden e.l) with money. 
But with lots of money. Oh well, he can be not so rich. He can be a rich uncle 
(figuratively, an older adult e.l.) with money. He can be a rich Grandpa (figuratively 
an old man e.l) with money. The age is not important. It is Important that he will be 
rich. And let’s continue with the quotations. Under “Get Up Dear Stoian” there 
is also an assignment for the Miss in quotes which literally says:  
‘years will pass. You will like a dark brave; what conditions will you put to 
him if you haven’t already fallen for a different brave and things have arrived already 
to wedding?’ 
Let’s analyze first. That brave. According to the assignment the girl needs to 
look for dark brave. (Let’s) see what dark is what gets ‘dark,’ dear audience. The 
adjective “dark” is used usually for a black shaggy sheep (laughter and applause e.l.). 
Consequently the brave needs to be black and to be shaggy (laughter e.l.). And if 
possible a sheep, and more precisely a masculine sheep, ram. Consequently girls. You 
who are in the fourth grade. When you grow up look for ram company, meaning, any 
dark friend. Now I’ll criticize myself. Why do I underestimate the positive influence of 
popfolk on youngsters? Thus for example everyone who watched Galena’s clip in the 
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bathtub (an allusion to a porno web clip of the popfolk female singer Galena e.l.) 
knows that it teaches the children that what is most important is hygiene. Isn’t it so? 
This is clear for everybody (applause e.l.). Except that it clearly proves Archimedes’ 
theorem, which determined that a body dipped in water becomes famous. (applauses 
and laughter). And Azis? This person is an example of racial tolerance. Sleeps with 
Kitaetsa (“the Chinese,” the nickname of Azis’ proclaimed male lover e.l.). Except 
that, there is nothing bad that present-day children imitate popfolk (female) singers. 
But as a more sober-thinking (person) I want to advise girls not to be so material. 
They need to know that when a person is good, it doesn’t matter what color his yacht 
will be. Under the influence of the folklore art of the (pop)folk (female) singers, and in 
particular the folk art of Peio Peev, I have another suggestion for a school song with 
educational character, which reveals the complex relationship between a young 
macho goon and a naughty wannabe “mutressa” (goon’s mistress e.l.).”  
Trifonov shifts his speech to a parodic (or digressive ironic) performance of 
chalga. He uses the same intertextual methods of “Get Up Dear Stoian,” 
entextualizing sexual meanings within a purified environment of “authentic” folklore. 
However, to invoke digressive-ironic effect, Trifonov takes the strategy of a double 
speech. He calibrates the poetics of the musical background and tone of speech to 
folklore, while combining the folkloric vocabulary and syntax of the lyrics (in bold) 
with the hyper-sexualized vocabulary of chalga (underlined). The digressive ironic 
outcome of this combination is marked with underlined italics. 
First Trifonov makes a transition by defining the frame as a claimed parody of 
chalga that fits with the morals of avoidance:[turns to his orchestra] “I need your help 
(the clarinet player begins a folklore-style sentimental overture e.l.).” (Slavi turns to 
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the sound technicians e.l.) But give me like that, folkish that has an echo (the clarinet 
continues with a sentimental folklore melody e.l.).” 
Then he performs his parodic version of the “fakelore” song with a dramatic tone:  
“A girl young beautiful (momiche mlado hubavo) 
Was looking at a brave dark (iunakche vlako) 
In a car black glamorous 
And saying to him slyly 
‘Oh you brave dark, 
If I make for you a reed-pipe 
A reed-pipe like an enjoyable kaval  
(in colloquial Bulgarian the verb “to whistle” means both to play the flute and 
to give a blowjob e.l. )  
Would you upgrade me 
Would you upgrade me 
With Botox on my face girly (litse momino) 
With silicone boobs 
And anti-cellulite massages?’ 
The brave dark answered: 
‘Girl, little beautiful  
Get off the Jeep immediately 
One reed-pipe is not enough  
for these expensive procedures 
In the bathtub to videotape yourself  
(again an allusion to Galena’s web porn video e.l.) 
On the web to put yourself  
And then call me up.’” 
(“Ku-Ku Band” cut the sentimental “folkish” mood with a popfolk-style58 
coda e.l.) 
Gaitadzhiev could stomach somehow what he considered unfair presentation 
of his pedagogical ideology on “This Morning” Show. Slavi Trifonov’s parody, on 
the other hand, hurt him deeply. Trifonov not only allied with the detractors of the 
textbook, he also pushed further the argument that linking Bulgarian folklore with 
contemporary everyday life is an act of chalga corruption. Gaitandzhiev told me that 
he was particularly offended because he risked his own face to defend Trifonov in 
public. He also presented Trifonov in his textbooks as the showcase of contemporary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 I identify the coda as popfolk rather than chalga, because the tune sounds as a typical “Ku-Ku Band” 
style of fusion between Bulgarian folklore and Western pop.  
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local popular music, against the view of Bulgarian musical establishment (to which 
Trifonov was another chalgadzhiia [a chalga performer]).  
The way Gaitandzhiev soothed his offense revealed to me his inability to go 
beyond the role of intellectual legislator, which he aimed to deconstruct. He tried to 
undermine Trifonov’s presentation of himself as a cultural safeguard by turning him 
into to a simpleminded Bulgarian. In other words, Gaitandzhiev tried to present the 
parody about his textbook as a failed performance of avoiding chalga. First, he 
reminded me that Trifonov was not the author and pricipal of his text, but only the 
animator of what his scriptwriters wrote for him. Gaintandzhiev dismissed Trifonov 
as even less powerful rower of bTV than Miron Krumov, the scriptwriter from the 
item on “This Morning.” Second, Gaitandzhiev stressed that “Slavi’s Show” needed 
to earn rating and therefore it addressed the lowest common denominator, i.e. the 
wide Bulgarian public that loves chalga but is habituated with the totalitarian shame 
and fear to deny it. His conclusion of the sketch was that Trifonov indeed was a very 
talented musician, however not a very commendable person. His performance of 
modern rationality was rather mimicry of a Bulgarian who is captured by the ordinary 
fear and shame of backwardness.  
Gaitandzheiv lost the debate that followed the scandal over the textbook. His 
attempt to employ his discursive authority as musical pedagogue to interpret 
Bulgarian folklore rather than legislating it got defeated. Slavi Trifonov, on the other 
hand, managed to engage with chalga and save his face of a gatekeeper and 
modernizer of Bulgarian traditional culture. The reason was that Trifonov and his 
colleagues never abandoned their duty to hybridize pop and folklore “rationally,” 
without letting their (backward) temptations conquer their reason, as Gaintandzhiev 
presumably did according to his opponents.  
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Trifonov still continues to host popfolk singers on his TV show. Once he even 
arranged a music audition contest on his show, which he called “Be a Popfolk Star.” 
In Fall 2010 he even included the popfolk singer Emanuela in his concert tour in the 
US and Canada. At the same time he also continues his negative depiction of chalga, 
which he expresses both seriously and comically, oftentimes together with other 
popfolk performers. Gaitandzhiev, on the other hand, lost not only his textbook 
project and teaching positions, but more severely, his mental power to live. I saw how 
this scandal crushed his spirit completely. His physical health was not so good 
anyhow. Now it deteriorated so rapidly that he had to quit also his radio show. Our 
meetings became less and less frequent in the following months. I met his wife, the 
ethnomusicologist Claire Levy, more often. She told me that he had withdrawn into 
himself. 
In the few times I met Gaitandzhiev after the scandal we continued to talk 
about the same topics, but he already admitted his defeat. All the issues of chalga 
were past memory for him. The last time I saw him was a few days before I left 
Bulgaria at the end of my fieldwork (June 2009). That was the first time I went to his 
home. He bitterly complained that nothing remained from all his lifework; he was 
forgotten. At the end of the meeting he followed me to the elevator when time arrived 
to go. Before I went down, I told him that I was looking forward to seeing him next 
summer when I come back to Sofia. He smiled to me bitterly. I felt guilty. I knew that 
I was lying. Deep inside I knew that it was the last time I would see him. 
Unfortunately I was not wrong. Gaitandzhiev passed away in April 2010. 
 
 
	   201	  
Conclusion 
My objective in this chapter was to unfold how Bulgarian intellectuals employ 
distinctions between authentic folklore and corruptive chalga to recontextualize in 
democracy their role during socialism: the cultural brokers of the regime’s language 
ideology of evolutionary modernization. The scandal over the adapted animal tale in 
the music textbook pointed to a clash between two camps: a majority of intellectual 
legislators who sought to retain their previous role and a minority of interpreters who 
aim at abandoning it. The two italicized terms (proposed by Zygmunt Bauman) key 
the debate to the question of knowledge-power, whether the intellectual elite should 
keep holding an exclusive power to direct ordinary Bulgarians how to adapt 
“traditional” cultural forms and practices to the current hegemonic paradigm of 
modernity (EU and US) or whether democratic intellectuals should limit their role 
only to mediating a pluralistic communication about Bulgarian tradition and 
modernity. In the textbook case, the debate revolved over whether its authors betrayed 
their intellectual duty, that is, whether they misguided children with chalga dressed as 
folklore, or whether they successfully made folklore relevant to present-day children.  
I analyzed the scandal ethnographically from the standpoint of Gencho 
Gaitandzhiev, the head author of the textbook and a leading interpreter. My 
theoretical perspective was informed by Bauman and Briggs’ critique of 
interpretation; that it makes the knowledge-power nexus invisible rather than breaking 
it. Gaitandzhiev and his detractors alike shared the same perceptions of themselves as 
modernizers, whose exclusive self-reflexivity allow them to confront the risk of 
hybridizing “pure” folklore in modernity for the wellbeing of ordinary Bulgarians, 
whose mindset is limited to their “traditional setting.” Legislating intellectuals 
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identified this setting with “the Balkan Orient;” Gaitandzheiv and his allies identified 
it with the “totalitarian syndrome” of the previous regime. Despite their opposition, 
however, the perspectives of both camps stemmed from a gender dichotomy of the 
socialist discourse of modernization, which counters rational virility with feminine 
seduction, the first stands for European modernity and the latter for its digression into 
Balkan backwardness. I showed the explication of this opposition with the exclusive 
license male intellectuals took to minimize intertextual gaps between modern and 
folkloric texts in an “improper” way that provoked connotations with chalga. The 
scriptwriter Miron Krumov and the popfolk star Slavi Trifonov invoked chalga in a 
digressive ironic manner to warn the public against what they saw as dangerous 
misinterpretations of democratic freedom. Gencho Gaitandzhiev invoked chalga in a 
polysemic ironic way in order to free the public from what he considered as their 
dangerous habit to oblige with any regime of modernity without understanding its 
nature.  
As I wrote above, I cannot determine why Gaintandzhiev lost in this debate. I 
pointed to a few possible reasons, which could be commercial or political. I do think 
that his position was less effective because operating within the same gender 
dichotomy of European modernity and Balkan backwardness he used his male 
intellectual discursive authority to define the risks of modernity, however he did not 
translate his power to offer the “traditional” public any sort of patriarchal protection.  
I will shift my ethnographic scope in the next chapter to an examination of 
how ordinary (“traditional”) Bulgarians use chalga to recontextualize in democracy 
their socialist identification with the traditional (“pure” “authentic”) narod. I will 
particularly deal with the post-socialist class of “urbanized peasants.” These are 
Bulgarians who run the risk of not modernizing “correctly” thus representing “reality 
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as it is,” “the rabble in the alley” (which never sings only makes noise), effeminate 
slaves, or as Bulgarians derogatorily label them(selves): “the folk.”  
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Chapter 3 
 
 Marina’s Prom, or the Hazards of Dancing Kiuchek  
 
You want only classical stuff,   Iskah samo klasika,  
Who do you think you are,    Na k’va se pravish ti,                                                              
That we are all from the village, except you  Che vsichki sme ot selo, no ti ne si,            
You are so pretty, but better shut up              Tolkova se hubava, no po-dobre mlŭchi 
I’ll put for you some Serbian (music), go away  
Shte ti pusna malko sŭrbsko i si vŭrvi  
 
“Some Serbian (Music)” (Malko Sŭrbsko)—Slavi Trifonov and Ku-Ku Band, 200859  
 
 
In the previous chapter I discussed how Bulgarian intellectuals employ chalga 
to recontextaulize in democracy their previous role during socialism of articulating, 
regulating and disseminating the official language ideology of evolution from 
tradition to modernity. The scandal over the adapted animal tale in the music textbook 
engendered a debate between two camps over their competing perceptions of 
intellectual duty to protect Bulgarian tradition from the risks of democratic modernity. 
The majority camp identified risk in the absence of political power that authorizes 
intellectuals to cultivate the social base—i.e. the Bulgarian narod—with “proper” 
forms of evolution. The textbook’s detractors used it as evidence that when 
intellectuals could no longer authorize “correct” fusions of folklore and modern 
culture, the society was injured. The minority camp of populist intellectuals found 
risk in Bulgarians’ expectations to follow official forms of modernity and tradition. 
Gencho Gaitandzhiev, the head writer of the textbook, recognized a totalitarian 
syndrome in such expectations. He and his writing team saw it as their intellectual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 “Слави Трифонов и Ку-Ку Бенд - Малко сръбско,” accessed October 25, 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oT8pth7gDwQ. 
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duty to “heal” especially the young generation from this syndrome by encouraging 
them to create spontaneously adaptation of Bulgarian folklore to present-day life.  
Drawing upon Zygmunt Bauman’s postmodern terminology, I related to the 
first camp as legislators and to the latter as interpreters. The two terms helped me to 
analyze the textbook scandal with Bauman and Briggs’ critique of the power 
inequality embedded in associations of modernity with risk. I argued that 
Gaitandzhiev and his allies, not less than their rivals, reinforced the prior discursive 
authority of Bulgarian intellectuals to define pure forms of tradition and modernity 
and protect the former from its perceived inferiority to the latter. The two camps 
battled over what safe democratic hybridizations meant. For “legislators,” it meant 
maintaining the authoritarian canon of modernized folklore but now voluntarily. For 
“interpreters,” it meant populist liberty to fuse tradition and modernity without any 
official form. Throughout the ethnographic narrative I showed that considerations of 
safeness and risk related more to intellectuals’ shift of political power from a single-
party and the government to the commercial media market. Both camps had to 
convince the consuming audience (whom they identified with the social base, i.e. the 
narod) what model of hybridizing tradition and modernity would provide Bulgarians 
with more effective (and hence, safer) adaptation to democracy, the authoritarian 
paradigm that limits chalga or the populist one that emancipates it. 
To understand why the authoritarian model got better reception than the 
populist model of Gaitandzhiev and his allies, I turn now to the dialectical counterpart 
of the intellectual elite: Bulgaria’s social base, discursively called the narod. I ask 
how Bulgarians, who do not hold discursive authority to define relationships between 
nation and tradition, employ chalga to recontextualize in democracy the previous role 
of the social base in socialist evolution: being the authentic source (izvor) of 
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Bulgarian modern nation, its “bearer of tradition.” As I mentioned in the previous 
chapters, this status carried simultaneously a derogatory meaning of Balkan 
recursivity, that is, marginality or digression to concepts and practices identified with 
European modernity. Indeed, these two roles of the narod (authentic and backward) 
were not unique to socialism; they stem from the Balkanist strand of the language 
ideology of European modernity. However, something new happened to the line of 
backwardness after the introduction of democracy following the collapse of socialist 
regimes 1989. Bulgarians split it from the line of authenticity and put it in discourse 
with a new name—the folk. This split was more than semantic. It stressed one major 
anxiety regarding transferring power from the elite to the narod. Bulgarians expressed 
fears that the social base was not capable to distinguish voluntarily between 
modernity and “pseudo-modernity,” between “real” modernization of Bulgarian 
tradition and its corruption and between “rational freedom” and “licentiousness.” 
The language split between the narod and the folk guides my analysis in this 
chapter. I show how non-elite Bulgarians both reject and reaffirm the socialist 
discourse of evolution when negotiating what they see as the hazards of democracy: 
modernity corruption and pseudo-modernity. I argue that, as the idiom “after 
democracy came” indicates, post-socialist Bulgarians have welcomed democracy as 
the next language regime that defines them as essentially traditional and subjects them 
to the current project of modernization. Instead of evolving into a member in the 
family of Soviet nations the defined goal is now integration with the capitalist global 
world (more specifically, the EU). Continuing the trope of intertextual gaps from the 
previous chapter, my analysis reveals that the narod and the folk (or more precisely, 
utterances, texts and forms associated with the two signifiers of social base) equally 
hold large gap with cultural forms Bulgarians associate with the current regime of 
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modernity. Both the narod and the folk signify Balkan liminality to modern Europe. 
However, when Bulgarians perform a narod face they express obligation to minimize 
(or, more precisely, erase) this gap (through socialist evolution or democratic 
integration). When they perform a folk face they widen this gap, most times ironically 
(in the polysemic or digressive meanings of the word, see the previous chapter). My 
ethnographic case will explore the poetics of performing folk face and the strategies of 
switching to formal speech in which people perform either modern urbanity or the 
face of the authentic narod.  
Positive and negative associations of chalga with the folk allow Bulgarians to 
maintain ambiguity regarding the authoritarian (“legislative”) and populist 
(“interpretive”) formulations of democratic integration. With negative associations 
people key their speech to the authoritarian rhetoric that shifts the responsibility of 
minimizing the gap with modernity from the modern elite to the traditional narod. I 
encountered negative associations most often when people portrayed chalga as a sign 
of modernity crisis. They condemned the non-evolutionary character of chalga 
hybridities to identify themselves as the narod that, unlike the folk, was capable of 
spontaneous integration. With positive associations, people key their speech to 
populist calls for grassroots integration. I met people who identified themselves as the 
folk in order to claim that they have already abandoned the socialist concept of 
authentic folklore in favor of popular culture, which for them represented the macro 
configuration of democratic modernity: globalization (more in detail, later). 
Gaitandzheiv and other “interpreter” intellectuals used to distinguish democratic 
modernity from the socialist one by equating liberal pluralism with postmodernity. 
These Bulgarians did reject modernity altogether but tried to capture what they saw as 
the hybrid nature of globalization.  
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Conceptually, this chapter opens a debate with Michael Kearney (1996) who 
equates the category of modern social base with peasantry and defines two analytical 
perspectives—derogatory and celebratory—to the role of peasants in the cultural and 
economic dialectics of modernity. He links the derogatory perspective with 
modernists who formulate peasantry as urbanity’s primitive stage of development. 
The celebratory perspective belongs to romanticists who load peasantry with pre-
modernity nostalgia. Kearney maintains that both the modernist and nostalgic 
perspectives to peasantry stem from the essentialist dualism of traditional village (or 
country) vs. modern city, in which the first is instrumental for the hegemony of the 
latter (Williams 1973). Kearney argues that anthropologists played central role in 
inventing the category of peasantry as modernity’s object. They formulated peasantry 
in the late 19th century as modernity’s internal Other, equivalent to the “primitive”—
the colonialist form of external Otherness. Bauman and Briggs (2003) stress the role 
of folklore as a prime cultural realm invented by modern intellectuals in the 18th 
century to naturalize peasant otherness within the realm of language. The Balkanist 
concept of the Bulgarian peasant is an offspring of this project.  
Kearney argues that during the Cold War both capitalist and socialist 
modernizers employed the dualist essentialism of the city vs. the village when 
competing to develop (or in the socialist context, to evolve) the “peasants” through 
enterprises of industrialization and urbanization. Dynamics of globalization in 
aftermath of the Cold War, he maintains, require us to evaluate the degree to which 
the category of peasantry is still valid to characterize communities’ social and cultural 
traits. The relevance of his argument to Bulgaria is not inferential as Kearney lists it 
alongside with Romania, former Yugoslavia and Poland as one of “the most strongly 
peasant nations of Europe” (ibid: 9). Kearney finds that in such countries (as well in 
	   209	  
other non-European peasant societies such as Mexico, his main ethnographic filed), 
“‘rural’ communities demonstrate demographic and what appears a cultural 
persistence (my italics e.l.) few observers foresaw a decade ago” (ibid).  
I italicized “persistence” to highlight a language consideration that Kearney 
leaves outside his discussion and which is relevant to my study: what prompts 
Bulgarians to keep holding to the previous (developmentist) identification of the 
social base with peasantry even after they were not forced to do so. This question is 
crucial to this society, in which socialist peasantry oftentimes carries painful 
memories of imposed collectivization, confiscation of land and other property, 
agricultural industrialization as well as demographic control. What adds also to this 
question is the fact that currently the majority of Bulgarians no longer live in villages.  
Bulgarians’ persistence in holding onto language forms of peasantry reminds 
me of the strategy with which Bulgarian villagers negotiated the socialist enterprise of 
rural development (Creed 1997). They both sabotaged and complied with their 
formulation as peasants on the path of evolution into proletariat. Creed argues that 
Bulgarians employed this strategy, to which I referred both in the introduction and 
chapter 1, “conflicting complementarities,” not only to express ambivalence to the 
socialist legacy of development. It actually helped them domesticate socialism in a 
way that benefited them not only the regime that enforced it. Creed writes that his 
informant-villagers employed this strategy again in the transition from socialism to 
capitalist democracy. They kept voting en masse for the former communist party in 
order to sabotage as well as to comply with the new political power that now 
demanded them to privatize agricultural production and compete alone in the 
commercial market. 
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I analyze in this chapter a language component of “conflicting 
complementarities” which relates to Kearney’s suggestion to replace the category of 
peasantry with ethnicity in order to deconstruct the element of subalternity embedded 
in the dialectics of developmentism (the evolution of traditional peasants into modern 
urbanized). He proposes a new category of social base—“polybian”—that centers on 
subaltern subject position in complex circuits of worldwide value-power exchange 
(his alternative to the more static nexus of culture and economy in capital). Polybian 
identity transcends modifications (or hybridizations) of developmentist peasantry, 
such as “worker-peasant” (ibid: 104), that stress immigration and dislocation while 
still reiterating the dualism of ruralty vs. urbanity. These “hyphenated peasantries” 
(or, in my words, hybridities), he argues, indeed capture the crisis of late modernity. 
However they still maintain the power of modern hegemonies to imagine themselves 
by inventing antithetic pre-modern peasant life.  
Kearney suggests also shifting the unit of ethnographic study from the “pure” 
locus of peasants—the village—to personal polybian lives that emerge within hybrid 
webs of ethnicity through “the flow of general value in its various forms (surplus 
labor, money, information, goods, services, energy, style)” (Kearney 1996: 174). He 
offers reticula to be the metaphor of polybian social spaces. With this biological 
synonym of rhizome and hypertext Kearney proposes tracing “the cultural 
construction of person and community” (ibid: 179) within transnational webs of 
“…production, loss, transfer, accumulation, and consumption, that is, the differential 
distribution” (ibid: 168) of value-power. 
Let me begin my critique of Kearney’s post-developmentist concepts with a 
reference to Creed, who quotes the diatribe of a Bulgarian villager against the word 
“post-socialist transition.” Reflecting on the century old history of Bulgarian national 
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history this informant utters that the society has always lived in a state of transition: 
from an Ottoman province to nation, from monarchy to Soviet socialism and now to a 
capitalist democracy. Every regime propagated its model of transition with a 
promised destination of modernity. In practice, modernization always required 
ordinary Bulgarians to reject their current social reality and adopt new one. However, 
once Bulgarians approached the destination, the political climate outside Bulgaria 
changed and with it the local regime. New hegemonies announced their power by 
abandoning the previous destination and defining a new destination of transition. The 
villager concludes his diatribe with what Creed sees as an unperceived accurate 
diagnosis of Western capitalism. That villager complains that Bulgarians were 
doomed to live in a never-ending transition with no destination and no end—
transition for the sake of transition. 
Indeed, I oftentimes encountered notions of developmentist subalternity (to 
use Kearney’s terminology) in utterances of non-elite Bulgarians who, as a mater of 
fact, considered themselves at the bottom of modern European development. 
“Simpleminded people, peasant state” (prosti hora, selska dŭrzhava) was one of the 
crudest statement with which my informants both celebrated and denigrated 
themselves. Bulgarians’ humoristic self-reference of being the last hole on the kaval 
(see chapter 1) keys narod subalternity to peasant folklore. The Leninist framework of 
socialist evolutionism reinforced this stereotype of utter inferiority during the Cold 
War. I realized how prevalent it remained even two decades after the fall of the 
previous regime when people lamented to me that, as a peasant society, Bulgaria 
lacked the basic social prerequisites of modernity: proletariat and bourgeoisie. 
“Legalist” intellectuals reiterate this perception when arguing that, in the absence of 
social conditions of grassroots modernization, only the state should lead “proper” 
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evolution of the narod in order to protect it from the consequences of wrong contact 
with modernity: turning into a corrupted folk whose of main cultural characteristic is 
being people who listen and perform chalga. On the other hand, considering the 
Balkanist anxieties of ethnicity, the self-perception of peasant society has also self-
affirmative aspect. Defining Bulgarians as peasants meant that they are still Europe’s 
incomplete Self, not exterior Others. Being peasants and not an ethnicity means to 
Bulgarians that they can still minimize their gap with Europe; their fractal recursivity 
from modernity still has the potential to be erased.  
The way the villager in Creed’s study relates to capitalist transition casts a less 
favorable light on Kearney’s emphasis on the motive of movement in the concept of 
ethnicity—the circulation of value-power over global reticula. Ethnicity indexes to 
Bulgarians a very specific sort of movement, that is, of poor guest workers in manual 
labor jobs (such as construction and seasonal agriculture) that Western Europeans do 
not want to take. The association of transition with poverty appears also in the words 
of the popfolk singer Marta (see chapter 1), who relates to her constant travel to gigs 
as chergarska rabota (nomad’s work, or literally rug-holder work, “you fold your rug 
and go away” as the proverb goes).  
Referring to Irvine and Gal’s (2000) triad sociolinguistic processes 
(iconization, erasure and fractal recursivity), I suggest that both Balkan peasantry and 
ethnicity iconize difference to Europe. However Bulgarian nation-builders (like in 
Greece and Turkey—the other two post-Ottoman societies remained ethnically and 
religiously heterogeneous after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire) designed the path 
of language modernization by stressing peasantry as the national realm of liminality 
Europe thereby eliminating ethnicity as an icon of difference. This was not the only 
way to modernize in the Balkans. Yugoslavian and Romanian nation-builders took a 
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more ambivalent path, sometimes tolerating sometimes suppressing local ethnic 
identities. As a realm of fractal recursivity, both peasantry and ethnicity signify wide 
intertextual gap from urbanity—the icon of European modernity. In Bulgaria (just as 
in Turkey and Greece), the association of the social base with peasantry discloses the 
commitment to minimizing this gap. The language ideology of modernization means 
that peasants should turn into urbanites. Ethnicity stands as an antonym. It means 
further widening the intertextual gap from urbanity back to the stereotypical 
landscape of the Ottoman Balkans.  
Following Kearney’s methodological focus on personal polybian lives 
emerging in the global reticula I analyze how his post-developmentist model actually 
revalidates developmentist manners of domination and power. The case of Veselin 
Karchinski, which stands at the center of my ethnographic narrative, reveals how 
Bulgarians experience democratic ethnicity as a source of risk of fractal recursivity 
with modernity rather than as possibility of erasure (i.e. integration) and how they 
negotiate their notion of risk by performing narod and folk faces in regard to chalga.  
Vesko (the diminutive of Veselin) is a native of Goritza,60 a small village in 
north central Bulgaria and a current resident of the capital of Sofia. I met him when he 
worked as a fruit and vegetable vendor in a street booth at the upper-middle class 
neighborhood in which I lived. During our close communication for a period over two 
years, I heard from Vesko about his early life in the village during the socialist era, 
the political changes that pushed him to immigrate to the big city, as well as his 
struggle to survive during the early democratic era.  
Vesko drew to me a self-portrait that both countered and affirmed Kearney’s 
concept of polybian. He identified himself as an urbanized-peasant (selianin v grada, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 The names of Veselin Karchinski, his family members, work colleagues, and native village are all 
pseudonyms.  
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literally “villager in the city”) and expressed his ambition to transform into a full 
urbanite (grazhdanin). He planned to do so by starting a family fruit and vegetable 
store that would guarantee middle class life to his daughter, Marina. Chalga was the 
most common topic in regard to which Vesko articulated the social experience and 
meanings of his self-portrayal. Above all, he articulated to me through speech acts of 
chalga the new regime of class, which was packaged in rhetoric of liberation from the 
limitations of being a socialist peasant. As I will show momentarily, Vesko 
recognized the risks and potentialities of his new transitional position. He negotiated 
these risks with expressions of shame and affinity with musical images Bulgarians 
recognize as chalga. Similarly to the intellectual elite, Vesko and his social 
environment identified chalga with what they saw as hybridities of traditional and 
modern Bulgarian culture that fell outside the official (socialist) canon, above all the 
Gypsy dance music of kiuchek (the strongest stereotype of Balkan ethnic recursivity). 
Vesko’s ambivalence of shame and affinity with chalga also challenges 
Kearney’s argument that popular culture is a major mediator of the transformation of 
national peasants (whom he identifies with folklore) into global ethnicities in the 
aftermath of the Cold War. Kearney maintains that within the developmental 
dialectics of modernity folklore provided peasants with capital of authenticity. 
Working and living in the Californian border zone on us and Mexico, he argues that, 
transcending this dialectics, polybians can now exceed national boundaries and form 
personal and communal identities as well as seek power by producing and, even more 
importantly, consuming mass mediated values and symbols circulating worldwide.  
Indeed, the World Music wave of the 1990s was one of the strongest 
expressions of this utopian hope that transnational popular music dialogue, 
particularly between post-peasant-émigrés, would propel new global social ties and 
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ethnic class-consciousness (e.g. Lipsitz 1997). In the context of Bulgaria, particularly 
Dimov (2001) and Rice (1996, 2002) express this hope when drawing lines of 
continuity from socialist folklore to democratic chalga. Similarly to Kearney, both 
scholars rely on equation of cultural forms with defined social identities. The 
transformation of folklore into chalga indicates to them the transformation of the 
Bulgarian social base from national peasant (the narod) to globalized ethnicities (i.e. 
polybians).  
Taking a postmodern perspective Dimov abandons the socialist grounding of 
Bulgarian folklore in pure national canon and core (the Bulgarian word is izvor, also 
“essence,” “authenticity,” “spring,” e.g. Buchanan 2006 and chapters 1 and 2 of this 
dissertation). In his view, tradition is always hybrid in the sense that it is the general 
term of festivity (praznik) and everyday life (delnik) practices common in Bulgaria. 
This definition prompts him to shifts the locus of folklore from the quintessential 
Bulgarian village to a Bulgarian identity emerging from a multiethnic dialogue 
particularly with Turks, Roma, Greeks, Serbians, Romanians and Macedonians. This 
perception is what prompts him to suggest renaming chalga “ethnopop,” to stress that 
Bulgarian folklore (as well as Bulgarian national identity) has not fell in crisis with 
the collapse of socialism but has remediated from the musical apparatuses of the state 
to global media.  
Rice proposes a Marxist analysis61 of how musical transformations from 
folklore to chalga62 react to the transformation of the local economic base from 
socialism to capitalism. He argues that the emergence of chalga and decline of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Rice employs a “component parts” model formulated by the Russian revolutionary Nikolai Bukharin 
(1925). This analytical model includes: genre or function, instrumental technique, human or social 
organization of musicians, formal elements (rhythm and harmony), style or expression, content or 
subject. 
62 In his 1996 text, Rice identifies chalga specifically with Wedding music (svatbarska muzika)—the 
earliest chalga current, which was at its peak around the 1989 changes. In his later text from 2002 he 
widens chalga to include also what Bulgarians recognize as popfolk.  
	   216	  
folklore mediates the historical reorientation of Bulgarian national identity from the 
pure village to the global multiethnic world. Rice maintains that early chalga exposed 
the crisis of the communist rhetoric in the late 1980s. The unprecedented popularity 
of non-authorized performers, such as the wedding musician Ivo Papazov, signaled to 
Bulgarians that the ideology of socialist progress embedded in folklore was 
profoundly detached from the new economic conditions. Rice concludes that anxieties 
around chalga reflect socialist pessimism regarding the ability of the state to maintain 
its hold vis-à-vis the democratic wave of ethnicization and globalization. When 
located within the post-Cold War context, chalga, he believes, has the power to 
promote a vision of attenuated Bulgarian nationalism, which contrary to fears of 
Balkanization (that reiterate the modernist mythology of clash between the Occidental 
European and Oriental Ottoman civilizations), can seek multicultural ties across the 
Balkans and beyond.  
A more ambivalent perspective to chalga comes from Donna Buchanan (2006) 
and Carol Silverman (2012) who stress in different ways the political economy of 
homogenization that underlies the post-socialist hybridization of Bulgarian music 
culture. Their critiques resonates with Feld (2005a) who argues that forces of 
domination build on the split between original sounds and their electronic replication 
and transmission (schizophrenia) and the cycle of action and reaction 
(schismogenesis) which has blurred borders between exotic and familiar, local and 
global and generated world music and world beat. Buchanan argues that socialist 
production of village feminine voice in folklore women choirs of the state radio 
circulated to the World Music market as Le Mystère des Voix Bulgares but did not 
create a new venue of social mobility for Bulgarian peasants. Rather, this circulation 
shows the decontextualization of European Balkanism from Soviet progressivism and 
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its recontextualiztion in post-socialist French neo-colonialism. Silverman argues that 
the global circulation of Roma as a metonym of musical excellence has been a double 
edge sword. Roma musicians could sometime seek international careers as 
“authentic” representatives of Gypsy music (in its schizophrenic and schismogenetic 
forms). On the other hand, the cultural value-power of Gypsy music has not translated 
into political value-power but reinforced longstanding Romani marginality and 
stereotypes of otherness. 
Veselin Karchinski, his family, friends and colleges elaborated to me an 
additional mechanism of language homogenization, which reaffirms Buchanan’s and 
Silverman’s critical perspective to post-Cold War globalization, on one hand, and 
challenges Dimov’s and Rice’s (and by inference, Kearney’s) celebratory one, on the 
other. These former villager Bulgarians keyed his chalga references to shame when 
they recognized visible or invisible authority that required them to calibrate their 
communication to either modern urbanity or traditional peasantry (i.e. the Bulgarian 
narod). They expressed affinity with chalga in situations they recognized safe enough 
to digress from what they anticipated to be the formal rule of urbanity and peasantry 
and create spaces of intimate sociality. Experiencing themselves inferior to an 
imagined category of real urban Bulgarians, they calibrated their communication to 
intimacy with images they associated with the backward, corrupted or pseudo-modern 
folk.  
I explore the role of folk intimacy through three critical perspectives proposed 
by Martin Stokes (2010). Shame of chalga points to the first perspective, which 
Stokes relates to Ronald Barthes’ characterization of intimacy (particularly its 
language of sentimentality) as “unwarranted discourse…spoken perhaps by thousands 
of subjects (who knows?) but warranted by no one; it is disparaged, or derided by 
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them, severed from authority but also the mechanisms of authority (science, 
techniques, art)” (Barthes 1977: 1, quoted from Stokes 2010: 31). With this 
framework I could hear the common statement “chalga is the most popular music in 
Bulgaria but I personally don’t like it” not as an attempt to dissociate from chalga but 
as a way to signal that people were entering the sensitive zone of folk intimacy, which 
required safety measures: denying personal relations with the media of intimacy—
chalga.  
The second perspective belongs to Berlant and Warner (1998) who critique the 
institutional enforcement of heteronormative hegemony over sexual intimacy. Their 
emphasis is on the power inequality that underlies Habermas’ idea that personal 
subjectivity is publically mediated and is always oriented to the public. This critique 
helps me analyze how Vesko and his social environment articulate vis-à-vis his fruit 
and vegetable booth and a nearby café the protocol of modern urbanity and traditional 
peasantry as well as the limits of tolerance to digressing from them with folk intimacy. 
The consequences of successful and failed negotiation have revealed to me most 
vividly the mechanism of discipline and punishment implicit in the language ideology 
of democratic freedom. 
The third perspective belongs to Michael Herzfeld (1997) who considers 
intimacy a source of shared identity emerging from shared embarrassment in regard to 
shared cultural practices that do not fit with the European metadiscourse of modern 
nationhood. In the case of nation-state Bulgaria I argue that it is the Balkanist strand 
of this metadiscourse that prompts Vesko both to dissociate and associate with chalga. 
As I will show below, he was fully cognizant of the power of such associations to 
invoke the harsh sense of Bulgarian “fellowship of the flawed” (ibid, see also Dent 
2009). Vesko could subvert his own narrative of integration in the city by reminding 
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his fellows that, regardless of class and level of education, liminality to European 
modernity (namely, “peasant society, simpleminded people”) is the common 
denominator of Bulgarian national identity.    
 Combining the three perspectives together, I argue that expressions of shame 
and affinity with chalga are emotional cues by which Bulgarians create intimate and 
formal zones of communications. Over the long period of our friendship I learned that 
positive and negative references to chalga were a most powerful medium of 
expressing inferiority to democracy’s language of power, since nothing like chalga 
invokes a sense of subjectivity that always stands in gap with or digression from the 
two competing models of democratic modernity, the authoritarian, on one hand, and 
the populist, on the other.  
The high-school graduation prom of Vesko’s daughter Marina, was a climactic 
point, in which I witnessed most vividly (and most crudely) the stakes involved in 
maintaining careful balance between cues of formality and intimacy. Vesko planned 
this event to be his rite of passage to the status of an integrated urbanite. He located 
the party in the bar-café across his booth and invited his extended family (mostly 
former villager-émigrés in the city like him), his colleagues, and bosses, friends, and 
clients. At the peak of the party, Vesko cast off the inhibitions of shame with chalga 
and took the license to celebrate as he “really felt,” with the ethnic Gypsy belly dance, 
called kiuchek. Bulgarians maintain that “real” urbanites can ostensibly digress to 
Gypsy ethnicity carefree without losing face. They do that by disclaiming association 
with chalga (the strategy of unwarranted discourse) with digressive irony (see chapter 
2). In the case of Vesko, taking liberty to express affinity with ethnic chalga without 
reservations brought to his demise. He was punished with losing his workplace, 
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personal orientation and, finally, his ability to fulfill his goal of integration in the 
urban space.  
I analyze Vesko Karchinski’s hazardous speech acts of chalga music in four 
sections. The first section discusses the socialist division between the modern city and 
authentic (though backward) village, whose collapse “after democracy came” signals 
the rise of the new social base of “urbanized peasants.” In the second section I present 
Vesko’s post-socialist biography as a peasant in the city of Sofia. The third section 
elaborates on the semiotics and pragmatics of shame and affinity with chalga, 
specifically how Vesko orients his communication between the formal codes of 
modern urbanity and traditional peasantry as well as folk intimacy. The fourth section 
discusses Marina’s prom and its unfortunate aftermath. These four sections guide my 
critique of Kearny’s post-peasant paradigm (as well as Rice’s and Dimov’s lines of 
continuity from folklore to chalga). In my view, the ethnographic case of Veselin 
Karchinski indicates that even though popular culture symbols are indeed available 
globally across divisions of class, the ability to translate symbols to value-power still 
depends on the modern dialectics of urbanity vs. peasantry and their unequal 
relations. In the context of Bulgaria, this is the authoritarian formulation of 
democratic integration, which, much more effectively than the populist one, rewards 
former villagers with recognition of urban integration when they admit their inherent 
backwardness, and punishes them when they express affinity with signifiers of 
backwardness outside the ideologically circumscribed realm of digression in which 
they can be tolerated.      
The Socialist Dialectics of the modern City and the traditional Village 
The Bulgarian Communist Party formulated the city and the village as two 
antithetic ideological loci from which national modernity was supposed to evolve. 
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According to the Soviet model, the village represented the “authentic” idyllic 
chronotope (Bakhtin 1981) of the pre-modern social base (e.g. Buchanan 2006; Rice 
1994)—the Narod—the “authentic” origin (izvor) of the modern nation. The state 
built model villages in a socialist realist manner to mediate (or, more idiomatically, 
propagate) the official narrative of Bulgarian history, tradition and folklore (Kaneff 
2004). Even though socialist modernization centered heavily on creating urban 
proletariat, having roots in the village carried substantial social capital. Village houses 
functioned as villas for vacation, gardens for growing food, as well as places of retreat 
after retirement. Former villagers who were well off would have a summerhouse in 
their village of origin. City dwellers with means would also buy a second house in a 
village nearby their urban residence where they would keep a garden. A Bulgarian 
informant once told me half jokingly that the socialist economy collapsed once the old 
generation in the village died. The serious part of this statement relates to the fact that, 
by depending on village relatives with garden and livestock, city people could 
overcome the chronic shortages in the government stores of fruit, vegetables, dairy, 
meat, and alcohol (e.g Verdery 1996, Creed 1997).  
Demographic control was the major social mean by which the socialist regime 
practiced the language regime of purification and hybridization between the city and 
the village. People were allowed to move from one locus to the other only if they 
qualified professionally (a working position) or domestically (marriage) for the 
ideologically defined lifestyle of the place to which they intended to move. In some 
cases, state officials forced villagers to move locations with factories that needed 
labors. Villagers could immigrate to urban centers (and, similarly, from small 
provincial towns to bigger cities) voluntarily only if they went through a social path 
of modernization; they either studied in state institutions leading to professional jobs 
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in the city or formed family ties with city residents who had ostensibly developed 
urban lifestyle. Even though villagers did immigrate to big cities during socialism, the 
identity of villager in the city did not carry a derogatory meaning, as it began to carry 
“after democracy came.” Stemming from a prevalent legacy of economic 
backwardness (e.g. Chirot 1991, Gerschenkron 1962), petit-bourgeois urbanity did not 
stand in many socialist Eastern European societies as standard of modernity like in 
Western European societies. In Bulgaria, the regime directed its power against the 
thin crust of local bourgeoisie in order to replace it with a socialist-realist class of 
Bulgarians as they “ought to be:” urban proletariat. Joining urban proletariat did not 
always entail immigration from the village to the city, but going through the 
dialectical process in which both the bourgeois city and the traditional village were 
supposed to coalesce into a homogenous industrial working class (e.g. Creed 1997). 
The collapse of the socialist regime brought to an end the internal 
demographic control. The language divisions between the modern city and the 
traditional village lost official status as well. Nevertheless, as I will show 
momentarily, this language division is still embedded in daily communications as it 
was during socialism. Let me start with the demographic changes. Bulgaria went 
through a rapid process of depopulation during the economic crisis following the 
transition from the state-run socialist system. According to the World Bank, the total 
population of Bulgaria dropped from almost 9,000,000 in 1989 to slightly above 
7,500,000 in 2008.63 One direction of emigration was westward, mostly to the US 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Other reasons for the negative population growth in Bulgaria (-0.5% annually), are, according to the 
World Bank, low birth rate (10 per 1000), shorter life expectancy than in Western countries (73 years), 
and aging population (17% 65 years old and above, 69% 15-64, and 13% 0-14), see “Public Data—
Population—Bulgaria,” Google, accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://www.google.com/publicdata?ds=wb-
wdi&met=sp_pop_totl&idim=country:BGR&dl=en&hl=en&q=bulgaria+population; “Population 
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(mainly to the metropolitan area of Chicago), Canada, Germany, Spain, Italy, and the 
UK. A second direction of immigration was from villages and provincial towns to 
central cities (Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna, and Burgas). The capital of Sofia is the most 
attractive destination of internal immigration. The city has grown from a bit less than 
1,000,000 in 1989 to about 1,500,000 (I encountered also non-official estimations of 
2,000,000 people and more). Oftentimes, when Bulgarians claim modernity they 
locate themselves in opposition to the urbanite peasants who rushed to the big cities 
after the 1989 changes. To claim “real” urban identity means to condemn these 
internal immigrants as having spoiled the city landscape—i.e. they either brought the 
village landscape to the city or they mixed improperly tradition and modernity. The 
popular term with which people point to the contamination of the city is selianiia 
(village-type modes of digressions from modern urbanity).  
While many villages became depopulated throughout the 1990s, those that 
survived capitalist privatization have maintained their previous material function 
(supply of food and a place of retreat). Additionally, there are villages that developed 
as touristic sites (such as mineral bath resorts) or textile industry (especially nearby 
provincial town in southeastern Bulgaria, e.g. Ghodsee 2009). Villages by the seaside 
and popular mountain resorts became attractive for financial investment when the 
Bulgarian real-estate market went through a rapid growth during the 2000s. What 
stimulated this development was that retired people from Western Europe (from the 
UK, e.g. Elchinova 2010) found rural Bulgaria both an affordable and convenient 
location for their post-employment life. Informants told me about villages in which 
English became the first spoken language. I learned also that, in the proverbial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Growth,” The World Bank. Accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW. 
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Bulgarian way, selling village houses to foreigners became for a while a popular 
channel of speculations and illegal schemes (dalavera). I heard about foreigners who 
bought houses that were presented to them only in pictures in villages that actually 
did not exist. I also heard about foreign crooks, who cheated local villagers to sell 
their houses for a lower price.  
People expressed the sense of dissonance between the language expectation of 
division between the city and the village and the fact that one could not distinguish 
between the two loci in social reality (even in a fabricated one for the sake of 
propaganda). One of the first complaints I heard in regard to chalga was that the city 
lost its modernity while the village lost its tradition. People often described to me 
contemporary villages as totally rundown places in which nothing was left, except “a 
few old grandmas” (niakolko stari babi) and extremely poor Gypsies. The only 
villages that were presented as doing relatively well were those of ethnic Turks. 
People claimed with anger that the political party “Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms”—the non-official representative of the Turkish minority—subsidized such 
villages in return for villagers’ votes. The only other well-off villages were those in 
which Nuevo riche Bulgarians and British retirees owned villas. The conclusion 
people drew from the current situation of post-socialist villages was that Bulgaria was 
doomed to lose its national identity. In due time the country will either be (re-) 
annexed to Turkey or become a peripheral slum of Western Europe. And allegedly 
one could already see this future present in Bulgarian culture with the fact that both 
pop and folklore music were in a state of decline, because the local taste was oriented 
only to chalga hybridities of cheap pop and Gypsy kiuchek. 
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Veselin Karchinski – a short biography of a post-socialist peasant in the city 
I met Vesko in 2007. I lived not far from the fruit and vegetable booth where 
he worked and which was located in an upper middle class neighborhood in the center 
of Sofia. Our communication began with safer topics than chalga music: Bulgarian 
and European soccer. We dared to open up the topic chalga only after almost half a 
year of acquaintance, when enough trust was established between us. It happened 
after my family visited his family apartment (the Bulgarian term is na gosti; this is a 
cultural rite of forming personal relationship, see Buchanan 2006). 
Vesko was 40 years old when we met. He was born and raised in a small 
village in the district of Pleven (north central Bulgaria), which I will call here: 
Goritsa. Vesko met his future wife, Tsvetelina (diminutive, Tsetsa), in high school. 
She was an orphan from the nearby provincial town of Dolnitsa. They got married 
immediately after graduating from high school. Vesko did his military service at the 
army hospital in Sofia. He intended to study veterinary medicine after completing his 
service. “After democracy came”  he was forced to take a different course of life.  
Vesko’s father died in 1988—a year before “the changes” (another idiom of 
the fall of the socialist regime). His mother was then a kindergarten teacher in the 
village. His sister was already married. Vesko understood that, in order to survive the 
new period of uncertainty, he had no choice but to drop the idea of studying and 
immediately look for a job. He had no particular professional skills so he looked for 
whatever work that was available. The first job he found was in a steel factory nearby 
his village. That factory was one of the only industrial plants in the area, which 
survived the post-socialist transition. His job was to carry hundred kilograms of steel 
everyday. Vesko is a pretty short and thin guy; he could not bear the physical 
hardship of that work. After a few months he had to quit. His next job was as waiter 
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in touristic resorts. He lived there spending as little as possible. He used to send 
almost all his salary back to the village to feed Tsetsa and his newborn baby, Marina. 
Marina was a sickly baby and needed intensive medical care. Vesko enjoyed his job 
as a waiter, especially because at the restaurants in which he worked he could watch 
the most famous chalga stars of the early 1990s in live shows.   
Goritsa was among the majority of Bulgarian villages that went through 
depopulation in the 1990s. With the collapse of the state-engineered economy, almost 
all factories and agricultural plants in the region closed down (see Creed 1997; 
Ghodsee 2009). Villagers received their land back after the restitution of private 
property, but had no money to buy machinery and seed (Creed ibid; Kaneff 2004). As 
a result, most of the villagers remained unemployed. In the few factories and farms 
that still functioned, people had to work in very poor conditions for minimal salary 
with no benefits or security (as in the steel factory, Vesko’s first working place). 
Small-scale agriculture could maybe satisfy part of people’s nourishment needs, but 
could not be a source of income. Vesko testifies that almost all his friends from the 
village chose to leave Bulgaria and look for work in Western Europe, mostly in Spain. 
Vesko decided not to join them but to stay in Bulgaria. His choice, though, was to 
immigrate to the city.  
When Vesko’s daughter, Marina, grew up and her health situation improved, 
he decided to move the family to Sofia. He remembers that the first year was terribly 
difficult. Sofia’s winters are very harsh. The temperature is unstable and shifts above 
and below 32°F (roughly between 50°F and 14°F). The city is situated in a valley 
surrounded by high mountains and so fog goes down and creates heavy smog. The 
snow also is rarely removed from the streets; it turns quickly into ice mixed with mud 
and dirt. Poor apartments are not well insulated and people save on heating. Standards 
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of health maintenance are fairly low. Even though public clinics are free of charge, 
they are crowded, poorly equipped, and function with minimal staff. Private doctors 
are relatively expensive. Sick leaves for non-professional workers are oftentimes not 
paid.  
Vesko and his family could rent a small basement room in the city center with 
the money brought from the village. The room had no heating and no running water. 
Vesko told me that they used to sleep in one bed hugging each other and sharing one 
blanket in order to keep warm in those freezing nights. They used to take shower once 
a week at Vesko’s sister (who had moved with her family to Sofia a few years 
earlier). Vesko’s sister was in a better material situation. Her husband was a chinovnik 
(a state bureaucrat) in the Ministry of the Interior during the socialist era. “After 
democracy came” he found work as a truck driver and, later, as a construction 
manager. 
The first job Vesko took in Sofia was as vendor in a fruit and vegetable booth 
in the open market of “Graf Ignatiev” street market targeting upper class clientele. 
Vesko said that he worked in miserable conditions. The booth was uncovered and so 
he used to work from early morning to late night, exposed to summer heat and winter 
frost. He remembers how during winters he used to come back home from work with 
frostbites on his fingers and toes. Nevertheless, he saw no choice but to keep on 
working there. The situation seemed to improve when one of Vesko’s customers 
arranged for Tsetsa to have a job in the kitchen of a nearby restaurant owned by an 
Israeli businessman. Vesko said that the work was physically bearable but 
emotionally very taxing. Tsetsa had to function under the heavy pressure of the 
restaurant owners (Neither Vesko nor Tsetsa ever explained what this pressure was. 
My impression was that they were cautious not to offend me with seemingly anti-
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Semitic remarks). After a short time she had a nervous breakdown. It happened to her 
during a work shift. Vesko still remembers vividly how someone from the restaurant 
came to the booth to call him urgently. He did not want to describe to me how he 
found Tsetsa, but hinted that she was in a very miserable condition.  
Vesko worked at the booth on “Graf Ignatiev” for almost 8 years. He quit after 
he received another job offer from Zhoro (diminutive of Georgi), the owner of a few 
street fruit and vegetable booths. Zhoro also owned a fruit and vegetable delivery line. 
He assigned Vesko to work in his fruit and vegetable booth in the neighborhood I 
lived. Vesko was quite satisfied with the new job. The salary was still low and the 
working hours were long. But the booth was partially covered and thus somehow 
better protected from summer heat and winter frost. Eventually Zhoro also allowed 
Vesko to take a weekly day off and an annual vacation (both unpaid, though). The 
clientele was more regular and residential (in contrast to “Graf Ignatiev”’s clientele of 
pass-byers from businesses, offices, and apartments rented to foreigners). Vesko had 
been working in Zhoro’s booth for three years when we met. He had six working days 
a week. His shift started at 7 am and ended around 8:30 pm. Vesko used to start at 3 
am and finish around 2 pm on weeks in which Zhoro assigned him to deliver stock 
from the wholesale market. His salary was 25 leva (approximately $20 during the 
time of my fieldwork) a day regardless if he worked at the booth or delivered 
produce. Days off, vacations, and sick leaves were unpaid. Similarly to many 
employers in Bulgaria, Zhoro also did not pay insurance or social benefits for Vesko. 
While working in Zhoro’s booth, Vesko found a job for Tsetsa as vendor at the deli 
section of a nearby supermarket. She worked 14-hour shifts for two consecutive days 
followed by two days off. Tsetsa’s monthly salary was 400 leva (roughly $320) with 
no paid vacations. Vesko told me that his dream was to start his own business. He was 
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very excited by the idea of running a small family fruit and vegetable store. He 
planned that Tsetsa would quit her job and come to work with him. He wished that 
Marina would find a white-collar job after graduating from high school (Marina was 
an 11th grader when we met). But since she was not inclined to pursue higher 
education, he thought that joining them in the store would be the best solution for her.  
Earning two salaries, Vesko and Tsetsa could afford moving from the 
basement room to a tiny two-room apartment split from an old house. They shared a 
small yard with their neighbors. The house was located in a neighborhood not far 
away from the city center. Their monthly rent was 100 leva (around $80). Marina had 
a room of her own. Tsetsa and Vesko slept on a folded couch in the main room that 
functioned during the day as both the living room and the kitchen. They also had a 
bathroom. Their home was furnished basically. Nevertheless it felt very cozy. While 
at home they usually had the TV on tuned to Planeta or Fen TV (the two popfolk 
music channels). We used to socialize in the common Bulgarian way of gathering 
around the dining table and the TV when I came with my family na gosti. The dinning 
table (trapeza) provided meat dishes, salads, and soft and alcoholic drinks; the TV 
provided music as a background and topics of conversation, typically gossip about 
popfolk stars’ personal life. Watching popfolk channels was a mark of intimacy 
between us. People playing chalga in front of guests might run the risk of losing 
modern urban face, and so people tend to tune their TVs to popfolk channels when 
they either already trust their guests or signal breakthrough into intimate 
communication. 
Vesko also loved watching Bulgarian and European soccer on TV. He was a 
diehard fan of CSKA Sofia, the former sports club of the Bulgarian army. Founded in 
1948, the club, whose nickname is “Reds” (Chervenite), was closely identified with 
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the socialist regime. In Europe he was a fan of Liverpool (Vesko used to say with a 
smile that he was “red” all around, from politics to local and European soccer). Tsetsa 
and Marina enjoyed watching soap operas. Marina had a computer with high speed 
Internet connection. She used to download movies from the web for her parents. 
Vesko loved watching foreign films on Marina’s computer (usually dubbed to 
Bulgarian). He also used to read sports websites.  
In many of our discussions Vesko shared with me his great wish that Marina 
would continue studying after graduating from high school. He put high pressure on 
her to do so. He believed that higher education would be the best way for Marina to 
complete the family’s integration in the city. He said that with a college degree she 
would be able to find a professional job with better salary and benefits. He wanted for 
her to be able to live a more comfortable life than him. Vesko strongly wished that 
Marina would study psychology. As many Bulgarians he believed that psychology 
underlay both individual and social life. He had no knowledge of this discipline but 
believed that understanding the human psyche (choveshka psihika) was crucial to 
climbing up from the peasant state of constant struggle for survival. He often told to 
me that knowing psychology was the key for enduring the burdens of modern life. 
Vesko explained to me that this knowledge helped people to control their reality, 
because whatever we experience was determined by psychological factors. He used to 
say that psychological knowledge opened all doors in life because not only our 
emotions and senses but politics, economy, and the sciences were all human activities 
and so they depended on psychology as well. Vesko complained that psychology was 
not a very developed profession in Bulgaria. This fact did not surprise him, because it 
fit his perception that Bulgaria was backward. He was convinced that European 
societies were more developed (i.e. more modern) because their members have 
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already understood that the profession of psychology was central for the success of 
societies. He believed that people in Bulgaria would get it also, but later than in the 
West, as usual.   
Vesko’s emphasis on the centrality of psychology in his social experience is 
one of my guiding threads to articulating the language ideology of democratic 
integration with his relationship of shame and affinity with chalga. Vesko, like many 
people with whom I spoke during my fieldwork, insisted that my research and the 
questions in which I was interested did not relate to culture or politics but to 
psychology. I understood the reason only after I set out to write my ethnography. The 
psychological realm was the level of dealing with powers beyond the concrete 
present, similar to forefather spirits Indonesian Anakalangs (Keane 1997) need to 
consider when negotiating ritualized exchange. Enraging powers of past order runs 
the risk of invoking internal conflicts in the present.   
I saw non-elite Bulgarians gearing their speech as a matter of caution to what 
they understood as the official language of urban modernity with which they had to 
comply. Less referential and more abstract level of emotional communication 
provided them with a sense of room for negotiation. In the previous chapter I 
expanded on this issue. The musical pedagogue Gencho Gaitandzhiev was the first 
person who told me that in order to understand the social experience of chalga, I 
should ask why Bulgarians are so obsessed with expressing hate to its associated 
music while hiding that they actually love it. From different perspectives, both 
Gencho Gaitandzhiev and Vesko Karchinski insisted that I should look at the genre as 
a “national psychological complex,” as a syndrome of being caught between two 
opposing notions of failure when Bulgarians try to fulfill their national ideal: being 
modern society genuinely integrated in Europe. Vesko explained to me that 
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Bulgarians fail to be Europeans when they either indulge in “peasant 
simplemindedness” (selska prostotiia) or when they deny having peasant roots 
(kompleksarnost), i.e. expressing inferiority complex64 vis-a-vis their rural heritage. 
Just as my other informants, Vesko related to the literary hero, Bai Ganio and to the 
dramatic play “Poorly Understood Civilization,” as the most prominent cultural 
symbols of this syndrome.  
Soliciting interpretations from my field interlocutors about the meaning of 
these two derogatory words, I learned that peasant simplemindedness (selska 
prostotiia) was, for instance, when someone goes on long distance travel via public 
transport with homemade cooked food. Doing so alludes to the habit of villagers to 
eat boiled chicken seasoned with salt and red pepper on trains and buses. The chicken 
is wrapped with newspapers and eaten with fingers. I encountered the counterpart of 
peasant simplemindedness, kompleksarnost (expressing inferiority complex vis-à-vis 
their rural heritage), for instance, when my neighbor in Sofia complained once about 
the secretaries in the office above her apartment, who make annoying noise all day 
long with the high heels of their shoes. When she tried to solve this problem directly 
with the secretaries, they dismissed her by asking if she expected them to go with 
terlitsi (the Turkish-derived word for rural, woolen, hand-knit slippers). The neighbor 
mocked the secretaries’ reply. She said that once these women left the village they 
wore high heel shoes compulsively, to guarantee that they were in the city. In short, 
Bulgarian urban residents, but especially peasants in the city (like Vesko) cautiously 
walk the invisible line between selska prostotiya and kompleksarnost in their daily 
life in the city. Invoking the chalga register, as I will show now, is a central device 
with which people invite their interlocutors to communicate this negotiation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 The scope of this dissertation does not allow me to expand on the concept of inferiority complex, 
which was developed by Alfred Adler, the founder of Individual psychology and is highly relevant to 
exploring Bulgarians’ ambivalent relationship with the peasantry.   
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Vesko’s grammar of shame and affinity with chalga  
Let me now turn to the grammar of cuing speech acts of chalga to shame and 
affinity, with which Vesko defines spaces of formal and intimate communications, 
draws the lines between them and articulates his code switching. I was first 
introduced to this grammar when I solicited Vesko’s view on the inclusion of music 
that connotes with chalga in school textbooks (authored by Gencho Gaitandzhiev). I 
also asked his opinion about why they stirred such harsh public reactions. This topic 
prompted him to elaborate on the risk of losing face by being marked with either 
selska prostotiya or kompleksarnost.  
Vesko explained to me that in his daily interactions he needed to distinguish 
between peasants who adapted to modern urban lifestyle and “lowlife peasants” 
(seliani) who contaminate the city with rural backwardness. Maintaining the 
difference was essential for maintaining the right balance between the values of 
integration in the city while not denying his traditional village roots. As a villager, 
Vesko had to acknowledge his inferiority to modern urbanites but to show also that he 
identified with the values of the city. Failing to maintain the right balance of shame 
and affinity when relating to chalga poses risks Vesko’s integration in the city. Both 
urbanites and other villagers might mark him either as simpleminded peasant (selski 
prostak) or as denier of his village roots (kompleksar).  
Vesko navigated these two risks by considering Gypsies as shifters 
(Silverstein 1976) of generic representatives of backwardness from which he 
maintained safe distance. Silverstein’s shifter concept exposes most poignantly the 
blind spot of Kearney’s post-developmentalist paradigm of polybian ethnicity: 
inattentiveness to language. Employing the analytical concept of intertextaul gaps 
(Briggs and Bauman 1992), I argue that Vesko relates to peasantry as a speech genre 
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of Bulgarian socialist national imagination, in which becoming modern means 
abandoning ethnic identity (the category of Ottoman sociality) in favor of class (the 
category of European nationhood). Bulgarians utter that, in order to modernize, one 
should abandon ethnicity and think only in terms of class. Class became even more 
important in socialist language ideology, which centered on proletariat revolution as 
the path to modern evolution. Could ethnicity become a generic marker of democratic 
modernity as Kearney proposes? Vesko’s speech choice of distancing himself from 
stereotypes of Gypsy ethnicity (on which I will expand in the next chaper) and 
upholding Bulgarian peasantry hints to the answer. I argue that, for Vesko, associating 
ethnicity with democratic modernity (as Kearney suggests) and trying to minimize the 
gap from Gypsies (the shifters of Balkan ethnicity) would have actually widened his 
gap with modernity. After all, under the impact of Balkanism, EU countries (the 
political paradigms of democratic modernity in Bulgaria) still hold Roma as a major 
ethnic problem rather than as an equal member of multiethnic Europe. Cognizant of 
this risk, Vesko employed the strategy of “conflicting complementarities” to 
recontextualize in democracy the socialist speech genre of class. He claimed being 
modern by minimizing his intertextual gap (as a former peasant) with urbanity and 
widening the gap from the antithesis of class modernity—Gypsy ethnicity.  
Na kafé65 
March 19, 2008, I passed in the afternoon through Zhoro’s booth hoping to see 
Vesko there. I was happy to find him at work. I asked him briefly whether he had time 
to meet with me that evening. We used to sit together from time to time after his 
working day (around 8:30-9:00 pm). All our meetings until then did not revolve 
around any particular topic. We used to sit at the café across Zhoro’s booth, drink 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 This term means in Bulgarian “casual conversation” (conversation over coffee).  
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beer and chat. Our discussions used to flow associatively between Bulgarian soccer, 
politics, and life stories. I reveal to Vesco that I was writing a doctoral dissertation 
about chalga only about half a year into our friendship. When I told him about my 
research he did not react (Bulgarian informants usually saw chalga as a very strange 
topic for academic research). I learned though that not reacting was a common way 
people acknowledged risk. It was a strategy of killing the topic before it would 
unleash interlocutors to take the interaction too much away from controlled formality. 
In other words, not reacting to the register of chalga was a manner of declining or 
postponing invitations for intimacy.  
The café in which we used to meet had a design Bulgarians recognize as urban 
European with a slightly Balkan twist—a style that marked the transformation of 
social eating and drinking institutions in post-socialist Bulgaria. The café was post-
socialist in the sense that it reflected the blurring of borders between the modern city 
and the traditional village. On the other hand, the café did maintain the socialist 
manners of differentiating between the two loci. The physical organization of the 
space projected an identity of a European urban coffeehouse and not of krŭchma (see 
chapter 1)—the Balkan establishment for social drinking. On one hand, popfolk songs 
as well as songs from other Balkan pop genres frequently appeared on the computer’s 
playlist at the bar. However except for playing popfolk, the café did not have any of 
the proverbial markers of the krŭchma: peasantry (selianiia) or, worse than that 
Gypsiness (tsiganiia). Rakia—the essential krŭchma hard liquor drink—did not 
appear on the menu. Cognizant of the association of rakiia with Bulgarian tradition, I 
understood that having this liquor on the menu might raise doubts about the urban 
character of the establishment. If rakiia were served people would cross the fine line 
between liminal popfolk and recursive chalga.  
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I saw the care many owners of folk clubs (discotheques playing popfolk) took 
to disassociate themselves from krŭchma. I could never order rakiia there. Whiskey 
and vodka were the most popular drinks. The common practice in folk clubs is to 
have a bottle of whiskey on each table (usually Johnny Walker or J&B). When people 
sit by the table they are obliged to pay for the bottle a price that can vary roughly 
between 80-150 Leva (50-120 USD). A crossover between folk club and krŭchma is 
called in Bulgarian selska diskoteka (village discothèque). A DJ of a casino in a small 
town in Dobrudzha told me with laughter that the characteristic of such places is that 
people go to dance there with their slippers (pantofi). 
To be clear, I do not suggest here that rakiia always marks its drinkers with 
selianiia or tziganiia. Many of my (modern) urban Bulgarians acquaintances, for 
instance, consider rakiia a delicate aperitif, part of the culinary specialties of the 
Balkans. For example, I attended a wedding at which the father of the bride (a 
professional industry worker from a provincial town) offered to all guests his own 
homemade rakiia. The bride and the groom were young urban professionals from 
Sofia. There was a rakiia bottle on each table. The labels on the bottles were also 
especially made for the wedding; the names of the bride and the groom as well as the 
date and place of the event were printed on the labels. The supply was unlimited. The 
hosts encouraged people at the party to take home leftover rakiia bottles. The 
wedding organizers though framed the event with strong markers of urbanity so that 
rakiia would not index digression. Not even popfolk and a few kiuchek songs put the 
faces of the guests too much at risk. For instance, a DJ entertained the guests with 
recorded music not with a live band (which most often consisted of Romani 
musicians). The presence of a band that plays eclectic repertoire could invoke one of 
the metonyms of chalga: Wedding Orchestra (Svatbarski orkestŭr), and I don’t mean 
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here in its prestigious World Music incarnation but in the local derogatory sense 
called chagladzhii (players of chalgiia, the Balkan-Ottoman multiethnic tavern 
music).  
The celebrating family was not free of risks. Being a close acquaintance, I 
witnessed once an attempt to shame the bride with seleniia in another context. This 
young professional was forced to deal with anonymous comments that appeared on 
one web forum immediately after she was promoted in her work place (a big 
international firm). The comments tried to undermine her qualification for the job 
with smears of not being a truly grazhdanka (urbanite woman). They reminded her 
that until recently she was still returning back to Sofia from weekends in the province 
with jars of mandzha (cooked food). These statements implied that under the cover of 
an educated grazhdanka there was still hiding a prosto selsko momiche (simple 
village girl). Using her connection in the Sofia business community, this young 
woman forced the managers of the forum to remove the statements with threats of 
defamation lawsuit. 
All the alcohol at the café where I met Vesko was imported, except local beer 
whose labels (Kamenitza, Zagorka, Shumensko etc.) carried national Bulgarian 
connotations, free of Balkan ethnicity. Food that usually follows krŭchma drinks was 
not served. I especially mean kebapcheta, kiufteta (two traditional dishes of minced 
meatballs) and shopska salata [vegetable salad with roasted peppers topped with 
grinded feta cheese]).66 Industrial potato chips in bags were the only food that was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Shopska salata (Salad from the region around Sofia) is commonly considered in Bulgaria an 
essential cultural mark of chalga-type Bulgarian locality. During August 2009, I encountered a news 
report that circulated in many media sites that this salad was actually invented in the 1950s or the 
1960s by officials of Balkanturist—the tourism authority of Socialist Bulgaria—in order to create 
unique Bulgarian cuisine that was different from other Balkan neighbors. During the 1990s shopska 
salata was strongly associated with celebration of chalga boorishness (prostotiia). See for instance, a 
web report of the newspaper 24 chasa [24 hours]: the Tricolor of the Bulgarian Taste,“Трикольорът 
на българския вкус,” August 14, 2008, accessed October 25, 2014, 
	   238	  
sold.67 The café owners allowed guests to bring in food from outside. The two 
waitresses who worked in shifts used to provide people with plates on which to put 
their food (I heard Bulgarians remarking on this practice as manifestation of selska 
prostotiia). The interior space was always dark, during daytime as well as during the 
evening and night hours (the working hours of the café were from around 9:00 am till 
2:00 am). The music was always loud and the tables were set some distance from 
each other.  
Also the invisible norms of encounter between people at the café keyed to a 
modern urban neighborhood.68 Clients were not supposed to hold multiple 
interactions across tables (what characteristically happens in the krŭchma). The 
tendency in the krŭchma is toward breaking formal divisions of strangers vs. 
acquaintances (i.e. formal vs. intimate communication). People usually drink in big 
groups (in Bulgarian, kompaniia) that easily integrate people from outside. In the 
Western-style urban café in Bulgaria, on the other hand, people drink either alone or 
in closed groups. People do not seek to cross lines between drinking companies. 
People are expected to respect the privacy of strangers by not taking co-presence as 
an invitation to initiate intimate contact.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.24chasa.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=204057). One of the songs that entered the “pantheon” of 
classical Chalga songs from the 1990s is the hit “Shopskata salata” sang by Rado Shisharkata 
(accessed October 25, 2014, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mdSARZjfTjE). This is a cover of the 
Greek song Gia Ta Lefta (“For the Money”) sang by Antipas (accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ikrI9yoZy4w).   
67 I emphasize these issues because from my experience in the Balkans and the Middle East, 
accompanying or not accompanying light food with alcohol is an important cultural signifier of 
traditional (in Bulgaria, krŭchma and mehana) vs. modern (for instance, café or pub) types of social 
drinking. For the intimate meanings that krŭchma food carries, see in the next chapter the utterance of 
the Bulgarian minister, Emel Etem.   
68 The neighborhood where I lived is a combination of pre-socialist and early socialist architecture for 
the party elite. My family and I lived at the periphery of the neighborhood in an apartments bloc that 
was built after 1989. Demographically, the neighborhood is a combination of old socialist elite, 
bourgeois bohemia, post-socialist upper middle class, and foreigners. 
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A type of soft core Nuevo rich self-presentation that carries the same 
nickname of popfolk singers (see chapter 1): folkadzhiia,69 is one of the only 
digressions from cues of urban behavior, which, to my impression, could be tolerated 
at the café. The aesthetics of folkadzhiia stereotypically alludes to popfolk singers. It 
involves slim women dressed with tight and exposing clothes. Folkadzhiiki (plural of 
female folkadzhiia) stereotypically have silicon breasts, collagen lips, and bleached 
hair. Men are supposed to shave their heads (or have a close cut) and wear tight T-
shirts and pants that emphasize their pumped up muscles. Both men and women 
folkadzhii are marked by ostentatious gadgets (cars, clothes, jewelry, cell phones, 
cigarettes, and lighters). Folkadzhii are associated with urbanized peasantry and so 
they might risk the modern look of the café. If a folkadzhiia commits prostotiia (i.e. 
brings the krŭchma into the café), shame would spill on everyone that was co-
present.70  
When I saw Vesko that afternoon I told him that I wanted to hear his opinion 
about an issue connected with my fieldwork. Vesko smiled and said that he would be 
happy to talk about whatever I wanted to hear. First, I wanted to share with Vesko the 
media attacks against Gencho. Secondly, I wanted to hear Vesko’s opinion about the 
previous incident related to Gaitandzhiev’s music textbooks. The parents from the 
town of Stara Zagora, who protested against the appearance of the Romani popfolk 
singer Sofi Marinova in one of Gencho’s textbooks for pre-school children.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Mutra and mutressa (female mutra) are colloquial labels of hardcore Nuevo rich Bulgarians (e.g. 
Ivanova 1997). Commonly such people are associated with the mafia culture that was prominent in the 
transition era of the 1990s. Folkadzhiya (male) and folkadzhiyka (female) are the softer and more 
integrated labels of Nuevo riches in the lexicon democratic modernity. The café could tolerate 
folkadzhii; mutri might prefer ostentatiously richer neighborhoods, such as Lozenetz. Once I took a taxi 
to a café in Lozenetz to meet with a popfolk star-singer. I gave the name of the place to the driver and 
asked him if he knew how to go there. The driver told me with disgust that that café was famous; mutri 
used to meet there and shoot each other.  
70 My characterization of folkadzhiia is not prescriptive. People called folkadzhiia do not necessarily 
look in such a way. Folkadzhiia, just like all other archetypical labels, which I discuss in this 
dissertation, is a signifier of fractal recursivity to authoritative forms of European modernity. Being 
related with this label has the power to affect people’s modern face.  
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A few hours later, a little bit after 8:00 pm, I returned to the booth and waited 
for an hour until Vesko finished serving the last customers. The street finally got 
empty and Vesko started storing the fruit and vegetable boxes in the store next to the 
booth (the store, like the booth, belonged to Zhoro, Vesko’s employer). I offered to 
help him but he refused. I stood by the booth and looked at him storing all the stock, 
unplugging the cable of the few light bulbs that lit the booth, sweeping superficially 
the sidewalk near the booth, and collecting his own stuff. After he was ready, we 
crossed the small street and entered the café. As usual, I got a free table and took seats 
both for him and for me. Vesko meanwhile went to the bathroom to wash his hands 
and face and to dampen his hair. Then he went to the bar and took two bottles of 
Heineken beer, one cold, for me, and one room temperature for himself. I always 
loved observing the transformation Vesko passed in the bathroom. He used to look so 
drained and exhausted when he entered the cafe. When he came out of the bathroom 
he looked to me as if he had washed away the appearance of a street vendor and 
momentarily crossed the class lines, he was now a neighborhood resident. 
As always we began our meeting with a toast. We clinked each other’s bottles 
and said nazdrave (cheers). Then Vesko added his usual line, da sme zhivi i zdravi 
(may we be alive and healthy). After finishing his line he hugged my head, kissed me 
on my forehead and laughed. We opened with a short chat, after which I presented to 
him the topic I wanted to discuss with him. During my entire speech Vesko kept 
silent. He did not interrupt my narrative; he only looked at me with a tiny smile.  
I interpreted the smile as a sign of embarrassment with the role game we 
played—I the interrogator, he the interrogated. Imposing structure on our discussion 
embarrassed me as well. I felt awkward that revealing openly my interest in chalga 
entailed limiting my dialogue with Vesko to a form of interview. The focus on one 
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topic emphasized to me the crucial difference between us, which was always present 
in our communication but about which we never really talked. I was the modern, 
educated, richer, and more powerful person than he was— my traditional fieldwork 
sample—the poor and weak Bulgarian urbanized peasant. There was another factor of 
awkwardness in our talk. We both knew what inferiority Vesko’s status of urbanized 
peasant implied. He was not one of these important people who are interviewed on 
TV. For those Bulgarians who were entitled to express their opinions on social issues, 
Vesko was only a unit within the faceless mob, a “chalga person,” as the Bulgarian 
ethnomusicologist Rozmari Statelova (2003) views the stereotypical member of the 
folk from the point of view of intellectual legislators (see chapter 2). I assumed that he 
cooperated with me nevertheless because he knew that I was not expecting him to 
play to me the non-self conscious association between urbanized peasants and chalga 
music. I believed that Vesko was ready to observe the structure of interview that I 
imposed only because I still claimed being his friend (practically, I drank beer with 
him as usual, I did not use a tape recorder, I did not take notes, and most importantly, 
I was not dissing chalga). I was very cautious, though, not to disclose to Vesko that 
Gencho Gaitandzhiev was my friend and that I disliked anti-Roma racism. I assumed 
that had I revealed straightforwardly my opinion, Vesko would have immediately 
reaffirmed it, regardless if he agreed with my point of view or not. He would have 
seconded my opinion only to show his solidarity with me as my friend, who came to 
protect me when my affinity with chalga put me at risk of being marked with 
prostotiia.  
Additionally, in regard to the parental protest in Stara Zagora against the 
inclusion or Romani popfolk singers in music textbooks, I assumed that Vesko was 
aware that in EU-member Bulgaria uttering racist slurs against Roma was politically 
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incorrect. Bulgarians would utter them in intimate settings but avoid them when 
attempting to put formal urban face. Unlike chalga, though, anti-Roma racism was not 
limited only to intimate communication. It could also appear on the margin of urban 
formality. People used to key slurs to formality by denouncing Western Europeans 
who were presumably obsessed with ethnicity and cared more about Roma than about 
Bulgarians.71 Bulgarian interlocutors insisted that Westerners’ interest in Roma was 
an example of utter hypocrisy, especially since they believed that people from 
Western Europe were actually more racist than Bulgarians in regard to Gypsies. In the 
West, I was told, people would not tolerate what Bulgarians were ready to tolerate. 
Westerners would not let Gypsies be “free riders” as they lived in Bulgaria. But it was 
easier to throw the blame of racism on Bulgarians, because in the eyes of the West, all 
Balkan people were anyhow inferior “just like Gypsies” was the common conclusion.   
The film historian Dina Iordanova provides a fascinating insight to this 
perception when writing that Balkan film-makers have internalized Western 
association of the Balkans with the stereotypical image of the “Gypsy.” “When 
choosing Roma stories and characters,” she writes, “Balkan film-makers use them as 
a metaphor in ‘Balkans to Europe as Gypsies to us’ sense. The fact that the Roma are 
considered to be the least integrated ethnic community in these parts bears direct 
parallels to the way the Balkans are seen in a wider context – as the least integrated 
group of countries within the greater European realm.” (2001: 215-216) Drawing 
dichotomy between Bulgarians’ and Westerners’ attitudes to Roma oftentimes led my 
Bulgarian interlocutors to reaffirm Western Balkanism. People took the fact that 
Gypsy “anti-social” lifestyle was tolerated in Bulgaria as the proof that Bulgarians 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 The Open Society Institute is a frequent target of such censure. After Bulgaria joined the EU the 
Institute has gradually stopped all its projects in the country, except projects specifically targeting 
Roma, such as Romfest, the Romani music and dance festival that takes the center of the next chapter.  
	   243	  
could not handle modern social standards. Informants uttered with sarcasm that in 
Bulgaria “lowlife Gypsy traits” (tsiganiia) were the norm; people told me that after 
all, all Bulgarian politicians were corrupt and the ordinary people (the social base, the 
narod) were apathetic and passive peasants. 
Vesko’s reaction resonated to me with the strategy of conflicting 
complementarities. I got the impression that, while the animal tale indexed to him the 
more domesticated notion of socialist peasantry, the association of chalga with 
ethnicity invoked the same old (or, more precisely, modern) discursive field of Balkan 
otherness. For Vesko, affinity with ethnicity did not signal an opportunity of 
integration (erasure) with the globalized world (the landscape of post-Cold War 
democracy), but a drawback of such integration, the continuation of fractal recursivity 
with modern Europe. Vesko experienced allusions to ethnicity as recontextualizing 
his Gypsy-type inferiority within democracy rather than transcending it.  
I stopped my speech after completing my report to Vesko about the two 
incidents—one are the media attacks against the presence of chalga texts in Gencho 
Gaintandzhiev’s school textbooks and the second is the scandal in Stara Zagora 
against the textbooks indulgence in “lowlife Gypsy traits” (tsiganiia). I asked for his 
comments. There was a moment of silence. Then Vesko apologized; he had not heard 
about either of these cases. He said that there was no way for him to keep track of all 
the news. He worked in Zhoro’s booth from early morning to late evening. He had 
only very little time in the morning to skim the sports websites when he drank his 
coffee before going to work. On days when CSKA Sofia played he could grab some 
time to watch the game on TV in the café. Also on his weekly day off (usually 
Saturday or Sunday) what he loved to do was to spend long time with sports 
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newspapers while drinking his coffee (nonetheless Vesko was fluent in Bulgarian 
politics and identified himself as a devoted “red”, i.e. socialist).  
After this disclaimer (Bauman 1992) of his ability to perform the role of 
interviewee, Vesko made an opening gesture to socialist regime of indexical 
positivism—how the government attempted to formalize semiotic ties between each 
fixed signifier and each fixed signified (see previous chapter). He reminded me of 
something he had said once before. On one occasion, he compared to me the 
textbooks from which he studied in school and those from which Marina studied. He 
could not understand why there was a need for more than one standard textbook for 
each discipline. During the socialist times, he said, all Bulgarian school children 
studied from the same textbooks. There was one and only biology textbook, one and 
only history, one and only mathematics, and so on. After democracy came, he 
maintained, students became confused. Now, for every discipline there are ten 
different textbooks and no one can know what textbook one should choose. This 
situation seemed ridiculous to Vesko; it was senseless. What can be so different 
between textbooks? He asked, chemistry is chemistry, history is history, mathematics 
is mathematics and so on. You have different textbooks but the subject is always one 
and the same subject. 
When I shared this conversation with Gencho Gaitandzhiev, he reacted with 
anger that this was exactly the totalitarian syndrome he was complaining about. 
Bulgarians constantly wanted to live in a reality in which there is no diversity of 
meanings (in Bulgarian, “plan b” vtori plan, see the previous chapter). They could not 
deal with a plurality of choices; they felt it as anarchy, as chaos. To my 
understanding, the emphasis of intellectual legislators on this sort of semiotic 
positivism is what made their authoritarian interpretation of democracy much more 
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plausible to non-elite Bulgarians such as Vesko. The idea that the regime would 
dictate from above comprehensive rules of democratic culture did not sound strange 
to Vesko. On the contrary, like most Bulgarians I met, he welcomed such dictation 
hoping that it would normalize democratic life; it would make it much less chaotic 
and risky.   
Vesko did not support indexical uniformity in regard to chalga. I read this 
move as caution not to look like kompleksar. I asked him whether he thought that 
including chalga in textbooks was indeed utterly wrong. He said that of course it was 
not. He thought that it was stupid to ban these textbooks. He claimed that no one 
could expect children to be interested in all these old folklore songs; they were so 
remote from children’s present-day reality. Want it or not, Vesko said, children 
nowadays listen to chalga. I felt that this word choice instead of popfolk meant that 
we were intimate with each other. At the same time, Vesco also maintained his 
modern urban face by widening the intertextual gap between chalga and folklore. He 
could agree that it was impossible to ignore chalga in music textbooks but he would 
not accept that chalga was a present-day folklore (the approach that Gaintadziev, his 
co-writer Popova, Dimov and other intellectual interpreters advocated).  
You cannot prevent them from listening to chalga, he continued, so you could 
attract schoolchildren to study music by teaching them the sorts of music to which 
they listen. I reminded Vesko the dirty associations of chalga. I asked him whether he 
would listen to chalga in his workplace. He said that of course he would not, because 
the people who shopped at Zhoro’s booth were of higher class and would not approve 
of hearing this music in their public environment. If they did not care being 
bombarded with chalga they would have shopped at Zhenski pazar (“The Women’s 
Market”—a big open market in the center of Sofia used to be known for its low prices 
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and peasant-style atmosphere. Recently it has been renovated to attract higher-class 
clientele). Customers were ready to pay more money not to be “harassed” with 
chalga. Vesko was sure that many of his customers listened to chalga at home.72 He 
mentioned that among the regular customers at the booth were even a few famous 
popfolk star-singers. However, no one in the neighborhood would feel comfortable 
having this music played loudly in the street. People would be scandalized by such 
blatant exhibition of peasant prostotiia. 
I observed a similar case of Vesko’s caution of not playing chalga in his 
workplace in a news report in July 2008 on the evening news edition of bTV. 73 The 
Municipality of Burgas, the fourth largest city located by the Black Sea, forbade bus 
drivers to listen to chalga while driving. This order aimed at upgrading the public 
transportation system by removing any sort of prostotiya that would not offend the 
public. Passengers who spoke to the camera stated that drivers could listen to 
whatever music they wished in their private cars, but by no means could they “harass” 
people in public. A driver commented to the reporter as well saying that he actually 
suffered from an opposite problem. He did not like chalga and preferred to drive 
without music at all, but he was constantly forced to listen to chalga songs throughout 
his working shifts, which came from passengers’ cell phone ringers and headphones. 
The second topic shifted the focus of our conversation from peasantry to 
ethnicity. I asked Vesko what he thought about the parental protest in Stara Zagora. 
The question I raised was whether the protesting parents were right or wrong in 
condemning the inclusion of the Romani singer Sofi Marinova in the preschool 
textbook. To my surprise, Vesko replied that, in this case, the parents were absolutely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Veneta Raikova, a famous Bulgarian TV host, who often invites popfolk stars to her weekly talk 
show “Hot” (goreshto, Nova Televiziia) claims that when (modern) Sofia people (Sofiiantsi) want to 
chill out, they sit at home, drink rakiia, and listen to (Serbian-influenced) chalga music. 
73 “В Бургас Забраниха Чалгата В Градският Тра,” accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://vbox7.com/play:9a566112. 
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right and the textbook authors were wrong. Sofi Marinova is a Gypsy, he said, 
everybody knows it. Presenting her singing in Romani language (tsiganski) sets a very 
bad example to children. It teaches children that gypsiness (tsiganiya) is something 
good. I asked him whether he thought that including popfolk stars from Bulgarian 
ethnicity such as Kamelia,74 who used to perform almost naked, was fine but 
including Sofi Marinova in Romani language was wrong. Vesko answered decisively 
that yes; that was his opinion. How come? I asked. I was truly surprised by his reply. 
He explained to me that to watch Kamelia naked was funny; people looked at her 
performance as a joke more than as a sexual provocation. She is old by now, he said, 
nobody thinks of her as a sex symbol anymore (Kamelia was 37 years old at the time 
of our conversation. She was born in 1971). Sofi Marinova was a different story, he 
maintained, it was enough that she was Gypsy. You cannot expect children to 
distinguish between “good” Gypsies and “bad” Gypsies. The word that Vesko used 
for “good” Gypsies was the common ethnic marker tsigani. For “bad” Gypsies he 
used the racist equivalent: mangali. In the next chapter I will expand on this harshly 
racist ethnic marker—an equivalent of the “N-word” in US English.  
The way Vesko distinguished between “good” Gypsies (tzigani) and “bad” 
Gypsies (mangali) resonated with the democratic rhetoric of erasing Balkan 
recursivity through integration. Vesko took the lead over the conversation and told me 
in length about one village nearby his home village. In that village there were two 
Gypsy neighborhoods. The first one was of “good” Gypsies; they were integrated. I 
asked Vesko what he meant by “integrated.” He answered that the people in that 
neighborhood shared the Bulgarian lifestyle; they were civilized, productive, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Kamelia is famous in Bulgaria for her sexual explicitness. She performed in the Planeta Derby 2007 
tour only with stickers covering the nipples of her naked breast. She was one of the first chalga singers 
whose nude pictures were published in the Bulgarian edition of Playboy: “Специален брой на сп. 
‘Playboy’," Kamelia Online, accessed October 25, 2014, http://www.kamelia-
online.com/gallery/thumbnails.php?album=21.  
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hardworking. They were also educated and spoke very good Bulgarian without the 
stereotypical Gypsy accent. As ordinary Bulgarians, these “good” Gypsies sent their 
children to school, held ordinary jobs, paid their bills, and maintained a hygienic 
environment. They also maintained normal relationships with their Bulgarian 
neighbors. Vesko emphasized that the people in that neighborhood were well off. A 
few of them were even rich; they lived in houses built entirely of marble. The second 
neighborhood was of “bad” Gypsies, the mangali—the “worst people in Bulgaria.” 
They lived in their poor mahala75 (slum ghetto). They didn’t pay taxes and bills, 
didn’t have normal work, and didn’t send their children to school. You can recognize 
a mangal, Vesko said, by the fact that the smallest finger of the right hand is missing. 
When a baby is born, he explained, mangali first cut off his or her finger to make the 
hand suitable for pick pocketing.  
At the bottom line, he said, every tsiganin (“good” Gypsy) is also mangal 
(“bad” Gypsy) and therefore you can never really trust them. This is the reason why 
presenting Sofi Marinova singing in Romani language in a school textbook was 
wrong. Instead of directing Gypsy children to forget their “lowlife” background and 
grow up as integrated Bulgarians, you teach Bulgarian children that the “bad” Gypsy 
lifestyle is a legitimate one. This last sentence reminded me of the words of the 
protesting parents in one of the newspaper reports which attacked the inclusion of 
Sofi Marinova in Gaitandzhiev’s textbook: “is it the pureblooded Bulgarian children 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Mahala is a Turkish derived word that denotes in colloquial Bulgarian poor slums, in contrast to the 
ideological modern landscape of the neighborhood (kvartal). As I mentioned earlier, shifting between 
Turkish derived words and words with Slavic roots or words derived from Western European 
languages is a common way for Bulgarians to distinguish between modernity and tradition. The 
meaning of this differentiation is not only derogative. For instance, many village-born urban 
Bulgarians still call the kitchen in their village house with the Turkish word mutfak while for the 
kitchen in the urban apartment they use the standard Bulgarian word kuhnia. The mutfak is a place of 
retreat to the familiar environment in which such people were born.   
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who need to integrate in the Romani minorities or the opposite?” (Peicheva and 
Dimov 2005: 121) 
I argue that despite the straightforward racist resonance of Vesko’s words, he 
perceived Roma not as the Other but as shifters (Silverstein 1976) of folk intimacy, 
which play on liminal space between authentic peasantry and liminal ethnicity. In this 
sense performing gypsiness (tsiganiya) is riskier than performing peasantry 
(selianiya); both index lack of fit with modern urbanity. However, Vesko maintained 
that when chalga signified urbanized peasantry (as was done in the computer playlist 
at the café or on stage by Kamelia), playing it did not run the risk of committing 
prostotiia. Performing chalga saturated with gypsiness, on the other hand, celebrated 
the most backward aspect of traditional lifestyle characteristically held by “bad” 
Gypsies (mangali). Such performances were supposed to be excluded completely 
from the society outside the mahala. People were supposed to be ashamed of them. 
Unlike peasant chalga that could be erased (i.e. integrated) within in pop music, 
Gypsy chalga led only to the otherness of Balkan backwardness.  
In a later conversation I viewed a sort of intimacy in Vesko’s utterance against 
Roma, which the Bulgarian cultural studies scholar Aleksandar Kiossev (2002) calls 
“dark intimacy.” Drawing upon Herzfeld’s concept of cultural intimacy, Kiossev 
argues that Balkan intimacy is based on a shared paradoxical characteristic: a 
common urge to fragmentation. People in the Balkans tend to perform higher level of 
modernity than their neighbors by pointing to the latter’s assumed lower level 
backwardness. However, everybody agrees that at the bottom line all Balkan societies 
are equally backward, “like the Gypsies.” Kiossev’s paradigmatic example is the story 
about a Serbian soldier during the Yugoslav Civil War, who explained the difference 
between them, the Serbs, and the Croats: “Look, here's how it is. Those Croats, they 
	   250	  
think they are better than us. They want to be the gentlemen. They think they are 
fancy Europeans. I'll tell you something. We're all just Balkan shit.” (2002:184). In 
another place (ibid:189), Kiossev utters that “Gypsies” is the ethnic metonym of 
“Balkan shit.” Vesko reminded me then with a smile that Bulgarians were not so 
different from Gypsies (he used the derogatory term, mangali). In that discussion he 
said that, just as Gypsies, Bulgarians could not do things right in the normal way. 
They always looked for shortcuts (tarikatlŭk), preferably by screwing up someone 
else. Vesko related to me to the cultural rule that screwing up (da pretsakvash) 
someone else is the best guarantee for you not to be screwed up (da si pretsakan).  
However in some of our later converstations, despite his unequivocal 
denunciationof the “lowlife Gypsy” characteristics in what he recognized as 
Bulgarian mentality, Vesko showed that even such a severe racist prejudice could be a 
source of affinity. He did so by ascribing Gypsy ethnicity back on himself, the 
urbanized peasant. Vesko revealed to me that he was very familiar with Gypsy 
mentality because Gypsy blood ran in his own veins. Vesko explained that when he 
was a baby his mother had no breast milk and therefore he was breastfed by a Roma 
woman from his village. In the breast milk he received many Gypsy characteristics 
that are still active in his blood. Vesko loved to tell this story especially when we 
talked about chalga. He boasted that he was not just a fan of the music; he was an 
excellent dancer of the Romani belly dance of kiuchek. He said half laughingly half 
seriously that he received the talent for kiuchek with the breast milk of that Gypsy wet 
nurse.  
To recognize the verbal decorum of urban space Vesko carefully hid what he 
considered the Gypsy side of his character at his workplace and exposed only his 
peasant face. He did so by communicating with customers with informal but 
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grammatically standard Bulgarian. For instance, he never addressed the customers in 
the formal plural second person, Vie, but in the familiar singular one, ti. He also used 
to call all his women customers “sweetheart” (dusha), regardless of their age and 
class. When I observed him doing it, I sensed that for his clients, this sort of address 
did not index sexual harassment. In public it is normatively legitimate for men to 
address women in Bulgaria with the word dusha. And women do not have legitimacy 
to express offense when male strangers call them in public “sweetheart” or any other 
similar informal remark. I learned that with informal second person and dusha, Vesko 
intended to establish sense of trust with his customers. He implied that he would not 
cheat them, because he was on their side as if they were from the same village. 
Vesko took great pride in his ability to speak as equal with people richer and 
more modern than him. He connected it to his belief in communist equality (as I 
mentioned beforehand, Vesko was a diehard “red,” just as the villagers of Zamfirovo 
in Creed’s [1997] ethnography). Speaking informally was a way to subvert any 
possibility of those people to treat him condescendingly because he was an urbanized 
peasant. As an expert in the quality of the produce, he was momentarily equal to these 
people, among whom there were businessmen, parliament members, and ministers. 
All these titles, though, seemed to him artificial. Deep inside we are all the same, he 
used to say. We, Bulgarians, are all peasants, concluded Vesco alluding to the self-
derogatory proverb I mentioned in earlier chapters—“peasant country, simpleminded 
people.” Recognizing that at the bottom line all Bulgarians were peasant allowed him 
not to deny his love of chalga. For Vesco, to integrate in the city did not mean turning 
into a kompleksar—a person that claims modernity by denouncing his or her own 
traditional peasant roots.  
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Hence, successful performance of village informality meant for Vesko 
creating affinity with his customers—earning their trust in him. Failed 
communication, on the other hand, meant that he ran the risk of committing the shame 
of prostotiia both on himself and on his clients by drawing them back to the 
traditional village, or worse to the Gypsy mahala. Vesko knew that to succeed in his 
communication he should not cross the normative lines of public informality; he 
could address his customers with informal "you,” but not embarrass them with chalga. 
For Vesko, throwing off completely formal inhibitions of urbanity and expressing his 
intimate emotions of affinity meant being able to exhibit his talent of dancing Gypsy 
kiuchek with cool (yaka) chalga. He promised to me that soon I would be able to see 
what a good kiuchek dancer he was. His daughter Marina was 19 years old and was 
about to graduate from high school in May 2008. He expected her prom (bal) to be a 
peak point in his life. He would be the patron of the event and, therefore, would be 
free to celebrate “as he really felt.” 
Marina’s Prom 
Thus far I presented Vesko in situations in which he articulated and negotiated 
the language ideology of democratic integration by signaling formal communication 
with cues of shame with chalga (such as avoiding playing popfolk songs in the booth) 
and signaling folk intimacy by countering shame with cues of chalga affinity (popfolk 
TV channels at the background when people come na gosti). Being able to switch 
between the two communication levels provided Vesko with an indication that he was 
indeed on the right track of becoming less a traditional peasant and more a modern 
urbanite. His measure of successful integration was that he was not caught within the 
“national psychological complex.” He was neither simpleminded peasant (selski 
prostak) nor was he a denier of his village roots (kompleksar). The test if he had 
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completed the process of closing his perceived gap with modern urbanity was whether 
he could express his “peasant soul” (selska dusha) with no risk of losing urban face. 
Let me close now the chapter with the event Vesko intended to mark this erasure. He 
wished to do that by celebrating the high school graduation of his daughter in the way 
he “really felt:” with “cool” chalga, particularly the Gypsy belly dance music of 
kiuchek. Vesko took the risk of expressing folk intimacy in the modern setting of the 
café across his booth. The outcome of the party taught him that he went too far.  
Vesko’s family began the preparation for Marina’s high-school prom from the 
beginning of her senior school year. Vesko took extra shifts in the booth to save 
money. He wanted to throw a big and generous party. In the evenings when we sat at 
the café he used to count the revenue of the day. Every time he used to end the 
counting with a satisfaction remark: bereket versin (“May [god] give his blessing”).  
He knew that this colloquial expression came from Turkish. He said to me 
with a smile that many words used in the village were Turkish borrowings. He knew 
also that Turcisms played on the liminal space between peasantry and ethnicity; they 
could invoke the imagined space of the traditional village as well as of the Gypsy 
mahala.  
He put the money back in his pocket and said that it was a good day. I tried to 
ask him whether he received bonuses for days when sales were especially high, but he 
deflected my question. He promised to tell me after the prom, but we never came back 
to this topic. He planned to hold the party within the social network of his workplace. 
He closed a deal with the café owners to rent their place for the entire day. He ordered 
plates of salads and lamb meat cooked with rice from the nearby restaurant. 
I learned that particularly offering lamb meat shows the importance of the 
occasion. Late April and May are the months during which Bulgarian villagers 
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slaughter and eat lamb especially for St. George’s Day and for Easter. In general, 
slaughtering a lamb for a big occasion marks as a highly festive event. Lambs can be 
slaughtered as offerings for sickly children (so that they become strong and healthy), 
as a way to chase away negative things and attract good luck and strength. I can 
assume that, for Vesko, eating lamb prepared in a restaurant (not slaughtered in the 
village by people you know and roasted in the open) and in an urban setting was, 
quite likely, the ritual of urban integration, a mark of success, as if from then on 
things were supposed to become only better. 
On the party day bottles of whiskey and vodka were put on each table in 
addition to soft drinks and nuts. People could also order beer and wine on the house. 
Rakiia was not part of the alcohol supplied by the cafe. Vesko brought with him from 
his native village homemade rakiia in plastic bottles of mineral water. The rakiia was 
not offered to everyone but only to the closest family guests. The café was closed for 
regular customers. However, Vesko invited in people who mistakenly entered the 
café; he asked them to join the party, to become the family’s guests. This crossing of 
lines between invitees and strangers did not turn the café into krŭchma. Vesko 
followed the Bulgarian tradition of celebrating one’s own festive occasion by showing 
a village-style generosity (shtedrost), which entailed treating all co-present people 
with food and drinks (pocherpka), regardless if the people enjoying the treat are 
acquaintances or strangers.  
Having limited money to throw a party, Vesko and Tsetsa had also to rely on 
their workplace connections to provide Marina with material means of a real prom, as 
it should be—as ostentatious as possible. Vesko’s boss, Zhoro, sent his son to pick up 
Marina from home with his black Audi car. The car was clean and shiny. Zhoro’s son 
drove Marina to the café, afterwards to her school and from the school to the hotel in 
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which the prom party was about to take place. I went with Vesko, Tsetsa, and a few 
family friends—all of them former residents of Vesko’s village Goritsa—in a big cab 
that followed the Audi car to café. On the way, Vesko and one of his friends talked 
about family members and friends who stayed in the village. The two speakers 
heightened the festive affect of Marina’s prom by emphasizing the gap between 
themselves, the city dwellers, and those, who lagged behind in their peasantry. Vesko 
and his friend shared the opinion that people in the village had unrealistic 
expectations that those who moved to the city would keep in close touch with them. 
Vesko said that he worked from early morning to late at night, so when could he find 
the time to keep in touch with people except with his mother? Vesko’s friend 
concluded that people in the village could just not understand that life in the city was 
drastically different. City people could not afford wasting time in the way village 
people could. All agreed that people have too much free time in the village; in the city 
one does not have free time at all.   
I took the role of a family photographer for the entire day. After we all arrived 
to the café I joined Marina and one of her girlfriends in the Audi car of Zhoro’s son. 
We left the place and continued to Marina’s school. I recorded/photographed Marina 
and her girlfriend how they stood out of the car’s open roof and yelled the standard 
line of all 12th graders counting their school years: I koi kaza? (“and who said?) 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, yuuuhuuuu. Marina was dressed with a purple gown that 
was sewn especially for her graduation day. Just as her other high school mates, she 
was allowed for one day to violate formal urbanity without being stained with 
prostotiia. During the season of graduation parties (May to early June) I observed 
high school graduates celebrating in the streets of Sofia with ostentatious cars and 
clothes that span from elegant to Gypsy-type suits, from evening dresses to oriental 
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belly dancer scarves. In front of Marina’s high school stood a small band of three 
Romani musicians (one trumpeter and two drummers), who entertained the graduates 
as well as their families and friends with kiuchek tunes. Teenagers danced to the 
music together with accompanying adults. Boys performed masculine patronage by 
going around with bottles of whiskey and sticking money in the musicians’ 
instruments and clothes. After spending some time in front of Marina’s school, we left 
with everybody in a long line of cars for the hotel in which the prom was about to 
take place. That was the last stop on the prom day. We followed Marina to the hotel 
and then returned to the café to continue the celebration. In front of the hotel I saw 
Marina’s boyfriend for the first time. He was her classmate. They hugged and kissed 
and walked through the hotel entrance together. 
Later in the café Vesko prepared to fulfill his promise, to exhibit his kiuchek 
talent. He was so happy. He hugged me and yelled in my ear, “19 years I have been 
waiting for this moment. This is the greatest achievement of my life.” The person at 
the bar picked kiuchek tunes on the computer’s playlist. The music alongside with the 
alcohol, meat and cigarette smoke heightened people’s excitement. At some point, 
Vesko climbed on a chair and started to dance emphasizing the moves of his hips and 
shoulders while spreading his arm to the side as if he was a big eagle. Vesko began 
his dance alone. Tsetsa joined him shortly after. Marina’s girlfriends jumped on 
another chair and started to dance as well. I continued to shoot with my camera. After 
going over the pictures I realized that most of them were of Marina’s girlfriend. She 
looked really pretty. I could see in the pictures that other men were staring at her as 
well.  
Vesko was not satisfied with the party’s playlist, though. It was too light for 
his needs. He wanted the café owners to play tunes with more instrumental 
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improvisations. He shouted at one of the owners that stood by the bar, “hey, stop with 
this music! I want now real ‘lousy Gypsy’ kiucheks!” (Haide, stiga s taia muzika! 
Iskam sega istinski mangalski kiuchetsi!). The owner complied only briefly with 
Vesko’s demand. He put a few tunes but then switched to other musical genres. It 
wasn’t because of limited kiuchek tunes on the computer’s playlist. I carried with me 
to the bar a few CDs with lots of kiuchek on mp3 files. I handed them to the barman 
offering him to download the files to the café’s computer. He replied with a smile that 
he had no need for them; he had plenty of kiuckek already. Reflecting on the barman’s 
control over the playlist, I understand that controlling the musical flow (Williams 
1975) of the party was his way to prevent Vesko from puting the reputation of the 
café at risk. He let Vesko digress to folk intimacy but without letting the party turn 
into a manifestation of selska or, even worse, tsiganska prostotiia. Vesko was 
disappointed with the café owner that he did not fulfill his request. But he did not 
protest. Vesco exhausted his power to resist the invisible rules of modern urbanity. 
Now was the time to switch to the antithetic side of the conflicting complementarities 
equilibrium. Vesko complied. 
Throughout the night he and the guests danced to popfolk and other Turkish, 
Serbian, and Greek pop hits. They danced also to foreign pop songs, tango, waltz, 
and, of course, socialist obrabotki (arrangements) of Bulgarian folklore dances. 
Everybody adapted to the musical flow shifting smoothly between the different music 
genres as if they were expecting what genre comes next. They switched from one 
style of dance to the other—from individual disco and kiuchek to couple-type waltz 
and tango and to the row-manner horo (the structure of folklore dance based on 
asymmetric rhythms, most commonly 7/8). When the computer playlist played 
folklore horo, Vesko, Tsetsa, and four other guests went out of the café and 
	   258	  
performed a row dance in street. In the middle of their dance the music switched to 
kiuchek. The row immediately fell apart and turned into individual dance. The 
emphasis of body movement went from the legs to the hips, breasts and shoulders. 
People who passed by in the street stopped to observe the horo and kiuchek dances. A 
few of them also shot the street dance with small camera and cell phones. It was 
indeed not a usual scene in this elite neighborhood of Sofia. Reflecting on this scene, 
the way people switched from one form of dance to another according to the shifting 
computerized playlist, illustrated to me most eminently eminently Bulgarians’ skill of 
adapting to switching paradigms of modernity delivered by authoritative mediators 
and their intermediaries (Latour 2005). 
Was Marina’s prom party at the café a successful event? On one hand it was; 
Vesko and Tsetsa were satisfied with the very good turnout of family relatives, 
friends and neighborhood customers. Among the guests were relatives who were still 
living in the village; others were villagers in the city, just like Vesko and his family. 
Other guests included Vesko’s colleagues from the booth, as well as Tsetsa’s 
colleagues from the big grocery store in which she worked (the store was in the same 
street, not far away from the booth). A few of Vesko’s customers from the 
neighborhood also came. On the other hand, Vesko and Tsetsa complained about 
village relatives as well as city co-workers who presumably tried to sabotage the 
special festivity of the prom by reminding the family their peasant roots.  
When I came to their house on the following day, I found Vesko, Tsetsa and 
Marina in the middle of an angry discussion about Marina’s cousin (the daughter of 
Vesko’s sister, at whose apartment Vesko’s family used to take showers during their 
first years in Sofia), who was supposed to shoot the party with my video camera. I 
myself instructed the cousin how to use the video camera and provided her with 
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empty DVDs. Vesko told me bitterly that she shot only a few minutes. Tsetsa and 
Marina insisted that she did it on purpose. Although her family was in a better 
financial situation than Marina’s, this cousin envied Marina. From previous 
conversation I knew that there was an on-going competition between the two families 
about which one has integrated more successfully in Sofia. Tsetsa and Marina were 
sure that the cousin took the opportunity to sabotage by guaranteeing that the family 
would not have a video souvenir of this big event. For Tsetsa, this behavior proved 
that the family of Vesko’s sister never integrated in the city despite their better 
financial situation; they remained simple urbanized peasants. Tsetsa concluded her 
tirade by calling this relatives kompleksari. 
Vesko, Tsetsa and Marina also complained that a few guests tried to spoil the 
celebration of integration by attending the party with work clothes. These were 
Vesko’s colleagues who came dressed with dirty shorts, T-shirt, and flip-flop shoes—
the same cloths they used to wear at the booth. Tsetsa insisted that they did it on 
purpose. They came to Vesco’s city party but did not want to let him forget that he 
was still an inferior peasant.  
Tsetsa said that she could tolerate all these acts of sabotage. She already got 
used to this sort of behavior from all those kompleksari. She reminded me that, in 
Bulgaria, envy was the strongest motive of action. I connected this remark to the 
cultural trait I learned from Gencho Gaitandzhiev. In the previous chapter I wrote 
how he warned me that in Bulgaria one needed to be very cautious not to disclose 
personal success. He was cautious “not to boast” (da ne se pohvali). Nevertheless, in 
my mind, Vesko’s insistence to celebrate Marina’s prom with chalga and its culinary 
associations seemed as acts of boasting. Unlike the family in the wedding party, 
which I described above, Vesko danced kiuchek to cast off inhibitions of modern 
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urbanity and celebrate “how he really felt.” He did not limit his folk intimacy with any 
cue of digressive irony or shame and so he claimed discursive authority he did not 
have to redefine the rules of urban communication. 
What Tsetsa could not forgive, however, was what she saw as the cruel 
manner by which Zhoro, Vesko’s boss, reminded Vesko that the party was over. 
Zhoro showed generosity when he sent his son to drive Marina with his car. He also 
promised Vesko a day off after the prom. But late at night, before leaving the café, 
Zhoro approached Vesko and ordered him to show up to work on the following 
morning. I interpreted the order as an act of punishment. Vesko had not only to return 
to his low position of a street vendor, he had also to pay back for making Zhoro a 
participant in Vesko’s kiuchek digressions. I can only speculate that for Zhoro taking 
part in such an event was not an easy task. He, just as other guests (including me), 
could see the stitches in Vesko’s performance of integrated urbanity, particularly with 
the fact that he really danced kiuchek very well as if he was really a Gypsy from the 
mahala.  
The party’s aftermath  
Vesko did not accept the expectation of returning to his previous position 
before the party. Encouraged by the excitement of Marina’s prom, he decided that the 
time had come to realize his dream: opening his own fruit and vegetable store. On 
days he did not work, Vesko searched for a suitable space to rent. Meanwhile he 
began advertising his intentions among customers and colleagues in Zhoro’s booth. 
The news arrived quickly to Zhoro, who, on his part, ordered Vesko to take an 
unlimited unpaid vacation. Vesko reacted by announcing his immediate resignation. 
In the next days, Vesko bought a booth that was in a short distance from the old one 
(the booth was owned by the municipality of Sofia. Vesko paid 500 leva [$350] for 
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it). He asked Marina’s boyfriend to work with him. The boyfriend’s father 
volunteered to deliver produce every morning with his car from the wholesale market. 
The work went well during the summer months. It looked like that the new business 
was developing well. Vesko began building a regular clientele of people from the 
nearby streets. The booth was located on a main boulevard with busy pedestrian 
traffic. Vesko and Marina’s boyfriend seemed happy working together. Sometimes 
Marina and Tsetsa also came to help. Vesko was so satisfied with the successful 
launching of the booth that he even went one evening to Zhoro and paraded with his 
daily revenue. Vesko also surprised Tsetsa with new expensive electrical appliances 
that he bought for their home. 
The momentum started to wane when the winter approached. Vesko 
increasingly realized the insecurities of working as a single business owner. 
Additionally, Marina’s boyfriend complained that he got tired of that work and his 
father did not want to continue taking the burden of early morning delivery. Also the 
relationship between Marina and her boyfriend started fraying. Vesko and Tsetsa 
complained to me that they could not stand the family of the boyfriend; they were 
nothing more than simple peasants. Vesko and Tsetsa felt that Marina deserved a 
more “refined” boyfriend. I saw how Vesko was gradually losing his spirit.  
In November 2008, Vesko, Marina and I went to the annual concert of the 
popfolk music channel “Planeta televizia” (Tsetsa could not come, she was at work). 
We went to drink beer at a nearby krŭchma after the concert. Vesko showed me his 
frostbites from standing long hours in the cold street. The skin on his hands was 
totally red and cracked. I could see that he was in great pain. Around Christmas 
Vesko disappeared. When I managed to find him on the phone he sounded drunk. 
Two months later we met again. He told me that he had decided to quit the idea of the 
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booth. He did not even try to sell the booth; he just abandoned it altogether. Vesko 
blamed Zhoro for trying to destroy him. He claimed that Zhoro bribed municipality 
inspectors to fine Vesko for positioning stock boxes on parts of the sidewalk that were 
outside the limits of the booth. From time to time Zhoro’s workers used to pass in the 
area to watch what Vesko was doing. He broke down when temperature began to drop 
below the freezing point. Vesko had no place to store the stock at night so he used to 
lock it in the booth. One morning, when he came to work, he found that all the fruit 
and vegetables had frozen completely. He had to throw away everything. 
 The collapse of his new business affected gravely Vesko’s emotional 
constitution. He used to be very proud that he had managed to escape the typical fate 
of his former peasant acquaintances. He was in his early 40s but felt himself energetic 
as a teenager. He did not smoke, did not over-drink (except some beer when he 
wanted to relax after work), did not neglect his body, had all his original teeth, and 
deeply loved his wife and daughter. Emphasizing to me the importance of 
psychological heath, he always used to express great hope and optimism (not a 
common trait in Bulgaria). He believed that being hopeful and optimistic were crucial 
for enduring emotional and material difficulties.  
When I met him again he was different. He had become thinner, was 
unshaved, his eyes were red and his face was swollen. I heard from Tsetsa that he got 
drunk almost every night. He found all sorts of alternative jobs but quit after a short 
time after discovering that his employers stole his salary. When I managed to reach 
him he admitted that he avoided seeing me because he was ashamed of his situation. 
Within a year he stopped believing that his life situation could improve back. He 
finally accepted a job as a general worker in a construction company owned by a 
former resident of his village. He was satisfied that at least his boss was an honest 
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person who did not take advantage of Vesko’s situation. The new boss paid Vesko on 
time, let him take breaks during the workday, and did not try to cheat or exploit him. 
Not working anymore with urban class customers freed Vesco from following formal 
rules of modern communication at work. He and his colleagues on the construction 
sites could listen to popfolk radio stations with no worries of losing face. Playing 
loudly chalga radio stations in public was anyhow the stereotype of former peasant 
construction workers. Vesko had lost his recognition of being modern and gave up 
trying to regain it back.  
Conclusion 
The choice Vesko took—to give up integration in the city rather than live on 
the liminal zone between urbanity and peasantry—brings me back to Kearney’s 
suggestion of reconceptualizing the social base of traditionally agrarian societies 
(such as Bulgaria) in the era of post-developmentist globalization. Can we conclude 
that Vesko accepted the fate of living in a never-ending transition or has he 
abandoned his peasant identity and turned into a polybian—a subaltern subject 
position that emerges outside the dialectics of the country and the city? If the latter is 
true, in what space and time dimensions (alternative to modernity and tradition) 
should one locate the folk intimacy—the space Vesko and his environment create by 
cuing speech acts of chalga with signs of shame and affinity? And what about the 
context of class analysis, should we shift it from nation to globalization as Kearney 
suggests, or should we look analyze the folk intimacy that the chalga register 
mediates as an intertextual process with which Bulgarians experience, communicate 
and negotiate the two legacies of social base in Bulgarian national imagination: the 
authentic narod and backward folk? And what can we learn from the events 
surrounding Marina’s prom about the way Bulgarians perceive the current official 
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narrative of national modernization: integration in the democratic global world 
(namely the EU)? Do non-elite Bulgarians like Vesko and his social environment 
really find in democracy a path of populist modernization in which they can have 
their own grassroots (or ethnic) voice (as proposed by intellectual legislators as well 
as by Kearney) or do they receive democracy as another modernization program 
which, while its authoritarian power cannot be resisted, at least it can be domesticated 
(through conflicting complementarities of sabotage and compliance)? 
I managed to stay in touch with Vesko. We meet once a year during my 
summer visits to Sofia. Social media helps us also to keep in touch during the year 
and feed each other with family news. I discussed with Vesko in one of our follow up 
meetings what changed in his life after he abandoned the booth and become a general 
construction worker. He acknowledged that his life reality worsened. He did not see 
himself on any path of urban integration anymore. He played with the idea of going 
back to his village. He told me that his sister and her family did so. But, he did not 
seem ready to take this step and follow her. Instead, Vesko and his family find 
resources (or values-powers, in Kearney’s terminology) to maintain personal and 
communal space. Their social network develops in a reticulum manner encompassing 
their home in the margins of Sofia city center, Vesko’s native village, Tsetsa’s 
hometown, Vesko’s temporary construction projects all over the country and sites for 
leisure such as CSKA soccer stadium. Marina grew and is now contributing to the 
family economy as a seller. She changed jobs a few times expressing her frustration 
with employers who took advantage of her age and lack of education denying her 
salary on payday. Recently she found a job in a shoe store whose owners behave 
fairly. They even paid for her driving lessons. Vesko took a chance to go abroad for 
the first time in his life. He applied for a construction job in a Bulgarian firm that 
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sends guest workers to the Czech Republic. He had to borrow some money from 
friends to pay the application fee. Unfortunately, he had to borrow money again in 
order to come back home. The Bulgarian firm was discovered as another money 
scheme. Vesko and his fellow Bulgarian co-workers were indeed hired for jobs in 
Czech construction sites however they were fired and thrown to the street when 
payday came. Not knowing any other language but Bulgarian, Vesko felt lucky that 
he managed to find his way back home.  
This travel experience introduced Vesko to the grim reality of similar post-
peasants/guest-workers from other poor European countries. Despite the language 
barrier he felt strong subaltern solidarity with them. One can indeed find in this 
solidarity a beginning of what Kearney sees as global ethnic class-consciousness. The 
recent development of chalga might add to this consciousness a common language. In 
the years after my fieldwork, Latin American reggaeton has become the most popular 
rhythmic line of popfolk hits. In my view, Bulgarians like Vesko are intrigued by the 
rhythmic similarities between reggaeton and kiuchek, which allows them to enjoy 
familiar grooves and feel fit with global cultural trends at the same time (a rare 
occasion in Bulgaria).  
The language with which Vesko articulates his current situation reveals to me 
that he did not abandon the dialectics of modern urbanity and traditional village. He 
identifies his class with the Bulgarian social base: the authentic narod and backward 
folk. More concretely he sees himself as a peasant in the city and admits the 
inferiority complex that his transitional position entails. Culturally he keeps 
distinguishing between the two categories by associating the first with folklore and 
the latter with chalga.  
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Vesko never denied that losing his booth hit him financially. But he could find 
comfort with the fact that he domesticated for himself a place in the city in which he 
could live as he really felt without pretending to be someone else. His self-soothing 
words revealed to me a language comfort zone that does not stem from a polybian 
subject position but rather from recontextualizing in democratic life the traditional 
strategy of modernity domestication: sabotage and compliance. Vesko was happy that 
he did not need to play anymore the role of a modern urbanite to all sorts of 
kompleksari. He could show affinity with chalga music without limiting it with 
shame. If there was no danger of being abused by other, more powerful, peasants in 
the city (such as Zhoro, the owner of the old booth), Vesko himself had no problem to 
express his affinity with chalga. He loved all Balkan musics, from popfolk hits to 
Gypsy kiuchek, from Serbian turbofolk to Turksih arabesk. He testified that he was in 
his soul a Bulgarian villager and remembered that as a baby he suckled Gypsy 
rhythms with his breast milk. By no means did Veselin Karchinski deny his village 
roots. Despite his difficult financial situation, Vesko was happy that he could still live 
in the city without turning into a kompleksar. 
The ethnic resonance in Vesko’s conclusion is my point of departure to the 
fourth and last chapter of the dissertation. I turn now to discuss how Roma 
participants in a Romani music festival negotiate through the self-reflexive voice of 
chalga their role as shifters of Balkan ethnicity, that is, being backward Gypsies to 
whom Bulgarians point when expressing self-perception of recursivity to European 
modernity. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Romfest 2008: Between Ethnic Assimilation and Multi-Ethnicity 
 
“Emel Etem Doesn’t Give Money for Romfest 2008. It’s Apparently Just 
Kiuchek and Chalga”76 
 
The opening epigraph quotes a news report that circulated over the Bulgarian 
printed and digital media in early August 2008. The report informs about the decision 
of Emel Etem—at that time a government minister and the head of the State 
Committee of Ethnic and Demographic Affairs—to deny state funding for Romfest—
a festival of Romani dance and music, which took place in the city of Stara Zagora 
(Southeastern Bulgaria) every summer between 1992 and 2010. What attracts my 
attention in this quotation is Etem’s association of the festival with kiuchek and chalga 
(and in other utterances also with kebapche, minced meatball), which, in this context, 
invokes a stereotype of Gypsies ready to use any possible lie to exploit public 
resources for their immediate self-indulgent pleasures. There is another implicit line 
in this quotation. Emel Etem is a member of the ethnic Turkish minority that 
Bulgarians usually identify with the pre-national “occupation” of the Muslim 
Ottoman Empire over the Balkans, which they consider originally Christian (since the 
medieval era). By denying state funding to Romfest on the basis of its association with 
chalga, she counters her own ethnic stereotype by presenting herself as protecting 
national interests (i.e. public money) from Roma—the minority Bulgarians identify 
with present-day ethnic Balkan ghettoization.  
I related to stereotypes of Gypsy ethnicity in the previous chapter when I 
revisited Michael Kearney’s suggestion that ethnicity should be the category of class-
consciousness in the post-Cold War globalized world. I discussed the ways 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 See for instance, “Емел Етем не дава пари за ‘Ромфест 2008’, бил ‘кючек и чалга,’” Стара-
Загора.Орг, August 7, 2008, accessed October 25, 2014, http://novini.stara-
zagora.org/index.php?page=novini&novina=907. 
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Bulgarians (like Vesco Karchinski) mark the zone of folk intimacy with expressions 
of shame and affinity with kiuchek, the ethnic register of chalga (e.g. Peicheva 1999; 
Silverman 2012). This intimacy, which is presumably not intended to circulate 
beyond its confined space of digression, stands in opposition to another sort of 
cultural intimacy—peasantry—that signifies a developmental circulation (within the 
context of the nation-state) from the traditional village to the modern city. Evolution 
was the register which keyed peasant circulation to the socialist language ideology of 
modernization, which Kearney calls developmentism. The main point of my argument 
in the previous chapter was that, although democratic Bulgaria officially abandoned 
evolution in favor of another channel of circulation that takes place in transnational 
(and post-developmental) globalized world (above all the EU), peasantry is still the 
standpoint from which non-elite Bulgarians can seek recognition, social mobility and 
empowerment. While “integration” replaced “evolution” as the code of entextualizing 
(Briggs and Bauman 1992; Urban 1996) Bulgaria’s social base in the discourse of 
global circulation, ethnicity marks the same zone of fractal recursivity it marked 
during the era of nation-state socialism. Iconized by the Gypsy shifter, ethnicity 
signifies to Bulgarians the Balkanist self-perception of living in a ghetto of tradition 
and backwardness in the margins of modern Europe.    
Gypsy ethnicity stands at the center of this chapter, in which I analyze how 
Roma participants in Romfest 2008 both embrace and reject derogatory images that 
stem from associations of Roma with the musical and dance form of kiuchek. Both 
reactions, I argue, are strategies of negotiating a language ideology trope that ties 
Romani ethnicity with otherness to two presumably opposing discourses of post-1989 
democratic modernity: the Bulgarian ethnonation and European transnational multi-
ethnicity. I will expand on the concept of ethnonation in the sections below. The risk 
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involved in this sort of negotiation is what makes utterances of Gypsy kiuchek highly 
powerful. On one hand, it highlights Romani identity and accelerate its circulation 
between three inter-relating discursive contexts: the ethnic Gypsy ghetto (mahala, a 
Turkish-Arabic derived word), national Bulgaria and transnational Europe. However, 
at the same time, nothing like Gypsy kiuchek can reinforce stereotypes of ethnic 
difference, which have the power to ruin the discursive authority of Roma who 
attempt to perform Romani identity within and between the three contexts (the Gypsy 
mahala, national Bulgaria and transnational Europe). The opening epigraph is a 
paradigmatic speech event that plays on this risk. Emel Etem dismissed the modern 
quality of Romfest’s circulation of Romani identity by portraying the festival’s as 
nothing but opportunistic exploitation of public money for a mahala celebration. 
My goal in this chapter is to analyze the fine line organizers and participants 
in Romfest 2008 walked when communicating Romani identity through kiuchek. 
Above all, I show that this fine line consists of a language mechanism that highlights 
the (ethno)national channel above the intra-ethnic and transnational one. My 
informants in the festival equated modern circulation of Romani identity with the 
erasure of Gypsy recursivity. Meaning, they embraced stereotypes of Gypsy kiuchek 
as identity markers long as their performance was limited to bringing the ethnic ghetto 
to the artistic stage. The same organizers and participants denounced identification 
with Gypsy kiuchek offstage (i.e. in real life communication) when addressing the 
festival to the national audience, which ties circulation from the Gypsy ghetto to 
modern Bulgaria with assimilation in the Bulgarian nation (or more precisely, 
ethnonation). Interpreting the semantics and pragmatics of switches between 
embracing and denouncing Gypsy kiuchek I explain in this chapter why and how 
replacing peasantry with ethnicity as the democratic category of social base indexes to 
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Bulgarians widening the gap with transnational Europe (the current hegemonic 
geographical configuration of modernity, that is, Europe within the global world) 
rather than minimizing it.  
Greg Urban (1993) defines two kinds of function in discourse: meaning-
bearing (or signaling) and goal. Meaning-bearing has to do “with the stretch of a 
discourse for the communication in which it is part” (ibid: 241). For example, Urban 
writes, “verb forms can distinguish whether the sentence is to be understood as 
declarative or imperative” (ibid). Goal, on the other hand, is “the way in which 
speech, as a form of social action, is used to accomplish goals of the speaker,” such as 
“to build a social alliance or to provoke or to obtain information” (ibid). Urban 
maintains that, unlike signaling, the goal function is not specified independently. We 
can infer it only through observation of the role of discourse in social life. Goal 
pertains to individual wants and needs and so it comes alongside a third cultural one, 
which “involves discourse in the service of collective social purpose” (ibid). He 
points to a potential tension between individual goals and cultural functions. The first 
function makes use of the ability of language to serve diverse wants and needs. 
However, this ability can come in conflict with the cultural function that depends on 
the regimentation and normativity of discourse. The ability of meanings to be 
communicated depends on formal coding of what discourse could be used in what 
social context.  
Using this threefold functional definition of signaling, goal and culture to my 
analysis of Romfest 2008 I ask how the festival organizers used kiuchek as the most 
effective form of communication between the assimilated Romani organizers and the 
audience (whom the organizers considered ghettoized Gypsies). However, to be able 
to homogenize (or, in other words, entextualize) the festival within the language 
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ideology of nation-state Bulgaria, the organizers operated on the goal and cultural 
levels of this seemingly non-modern cultural form. They attempted to erase its 
associations with ethnic recursivity without changing its signaling function by 
framing the stage performance with formal indices of assimilation (and so fitting the 
stage performance with the discourse of modern Bulgarian culture). They needed, 
though, to present this framing as a rational act of synthesis between ethnicity and 
assimilation in order to avoid the risk of losing assimilated face and being reproached 
as opportunistic Gypsies, who are ready to perform whatever face needed to earn 
money or any other benefit. The festival organizers took the risk and offered a path of 
circulation from the staged Gypsy ghetto to the Bulgarian nation (and, later, to 
transnational Europe) in order to claim discursive authority of brokering between the 
three discursive spaces (mahala, nation, Europe).  
Three ethnographies of cultural performances of subaltern identities—
Goodman (2005), Lemon (2000) and Seizer (2005)—prompt me to not study the 
performance of Roma identity in Romfest 2008 in isolation from the larger contexts of 
the Bulgarian nation-state and transnational Europe. Also, drawing upon these studies 
I do not seek an “authentic” Romani voice underneath the hegemony of these two 
larger contexts. Instead I trace how people at the festival perform or perceive either 
Romani or Gypsy identities always in regard to the two presumably more modern 
contexts (the nation and the global world), in which “Gypsies” were invented as the 
shifters of modernity’s ethnic recursivity and “Roma” were invented to index 
assimilation (i.e. recursivity erasure).  
The performance of kiuchek and its associated stereotypes in Romfest mediates 
the Gypsy ghetto similarly to the ways Berber language, songs, narratives and 
museum display items mediate the Berber village in Goodman’s (2005) study. 
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Kiuchek provides the imagined locus of “the Gypsy ghetto” with acceleration power 
to go on to what Goodman calls “world stage”—a discourse of communal self-
presentation constituted through and for the sake of being recognized in multiple 
sociocultural contexts as well as in multiple webs of global circulation (such as the 
nation-state and World Music).  
The performance of Russian Roma identity in theater and daily life in 
Lemon’s (2000) study helps me to explore cultural texts and images as forms of 
mediation. I particularly pay attention to the strategies by which, to get recognition, 
Roma negotiate their designated iconicity of ethnic Balkan recursivity within 
discourses of national modernity (modern Russia, in the case of Lemon’s study). My 
analysis of how Roma participants in Romfest 2008 invoked stereotypes of Gypsy 
kiuchek aims to uncover the “more diffuse performance and performative moments in 
everyday interaction, to track how ideologies about performance reproduce social, 
and especially racial categories” (ibid: 27).  
Seizer’s study of Tamil Special drama artists (2005) allows me to add the 
element of risk to the performance of stereotypical Gypsiness. I examine how Roma 
negotiate the stigmatic consequences of digression from national and transnational 
modernies involved in centering the festival on kiuchek. Seizer writes, “the comedic 
scenes in Special Drama are the locus for so much stigma on actors, as well as the 
arena in which artists most masterfully negotiate the terms and discourses of that 
stigma itself. Comedy plays off common notions such as that actresses are prostitutes, 
for example, or that stage artists have neither culture nor morals. Such are the shared 
stereotypes and stigmatizing accusations that pervade life for Special Drama both 
onstage and off” (ibid: 21). The opening epigraph points to risk of losing state funding 
when celebrating Romani identity with the prime cultural form that that invokes such 
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deep stigmas of Balkan ethnicity. In the ethnographic discussion that follows I will 
show that, just as the Special Drama artists in Seizer’s study, keying the festival to 
kiuchek provided these participants with the means both to resist as well as to 
collaborate with the discourse that stained them with markers of spoiled identity 
(Goffman 1963) and then sanctioned their access to the normative society (the Tamil 
middle class, in the case of Seizer’s study, nation-state Bulgaria in the case of this 
chapter). The duty of the festival’s organizers was to prevent the stigma from leaking 
(or, in other words, unwantedly circulate) from the performers to the audience. There 
were two channels of hazardous leakage (Goffman 2008), a minor one from the 
physical stage to the attendant, and a graver one from the liminal reality of festival to 
the everyday reality of Bulgarian national society.  
I adopt Lemon’s strategy of drawing thin analytical line between stage and 
everyday life as two realms of performativity. I use the identity marker of “Roma” 
(and its adjective “Romani”) when speaking about members of this particular ethnic 
group who perform assimilation in national Bulgarian society. The identity marker of 
“Gypsy” (as well as “Gypsiness”) denotes a digression from the national society to 
the stereotypes of the ethnic ghetto. My analysis traces moments in which people shift 
between the two language ideology contexts: the festival’s stage vis-à-vis the Gypsy 
mahala and the festival as a stage vis-à-vis the Bulgarian nation and transnational 
Europe). I also explore how people either accentuate or underplay the switching of 
lines between being assimilated Roma and mahala Gypsies.  
Reflecting on these two levels of onstage and offstage performativity I show 
how organizers, participants, and audience of Romfest 2008 negotiated the links and 
divisions between ethnic Gypsies and assimilated Roma. For instance, people could 
perform Gypsiness and maintain a modern Romani face as long as their performance 
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was strictly confined to the stage (the concrete or imagined). Leakages from the stage 
to the audience could be tolerated as long as the festival attendants abandoned their 
role as audience and became part of the show. Then, the festival as a whole became a 
stage of performing stigmatic Gypsiness to an imagined audience, the Bulgarian 
nation and, at large, modern Europe. As I will show momentarily, the festival 
organizers held the responsibility to manage the division between the two realms of 
stage and everyday life. The first realm was the concrete physical stage and its 
audience; the second realm was more imagined ream of the festival as a stage and the 
larger Bulgarian society as its audience.  
Gypsy kiuchek in national Bulgaria and transnational Europe  
The local discursive field of Gypsy kiuchek in Bulgaria stems from the larger 
archetype of the Gypsy musician, as developed in Western literature, opera, theater 
plays, musical compositions, songs, and films. This archetype ascribes to Roma 
passionate musical soul for which natural rather than normative freedom is the source 
of power (e.g. Lemon 2000, Sliverman 2012, Trumpener 1992). Special to Bulgaria 
are local anxieties that kiuchek is such a powerful mediator of Romani identity that it 
violates national taboo of ethnic politics. During the transition era of the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, American ethnomusicologists (e.g. Buchanan [1996], Rice [1996, 
2002], and Silverman [1996, 2012]) as well Bulgarian ones (Dimov [2001], Levy 
(2005, 2007), and Peicheva [1999, 2008]) identified in Gypsy music a power to resist 
the communist engineered folklore. These scholars argued that wedding bands—a 
precursor of post-socialist popfolk or chalga, which emerged as a semi-legal form 
probably in the late 1970s and was performed mostly by Roma musicians, above all 
Ivo Papazov-Ibriiama—were grassroots voices of excluded minorities and erased 
vernacular culture. Wedding music was not completely disconnected from the official 
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folklore canon. Many performers were fluent in the two genres and combined folklore 
motives in wedding music (Peicheva 1999, 2008). However, cross-generic 
combinations were only one directional. While wedding music was open to 
intertextual exchange, folklore remained closed, homogeneous, and purist. For these 
post-socialist ethnomusicologists, then, the exclusion of kiuchek from folklore 
reflected the totalitarian hegemony of Bulgarians over Roma. Dimov and Levy both 
attempt to embrace kiuchek in Bulgarian national culture by rejecting assimilation 
altogether. As I mentioned earlier, Dimov suggests calling popfolk or chalga 
“ethnopop” in the spirit of World Music’s multidirectional dialogue, Levy suggests 
calling kiuchek “ethnojazz.” In my mind, the emphasis on ethnicity in these two terms 
maybe suggests why they failed to catch on in the Bulgarian cultural discourse. These 
two scholars attempted to calibrate kiuchek to the language ideology of transnational 
European multi-ethnicity while skipping national Bulgaria’s language ideology of 
assimilation altogether. In so doing, the generic coinages they propose stress rather 
than erase the equation of Bulgarian national identity with the hegemony of Bulgarian 
ethnicity.  
Despite advocacies of Romani musical culture, the grave stigmas involved in 
Gypsy kiuchek indicate that the socialist rhetoric that equates Roma modernization 
with assimilation is still effective in democratic Bulgaria. Images of stereotypical 
Gypsies still remind Bulgarians that Gypsies’ social reality still falls behind the rest of 
the modern world. Indeed, Silverman (1996, 2007, 2012) rightly argues that Roma 
musicians are not mere victims of their stereotypical derogations. On the contrary, 
they take part with them in order to address effectively their audiences. Turning 
stereotypes into World Music exotica is the major way by which Romani musicians 
can travel from the mahala to the world stage. Silverman writes that especially 
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musicians, whose work depends completely on the expectations of the audience, 
affirm or counter common perceptions about Roma; musicians exoticize themselves 
or emphasize integration, express pan-Roma unity or tribal hybridity according to 
their prescribed role in the performance. The performance of Romani identity depends 
on the context of the performance—the sort of Gypsiness that the audience has in 
mind beforehand. Not less importantly, Roma perform their identity according to the 
political economy of the performance; whether a performance is a state funded 
exhibition of ethnic traditional culture or whether a performance is a World Music 
commodity.  
I would like to add one consideration to Silverman’s analysis: how do Roma 
living in democratic Bulgaria operate within the spectrum of stigma and exotica when 
using music as a medium for communication within their ethnic community and with 
the Bulgarian nation-state? The requirement to perform one’s own ethnic stereotypes 
is a defining characteristic of World Music’s political economy (e.g Feld 2000). 
Musicians can market themselves effectively by participating in the industry of Gypsy 
exotica, authenticity as well as lowlife and misery. Yet, how can one transfer the 
cultural capital (of musical excellence) into political capital, such as national 
recognition, when Romani musical performance invokes such vehement ethnic 
anxieties followed by blames of opportunism? Or in other words, could ethnicity turn 
in Bulgaria from a strong negative index of ethnic Balkan recursivity into positive 
icons of national folklore or socio-cultural dialogue and pluralism (just as the generic 
labels ethnojazz and ethnopop suggest)?  
Romfest 2008 
My ethnographic attempt to address this question departs from Romfest 2008 
being well attended, well organized, and musically successful event, on one hand, 
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and, on the other hand, its ongoing almost invisibility outside the Romani community 
of Stara Zagora. Although the festival carried a national label, it was basically the 
private enterprise of Aleksandar Kracholov—a local Romani businessman and the 
director of Lozenets, a Roma-rights NGO from Stara Zagora, which advances Roma 
integration in Bulgarian society through cultural and educational activities. 
Kracholov77 founded the festival in 1992 with state support thanks to Andrei 
Lukanov, Bulgaria’s last communist prime minister (February-December 1990) and 
an important figure in the privatization of the socialist economy during early 1990s.78 
The financial start came from Kiril Rashkov, better known as Tsar [King] Kiro—a 
shadowy businessman and political figure from the elite Romani tribe of Kalderashi, 
who crowned himself as the king of all Bulgaria’s Roma (Marushiakova and Popov 
2000, Spirova 2004).79 Additional financial support arrived occasionally from the 
Open Society Institute, the Municipality of Stara Zagora, as well as from the 
Bulgarian state. The festival’s organizing group was made (in addition to Kracholov) 
of Romani-rights activists, Romani intellectuals, musical figures, and managers of 
Romani NGOs.  
The festival opened with an ethnographic exhibition of objects and pictures of 
rural life, the common metacultural (Urban 2001)80 perspective with which 
Bulgarians perform self-reflexively their circulation from traditional peasant ethnicity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 This background information is based on personal conversations with different informants as well as 
Peicheva (2003) and Peicheva and Dimov (2005). 
78 Andrei Lukanov was allegedly a central player in the emergence of Bulgaria’s post-socialist mafia 
economy. He was assassinated in 1996. The assassins were never found. However, the common claim 
is that Lukanov’s death was connected with power struggles in the emerging Bulgarian Mafia (e.g. 
Crampton 2007)  
79 Tsar Kiro also founded in 1997 a short-lived Roma-rights party called “Freedom Bulgaria” 
(Svoboda Bulgaria), of which Kracholov and a few Roma participants in the festival were members. 
After the dissolution of the party, Kracholov and his colleagues found a political home in the Bulgarian 
Socialist Party. 
80 Goodman explains that metaculture is a discursive characterization of the speed of circulation: 
accelerative or inertia. “Metaculture—the way cultural item is talked about in regard to its past and its 
future—is what provokes one or the other kinds of motion” (2005: 17).   
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to a modern nation. In this case, the same manner of self-reflection revolved 
exclusively on ethnic Romani village communities. The exhibition was followed by a 
round-table sponsored by the Open Society Institute that dealt with issues of Romani 
integration. This is a common term in official communications, which explicitly 
indexes multi-ethnic pluralism. Integration does not entail recognition of the minority 
rights of Roma but stands as an antonym to the other form of ethnic exclusion, 
ghettoization. During socialism, integration denoted the official policy of national 
homogenization through assimilation. Currently integration casts responsibility on 
Roma themselves who are expected to find themselves ways to participating in 
national life. When I asked informants what integration practically meant, people 
usually proposed paths of assimilation in what they considered modern Bulgarian 
lifestyle: learning the Bulgarian language, receiving national education, quitting the 
mahala in favor of modern neighborhood, limiting families to one or two children etc.  
Three nights of open-air musical shows followed immediately the round table 
discussion. The first two evening shows gave stage to bands from Romani 
neighborhoods and villages from all over Bulgaria, which performed different kiuchek 
soundscapes from Bulgaria, Turkey, Macedonia, Greece and Albania. Most of the 
bands were professional in the sense that their musicians play in gigs for living; a few 
youth ensembles were organized and funded by local Romani cultural centers. The 
professional bands were either paid to perform in Romfest or took the event as a venue 
of advertisement. Officially, though, the two first musical nights were organized as a 
competition in front of a jury of professional musicians and ethnomusicologists 
nominated by Mr. Kracholov.81 The closing festive performance on the third night 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 The jury included the ethnic Bulgarian ethnomusicologist Lozanka Peicheva, the Romani singer 
Nikolai Gŭrdev, the Romani composer, director, and cymbal player Andzhelo Malikov (now 
deceased), as well as the ethnic Bulgarian folklorist Krum Georgiev. 
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brought to the stage well-known Romani kiuchek musicians, who are the most 
demanded performers in Romani weddings, such as the singer Dzhamaikata and his 
companion trumpet player Gŭmzata,82 the singer Dzhago, and the singer Ivan Ivanov. 
All these singers arrived with their own instrumental bands. The highlight of that 
show was the guest performance of the popfolk star Toni Storaro (the stage name of 
Tünçer Fikret Ali),83 who sang over his sinback (recorded instrumental tracks). Toni 
Storaro is a member of the Turkish minority, however his repertoire is in Bulgarian 
(he speaks better Turkish than Bulgarian but rarely release songs in Turkish). His 
singing style is eclectic, combines Greek laiako, Turkish arabesk, Gypsy kiuchek and 
socialist Bulgarian Estrada.  
Despite the success of the festival in creating an annual event of Romani 
music and dance, which itself enjoys wide popularity in the country, the festival 
remained a fairly marginal event in the cultural calendar of Bulgaria or even of its 
hometown, Stara Zagora. Around 3,000 people attended the evening concerts, but this 
audience largely consisted of the residents of “Lozenets,” Stara Zagora’s biggest 
Romani mahala. Audience outside this social circle (except, maybe, Roma from 
nearby villages) was rather rare. The concerts took place in an open-air amphitheater 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Gŭmzata is the only musician on the list who is ethnic Bulgarian and has formal western music 
education. He is also a prominent member in Slavi Trifonov’s Ku-Ku Band. He acquired his close 
affinity with Romani kiuchek from his Romani trumpet teacher, Sasho Roman, who himself is one of 
the pioneering chalga star-singers. Currently Sasho Roman works as a community activist for Romani 
youth. He performed in Romfest on numerous occasions and attended the 2008 festival with a children 
dance ensemble from Sofia. Sasho Roman had also a short-lived political career in the Bulgarian 
Socialist Party.  
83 For sample clips of these performers see:  
Dzhamaikata, “djamaikata 20 evro !.avi.”	  accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kIXGfRmLrpA. 
Gumzata, “Гъмзата и Emotion Wedding Agency – Хасково,” accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0f7OXNM6Rnc. 
Dzhago, “djago 2010 vbox7,”accessed October 25, 2014, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i7weq_-
D0zQ. 
Ivan Ivanov, “ork. Kozari – Pazari,”	  accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aGtxO2R59v0. 
Toni Storaro, “Toni Storaro - Unikat ( Unique ) 16:9 Super Quality,”	  accessed October 25, 
2014,http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Cp5V8A0P1o. 
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located on a hill outside the city center. It was a fairly isolated point where people do 
not pass by. The national media as well as the local media of Stara Zagora also 
provided minimal coverage. I did not notice any street advertisement for the event.  
The fact that the festival remained dependent on state funding and did not 
develop commercial independence prompt me to start looking at how Kracholov and 
his assisting partners coped with two opposing discourses of ethnicity in Bulgaria: 
transnational multi-ethnicity and national assimilation. The first is the official 
framework of minority rights in EU-member Bulgaria; the second was the official 
ideology of nation building during socialism. Hence, Kracholov and his partners 
promoted the festival as a cultural venue of multi-ethnicity and, at the same time, 
reiterated anti-Gypsy stereotypes (similar to the one implied by Emel Etem) that 
keyed the festival to assimilation. Successful switching between the two discourses 
helped them claim two sorts of discursive authority: modern Roma in the multi-ethnic 
EU and assimilated Roma in Bulgaria. My goal in the following sections is to analyze 
the self-perception of subalternity that underlies the code switching between the two 
discourses. In order to access European multi-ethnicity as modern Roma rather than 
recursive Gypsies, Kracholov and his partners had to show first that they were well 
assimilated Bulgarians.  
How do modern Roma look and sound? 
I expected Romfest 2008 to provide me with an opportunity to observe first-
hand Roma negotiating mahala Gypsiness and Romani assimilation in a context in 
which their ethnic identity was at the center of a festive event. A mutual friend 
introduced me to Aleksandar Kracholov to whom I explained my research project. 
Kracholov invited me to be his personal guest, which included full ethnographic 
access to the festival on- and off-stage. In return I offered to Kracholov to act on 
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voluntary basis as the festival’s official stills photographer. I hoped also that my 
photography work would lead to a longstanding cooperation with Kracholov. I 
offered to develop a website for Romfest which would expose the festival to bigger 
publics in Bulgaria and beyond.  
We did not discuss what each of us envisioned as the target audience of my 
pictures. Only later I realized that he sought a way to reach national Bulgaria, while I 
was thinking about the global audience of World Music. The difference between us 
was crucial. Circulating to the national public required minimizing associations of 
Romani ethnicity with digression from modernity in order to key the festival to 
assimilation. Circulating to the World Music market, on the other hand, required 
heightening digression as a marker of exotica. My model idea was the website of 
Guča Trumpet Festival (http://www.guca.rs/), a Romani brass music festival in 
Serbia, which has grown into an international World Music cultural event and a 
highly successful tourist business (Hofman 2014). Kracholov seemed interested in 
principle in my idea. He agreed with me that attracting foreign tourists could help the 
festival break its marginality in Bulgaria and build financial independence. However, 
he was not ready to invest either money or any effort in developing the festival’s 
website. Our work together began by looking for funding for the website but never 
developed further. Talking about this experience with ethnic Bulgarian friends of 
Kracholov I understood that he was hesitant to take this initiative because it meant 
embracing digressive stereotypes of Gypsy kiuchek and so risking the appearance of 
assimilation. To attract the Western audience he had to perform either of the Gypsy 
stigmas: a crazy Balkan barbarian or an opportunistic crook dressed as businessman.  
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My license of unlimited access and the fact that nobody actually told me what 
kind of pictures I was supposed to produce, confronted me with a basic ethnographic 
question: how should assimilated Roma look like? Above all, I wanted to avoid 
falling in the common trap of reiterating visual stereotypes of Gypsies. I did not want 
to repeat the same attitude of other photographers who took pictures of the festival: 
directing people in the audience to perform frantic behavior in front of the camera. I 
was especially sensitive to this issue, because I knew that Kracholov and his 
colleagues really wanted to represent Romani culture as modern Bulgarians. But how 
was such representation supposed to look? Nobody provided me with any codes of 
“ethical listening” (Hirschkind 2006)—moral physiology experienced and performed 
in regard to ideologies of active hearing (sermons in the case of Hirschkind’s study, 
kiuchek music in the case of Romfest).  
To be honest, trying not to fall in the trap of capturing Gypsies celebrating 
kiuchek was quite a difficult task. The visual expertise of professional photographer 
already positioned me as more modern than the festival attendants. Similarly to the 
conflict of secular vs. religious senses of communication that Hirschkind (ibid) 
defines in Egypt, people in Bulgaria hold visuality as more rational sense of 
communication than aurality. Just as in other European languages, roots that denote 
visuality (vizhdam, nabliudavam, gledam etc.) are respectively tied in the Bulgarian 
language with modern morality, that is, autonomous rational conduct. Roots that 
denote aurality (slusham, chuvam etc.), on the other hand, are associated with 
traditional morality based on subordination to authority. However, just as in the cases 
of Egyptian sermons (Hirschkind, ibid), Congolese Rumba (White 2008) and 
Moroccan Gnawa (Kapchan 2007), Bulgarians distinguish between two forms of 
subordination. The first is high listening, an “ethical” one; Sufi sama’ dance or 
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Bulgarian horo, for instance, are forms with which the audience performs spiritual 
obedience to moral values. The second is a low reciprocation of subordination to 
carnal desires. Congolese atalaku and Gypsy kiuchek are among the forms with which 
power holders (such as Mobutu in Zaire) can seemingly mobilize the masses by 
manipulating their senses.  
My own point of view (if to use this visual metaphor) was foregrounded by 
audio-visual depictions of Gypsies in films like Tony Gatlif’s “Crazy Stranger” 
(1997) or Emir Kusturica’s “Time of the Gypsies” (1988). I pretty quickly felt myself 
falling to the same inequality structure in those films of Gypsies performing Balkan 
ethnicity to modern Western voyeurs (Iordanova 2001). Also, my own intention of 
exposing the festival to the World Music market influenced my eye to capture images 
of Gypsy exotica. When people saw my camera they immediately gathered around me 
and begged to be photographed. Without being asked, people posed to me in the way 
Gypsies are usually depicted in pictures: wild, frantic, erotic. To check my bias, I took 
a decision to refuse picture requests of people whom I did not know. Faithful to my 
goal of building the festival’s website, I mainly took care of covering the concert 
performance on stage envisioning web browsers as the addressees, not the physical 
attendants. I tried to guess the way Kracholov imagined the ideal addressees of the 
festival’s web site.  
I walked all over the theater and took as many pictures from as many angles as 
I could in order to provide Kracholov with rich visual data for selection. When I 
examined my photographic output, though, I saw that, even though I did not 
orchestrate close-ups of frantic or erotic Gypsies, I had many such images. I captured 
many moments in which people did not observe what I realized was the cultural 
framing of the festival: a musical concert. My eye was attracted especially to people 
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who crossed the borders between the stage and the audience, the performers and the 
public, as well as between festive and casual self-presentation. Exploring the ways in 
which attendants of the festival, including myself, imagined and performed ethnic 
Gypsies and assimilated Roma, and particularly how we crossed the border between 
the two categories was the starting point to analyzing the considerations that 
prompted the organizers of Romfest to embrace Gypsy kiuchek as the form of stage 
performance but denounced it as a form of Roma representation. Above all, Iordan,84 
a Roma-rights activist, elaborated to me the codes of “ethical listening,” or, in other 
words, how the festival attendants had to relate to the stage in order to perform being 
“modern audience.” Without intending, Iordan was one of my main guides to the fact 
that being a modern Roma meant knowing the pragmatics of when to perform 
digressive (or recursive) ethnicity and when to perform assimilation, or, more 
specifically, when to reenact stereotypes of Gypsy kiuchek and when to denounce 
them altogether.   
Iordan (part 1)  
One late morning during the festival, when I sat at the café of the hotel in 
which the festival guests resided and downloaded photos to my computer, a 
middleaged man approached me and asked whether he could browse the pictures as 
well. That was my first interaction with Iordan. He was not just curious to see what I 
shot. He wanted to check if I had pictures that could be useful for him. He asked me if 
he could upload a few pictures on the website of the Romani NGO he managed in his 
hometown. He did not specify what pictures interested him; he was ready to take 
whatever I could give him. I showed Iordan the pictures that I liked the most, those in 
which people were celebrating by taking the performance as a dance party (fig. 1, 2). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Informants that appear in the chapter with a first name are pseudonyms. Those who appear with first 
and family names are real. 
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Iordan was completely unimpressed by these pictures. He did not say anything but his 
face posture disclosed that he really did not like them. What attracted his attention 
were pictures in which the audience was relating to the performance onstage as a 
concert. That is, people were sitting and observing the music performed on stage. I 
later learned that he wished the show to look like a concert at Hall no. 1 of the 
“National Palace of Culture”—the monumental performance complex built in Sofia in 
the late socialist era, which Bulgarians hold as the quintessential locus of modern 
culture (see chapter 1).  
Iordan was especially satisfied when he found pictures in which people sat with 
crossed legs and hands (fig. 3). I did not have a particular idea in mind when I shot 
these pictures. Most probably I took them just to keep my finger active on the 
camera’s button. Iordan, on the other hand, said these pictures proved that Roma 
could actually observe the norms of a “concert.” He saw in them people experiencing 
music in a “civilized” manner, not in typical “Gypsy manner” of shaking their tights 
and breasts in “cheap” kiuchek moves. 
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Fig. 1—The singer Ivan Ivanov in Romfest 2008, picture: Eran Livni 
 
Fig. 2—Audience in Romfest 2008, picture: Eran Livni 
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Fig. 3—Audience in Romfest 2008, picture: Eran Livni 
My long follow-up conversations with Iordan revealed that he was not in 
principle against kiuchek. Iordan himself came to the festival with a music ensemble 
that he formed in his cultural center. He was also strongly dedicated to advancing 
Roma-rights in Bulgaria through cultural activity; and he did not ignore the special 
power of music to represent Roma. He did not deny that kiuchek was dance music for 
celebration not for deliberation. Iordan also knew that kiuchek was far away from 
being simple music. Not so many people could perform well its asymmetric rhythms, 
changing pace, improvisation phrases, and bittersweet emotional expression. So why, 
despite the strong link of the music in the festival with dance, did Iordan want to show 
audience that was sitting and observing the music rather than celebrating it with 
dance? To begin interpreting Iordan’s and my conflicting photographic perspectives I 
need first to open a wider lens to the role of Roma in Bulgaria’s dialectics of modern 
nation and recursive ethnicity. 
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Translating liberal multi-ethnicity to Eastern European ethno-nationalism  
One may wonder why Roma should deal with this dialectics after post-1989 
Bulgaria has rejected assimilation and embraced the Western agenda of 
multiculturalism and multi-ethnicity. Bulgarian politicians and the media relate to this 
shift with the term “the Bulgarian ethnic model,” which denotes that multi-ethnicity is 
natural to Bulgaria. Unlike other former socialist societies (above all those composing 
former Yugoslavia), Bulgarians pride themselves with a longstanding tradition of 
ethnic tolerance and co-existence. The ideological shift to multi-ethnicity is indeed 
apparent in the history of the festival, which began shortly “after democracy came” 
and, as I wrote earlier, was sponsored throughout its more than decade of existence by 
the City of Stara Zagora, the Bulgarian government and the Open Society Foundation. 
Romfest’s reputation was enhanced when the country participated in the trans-
European initiative called “the Decade of Roma Integration 2005-2015.” However, 
Kracholov’s dependency on political patronage to receive state funding was probably 
the reason that brought to the end of the festival in 2010—a year after the Bulgarian 
Socialist Party lost the national election (the party was a coalition member from 2001-
2005 and the ruling party from 2005-2009). I was told that competing Roma activists 
in Stara Zagora, who were connected with Boiko Borisov the paternalist leader of the 
new ruling party—“Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria”—used the 
opportunity to suspend Kracholov’s financial resources and direct public funding for 
the party’s own interests and projects. The end of Romfest passed unnoticed in the 
Bulgarian public. 
Emel Etem’s short comment hints that, while official Bulgaria has abandoned 
assimilation, this ideology is still prevalent as a language mechanism of ethnic 
homogenization that limits the ability of Roma to translate cultural pluralism into 
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political representation. At the basis of this mechanism, I argue, stands synonymy 
between the name of the nation “Bulgaria” and the name of the hegemonic ethnic 
group “Bulgarians.” The discourse of national modernity that stems from this 
synonymy supports two intertwined mechanisms of homogenization which are 
implicit in the apparent liberal agenda of Bulgaria as well as other post-1989 Eastern 
European democracies. Robert M. Hayden (1992) names the first mechanism 
“constitutional nationalism;” Katherine Verdery (1998) calls the other one 
“ethnocracy.”  Let me present in brief these two mechanisms, which, in my mind, 
underlie the way both ethnic Bulgarians and Roma have been equating integration 
with assimilation, both during socialism and afterwards. Following this presentation I 
will discuss the two meanings of ethnic recursivity coded in Gypsy kiuchek and how 
assimilation operates as the cultural function erasing this recursivity and 
homogenizing Roma within Bulgarian (ethno)nation.  
Constitutional nationalism  
Hayden analyzes with this concept a systematic conflict within the 
constitutional and legal structures of post-Yugoslavian nation-states between seeming 
recognition of ethnic minority rights but actual privileges for “the members of one 
ethnically defined nation over other residents in a particular state” (1992: 655). What 
is significant in this concept is Hayden’s argument that genocide, ethnic cleansing, 
minority discrimination (“negative action”) and nationalistic chauvinism—the 
infamous manner of implementing ethnic privileges—are not unique to Yugoslavia, 
but common practices of nation-building in Central and Eastern Europe. In other 
words, “nation building” in this part of Europe is a language euphemism of ethnic 
homogenization. Hayden locates the reasons for constitutional nationalism not in 
historical interethnic hostilities but in a contradiction inherent to the modern category 
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of “sovereign nation-state.” This category emerged in Western Europe to denote 
territorial sovereignty—the French definition of jus soli (Brubaker 1992), “a state 
sovereign over all within its boundaries” (Hayden 1992: 670)—replacing pre-modern 
forms of sovereignty that “are based on the duties and obligation of loyalty of 
members of social, religious or ethnic groups to the group and its leaders, regardless 
of where they are found” (ibid). Hayden recognizes that the modern form of territorial 
sovereignty still maintains some links with previous social, ethnic and religious 
loyalties. However, “[w]hile some elements of these distinctions remain in the 
recognition of different rights and obligations for citizens and resident non-citizens 
within the territory of a state, citizenship in the modern conception is a leveling 
category: all citizens are or should be equal” (ibid).  
In Hayden’s view, this leveling category is characteristic to Western European 
liberal thought in which the sovereignty of the nation comes from its being the body 
that unifies and represents the interests of its individual citizens. Central and Eastern 
European political thought, on the other hand, was formed by the alternative German 
concept of modern national sovereignty—jus sanguinis (blood right, [Brubaker 
1992])—which defines the priority of the nation over its citizens. Sovereignty is the 
natural right of the nation based on its being a collective individual—Das Volk 
(Narod in Slavic languages). The citizen is the product of the nation. Personal 
individuality needs to stand in accordance with the defined characteristics of the 
national collective: a single language, a single culture, a single heritage and a single 
interest. Constitutional nationalism structures politics as the arena for realizing these 
characteristics. Hayden argues that, in practice, national politics is the mechanism that 
homogenizes the multiple ethnicities of Central and Eastern European nations in one 
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ethno-nation that is above the rest, discriminating, marginalizing and even excluding 
them.  
Ethnocracy 
Verdery (1998) argues that citizenship and property are two major categories 
through which transnational trends of privatizing “the people”—the social category of 
national belonging—get localized in post-1989 Eastern European democracies. She 
points to a couple of channels that redefine “the people.” Each channel refers to an 
opposite historical-political paradigm but both build on the same tendency in the 
region of basing national identity on one exclusive ethnicity. The first channel 
conveys attempts to repudiate communism by restoring pre-communist manners of 
discrimination between citizens and non-citizens “that coincided with ethnonational 
differences” (ibid: 297). The second channel reinforces communist organization of 
social collectivities around ethnically based reified national consciousness. “This 
consciousness, coupled with general privileging of ‘collective’ ideas, made national 
difference a ready vessel for new political struggles” (ibid).  
Unlike Hayden, Verdery sees these two channels of ethnonational exclusion as 
regionally specific mechanisms of democratic homogenization. She argues that in the 
US, for instance, exclusion works in a different way. The concept of “the people” 
carries a long legacy of excluding persons from the “wrong” sex and race. In post-
1989 Eastern European democracies, Verdery writes, “’…‘people’ connotes the 
sovereignty of an ethnic collectivity rather than the joint sovereignty of individual 
‘social contractors.’ The sovereign thus becomes the ethnic collectivity; democracy 
becomes ethnocracy” (ibid). This mechanism of homogenization entails that 
individual citizens are the property of the nation and not vice versa. The reason is that 
the nation functions as a collective individual; and so property does not define 
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personal space but the spatial extension of persons tied with the nation through 
(ethnic) blood.  
Let me show now how constitutional nationalism and ethnocracy have 
prompted Bulgarians to designate Roma as ethnic shifters of Balkan recursivity. Two 
intertwined anxieties underlie this designation: 1) The state of Roma in Bulgaria is 
analogous to the state of Bulgaria in Europe; and 2) Roma are catalysts of 
“gypsification”—that is, return to the pre-national, multi-ethnic landscape of the 
Ottoman Balkans. These two anxieties give license to official and non-official acts of 
Romani exclusion, such as work discrimination, police harassment, and street 
harassments organized by ethnic Bulgarian hooligans. The two anxieties also key the 
connotation of kiuchek with notions of immorality and danger. These negative values 
come up in the commentary of Veselin Karchinski to Gencho Gaitandzheiv’s 
textbook, which I discussed in chapter 3. Vesko did not see any moral problem with 
including in the textbooks sexually provocative popfolk singers like Kamelia, since 
she was ethnically Bulgarian. On the other hand, he could not tolerate the Romani 
popfolk singer Sofi Marinova, even in an innocent form of a lullaby song. As he said, 
at the bottom line, even the most integrated Gypsy still carries the contaminating 
power of the mangali (the racist synonym of Roma and Gypsy). 
First anxiety: the Balkans to Europe as Gypsies to us 
The film scholar Dina Iordanova (2001) argues that Roma in the Balkans, 
much like the Balkans in Europe, play the role of internal others, i.e. they provide a 
picture of traditional European lifestyle before modernity. Bulgarian as well as Roma 
interlocutors uttered a proverbial analogy “the Balkans to Europe as Gypsies to us” 
with neither ambivalence nor irony, neither self-celebration nor self-affirmation. 
People unequivocally distanced themselves from the stereotypical images associated 
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with the “Gypsy Others.” I witnessed such dynamics when, for instance, I followed 
the popfolk star Bobi to a transnational Balkan music festival. Bobi was very 
condescending toward the Romanian band that performed before him because, in his 
view, they were no real Romanians, but Gypsies.85 Yet he did not deny that most of 
the players in his band also were Roma. He expressed dissatisfaction with this fact 
explaining that he had no choice. In his words, Gypsy musicians were completely 
unreliable but very few Bulgarian musicians could play so well. In any case, to avoid 
confusion, Bobi performed with these Roma instrumentalists onstage but kept a 
distance from them offstage. He also made the effort to deny the widespread rumors 
in Bulgaria that he himself had Gypsy origins. In another case I followed Bobi to a 
gig in a Bulgarian village. Before the show a family of dark-skin Roma (the racial 
allusion of the Gpysy shifter to blackness, more in detail in a moment) approached 
him and asked to take a group picture. I took the opportunity to photograph the 
picture scene. While cooperating with the Roma family, Bobi looked at me and said 
with a big smile: “take our picture, these are my friends, they are Italians.”86 On the 
way out from the village he expressed his frustration with the low technical facilities 
of the show. He said to me, “look at these people, there are no Bulgarians there, they 
are all Gypsies.”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Romanians and Bulgarians tend to disqualify the European quality of each other by pointing to the 
prevalence of Roma in these two countries. Romanian society is bigger and so it has more Roma in 
absolute numbers (over 500,000 vs. less than 400,000 in Bulgaria). On the other hand Roma are greater 
in Bulgaria in relative numbers (around 5% vs. 2.5% in Romania). For data on Bulgaria, see the 2001 
population census held by the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute (“CENSUS 2001 - FINAL 
RESULTS,” The Republic of Bulgaria, National Statistics Institute, accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://www.nsi.bg/Census_e/Census_e.htm). For data on Romania, see the 2002 population census held 
by the Romanian National Institute of Statistics (“Romania Demographics Profile 2013,” Index Mundi, 
last modified August 24, accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://www.indexmundi.com/romania/demographics_profile.html).   
86 This comment alludes ironically to the discourse of blackness in Italian self-imagination; that is, the 
clash between the “white” “civilized” “European” North vs. the “black” “barbarian” “African” South. 
On one occasion I heard a joke from an Italian friend whose family roots were in the south but who 
currently lived in the north. He told me that Garibaldi did a very bad thing; he divided Africa.  
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I heard also on different occasions that popfolk stars are proud when they 
perform to Bulgarian audiences abroad except when such performances take place in 
front of Romani immigrants. In my view, the difference comes from the fact that after 
Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007 many Bulgarians no longer live in Europe as poor 
guest workers as they used to have in the early years after the 1989 fall of socialism. 
Immigrating to Europe is now associated with EU citizenship, that is, mobility and 
opportunity to be part of richer Western Europe (although Bulgarians are still second 
class EU citizens, since Bulgaria [together with Romania which joined the EU in 
2007 as well] is still not part of the Schengen agreement87). Roma are still taken at 
best as poor refugees and at worst as a grave social problem.88  
Second anxiety: Gypsification 
 This anxiety appears in Vesko’s reaction as well as in the protest of parents in 
Stara Zagora against Gencho Gaitandzhiev’s textbook for kindergarten, which 
included a lullaby in Romani and Bulgarian sang by the Romani popfolk singer Sofi 
Marinova. This appearance of a song in Romani language allegedly countered the 
national goal that Roma should quit their ethnic ghettos by assimilating in the 
Bulgarian majority, and so the parents were cited restating expectations of ethnic 
Bulgarian hegemony while asking rhetorically, “are Gypsy children expected to 
integrate in the Bulgarian society or the opposite?” The anxiety of gypsification 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 For the EU’s official Schengen web page, see “Schengen, Borders & Visas,” European Commission, 
last modified January 15, accessed October 25, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/policies/borders/borders_schengen_en.htm. Bulgaria and Romania were scheduled to access the 
Schengen area in 2011, however this deadline is currently postponed indefinitely, see “France: 
Bulgaria, Romania Schengen Entry May Take Years,” novinite.com, February 6, 2011, accessed 
October 25, 2014, http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=124970.  
88 The incident in 2010, in which the French President, Nicola Sarkozy, ordered the expulsion of 
Bulgarian and Romanian Roma immigrants back to their home countries indicates this difference, see, 
see for instance, “Sarkozy Toughens on Illegal Roma,” nytimes.com, July 29, 2010, accessed October 
25, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/30/world/europe/30france.html. 
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affirms also Lemon’s (1995, 2000, 2002a, 2002b) argument that Gypsies and 
Gypsiness function as shifters of race, class, and domestication in European national 
imaginations. Meaning, being Gypsy does not imply necessarily having Gypsy blood, 
but rather maintaining “Gypsy lifestyle” whose actual articulation varies from one 
society to another. Bulgarians tend to speak about the “dangers” of "gypsification” in 
terms of “Gypsy mentality” and “Gypsy psychology.” These terms denote people 
living “like animals,” with no original culture, no social consciousness, and no norms 
of public deliberation. According to this meaning, Gypsies contaminate nation-state 
Bulgaria by maintaining ethnic Balkan social lifestyle, from which ethnic Bulgarians 
have evolved (or which, at least, they have accustomed to deny in speech).  
The root tsigan is a basis of some of the harshest words in colloquial 
Bulgarian, most commonly tsiganiia (transgressive mess), tsiganska rabota (bad job 
or Gypsy affairs), tsiganizatsia (degradation), and tsiganori (a Gypsy-style gang). 
When people want to be really crude, they replace “tsigan” with the highly racist root 
“mangal” (as I showed the previous chapter).89 It is the most blatant shifter of 
blackness as it refers to Gypsies’ stereotype of having dark skin—the “natural” (i.e. 
racial) evidence that they are not organic part of the Bulgarian people (narod) but 
oriental others, i.e. they are not white but black. Metaphorically the marker mangal 
dehumanizes Roma who are black because they are like meat grill (in colloquial 
Bulgarian in some parts of the country as well as in Turkish mangal is also the word 
for barbeque grill). Among the popular inclinations of this root are mangasar and 
mango (even lower synonyms of mangal), mangalska rabota (see, tsiganska rabota), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 The analogy between Gyspiness and blackness works well also in this semantic level. Roma is the 
politically correct equivalent of the identity marker of African-American. Tsigan maintains a vague 
meaning of value, similarly to Black. Mangal is equivalent to Nigger, though it is still less tabooed in 
public than the N word in the US. 
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mangali (see, tsiganori), mangalsko (see, tsiganiia), and bai Mangal (Brother Gypsy, 
the non self-ironic equivalent of Bai Ganio).  
Both tsigan and mangal invoke the stereotype of Gypsies as marginal people 
living in a poor mahala, eating low quality kebapche (minced meat balls), drinking 
cheap homemade rakiia, and dancing to kiuchek tunes. Instead of cars they drive 
carriages pulled by beaten down horses and live either from street cleaning, illegal 
fruit and vegetable vending, selling of items collected from garbage cans, or, in the 
worst case, from smalltime stealing, cheating, prostitution, etc. Bulgarians claim that 
Gypsies are anti-social because in addition to not paying taxes and bills, they do not 
send their children to school, and do not maintain basic private or public hygiene. 
Their life expectancy is low, women get married extremely young and give birth 
often. Children continue the line of misery by growing up neglected.90 Politically, 
Bulgarians express fears of gypsification when criticizing the social reality of post-
socialist democracy and capitalism. Invoking stereotypical images of Gypsies, people 
complain that EU-style multi-ethnicity would widen rather than minimize Bulgaria’s 
gap with Europe.   
The image of Roma women surrounded with many children is a common 
signifier of gypsification anxieties, which keys ethnonational identity to demographic 
fear. The growth rate among ethnic Bulgarians has been continuously negative          
(-0.781% is the total national estimation for 2011).91 Ordinary Bulgarian families 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Bulgarians have become increasingly cautious about using the politically correct marker of Roma in 
public. However, utterances in which people mock, derogate, and stigmatize people from this ethnic 
group are still fairly common. See, for instance, a stills collection “Picture collection of Mr. Gypsy” 
that circulates in the Bulgarian public domain: “Колекция От Снимки На Бай,”	  vbox7.com, accessed 
October 25, 2014, 
http://ww.vbox7.com/play:4eee016e. The musical track of the clip is the hit “Bai Mangal” of “the 
Mangasarian Brothers.” This is a comic-musical trio of actors, who comment on Bulgarian social life 
through images of three stereotypical Gypsies called Ziumbiul, Kuliu, and Srebroto. 
91 “Bulgaria Population growth rate,” Index Mundi, accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://www.indexmundi.com/bulgaria/population_growth_rate.html. The population growth rate among 
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consist of one to two children only. Coupled with the emigration of over a million 
Bulgarians since 1989 and an aging population, the negative birth rate is gradually 
changing the ratio between the three main ethnic groups. Meanwhile, the birth rate of 
Roma and Turks rises. In tirades of frustration about the democratic changes, 
informants often concluded that in a few decades there would remain no Bulgarians in 
Bulgaria; the country would turn into a big Gypsy mahala.92  
Gypsification links Roma with social practices of opportunism: bribery, 
corruption, and stealing (as implied in Emel Etem’s opening epigraph). These 
practices are allegedly not limited to Gypsies; people in Bulgaria perceive them as 
regular modes of action in local social life. However, people in Bulgaria refer them to 
Gypsies when criticizing the European ideology of multi-ethnicity, which presumably 
supports elements that undermine modern European values. Bulgarians from different 
ethnic groups, including Roma, accuse Gypsies of expecting the state’s welfare 
system to support their big families. According to such claims, Gypsies can live 
peacefully as social parasites because politicians protect them from being 
disconnected from services in order not to lose the Gypsy electorate. A common 
knowledge in Bulgaria is that the voting turnout in Romani neighborhoods is 
notoriously high, because all the political parties allocate money in their budgets to 
buying Gypsy votes. The responsibility for this practice falls both on Roma and 
Bulgarian politicians. Gypsies are blamed for being ready to be bought for zhŭlti 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ethnic Bulgarians is probably much lower and is balanced by the positive growth rate of Roma and 
Turks. 
92 Bulgarian demographers forecast that in 2050 ethnic Bulgarians will become a minority in Bulgaria. 
The majority will be Roma and the second group Turks (see, “Scientists Raise Alarm over Apocalyptic 
Scenario for Bulgarian Ethnicity,” novinite.com, November 22, 2010, accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=122441). Coincidentally or not, the target year of 2050 
appears also in US demographic studies that forecasts the same fate to non-Hispanic white Americans 
(see “Whites to become minority in U.S. by 2050,” rueters.com, February 12, 2008, accessed October 
25, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/12/us-usa-population-immigration-
idUSN1110177520080212).  
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stotinki (i.e. “pennies”) without taking any responsibility for the consequences of their 
actions. Politicians are blamed for cultivating Gypsy short-term opportunism for their 
own capital.  
The following picture is a stereotypical illustration of the two meanings—“the 
Balkans to Europe as Gypsies to us” and “gypsification:”   
 
 
This Picture circulated widely over the Bulgarian media toward the end of my 
research alongside negative reports about Roma.93 It depicts stereotypical young 
Gypsies (such as dark complexion, wide-open mouth laughter, mahala landscape of 
rundown one story houses), posing to the camera (to the wrong direction, though) 
with beer and kebapches while wearing T-shirts of the Center-Right party “the Blue 
Coalition.” The script on the T-shirts is ironic and central to the two anxieties of 
Balkan ethnicity Gypsies signify. It carries the party’s slogan for the 2009 
parliamentary election: “Bulgaria, This Is You,” which alludes to the widespread fear 
that under the cover of caring about national (i.e. ethnic Bulgarians) interests, all local 
parties buy Romani votes with food, music, and petty cash. This practice is so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 This digital copy is taken from, Блогаът на Атанасов, accessed October 25, 2014, 
http://www.ayanev.com/bulgaria-towa-si-ti-558/.  
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widespread that it includes even parties, such as “the Blue Coalition” that champions 
civil society according to Western European standards. One can link this fear to 
Vesco’s objection to the inclusion of Sofi Marinova in Gaitandzhiev’s textbook 
(chapter 2). His personal experience has taught him that all Bulgarians are prone to 
degrading into Gypsies—the shifters of Balkan ethnic recursivity.   
Assimilation—language mechanism of erasure 
Veselin Karchinksi (chapter 3) was my first guide to the language ideology of 
assimilation when employing Gypsies and kiuchek as shifters of ethnic recursivity. 
Referring to all Roma—integrated tsigani and non-integrated mangali alike—as 
referential indexes (Silverstein 1976) of ethnic backwardness (in distinction from 
authentic peasantry), he negotiated integration in the city by associating formal urban 
speech with nationhood while tying (Gypsy-type) ethnicity with the liminal realm of 
folk intimacy above all Gypsy kiuchek. Throughout my fieldwork I encountered many 
other cases, in which Roma and non-Roma reflected on their social life by associating 
ethnic Gypsiness with kiuchek. My observations of such associations confirm what 
Lemon (1995) argues regarding Russian Roma and Levy claims (2005) regarding 
Bulgarian Roma. That is, the “Gypsy” shifter is an ethnic modification of a larger 
shifter in Western self-imagination: blackness, as an icon of racial recursivity to 
Western imagination of whiteness.  
Neuberger (2004) argues that, since the 19th century and throughout all the 
different political phases, both officially and unofficially, Bulgarian nation builders 
identified ethnic heterogeneity as a major social problem inherited from the Ottoman 
past, which they had to resolve in order to modernize, i.e. to become a European 
nation-state. The socialist regime was the first to propose as a policy of resolving this 
problem by assimilating ethnic minorities in the Bulgarian majority. This policy 
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replaced pre-socialist mechanisms of national homogenization, which mostly worked 
to marginalize ethnic minorities by linking civil and political rights with special 
minority regulations that ostensibly protected religious and linguistic liberties. 
Emigration was the other mechanism of creating a “pure” nation.94 On the language 
level, the objective of ethnic homogenization prompted the formation of standard 
national Bulgarian language by replacing words from languages spoken in the 
Ottoman Empire (mainly Turkish and Greek) with Slavic equivalents. The canonized 
standard Bulgarian is based on the dialect of Gabrovo (central Bulgaria) (Crampton 
2005) and aggregates a few pre-national dialects spoken by Bulgarian intellectuals 
with emphasis on the literati milieu of Veliko Turnovo, the historical medieval capital 
that symbolizes the era of national purity (Videnov 1999).  
The socialist regime operated the language mechanism of ethnic assimilation 
particularly regarding Muslim ethnicities (above all Turks and Roma). Most famous 
are the campaigns of compulsory name change (vŭzroditelen protses, literally the 
“process of revival”), during which Muslim citizens were required under the point of 
the gun to drop Turco-Arabic names and adopt Slavic Bulgarian ones (Neuberger 
2004). The Muslim minority of Pomaks represents an opposite language mechanism 
of de-assimilation. Due to the fact that they are Bulgarian language speakers, the 
regime listed “rescuing” these presumably ethnic Bulgarians from their former forced 
assimilation in Ottoman Islam among its modernization duties. 
Roma informants who lived during socialism related to me memories of how 
the authorities supported the language ideology of assimilation with social policies. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 For aspects about the emergence of national majority-minority relations in Bulgaria, see, for 
instance, Dragostinova (2011), Genov (1928-1929), Ivanova (2002), Nazŭrska (1999), Stoyanov 
(1998). 
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For instance, the state dismantled Romani neighborhoods and camps, relocated Roma 
in apartment buildings together with Bulgarians, enforced national Bulgarian 
education on Romani children, and sent Roma to work in state factories and farms. 
Transformation of their social life was supposed to help Roma to forget their ethnic 
language and speak only Bulgarian. People remembered these moments with 
contradictory feelings. On many occasions, Roma and non-Roma informants talked 
with great fondness about the opportunities the regime opened for Roma to 
modernize, i.e. to become Bulgarians. Non-Roma perceived it as the most rational and 
most effective way to bring this minority to the modern era. Roma used to add that 
forced assimilation opened for them a channel of changing the “Gypsy fate” of 
marginality and poverty.  
Roma could presumably become Bulgarians from Romani origins since 
Bulgarian nationhood (narodnost) was officially formulated in terms of class rather 
than of ethnos (although the categories of language and religion were implicated in 
the concept of modern Bulgarian nationhood). This channel of assimilation was 
supported with valuable resources traditionally out of Roma reach: formal education, 
modern housing, and organized employment. Of course, people admitted that the 
social reality of socialist Bulgaria was much more complex. Many Roma lived in 
ghettos and suffered racism also under socialism. On the cultural level, Romani 
traditions were never included in the canon of Bulgarian national folklore. Especially 
Romani music was classified as chalgiia, which indexes the ethnically heterogeneous 
soundscape of the pre-national Ottoman society (e.g. Buchanan 2006). 
Informants explained the failure of the assimilation policy to integrate Roma 
completely partly due to the overall failure of the regime to materialize socialism, and 
partly due to the “natural” backwardness of Gypsies who failed to integrate even 
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when it was forced on them. I learned that the fond memory of forced assimilation is 
what has prompted Roma to be an electoral powerbase of the Bulgarian Socialist 
(former Communist) Party. 
Intellectuals were those who took the role of implementing the language 
mechanism of assimilation in national public discourse. Within this project, 
musicologists coded folklore, pop, and rock as the musical meeting points between 
assimilation and more abstract modern values of rationality, purity, and deliberation. 
Carol Silverman (1996: 238) illuminates the manner of ethnic cleansing inherent in 
musical assimilation. She reports that in 1985 the Bulgarian authorities forbade 
musicians to perform with zurna (a “Gypsy” keyless oboe) in the annual Pirin Folk 
music festival (southwestern Bulgaria, a region in which Romani zurna is an 
important component of local vernacular dances). As a result, Romani 
instrumentalists in the festival were forced to perform on stage with svirki (Bulgarian 
shepherd flutes). They dropped svirki and played again with zurna after the show, 
when the players played offstage in a meadow above the festival. Finally the police 
came, chased them away, and restored public order. The chalga boom of the transition 
era (and songs which emphasize kiuchek) indicates the crisis of musical assimilation: 
cultural performance of ethnicity has become highly popular whereas political 
performance of ethnicity is still tightly controlled. One can enjoy Gypsy kiuchek in 
public, however in order to earn political legitimacy one needs to denounce its 
modern value. Silverman (ibid) concludes that this conflict encapsulates the paradox 
of Roma in the Balkans; their musical prominence fosters their political invisibility.   
The realm of parliamentary politics is reminiscent of the language ideology of 
assimilation in the official national life of EU-member Bulgaria. The 1991 
constitution forbids Bulgarian parties to run under an explicit ethnic banner. The law 
	   303	  
requires all political organizations to tailor their platform to the general national 
electorate. Minister Etem, for instance, was a member of “the Movement for Rights 
and Freedoms” (Dvizhenie za pravа i svobodi). Officially, the party addresses the 
public in Bulgarian language and gears its platform to general national issues. 
However, the political arena in Bulgaria takes this party as the unofficial 
representative of the ethnic Turkish minority with aspiration to represent all Muslim 
ethnicities in Bulgaria. Ahmet Dogan, the founder of MRF, used to challenge “the 
Bulgarian ethnic model” by pointing with hints to the mechanisms of constitutional 
nationalism and ethnocracy—coding ethnic Bulgarian hegemony in the ideological 
formulation of Bulgarian nation. I witnessed him commenting once in TV interviews 
that his party was ethnic Turkish in the same manner that Boiko Borisov’s “Citizens 
for European Development in Bulgaria” (Grazhdani za Evropeisko razvitie v 
Bŭlgaria) was an ethnic Bulgarian party, because its center-right platform attracted 
the ethnic Bulgarian electorate. 
Poetics of Gypsy speech 
Proficiency either in standard Bulgarian or in regional (rather than ethnic) 
dialects is a prominent non-official index of erasing the Gypsy shifter of recursivity 
with the mechanism of assimilation. Roma distance themselves from Gypsy 
stereotypes by showing ability to use Slavic instead of Turkish-derived vocabulary 
and emphasize frontal instead of back throat pronunciation (both features index 
modern Europe vs. the Muslim Orient). Teaching Bulgarian language to Romani 
children is a national enterprise that aims at releasing children from the ethnic ghettos 
and their perceived culture of backwardness. Let me expand briefly on this last point 
with a brief example of Andrey, a Romani singer whom I met in Romfest 2008.  
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Andrey lived in a small town in Western Bulgaria nearby the Serbian border. 
He was my roommate during the festival days, which provided me with an 
opportunity to hear his impressions about playing the role of Gypsy kiuchek musician. 
He told me that he had very little opportunities to speak his ethnic language as a child. 
There were only four Romani families in his native town. His parents also raised him 
to be a Bulgarian rather than a Romani. As a result, Romani was for him only a 
singing language. He could understand it but could not really speak it. It felt 
completely artificial for him.  
Andrey mocked Roma who claimed being assimilated, but made the effort to 
speak Romani with each other. They looked pathetic to him. He claimed that there 
was no need to preserve this language, because he and all the other Roma at the 
festival were Bulgarian citizens living in a Bulgarian speaking society. He expressed 
pride that he and his wife built a Bulgarian-style family. They had only one child, not 
many children like “Gypsies from the ghetto” (mahlenski tsigani). He expressed pride 
also that he managed to cut his daughter off Romani language altogether. She also did 
not live among Roma, had an engineering degree, was married to a Bulgarian-Turk 
and lived with her family in a modern neighborhood in a town on the Black Sea coast. 
Andrey took it as a matter of fact that ethnic Turks were more modern than Roma, 
because (in his mind) they were related to another ethno-nation: the Turkish Republic. 
He admitted that at the beginning of their relationship, the family of his daughter’s 
husband did not receive positively her Gypsy background. However, the fact that she 
had formal education and spoke Bulgarian as her only native tongue prompted the 
husband’s family to embrace her.  
The tie between Gypsiness and blackness came up a few times in our 
conversations. Andrey was proud that his daughter did not look Gypsy at all because 
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she had very light skin. He testified that many people did not believe him that he was 
not ethnic Bulgarian because he had lighter complexion than ordinary Gypsies. He 
admitted that he also had dark skin, but claimed that his complexion was moderately 
dark, not the very dark one that, in his words, was uniquely Gypsy.  
On one occasion, Andrey linked darkness with “Gypsy speech” when pointing 
to a young big dark skinned Romani man, who came to the festival with a big 
assembly including his wife and children. This guy was for him, as the Bulgarian 
proverb goes, “like a thorn in the eyes” (kato trŭn v ochite). He especially was 
repulsed by “the heavy Gypsy accent” with which that guy spoke Bulgarian. For him, 
that guy spoke Bulgarian like in the mahala. Ghetto Gypsies, he said with disgust, 
cannot say hliab (bread). They say instead hleb.95 Also he said that the most common 
consonant in their speech was x (like in Spanish Xavier). What he meant was that 
stereotypical Gypsies pronounced x from the throat unlike the standard Bulgarian x 
which is closer to the English “h;” it is produced by a blow of air between the back of 
the tongue that is positioned in close proximity with the soft palate. To demonstrate 
how ugly this consonant was, Andrey grimaced and yelled with a hoarse voice “x, x, 
x, x.” Above all he hated what he called “gypsy laughter.” It sounded to him like an 
explosion of x, “xa, xa, xa, xa, xa.”  
Andrey performed modern face by describing himself not as a Gypsy 
assimilated in Bulgaria but as a Bulgarian assimilated in Europe. He boasted that his 
CDs were recorded in the same studios in which the Bulgarian Estrada star Silvia 
Katsarova recorded her albums. This ethnic Turkish singer is an emblem of socialist 
assimilation. She was born as Silver Nuri and changed it to a Bulgarian name during 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Replacement of the standard vowel ia (я) with e is actually very common in western Bulgarian 
dialects close to the border with Serbia and FYR Macedonia. Especially old people in these dialectical 
regions (including in the capital of Sofia) tend to say also presen rather than priasen (fresh), nema 
rather than niama (there is not, or, I will not), and mleko rather than mliako (milk).  
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the “process of revival.” On many occasions she expresses her negative opinion of 
kiuchek and chalga. Andrey shared with me a point of superiority over Silvia 
Katsarova. He stressed that his CDs were not distributed to the Bulgarian market at 
all; they were sold only in Western Europe. On one occasion he pointed to the hotel’s 
ceiling to show me a mark of a shoe sole. He said with disgust that Bulgarians 
derogate Gypsies, but they themselves are equally prostatsi (simpleminded, brute). 
They cannot be in a public space without vandalizing it.  
Andrey was particularly proud in his regional western Bulgarian dialect, 
which, in his mind, was closer to the eastern Serbian dialect than to standard 
Bulgarian. He saw his dialect as an indication that his cultural influence came from 
Serbia, the western neighbor Bulgarians hold as more modern European than their 
country (Mishkova 2006). Reiterating the local dialect taxonomy, he identified the 
“hard” accent of western Bulgarian/eastern Serbian as more sophisticated and 
cosmopolitan than the “soft” accent of eastern Bulgarian dialects, which are 
considered provincial. He also saw greater sophistication in the Serbian accentuation 
of words mutual to both languages. This accentuation oftentimes falls one syllable 
before the accentuation of standard Bulgarian—godina vs. godina (year), voda vs. 
voda (water), zashto vs. zashto (why) etc.  
Formal multi-ethnicity vs. informal assimilation 
As I mentioned above, EU-member Bulgaria has abandoned assimilation and 
adopted the language ideology of multiculturalism and multi-ethnicity (titled locally 
as “the Bulgarian ethnic model”). That said, utterances of assimilation have not 
disappeared but have become more implicit and limited to informal settings in which 
people could feel safe to digress from the language etiquette of political correctness. 
Identity markers of “Roma” and “Gypsies” are prominent manners of switching 
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between the official language ideology of multi-ethnicity and the informal one of 
assimilation (i.e. constitutional nationalism and ethnonation). For instance, when 
talking about this minority group with my ethnic Bulgarian informants, I sensed that 
people took the license to switch to referring to Gypsies (Tsigani) rather than to Roma 
in a similar manner to the unwritten rule of switching from Vie to ti (formal vs. 
informal second person, equivalent to the German Sie and du). People were usually 
careful to talk about Roma (Romi, the plural form) at the beginning of the 
conversation when we still addressed each other with Vie. The transition usually took 
place with an apology that that the etiquette of relating to “Roma” felt artificial to 
them. In this context, “Roma” indexes recognition in the collective identity of this 
ethnic group; “Gypsies” indexed denigration of this minority that would prefer to 
lead, as I was oftentimes told, “rather miserable life with their ethnic kin in the ghetto 
to assimilating in the modern society.” 
I encountered many instances during the festival in which ethnic Roma 
switched between references to “Roma” and “Gypsies.” Just as my roommate Andrey, 
people identified themselves as “Roma” in official communications, in which they 
attempted to perform assimilation within the Bulgarian ethnonation. They called 
themselves “Gypsies,” on the other hand, in intimate communications, when relating 
to each other as ethnic kin. I even once witnessed Andrey doing so, when he was in a 
very chilled out mood and sat by the table surrounded by other assimilated Roma 
from his generation. Romani informants shifted back and forth to the ethnic Bulgarian 
manner of code switching. They used “Gypsies” to distance themselves from their 
own minority identity and take the point of view of national Bulgarians, who either 
perform assimilation in manners they see as modern European or retreat to folk 
intimacy. Meanwhile participants in Romfest related to themselves as “Roma” to fit 
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with the multi-ethnic politically correctness code of EU-member citizens. Let me 
present a few examples. 
“Are you an author or a Tsiganka (Gypsy woman)?”  
The festival’s official guests stayed in a hotel that was located at a mineral 
baths resort on one of the hills outside the city. The resort was fairly empty at that 
time. The hotel also seemed to have no other guests except us. Spending the time 
before the evening concerts at the hotel restaurant, people retreated from their official 
assimilated face to creating informal zone of ethnic intimacy, that is, the Gypsy 
ghetto. They did so by exchanging utterance of “reappropriation of ethnic epithets, 
such as the cases of African American ‘nigger’ (Kennedy 2002) and Asian American 
‘chink’ (Reyes 2007), as a solidarity term under certain interactional conditions” 
(Reyes 2009: 44). Those utterances of intimacy guided me to the discursive field of 
recursive ethnicity that gypsy epithets signify. 
I heard utterances that affirmed Emel Etem’s implied references to Gypsy 
opportunism and self-indulgence, such as Roma telling to each other “a person is an 
authentic Gypsy when he lies, steals, and takes but never gives,” “a Gypsy who 
doesn’t lie isn’t a Gypsy,” and “Gypsy and word of honor are a contradiction.” People 
linked such ethical pejoratives to aesthetical indices of recursivity, like values of color 
combination. When commenting on the printed portfolio of the festival one organizer 
gave an ironic compliment to the color choice. He said that the cover of the portfolio 
was “very colorful, very Gypsy.” The line of irony alluded to the stereotype of 
“Gypsy kitsch”—mishmash of noisy colors.96 The idiomatic term of such mishmash 
is shareniia, which is an antonym of sharenina—“tasteful” (i.e. modern) colorfulness.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 In chapter 2, I discussed an incident between Gencho Gaitandzhiev’s classmate and the art teacher 
about the combination of green and blue, which are the colors of the Romani flag. 
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Both words are derived from the same root: sharen—mixed, colorful. The 
different suffixes index the opposite value judgment: –ina connotes with the 
“authentic” Slavic basis of Bulgarian. As I wrote in regard to folkadzhiia and chalgiia 
(chapter 1), the suffix iia connotes with the “foreign” linguistic presence of Turkish, 
since this Arabic-derived suffix is prevalent in the Ottoman language. The lexicon of 
Gypsy pejorative is saturated with iia suffixes such as tsiganiia (Gpysy-style mess), 
kiuchtsiia (dancing like Gypsy kiuchek) and kebapchiia (Gypsy-style BBQ meal). The 
discursive ties between ethnic and peasant backwardness is evident in the usage of 
this suffix also to village pejoratives, such as seleniia (peasant-style practices and 
landscape), grozotiia (peasant-style ugliness) and the harsh derogation of prostotiia 
(peasant simplemindedness).  
A group of Romani activists with whom I had lunch accepted me “as one of 
them” with another Gypsy pejorative about “improper” mixing, this time of alcohols. 
Before ordering our food we drank rakiia as an aperitif (a common practice in 
Bulgaria). Afterwards I ordered beer with my food. Before we ate, though, one of the 
people at the table took out a bottle of whiskey and invited everybody to have a toast. 
When people saw that I could handle the alcohol diversity without a problem, 
someone mentioned with satisfaction that I had a Gypsy drinking taste.  
Another way of communication ethnic intimacy was by dissing playfully each 
other’s assimilated face. For instance, people mocked each other in regard to 
confusing between crude material and contemplative interests. On one occasion, I sat 
in the hotel’s restaurant at table with a few Roma rights activists. We passed between 
us a newly published book about contemporary Bulgarian folklore music. Each 
person at the table took the book, opened it, browsed it quickly, and handed it to the 
next person. When the copy arrived to one woman at the table, another person told 
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her, “leave it, it’s not for you, it’s not for eating.” The woman did not seem offended. 
She replied immediately with a rhetorical question: “can a Gypsy value something 
that is not for eating?” What attracted my attention to this short teasing exchange was 
the visual look of that woman, which affirmed the stereotype of a Gypsy woman from 
the mahala. I saw her during the opening day of the festival and thought that she was 
a cleaning lady at the hotel. She was very dark, short, and fat. Her facial expression 
signaled to me a common physical outlook of a drained middle aged poor woman. 
Only later I learned that this woman was actually a well-known literary author. 
Admittedly, I was ashamed of my own racist prejudice when I understood who this 
person was. Nevertheless, the first time I learned about this woman’s status was when 
one of the Romani-activists teased her by asking “are you an author or tsiganka 
(gypsy woman)?”  
With your stones, at your garden (s tvoite kamani, po tvoiata gradina) 
Addressing epithets of ethnic recursivity back at offenders (according to the 
Bulgarian proverb at the title of the section) was another way by which Roma 
participants in the festival reclaimed their modern (assimilated) face. A few weeks 
before the opening of the event, the organizing body of the festival held a press 
conference, during which he took the opportunity to protest against the decision of 
Minister Etem to deprive the festival from state funding. In his speech, Kracholov 
related to another version of Etem’s comments in which she also associated the 
festival with the kebapche (minced meat ball)—the stereotypical culinary icon of 
Gypsiness. His announcement to the journalists disclaimed Etem’s assimilated face by 
provoking nationalistic anti-Turkish sentiments: “and we have information that Emel 
Etem dances kiuchek and eats kebapcheta (the plural of kebapche, e.l) during the 
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Festival of Sacrifice (in Bulgarian and Turkish, Koç bayram e.l.),97 but we do not 
comment on her behavior.”  
Kracholov’s rhetoric threw back at Etem also the implicit line of opportunism, 
which she addressed at the organizers of the festival. Portraying this minister as if she 
was celebrating her Muslim religion in secret in the same oriental ethnic manner (i.e 
with kiuchek and kebapche) invoked claims by nationalist Bulgarians that “Movement 
of Right and Freedoms” (Etem’s party) and particularly its patriarchal leader Ahmet 
Dogan were making political capital by expressing loyalty to Bulgaria while seeking 
patronage from their “real” ethnonation: Turkey.  
I encountered Christian Roma who performed assimilated face by directing 
anti-Turkish nationalist prejudices against Muslim Roma at the festival, who spoke 
Turkish rather than Bulgarian or Romani. In one case, one of the organizers 
approached a group of young Muslim Roma who sat outside the hotel and talked 
between themselves in Turkish. He demanded (in Bulgarian) that in the premises of 
Romfest they should make the effort at least to speak Tsiganski (in Bulgarian, the 
Romani language). Then he turned to the table at which I sat and complained that 
Turkish has become an acute problem in the Stara Zagora region. Too many Roma 
prefered to communicate in the language of the major ethnic minority (Turks) rather 
than in Romani or Bulgarian. 
His complaint resonated with other cases in which Roma activists told me 
with anger that in many places in Bulgaria Muslim Roma were betraying their own 
ethnic group by identifying themselves as Turks in order to enjoy the patronage of 
MRF. I wondered in front of one Romani activist why doing that was so bad. Allying 
with this party was pragmatically a smart move, because, unlike Romani parties that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 In Arabic ‘Idu l-‘Adha, in Turkish Kurban bayramı. 
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have been completely insignificant, MRF was the third political power in the 
Bulgarian parliament and a frequent member in both rightwing and leftwing coalitions 
(MRF was in the opposition only during Boiko Borisov’s government, 2009-2013). 
This informant replied that an alliance with MRF affirmed the bad image of Roma in 
Bulgaria: being ready to surrender opportunistically to whoever pays them more, even 
to the Turks.  
The oxymoron of modern Romani ethnicity 
Kracholov and the ethnic Romani organizing partners could not escape the 
fact that Emel Etem was actually right. The festival stage performance indeed 
consisted of kiuchek and a cloud of smoke from kebapche BBQ stands indeed 
surrounded the open-air amphitheater. In their mind, there was no choice; that was the 
only way they could attract large audience to the festival. Lozanka Peicheva, a leading 
ethnomusicologist and advocate of Bulgarian Romani music, reacted to Emel Etem’s 
blames with frustration, “why can’t we just finally accept that kiuchek and kebapche 
are a legitimate part of our national culture?” But her question received no reply. I 
sensed that, unlike Peicheva who is ethnic Bulgarian, the Romani organizers had no 
other way of changing the meaning-bearing function (Urban 1993) of the Gypsy 
discourse. No one around could imagine the cultural ethnic trademark of Roma free of 
associations of Balkan recursivity. That was one of the strongest moments in which I 
realized that, despite the official rhetoric of multi-ethnicity, Roma had no other way 
of imagining themselves as equal to Bulgarians except through the cultural function 
of ethnicity in the national discourse: ghettoization (recursivity) or assimilation 
(erasure).  
One middleaged Romani intellectual whom I met at the festival explained to 
me the problem of trying to perform modern Romani identity alternative to 
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assimilation. He himself testified that he was divided between what he saw as his 
ethnic and modern identities. He remembered how as a child, during the socialist era, 
he had to walk everyday a very long way from his home in a big urban mahala to the 
nearby school. For him, the physical distance symbolized eminently the cultural 
distance he had to travel. He managed to minimize both distances as an adult by 
coming back to organize educational and cultural activities in his mahala. He saw his 
role as a cultural mediator of the Bulgarian nation-state to his fellow Roma. He also 
represented Roma issues vis-à-vis the Bulgarian nation-state. His goal was to unite 
these two social spheres by building a modern Romani public within the Bulgarian 
nation. He admitted though that this goal was impractical. Nobody around could 
understand what Romani public really meant. He kept pursing this goal for his own 
peace of mind, in order not to give up either his ethnic or intellectual footings. 
To explain further why he took this choice, this activist related to me a story 
about one of his Romani classmates, who, like him, took the challenge of travelling 
the road from the mahala to school. This friend did not manage to resolve the division 
between his Romani ethnicity and Bulgarian nationality. As an adult, he left the 
mahala, married a Bulgarian woman and moved to live an assimilated life. At the 
same time, he also tried to hold to his Romani identity, but tried to combine the two 
social environments. He ended up in an awkward situation. People kept relating to 
him as a Gypsy in his Bulgarian environment. At the same time, people did not 
recognize him any more as one of them in his Romani environment. They looked at 
him as if he had abandoned his roots. Consequently, this former classmate felt 
dissonance both from his Bulgarian and Romani contexts. He closed down within 
himself and lived emotionally as if he was on a lonely island. Reflecting on his and 
his former classmate’s life experience, this Roma-rights activist concluded that Roma 
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were so strongly connoted in Bulgaria with ethnic segregation that neither ethnic 
Bulgarians nor Roma could imagine the latter being a positive component within the 
Bulgarian public. For Bulgarians and Roma alike, he concluded, Gypsies and public 
are an oxymoron.  
High vs. low kiuchek 
Kracholov and his Romani partners proposed a generic framing of the festival, 
which, for me, resonated with the distinction Veselin Karchinski made in the previous 
chapter between integrated tsigani and ghettoized mangali. In the same manner of 
utterning distinction between sharenina and shareniia, the organizers insisted that the 
festival was intended to give stage only to “high” kiuchek, which they perceived as 
artistic, elegant and pure, not “low” kiuchek, which they saw as a crude and dirty 
musical mishmash. Tracing specific elaborations on this distinction, I understood that 
in “high” kiuchek people heard ethnic sound that sounded just like socialist 
modernized folklore (obrabotka, see chapter 2). This music could be played on the 
national radio and television without invoking stereotypes of tsiganiia. People pointed 
to Andzhelo Malikov, the late Romani composer and musician, as the emblematic 
representative of “high” kiuchek. His tunes combined ethnic Romani and Bulgarian 
folklore musical idioms as well as classical music harmonization; they were hence 
ready for homogenization in the canon of Bulgarian modern music.98  
While people expressed reverence to Malikov, who was a senior member of 
Romfest’s musical jury, none of the performers on stage played the sort of kiuchek he 
advocated. Interestingly, an authoritative musical figure (from ethnic Bulgarian 
origins) and a close friend of Malikov, complained to me once that his music was too 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 See for instance,	  “Anjelo Malikov - Romska muzika,” accessed October 25, 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ITyWDq2Pjj8; “Анжело Маликов Ансамбъл - Снощи Минах 
Покрай Вас (Angelo Malikov Ensemble - Snosti Minah Pokray Vas),”	  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5AdtvBuxUhQ.  
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removed from the “real” or “authentic” (i.e. Balkan-oriental) kiuchek. Malikov’s 
attempts to cleanse Romani music from its ethnic sounds resembled to this informant 
the failed project of the Turkish government in the 1970s to produce a high form of 
arabesk music. In Turkey this project was called “arabesk with no pain” (acısız 
arabesk, e.g. Stokes 1993) to denote that this music had some affinity with oriental 
sounds but, at the same time, was modern. This engineered form was free of the 
groove of pain which Turks associate stereotypically with non-modern defeatism and 
fatalism. His critique resonated to me with the title Lozanka Peicheva (1999) gave to 
her monograph about Romani musicians in Bulgaria: “The soul is crying, a song is 
coming  out” (Dushata plache, pesen izliza). Maybe this lack of pain grooves is also 
the reason why Malikov’s high kiuchek never gained wide popularity in Bulgaria.  
Andrey described the high quality his performance of kiuchek with more 
pragmatic terms. He stressed that people in his hometown regarded him as a 
cultivated and acclaimed singer because he did not sing for whomever threw some 
money at him. He worked as the house singer of an establishment, which was a decent 
restaurant, not a place of tsiganiia. Gypsies were not even allowed to enter this 
restaurant, he stated with pride. I took Andrey’s invitation and visited once the 
restaurant where he performed. It was really a very elegant place, locally known for 
having “Serbian BBQ” (Srŭbska skara)—a meat menu Bulgarians consider higher 
quality compared to the Bulgarian grilling menu. Andrey performed in the restaurant 
traditional Romani songs in addition to a repertoire of Bulgarian popfolk and Serbian 
turbo-folk hits. He introduced us to his colleagues at the restaurant as his special 
friends from Sofia. 
During the preparation meetings of the festival, I encountered similar attempts 
to frame the stage performance as high kiuchek with indices of assimilation that 
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revolved around economy and style. People in the organizing group—all of them 
middle-aged Roma who considered themselves assimilated —spoke about music as a 
cultural medium for national dialogue in which Roma could equally experience 
themselves as modern Europeans. To accomplish this goal they agreed that the 
festival should celebrate Romani music and dance respectfully without digressing into 
a manifestation of kiuchetsiia. At the formal organizational meeting of the festival’s 
opening day, Aleksandar Kracholov himself took the opportunity to state that he did 
not intend Romfest to promote commercial Romani bands. His concern came from the 
fact that kiuchek musicians made their living from commissioned gigs in private and 
communal events. His idea was to create a cultural event that would celebrate what he 
saw as authentic Romani music and dance tradition. He did not specify what he meant 
by authentic tradition except making verbal distinction between low and high kiuchek, 
that is, between music that connotes with stereotypes of Gypsiness vs. music that is 
free of such connotations.  
Conflicts between the individual goal function of gathering Roma at the 
festival with low kiuchek and the cultural goal of fitting with the discourse of 
assimilation (with high kiuchek) appeared when the participants in the organizational 
meeting went over the list of performers. People were asked to justify the rationale 
behind the predominance of low kiuchek performers on the list. One organizer asked 
why the singer Dzhago was placed lower in the order of singers, while the popfolk 
star Toni Storaro was placed as the festival’s special guest. One of the organizers 
answered that he himself prefers Dzhago to Toni Storaro. He reminded that Dzhago 
was after all acclaimed as “the Gypsy Pavarotti” (i.e. a replica or derivative of a 
Western European model, see chapter 1). But there is nothing to do, he sighed, 
mangalite (plural of mangal) “love stupid music;” they prefer commercial popfolk to 
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high Romani kiuchek. All the participants in the room laughed but agreed with this 
harsh statement. On the other hand, both at that meeting as well as on different 
occasions, organizers expressed pride that popfolk stars from Romani origins made 
the initial steps of their career on Romfest’s stage, above all, Sofi Marinova whose 
presence in one of Gaitandziev’s textbook stood at the center of parents’ protests. 
Kracholov himself expressed great pride that he managed to bring such a great star 
like Toni Storaro to perform at Romfest. He took care to guard personally the room in 
which Storaro waited for his turn to perform. He also asked me to take his pictures 
standing alongside this popfolk star together onstage.  
 Between the stage and audience 
Drawing or eliminating borders between the stage and the audience was 
another marker through which participants in the festival both aligned with and 
distanced themselves from the of stereotype of Gypsy ethnicity (i.e. tsiganiia). More 
idiomatically, Roma participants in Romfest could not deny that they were Gypsies 
(tsigani); this identity and its associated stereotypes affected the setting of the onstage 
performance. However, in order to be able to resist this role and its recursive 
connotations, many performers were cautious not to be caught performing tsiganiia 
offstage. Caution was supposed to signal that despite being Gypsy musicians, 
performers were still modern Bulgarians. 
A long sign hanging along the front edge of the stage provided modern 
framing. The sign announced with big green letters (green is the traditional color of 
Roma): “XVI National Festival of Romani Music and Songs Stara Zagora 2008.” An 
additional sign at the back of the stage listed with green letters as well the names of 
the festival’s sponsors: “The City of Stara Zagora, The Ministry of Culture, The 
ministry of Labor and Welfare, Open Society—Budapest.” The formal organization 
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of the evening concerts did not designate a strict division between the stage and the 
audience. Nevertheless the physical space suggested this division. The concerts were 
held in an open-air amphitheater that was built on the slope of a hill. Long rows of 
seats were located on the upper part of the slope. People sat on rusty metal seat bases; 
the seats that used to be attached to the bases were torn away. The rustiness on the 
seat bases and the fact that no seats remained unbroken are typical markers of the 
public landscape of post-socialist Bulgaria.99 The stage was located at the bottom of 
the slope. The amphitheater was surrounded with a high fence. There were three 
entrance points, at the bottom behind the stage and from the lower two sides of the 
audience section.  
 
Fig. 5—The lower part of the open-air amphitheater in Stara Zagora, picture: 
Eran Livni 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Oftentimes, when people express nostalgia to socialism and frustration with democracy, they 
describe how well maintained the public space was back then and how neglected it is now. I often 
heard how during socialism municipality workers used to clean the street with water and soap every 
night. “After democracy came” (as the popular refrain goes), streets became filthy, run down, and filled 
with garbage. The conclusion was that then there was modern order in Bulgaria, now there is only 
Balkan chaos. 
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The opening part of the first evening keyed the frame of the festival to 
assimilation. Meaning, no ethnic markers were presented on stage during the opening 
ceremony. Official speeches were delivered by Aleksandar Karcholov, the festival’s 
director, Prof. Svetlin Tanchev, the mayor of Stara Zagora, and Rumyan Russinov, a 
prominent Roma-rights activist, who is an advisor on Roma issues to the Bulgarian 
president and the vice Director of the Budapest-based Roma Participation Program of 
the Open Society Institute. The three speakers wore formal suits and ties. In their 
speeches they praised Roma culture. The three officials went offstage at the end of 
their speeches and moved to sit alongside with other official guests at an improvised 
VIP section that was designated with a yellow tape at the upper part of the 
amphitheater. The festival’s VIPs, though, sat on the same rusty metal bases as the 
rest of the audience. In the following morning (after the opening concerts) a few of 
the festival’s organizers discussed the reason why the city mayor spoke so much in 
favor of Roma. One person assumed that the mayor addressed the Romani electorate 
of the city. A second person dismissed this claim insisting that the mayor was a true 
(but closet) kiuchek fan. He claimed that he saw the mayor drumming with his fingers 
on his legs when listening to the music performed onstage. 
The end of the speeches part signaled the shifting of the stage performance to 
the performance of Gypsiness. The Bulgarian folklorist and ethnomusicologist 
Ventsislav Dimov has been serving for many years as the festival’s host. After the 
three speakers and all other official guests left the stage, he turned to the audience and 
shouted excitedly: “do you want more kiuchetsi (the plural of kiuchek e.l.)?” The 
audience shouted back “yes!” Dimov introduced the first band, which began to play. 
People from the audience, in response, got up from their seats and started dancing.   
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In the absence of strict division between the stage and the audience, people 
from the audience could go on stage and dance in the middle of musical numbers. 
People also gathered to observe the performances at the back of the stage. Singers 
went down from the stage and sang while hugging and taking pictures with people in 
the audience. There were people who sat and observed the show but many others 
walked, talked to each other, danced, smoked, drank, and ate. Throughout the 
concerts there was a continuous flow of people into and out of the amphitheater. 
There was also no special dress code. People came with festive clothes, others with 
casual ones, poor people with torn and worn out clothes, and others (particularly the 
official guests) with formal suits. Young men took off their shirts and remained half 
naked. There was no characteristic of age or gender. People came with their families, 
others in groups of peers, from young children to old people. A small group of 
transgendered women attracted the audience’s attention. In a few cases, these women 
stood on their seats and danced to the music on stage. In such moments, the focus of 
the performance shifted from the stage to the audience that congregated around these 
concert spectators who momentarily formed an alternative stage performance.  
Due to the absence of dressing rooms and backstage space in the amphitheater, 
performers sat with the audience before and after their musical numbers. Additionally, 
performers either changed from casual to stage clothes in front of the audience or 
came already with stage clothes and remained with them throughout the entire 
evening. A few of the celebrity singers, who performed in Romfest’s third and 
conclusive night, avoided sitting with the crowd. They either sat slightly away from 
the stage or came shortly before their number and left immediately afterwards. Only 
Toni Storaro, the guest popfolk star, had the privilege of having a separate space for 
himself. The organizers designated for him a small room at the back of the stage, 
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which had no ventilation, no electricity, and nothing that could offer him the 
convenience of a star. As the main performer of the closing evening he sat on a simple 
chair and waited for his number. As I wrote earlier, Mr. Kracholov himself stood at 
the entrance of the room. Only with his approval people could enter and take pictures 
with Toni Storaro.  
Only once I observed people who drew a strict borderline between performers 
and the audience. A couple of adults led a children dance ensemble consisting of 
about twenty girls and a few boys. The age of the children ranged from elementary to 
middle school. This ensemble, just as many of the amateur musical bands that 
performed in the three competition evenings, represented a Romani cultural center 
(chitalishte) from an urban Roma neighborhood. Throughout the event the children 
sat together with the audience, already dressed with their dancing clothes. The boys 
wore black pants and white shirts. The girls were dressed as harem-style belly 
dancers; that is, semi-transparent scarves that covered the girls’ breasts, hips, and the 
upper part of the legs. There was no unified design for the scarves; few were more 
exposing, others covered most of the girls’ body. The dominant color was red and 
black. Other girls also wore pink, purple, turquoise, white, and blue cloths. Most of 
them tied black bandanas around their hips. The bellies and the upper part of the girls’ 
breasts were exposed. The scarves were knit with golden coins all over.100 While on 
stage the children performed gender stereotypes associated with Gypsy kiuchek in 
which dancing girls and young women are objects of male’s sexual desires. Offstage 
the ensemble was guarded not to intermingle with the audience and especially not to 
dance to the music performed on stage. Whenever children stood up to dance, one of 
the adults came and commanded them sharply to sit down, to behave properly, that is, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Lemon (2000: 70) writes that in Russia, and more generally, in Europe, wearing money indexes 
“oriental” lifestyle identified with ethnic clinging to clan life and cultural backwardness.  
	   322	  
to not to join the other local Romani children who danced in front of, in the sides of, 
and on the stage. 
A short encounter revealed to me how people in the audience distanced 
themselves from the performance of tsiganiia on stage. While walking and taking 
pictures of the concert site I observed a woman possibly in her early 30s and a girl at 
elementary school age. The girl stood by a tree and danced kiuchek. The physical 
appearance of both the woman and the girl indexed stereotypical Slavic whiteness 
rather than Gypsy blackness, that is, light hair and fair complexion. They were just the 
two of them alone, unlike the ordinary companies of Romani big families or peers (as 
I explained earlier, having a family of one child is a marker of ethnic Bulgarians and 
assimilated minorities; families of many children index, above all, ethnic Gypsies as 
well as lower class Turks).101 The woman smiled as she paid attention that I was 
looking at her. I approached them. The woman pointed to my camera and asked 
whether I was a journalist. I presented myself and said that I was an ethnographer and 
also the official photographer of the festival. She recognized my foreign accent and 
asked where I was from. She told me that she herself was not “purely” (chista) 
Bulgarian. Her family origins were in northern Greece; her ancestors fled to Stara 
Zagora during the Balkan Wars (1912-1914). She worked as elementary school 
teacher in a school in Lozenets, the big Romani mahala of Stara Zagora. I asked what 
brought her to the festival. She answered that one of her friends was a policeman 
stationed in Lozenets. He recommended to her the festival; maybe she would meet her 
students. In her words, the school in which she taught was completely homogeneous; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 An exception in this discourse is the small minority of Vlachs—an indigenous rural Balkan 
ethnicity from Romanian origins, whose villages in Bulgaria are located mainly in the north and 
northwest. In many conversations that I held, people blamed Roma for their poverty by pointing to the 
tendency of these people to bring many children whom they could not support. Vlachs, on the other 
hand, were touted as a rare example of a minority whose ethnic identity is adaptable to modern 
lifestyle. For instance, I was told that, traditionally, Vlach couples bring only one child in whom they 
invest all the family’s resources.  
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all its students were ethnic Roma who spent their entire childhood speaking only 
Romani. And so, her work was to teach the children the basics of the Bulgarian 
language. Just as the speakers in the round table that preceded the festival testified, 
she considered knowing Bulgarian as a key to being able to quit the Gypsy ghetto and 
integrate in the modern national society. The young girl was her daughter. I 
complimented her daughter that she danced kiuchek very nicely. As I knew from 
previous experiences (such as my experience with Veselin Karchinski), people in 
Bulgaria are reluctant to take pride in dancing kiuchek in public. To guarantee that my 
compliment would not be taken wrongly, I told her that my daughter was a good 
kiuchek dancer as well. I said how much she loved dancing to popfolk video clips 
played on TV. The woman reacted only with a smile. She did not seem very flattered 
by my compliment to her daughter. However, she admitted that she, as many 
Bulgarians, really liked this music, despite their attempts to hide it. 
Conclusion or Iordan-part 2 
Let me now return at the end of the chapter to the clash of photographic gazes 
I had with Iordan, the Roma-rights activist, over his interest in pictures in which the 
audience experiences the performance on stage by sitting and observing with crossed 
hands while expressing an utter disinterest in the pictures I liked the most, those in 
which people danced kiuchek on- and offstage. I will tie this clash with Greg Urban’s 
three functions of discourse: signaling, individual goal and communal culture. A 
conversation I held with Iordan on the last evening of the festival revealed to me most 
vividly both the communal risk Roma take when choosing to perform Romani 
identity via the stigmatic form of Gypsy kiuchek as well as the personal risk they take 
when calibrating this performance to the cultural function of circulating from the 
ethnic ghetto—the Gypsy mahala—to nation-state Bulgaria and transnational Europe.  
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In that conversation he related to me his political biography as a veteran of 
“Freedom Bulgaria,” the political party of King (Tsar) Kiro (one of the original 
financial supporters of Kracholov’s Romfest enterprise). Iordan was especially 
interested in explaining to me why the party repeatedly failed in elections. This 
failure, he said, prompted him to abandon politics and turn to cultural activity. He 
opened his speech with a rhetorical question: do you know why Roma are the only 
people in Europe with no homeland (i.e. nation-state e.l)? He answered this question 
with a tale. Once upon a time, he said, God announced that he was going to distribute 
all the land in the world. This news made everybody very happy; people celebrated it 
with music and dance. On the announced day, people rushed to the meeting place to 
receive their share of land. Everybody went to take land, everybody, expect the 
forefather of the Gypsies. He remained celebrating. He danced and danced as if the 
party was still going on. He did not pay attention that he was dancing alone. Only 
when he got tired and stopped to take some rest, he looked around and asked, “Where 
has everybody disappeared?” But there was no one to answer his question. When he 
realized his mistake, it was too late. All the land had already been distributed. Nothing 
was left for the Gypsy; not even a small piece of land.  
Iordan explained to me that this misfortune of not observing the border 
between celebration and rational behavior still troubles Roma. He said that he and his 
colleagues in the party used to work so hard to reach their public, alas in vain. They 
received no reward on the Election Day. No matter how seriously they took the 
burden of serving Roma’s interests, Iordan said, Roma would always vote for those 
who buy them with some money, food, and music. He mocked those Roma who used 
to come to him and complain that parliament members never fulfilled the promises 
	   325	  
they gave before the elections. He told me that he used to dismiss the grievers by 
reminding them of their real motives for voting: bribery and entertainment. 
Iordan claimed that because crude opportunism rather than rational 
deliberation were Gypsies’ basic mode of social action they constantly fail to get out 
of their ethnic ghetto. Gypsies, he said, were ready to play any role and go with 
anyone as long as it gave them immediate material benefits. He dismissed the 
multicultural agenda of the festival. He stated with a smile that no one in the festival 
took the idea of multiculturalism seriously. It was only a slogan for earning funding 
and legitimacy from the state. Such opportunism, he concluded, was not less tsiganiia 
than dancing kiuchek. In order to gain political power, Roma had to earn the trust of 
the Bulgarian majority. Behaving in a modern rational manner would elicit this trust 
and help Roma develop respectful communal identity.  
That said, Iordan did not deny that he himself also had opportunist motives. 
He switched to supporting Roma cultural activities when he understood that nothing 
good would come from party politics. He perceived the Romani NGO he formed in 
his hometown as a venue for political and cultural action, but not less than that, as a 
business enterprise, just as Romfest was, he concluded with a smile.  
Iordan’s words illuminate to me not only why he was not interested in pictures 
of dancing Gypsies, but also why Aleksandar Kracholov was so apologetic about 
Emel Etem’s refusal to fund a celebration of kebapche and kiuchek, why Andrey 
accepted Romani language for stage singing but absolutely not for everyday 
communication, why the adult leaders of the children ensemble forbade the children 
to dance kiuchek offstage, why the organizers of the festival wanted to emphasize 
“high” kiuchek and eliminate kiuchetsiia, and, more generally, why Romfest 2008 was 
an ethnic communal rather than a national Bulgarian or transnational European event.  
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The organizers, participants, and attendants whom I met at the festival site 
knew that unlike Bulgarian politicians, intellectuals, foreign ethnographers and other 
European visitors who can congratulate their own public agency by playing with 
images of Balkan ethnicity, such as Gyspy kiuchek, Roma could not benefit politically 
from performing their stereotypes of otherness either in nation-state Bulgaria or 
transnational Europe. Indeed, the cultural climate of Bulgaria has become more 
tolerant to such performances of Balkan ethnicity. This tolerance denotes to some 
Bulgarians that democratic freedom means that popular culture is a realm in which 
people can find refuge from the burdens of performing assimilation in the national 
realm. To others, such tolerance denotes that culture, just as other realms of the 
modern Bulgarian nation, still suffers from the deep crisis of the post-socialist 
transition. My long-term ethnographic experience suggests that in the absence of a 
strong central authority people feel free to vandalise the local culture with Gypsy 
kiuchek just as drivers feel free to break the traffic law, residents of apartment 
buildings feel free to throw garbage from their windows to the street, and politicians 
feel free to buy Gypsy votes.  
By no means does the cultural tolerance to Gypsy kiuchek denote political 
tolerance to Romani ethnicity. Ethnicity is a prime category of Balkan recursivity in 
democratic Bulgaria as it was during socialism. The MRF and small Romani parties 
indeed address the electorate of ethnic minorities. However, at least declaratively 
these parties deny ethnic identity and advocate full assimilation in the Bulgarian 
national public (which is culturally still established on Bulgarian ethnicity). As during 
socialism, political representation is currently formulated by assimilation—the 
language mechanism of homogenization that underlies the mechanisms of 
constitutional nationalism and ethnonation. Roma can quit the ghetto and participate 
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in the social life of modern Bulgaria only by turning politically and socially into 
Bulgarians. Assimilation is the only framework within which Roma can perform 
ethnic cultural identity without losing face. The reason is that, just as during socialism 
(and before), cultural forms identified with Roma, above all kiuchek, still function as 
the prime signals of Balkan stigmatic deviation to modernity: backward ethnicity.  
When attempting to promote a Romani communal identity, the Roma-rights 
activists I met at the festival had to negotiate with the conflict between the culturally 
tolerated ethnic pluralism and its political taboo. They had to enact the most 
prominent cultural marker of Romani ethnicity—Gypsy kiuchek—in order to create a 
viable cultural site for Romani integration within the Bulgarian nation. Cognizant of 
the strong political and social anxieties Gypsy kiuchek invokes, these activists 
distanced themselves in their official communications from this marker. As 
assimilated Roma, they had to take the responsibility of keeping the festival distant 
from the Bulgarian nation. Pragmatically, they simultaneously embraced and rejected 
the stereotypes of Gpysiness in the way they related to the icon of Gypsy kiuchek, as 
their own traditional culture or as a way to gather a Gypsy crowd.   
Locating the festival in distance from the Bulgarian nation had another 
function. The organizers of Romfest 2008 claimed political integration by acting in 
what Bulgarians would perceive as a deliberative manner (rather than in the infamous 
opportunistic Gypsy manner). They did not use the popularity of Romfest among 
whom they regarded as ghettoized Gypsies for gaining political benefits; that is, they 
did not try to translate the cultural power of Gypsy kiuchek into electoral power. 
Iordan’s shift from politics to cultural activism revealed the practical motives of this 
deliberative stipulation. His words also resolved to me the paradox of the Gypsy 
kiuchek shifter, which simultaneously empowers and disempowers Roma. Iordan 
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showed that assimilation still holds currency of signifying rationality. For him, 
claiming assimilation is not only deliberatively right, but also useful for attaining 
practical goals. It opens new opportunities for gaining material benefits in the 
contemporary capitalist market. Having Romani identity has the power to earn NGO 
funding. It is also very attractive when organizing stage performances of Gypsiness. 
Neither Iordan nor any of my other Bulgarian informants perceived this 
channel of market opportunism as contradicting deliberation. Such opportunism was 
not crude or backward, because it was based on the rationale of Bulgaria’s integration 
in transnational Europe. Creed (2002: 124) formulates this rationale in the following 
way: “if you can’t consume, then you must be consumed.” The ethnographic context 
of his formulation is post-socialist villagers who turned their villages into sites of 
folkloric tourism. This formula is what prompted me to offer Mr. Kracholov to 
develop a web site for Romfest, which would potentially attract foreign tourists and 
World Music fans. Mr. Kracholov did not pursue this idea and preferred to maintain 
Romfest in its fairly marginal format. Did he choose this course of action because he 
wanted to maintain his image of an assimilated Roma or because as a good 
businessman he identified Romani assimilation in nation-state Bulgaria the safer and 
most efficient channel of circulating Gypsy kiuchek both in Bulgaria and abroad?  
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Conclusions 
 
Democracy or the Return of Paternalistic Populism? 
Bravo, Zhivkov, Bravo Zhivkov,    Evala, Zhivkov, evala, Zhivkov 
We remember you with fondness.    Spomniame si s kef. 
How we lived under you   Kak zhiveehme pri tebe,  
Only with a few Lev.     Samo s niakoi lev.  
With your comrades,    S tvoite drugari,  
You held firmly,     zdravo dŭrzhahte,  
the reins of power.    Hvanali vlasta.  
No one was hungry, no one was thirsty Niamashe gladni, niamashe zhadni,  
In our country.    v nashata strana.  
 
refrain: Bravo, bravo, bravo yo’ Zhivkov.  Evala, evala, evala, be Zhivkov,  
You were the best,     beshe nai-velik  
Both as a great leader,    i kato goliam ypravnik, 
And as a comedian    i kato komik. 
 
There was no UDF,102 there was no Dogan, Niamashe go SDS-to, niamashe 
Dogan,103 
To show off in front of the people  da pokazvat pred naroda,  
Whose is bigger?     koi e s po-goliam?  
There was only BCP104 in our country  Beshe samo BKP-to v nashata strana,  
And alongside it MOI105 kept order.  A do neia MVR-to pazeshe reda.  
Slavi Trifonov the showman was not there. Niamashe go shoumena Slavi Trifonov. 
Boiko Borisov the superman was not there. Niamashe fo supermena Boiko Borisov.  
And the king106 was out of sight abroad. A pŭk tsaria vŭv chushbina beshe se  
pokril. 
Far away hidden from the people.   Tam daleche of naroda toi se beshe skirl.  
 
There are no chitchats anymore.   Niama veche muhabeti.  
There are also no banquets anymore.  Niama veche i banketi.                      
There are no sweet sofras107   Niama veche sladkite sofri.  
With the best musicians.   S muzikanti nai-dobri.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 UDF-Union of Democratic Forces, a center-right party and the first post-socialist opposition. 
103 Ahmet Dogan-the founder and former leader of The Movement of Rights and Freedoms, the 
unofficial representative of the Turkish and Muslims minorities, see chapter 4.  
104 BCP-The Bulgarian Communist Party.  
105 MOI-Ministry of Interior that operated the infamous internal secret service.  
106 Simeon Borisov Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (or King Semion II) was born in 1937 and came to the throne 
as a child-king during WWII (1943). He was forced to give up his kingdom in 1946 after a rigged 
referendum by the new communist regime. He managed to flee the country to Spain where he lived as 
an exile monarch until 1996. He had to give up his claims to kingdom in order to enter to Bulgarian 
parliamentary politics as the head of a leader-centered party called National Movement Semion the 
Second. Rumors say that he returned to Bulgaria only to restitute his royal property that was 
confiscated by the communists. NMSS won the 2001 general election and Semion II served one term as 
a Prime Minister. The party came second in the following 2005 election and entered in a coalition led 
by the Bulgarian Socialist Party. NMSS was defeated and disappeared from the political realm after the 
2009 general election and Semion II retired from politics and public life.  
107 A Turkish-derived cultural idiom of socializing by a dining table. 
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The good time was over,   Svŭrshi hubavoto vreme,                    
And we didn’t even get it.    Bez dori da razbereme.  
Everything cheap went away.   Vsichko evtino zamina,                       
Like export for abroad.   Kato iznos za chushbina.                     
And what is left for us?   A za nas kakvo ostana?  
THE HANDLE, HANDLE of the frying pan DRŬZHKATA,	  DRŬZHKATA na tigana  
THE HANDLE, THE HANDLE  DRŬZHKATA,	  DRŬZHKATA 
THE HANDLE, THE HANDLE  DRŬZHKATA,	  DRŬZHKATA  
THE HNALDE of the frying pan  DRŬZHKATA	  na tigana. 
 
Bravo, Zhivkov (Evala, Zhivkov)—Panko, 2000108  
  
 
My dissertation explored how chalga functions not as a name of defined music 
genre but as a self-reflexive voice of conflict regarding the post-1989 
recontextualziation of Balkanism—the metadiscourse of European modernity in the 
Balkans—in liberal democracy. On one hand, the music represents the zeitgeist of 
post-socialist democracy: aesthetical and social heterogeneity as well as commercial 
mass media. On the other hand, chalga does not resonate with the metadiscursive path 
of the Bulgarian nation building: navaksvane—catching up—with modern Europe. 
The four ethnographic chapters of the dissertation narrated manners by which 
Bulgarians negotiate this conflict and the four subject positions that emerge from this 
negotiation, particularly shefs and their clients, intellectual legislators and/or 
interpreters, urbanized peasants, and ethnic Roma.  
Jacques Attali argues that popular music holds a greater role of social 
mediation than other media forms. Popular music is a prophecy whose “styles and 
economic organization are ahead of the rest of society because it explores, much more 
than material reality can, the entire range of possibilities in a given code. It makes 
audible the new world that will gradually become visible.” (Attali 1985: 11) Building 
on Attali, I showed that Bulgarians can tolerate music performance they connote with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  “Panko - Evala Jivkov,” accessed October 25, 2014, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t-
Lkq_6whoY.	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chalga as long as it is authorized by a paternalist figure, shef, who maintains language 
registers of modernity when performers and audiences digress with too many registers 
of Balkan liminality to Europe. In the same manner I witnessed throughout my 
research that ordinary Bulgarians seek a paternalist leader, who can communicate 
with them on an intimate level but is powerful enough to impose on them norms and 
practices of European modernity. The expectation of such leader is not exclusive to 
the post-socialist Bulgarian society. It has defined the local political scene since the 
foundation of nation-state Bulgaria. What is special to the contemporary era is the 
cultural formulation of such leadership, which I define as paternalistic populism. 
Referring again to Briggs and Bauman’s (1992) concept of intertextual gaps 
let me begin with a historical perspective to this vertical dialectics between grassroots 
vectors of widening the gap with models of modern Europe and top-down attempts to 
minimize it. Thereafter I will outline some current style and political economic trends 
of chalga, which, in my view, adapt this dialectics to the democratic context of 
contemporary Bulgaria. 
Absolutist democracy  
A short critical essay by Leon Trotsky, which I encountered while writing my 
dissertation, points to the Balkanist metadiscourse, in which Bulgarians’ expectation 
of paternal modernizer is grounded. The essay, titled “The enigma of Bulgarian 
Democracy in a Backward Country,” was written in November 1912 as part of 
Trotsky’s larger project of analyzing firsthand how the “Balkan problem” (the 
struggle between European powers over the post-Ottoman Balkans) exploded into 
regional nationalistic wars,109 which gave the Balkans the name of “the powder keg of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 “The War Correspondence of Leon Trotsky” ([1912] 1980) spans 1908-1913 and analyze the 
political, social, and cultural dynamics which prompted, first, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and 
Serbia to ally (“the Balkan League”) against the Ottoman Empire (first Balkan War, October 1912-
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Europe.” Bulgaria participated in the First Balkan War (1912) and served as the cause 
for the Second Balkan War (1913) was then a constitutional monarchy with an elected 
legislature. The king, Ferdinand I, belonged to the Saxe-Coburg-Gotha dynastic 
family, which European empires imported to Bulgaria from Germany in 1878. 
Trotsky characterizes Bulgarian politics as an exception within Europe’s liberal 
model—that is, an absolutist democracy.  
Trotsky describes a system of government whose power comes from bottom-
up struggle coupled with top-down rule. He writes that “[I]t is worth visiting Bulgaria 
if only to be shown the relativity of our political concepts. Formally democracy reigns 
here. Sovereignty belongs to the people, the people elect parliament on the basis of 
universal suffrage, the ministry is responsible to the parliament for everything it does. 
If, however, we examine the governmental mechanism of Bulgarian democracy, we 
discover in it without difficulty some significant features of absolutism” ([1912] 
1980: 47). What Trotsky found was that general elections determined the distribution 
of seats in the parliament and the monarch (who constitutionally reigned but did not 
rule) gave to the party that won the elections the mandate to form the government. 
However, in fact, the entire process was rigged. The parliament held a procedure of 
general elections, but the monarch used to determine the election results in advance, 
in order to put in power the party that he favored at a particular moment. Was this a 
real democratic system or just an electoral theater? Trotsky maintains that it was the 
latter, though he notes (with irony perhaps, though I can’t be sure considering 
Russia’s own grappling with backwardness) that Bulgarian monarchists (the political 
mainstream) advocated this vertical system by claiming that the monarch only 
anticipated the people’s will and directed his policy in advance of events. Even 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
May 1913) and, then, Serbia, Romania, Greece, Montenegro, and the Ottoman Empire to ally against 
Bulgaria (Second Balkan Wars, June-August 1913).   
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though my research took place a century later, I could see the local rationale behind 
this argument, which relates to the bifurcation between the perceived barbarous 
masses and the Europeanized elite. The masses could provide the quantity of votes 
(oftentimes with the incentives of chalga, see chapters 1 and 4), however only the 
elite could synthesize them “qualitatively” into a general “public interest.”  
Trotsky’s cultural explanation for this exceptional marriage of democracy and 
absolutism is similar to the way Bulgarians relate to chalga in the current democratic 
debate. He defines two interconnected reasons that both go beyond Bulgaria’s 
political structure. In his mind, the democratic process in Bulgaria was directed from 
above because of “the lag in Bulgaria’s historical development and the low level of 
social differentiation…Like all other backward countries, Bulgaria is incapable of 
creating new political and cultural forms through a free struggle of its internal forces: 
it is obliged to assimilate the ready-made cultural products that European civilization 
has developed in the course of its history.” (ibid: 49) Trotsky points to Bulgarian 
literature—a prime form of modern European literacy, particularly a national Russian 
pride—in order to show how his observations become manifest in the local cultural 
sphere. His view holds the same positivist approach that underlies the modern Europe 
and Balkan liminality/recursivity binary. Trotsky writes that Bulgarian literature 
“lacks tradition, and has not been able to develop its own internal continuity. It has to 
subordinate its unfermented content to modern and contemporary forms created under 
different cultural zenith.” (ibid). He concludes his analysis allegorically: “[i]n its 
movement in history, a backward country is to be compared not to a ship that cuts its 
own way through the waves, but to a barge being towed by a steamship. The captain 
of the steamship has to show initiative in choosing a course, whereas the man in 
command of the barge is bound hand and foot.” (ibid) Following this allegory Trotsky 
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suggests that if Bulgarians were to develop “conscious political self-government by 
the people” (ibid: 54), the local political elite should avoid imposing superstructure of 
democracy on the “primitive” base. Instead, democracy should develop in this peasant 
society through complex paths of internal struggle. 
Democratic centralism 
Needless to say, Trotsky’s non-vertical “solution” to the Bulgarian lagging 
behind Europe never materialized. The Bulgarian Communist Party that came to 
power in 1944 built a socialist-realist democracy that reflected the political, social, 
cultural and all other interests of an ideologically engineered Bulgarian narod. In the 
forty-five years of its rule, the regime directed the actual people, the “rabble,” to 
imagine themselves as a homogenous nation, which has rejected its Balkan-Oriental 
slavery in favor of evolution into a modern European proletariat. Democracy involved 
general elections, with the Party’s assigned candidates on the ballot, who always won 
with margins of nearly 100%. Thereafter the people went out to celebrate the electoral 
ritual with folklore music and dances, designed and delivered by official state bands. 
Music was a central media to realize the evolutionary program of socialist democracy. 
The regime attempted to eliminate the pre-national popular music form of chalgiia 
while designing and promoting (since the mid 1960s) the modern popular music form 
of Estrada. So, while there was a small minority of people in socialist Bulgaria, who 
indeed envisioned democracy from below (such as Gencho Gaitandzhiev, the main 
protagonist of chapter 2), the regime held monopoly over all political participation, 
which was intended to perform support in the socialist regime (Kaneff 2006). 
Grassroots democracy existed de jure in the utopian promise of proletarian 
dictatorship. On the ground level, democracy existed in a vertical interplay of 
“domestication” (Creed 1997)—the state imposed its “democratic” forms and 
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practices from above and the people integrated them in their lives from below through 
acts of compliance coupled with sabotage.  
Liberal democracy 
After 1989 Bulgarians were directed by the West to restructure the local 
political landscape according to a model of democracy marked by multiparty 
parliament, commercial market, and separation of state powers. In this newly 
emerging democratic society popular music became a commercial rather political 
field of cultural production.  The initiative for this process came from the EU, US, 
and IMF, which aimed at energizing grassroots forces that would foster democracy 
from below. On the macro level, the country has adapted to Western democracy 
successfully. Bulgaria has a functioning electoral system, the economy corresponds 
with the IMF (since 1997), the army is part of NATO (as a partner since 1994 and as 
full member since 2004), and following a long process of negotiations with the EU, 
Bulgaria finally attained membership in 2007. On the cultural level, the chalga boom 
of the late 1980s, which forecasted the end of socialist democracy, reveals a much 
more ambivalent adaptation to Western democracy. On one hand, the imaginative 
hybridity of music associated with chalga opened new-old cultural horizons beyond 
the doctrine of modernist national homogeneity. The music opens a unique venue of 
pursuing musical career (chapter 1), imagining grassroots pluralism (chapter 2), 
negotiating social mobility (chapter 3), and contesting the taboo of ethnic politics 
(chapter 4). On the other hand, the ethnic connotations particularly of kiuchek as well 
as its association with lowbrow elements resurfaced the intimate sense of Bulgaria 
lagging behind the rest of Europe. The post-socialist debate surrounding chalga 
confronted Bulgarians with the familiar notion that the local social base was just too 
“primitive” to distinguish between liberty (svoboda) and self-indulgence (slobodiia). 
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And so, if no one comes to rescue Bulgarians from themselves, democracy was 
doomed to fall into crazyocracy (ludokratsiia, Buchanan 2006: 430) or just to turn 
into an absurd transition with no end (Creed 1997: 1-2). 
The EU-membership era: paternal populism? 
So what poetics of world-making (Warner 2002) of Bulgarian democratic 
nation does chalga mediate? In the closing pages I will outline a few style and 
political economic aspects of chalga, which, in my mind, reflect the emergence of a 
new form of vertical democracy, which I call: paternalistic populism.  
Style—labeling, aesthetics, and reception 
Chalga and popfolk were almost synonymous when I began this ethnographic 
project in 2004. Popfolk was simply a less provocative signifier than chalga to label 
commercial hybridity of Bulgarian folklore, Romani and Turkish chalgiia, and 
Balkan pop. A decade later, the register of chalga has increasingly become obsolete in 
public. It resonates either with post-socialist nostalgia or with the Turkish and Romani 
sounds, which are present but less prominent in the mediated commercial music 
scene, i.e. popfolk. The growing gap between the two labels has an historical 
significance. Chalga reminds Bulgarians of the turbulent years of the post-socialist 
transition; they perceive popfolk, on the other hand, as a contemporary path back to 
normality. It allows them to imagine again evolution from the backward folk (the 
noise of the “rabble”) to modern pop. Producers and singers see evolution in the more 
available sophisticated technical equipment and professional personnel. They also see 
it in the greater circulation of money and tougher market competition. On the side of 
the audience, people see evolution in the advent of digital media, which brings to 
Bulgaria contemporary pop trends from different parts of the world.  
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In terms of aesthetics, I get the impression that the horizons of popfolk have 
become much more conversant with non-Balkan musics than they used to be when I 
began my research. For instance, there are growingly more original songs that 
combine local sounds with Latin American Reggaeton, Mariachi, and Cumbia 
rhythms.110 One can also find hip-hop and popfolk duets.111 Video clip creators draw 
ideas from foreign clips circulating worldwide over YouTube and many different 
social media venues. Singers also watch global pop to imitate fashionable visualities. 
The regional horizons of popfolk music have expanded as well. Cover songs mainly 
of Greek and Serbian hits are still popular in Bulgaria. However, one can find them 
played over the media alongside the original songs. Musicians and producers from 
neighboring countries find the musical openness of Bulgaria attractive for 
collaborative projects with popfolk singers.112 Balkanika TV, a regional music channel 
owned by Ara Music and Diapason Records, aims at making Bulgaria a trans-national 
musical crossroad thereby developing new opportunities for popular music 
circulation. 
While welcoming the idea of cultural openness, many of my informants 
complained that popfolk has lost the edge or authenticity of chalga. One strand of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 For instance, Desislava—“Reggaeton and a Little Bit of Chalga,” 2007: “Desislava -	  Reggaeton i 
malko chalga / Десислава - Регетон и малко чалга,”	  accessed October 25, 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6UN9Vt_58fc.   
Ilian—“Chikita,” 2011 (clip shot in Las Vegas): “ILIYAN – CHIKITA,”	  accessed October 25, 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=crsynw38xsw.    
111 For instance, Sofi Marinova and Ustata—“Storm in my Heart” 2006: “Sofi Marinova feat Ustata 
Buriata v sarceto mi,” accessed October 25, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ea3ZLed32-A.   
112 For instance, among many, Emanuela and Serdar Ortaç (Turkey)—“I Ask You Finally” 2011:	  
“Emanuela & Serdar Ortac-Pitam te posledno,” accessed October 25, 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L_Vj_Ri4hL4.  
Adrea and Costi Yunona (Romania)—“Used,” 2010: “ANDREA & COSTI (SAHARA) - 
UPOTREBENA (Halele) - Balkan HIT OFFICIAL VIDEO produced by COSTI 2010,” accessed 
October 25, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WBHv0pO94JQ.    
Tzvetelina Yaneva and Rada al-Abdullah (Iraq)—“Count Me”, 2011:	  “Цветелина и DJ Ники Генов - 
Чалга до дупка / Tsvetelina & Niki Genov - Chalga... (Офиц. видео),”	   accessed October 25, 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1bLwGgQu0gE.  
Alicia and Sarit Haddad (Israel)—“When You Noticed Me,” 2011, accessed October 25, 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rn9x7vkryAQ.     
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critique is that popfolk has become both sonically and visually a mere imitation of 
Western pop. I also encountered a second strand of critique that popfolk, just as 
chalga before, has no Bulgarian identity, i.e. it only exploits local ethnic and regional 
genres. A third more minor strand expresses nostalgia to the post-socialist era by 
valorizing chalga as local avant-garde and denigrating popfolk as a standardized 
global pop. Interestingly, I heard such complaints both from chalga advocates and 
detractors, who from opposite positions expressed a Balkanist cultural intimacy of 
democratic Bulgaria. They articulated their “community of flawed” with fears that 
Bulgaria is too backward to survive as an open society. The first two opinions 
reiterate the common perception that without imposed order like in real European 
societies, Bulgaria is doomed to lose its national identity—it will either be swallowed 
by the West or become a lawless country with Oriental (i.e. Gypsy and Turkish) 
majority. The third critique mourns Bulgarians’ failure to maintain grassroots 
independence without seeking submission to greater powers (just as the image of a 
sheep on the semi-parodic national symbol list in the introduction). 
The cosmopolitan and high-tech style of popfolk music might reflect the 
Westernization of Bulgarian urban landscape. In the decade since I began visiting the 
capital of Sofia I witnessed an architectural turn from homogenously rectangle 
apartment buildings to heterogeneity of geometrical shapes. Many cafés, restaurants, 
designer stores, and nightclubs offer greater options of consumer leisure. Newly 
constructed malls bring to Bulgaria the most famous world brands and fashions. The 
city hosts international festivals and is a frequent stop on the global tours of music 
bands, orchestras, and stage performance troupes. The evolutionary path of popfolk 
toward global visual and sound images (with some exotic Balkan twist) in addition to 
the monopolistic economy of the genre might also reflect the vertical nature of the 
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current Westernization process. Malls open at the expense of small street stores, chain 
stores take over neighborhood stores, vendors and booths gradually get pushed from 
the streets, and the metro system expands replacing the old-fashioned tramway. The 
growth of Sofia comes at the expense of provincial towns and villages, which still 
suffer depopulation. I recently heard that the municipality of Plovdiv, the second 
largest city in Bulgaria, decided to forbid Romani peddlers from driving carriages 
pushed by horses in the city premises. These trends do not mean that rural features 
have disappeared from Bulgaria but rather that the social landscape has become more 
segregated. Just as the gap between chalga and popfolk suggests, there is a growing 
gap in Bulgaria between being in Europe and being in the Balkans. This gap works 
well for the thin crust of rich and middle class people, who can imagine integration in 
modern Europe. This gap does not benefit the majority of urban and rural poor (e.g. 
Veselin Karchinski of chapter 3) or ethnic minorities (the participants in Romfest, the 
Romani music festival of chapter 4), who struggle to survive this system.  
Political economy  
The poetics of artificiality of popfolk star-singers reveal the two paternalistic 
political structures of Bulgarian democratic culture: the former socialist state-run 
monopoly and global capitalist music corporations. The hardship of the popfolk 
industry to break out of its generic media prompts producers, performers, and 
broadcasters to work in a closed circle, which depends on a number of authoritarian 
businessmen. Considering the chronic poverty of most Bulgarians, singers can rarely 
handle a viable professional career outside the firms. Musicians and producers need to 
generate profit in order to survive. No one can also take the risk of experiments, 
inside or outside the firms unless he or she serves the business interests of a richer 
patron. The life cycle of most singers is the initial five-year contract, in which the 
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simple rule is to generate profit for the record label boss, find a permanent sponsor, or 
perish. And, with the advent of digital media, the lifespan of songs becomes shorter 
and shorter. Singers cannot survive in the business unless they maintain a high rate of 
productivity and create hit after hit. Commercial success usually does not mean that 
singers become rich, but that they find a rich sponsor, who would fund their career. 
Otherwise singers fall in the margins of chalga: tavern singing and wedding bands. In 
some cases singers can live off performing in the margins of the folk, however they 
have to give up the modern aura of pop. 
The generic regimentation of chalga in popfolk might reflect a larger world 
trend in which commercial music is becoming increasingly centralized in a small 
number of gigantic corporations (e.g. Negus 1999). It might, however, also reflect a 
local failure of the country to generate a wide middle class whose consumption might 
engender a diverse music business. More than two decades since “the arrival of 
democracy,” Bulgarian society is still too poor to imagine the growth of modern 
culture from below. Popfolk seems to develop in the footsteps of socialist Estrada. 
During socialism, the state sponsored the production of popular music with 
infrastructure and resources; nowadays it is the shady money elite that does this job. 
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From Tato to Boiko—the emergence of paternalist populism? 
  
Fig. 1— “20 Years Later”—a photomontage of Todor Zhivkov (right) and Boyko 
Borisov (left), unknown source. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2—Todor Zhivkov (left) turning into Boiko Borisov (right)113  
 
 
The growing gap between the register of chalga and the generic label of 
popfolk provides Bulgarians with a sense of return to normality from the transitional 
era. People often recall the 1990s as a time of chaos and near anarchy or as a 
condition of absurdity in which transition happened for the sake of transition. What 
reflects the return to normality is that, unlike the transition era, music mediates a clear 
distinction between European modernity and Balkan(ist) digressions. Now, however, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  Стефан Северин, Личен уеб лог, accessed November 1, 2014, http://sseverin.com/защо-бойко-
борисов-мрази-бсп.	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there is again hierarchy that directs people what they need to do in order to become 
real Europeans. The hybridity of pop combined with folk (i.e. popfolk) allows people 
to move on the scale between public modern spaces and intimate liminal ones. Marta, 
Reni and their colleague singers do that when they tune their performance to the right 
balance between animating the voice of ordinary Bulgarians and animating the voices 
of their shefs; Vesko used to do that in his communications with his customers; 
Bulgarian intellectuals shift on this scale when following the protocol of modernity 
and digressing from it with irony; and the participants in Romfest 2008 moved on that 
scale when performing assimilated Roma or ghettoized Gypsies. 
Global sounds and visualities circulating in popfolk signal to Bulgarians that 
they are part of the global beat (and, by implication, of the capitalist world); local 
ethnic sounds bring people back to the familiar marginal premises of the Balkans. The 
ongoing hybridity of pop and folk reaffirm to Bulgarians that the country still lags 
behind the rest of Europe. The self-appointed task of the popfolk music industry to 
prompt musical evolution provides confidence that there are people at the top who 
enforce modernity order in Bulgaria, whereas the ability of people to move on the 
scale between modern pop and backward folk provides people with a sense of 
personal freedom, i.e. some power to decide whether to comply with the order or to 
sabotage it. 
What is the political implication of this musical normalization? “Bravo, 
Zhivkov” (Evala, Zhivkov) the popfolk song at the conclusions’ epigraph, expresses 
Bulgarians’ longing for the lifetime socialist leader Todor Zhivkov (Tato or bat 
[brother] Tosho, as Bulgarians call him with fondness). The bitter irony of the song 
starts with the colloquial Тurkism evala (in Turkish eyvallah means “thank you” or 
“goodbye”) that hails the person, who imposed totalitarian modernity for 35 years 
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(1954-1989). Digressive irony comes from the lyrics, which sing Zhivkov’s praise 
with a kiuchek melody that was publically forbidden during socialism. The refrain 
summarizes most vividly the sprit of nostalgia to this leader: “Bravo, bravo, bravo 
Zhivkov, he was the greatest/Both as a big ruler and as a comedian” (Evala, evala, 
evala na Zhivkov, beshe nai-velik/I kato goliam upravnik i kato komik). Indeed, all the 
Zhivkov tales I encountered throughout my research idealized him: he was ostensibly 
both authoritative and egalitarian, both a modern European leader and a Balkan-style 
people’s person (naroden chovek). Since his fall in 1989, Bulgarians have been 
looking for a leader in his image, sometimes voting for a person who could potentially 
embody Zhivkov sometimes voting for the socialist (former communist) party.114  
On the way back from a gig, I told Marta that, in my opinion, Boiko Borisov 
would for sure be the next leader of Bulgaria. It was during the municipal election 
campaign of 2007, when he ran for a second term as the mayor of Sofia. Marta 
laughed and asked for an explanation. I pointed to a street billboard with his picture 
(figure 2) and told her that it is designed like the cover of a popfolk album.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 The Bulgarian Socialist (former Communist) Party won the first free general election in 1991. Their 
government fell after a year and the next election of 1992 was won by the center-right “Union of 
Democratic Forces.” The socialists came back to power in 1994, but lost the next election in 1997 to 
the charismatic “UDF” leader Ivan Kostov. The winner of the next election in 2001 was the last King 
of Bulgaria, Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, who came back from exile and formed the “National 
Movement Simeon II” party. The party led Bulgaria until the 2005 election, which brought the 
Socialists (BSP) back to power, however only for one term. BSP lost the 2009 election to Boiko 
Borisov’s party “Citizens for European Development in Bulgaria.” Borisov’s government resigned in 
February 2013 after protests. An electoral tie between CEDB and its opposition in the 2013 elections 
brought BSP back to leading a shaky coalition with two ostensibly political foes: the ultra nationalist 
party ATAKA and “The Movement for Rights and Freedom” (the unofficial representative of the 
Turkish minority, see chapter 4). The current Prime Minister, Plamen Oresharski, gave his resignation 
in later July 2014 and at the time of completing this manuscript, the Bulgarian parties are negotiating 
terms for a new government and/or new elections that will, most probably, bring Boiko Borisov back to 
national leadership.  
	   344	  
 
Fig. 3—Boyko Borisov’s image as it appeared on 2007 election billboards.115  
 
 
I also added that since “Tato,” no political leader in Bulgaria has managed to 
be liked in such a way that people would relate to him only by his first name. I 
concluded that when I think about “Boiko” I imagine him as a sort of a music star. 
Marta laughed again, kept silence for a few seconds, and then said, “yes like 
Konstantin” (a popfolk male singer). Marta did not look surprised by my political 
prediction. It was known that Boiko Borisov enjoyed wide popularity and was aiming 
at the national political sphere. What surprised her was the connection that I made 
with chalga. After all Mr. Borisov has been making an effort to distance himself from 
everything associated with chalga. During the 2009 general elections in June, he 
apparently even forbade Mitko Dimitrov, the owner of Payner Music, the biggest 
popfolk record label, to lead the list of Borisov’s party CEDB (“Citizens for European 
Development in Bulgaria” [Grazhdani za Evropeisko razvitie na Buglaria, GERB])116 
in the electoral district of Haskovo (southeastern Bulgaria) so as to avoid any chalga 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  Picture taken from Frognews.bg, accessed November 1, 2014, 
http://frognews.bg/news_2066/Boiko_Borisov_Sreshtu_men_raboti_stsenarii_na_Kostov_Ovcharov/.	  
116 GERB is a center-right populist party, which was founded by Borisov and embodies his paternal 
leadership in the parliamentary system. Equivalent to this party in Europe are Silvio Berlusconi’s “The 
People of Freedom” (Il Popolo della Liberta) in Italy, Vladir Putin’s “United Russia” (Yedínaya 
Rossíya), and Recep Tayip Erdoğan’s “Justice and Development Party” (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) in 
Turkey.  
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associations. On the other hand, this anti-chagla façade did not convince my other 
interlocutors, who reminded me of his alleged close ties with the popfolk female 
singer Ivana. I also attended the music awards ceremony of the popfolk music channel 
Fen TV in April 2009, in which Mr. Borisov handed to Dzhina Stoeva the best 
popfolk female singer award.  
None of the people with whom I communicated expressed open support in 
“Boiko.” People used to mock him by quoting his crude and simpleminded utterances 
(like praising his project as the Mayor of Sofia of constructing new Metro lines: “I 
made a Metro like sun” [Napravil sŭm metro kato slŭntse]). Denying supporting for 
Boiko was what prompted me to associate him with chalga. In many different 
occasions I heard that Bulgarians loved him because they considered him to be as 
simpleminded as they were. My study informs me that people love, fear, and are 
ashamed of him, because he performs charismatic leadership in a way that resonates 
with a chalga star-boss. The 2009 parliamentary election, in which Mr. Borisov won 
with unprecedented majority, and his first term as a prime minister have shown thus 
far that Boiko indeed knows how to anticipate the popular will, how to ally with 
bigger forces in order to overcome the marginality and weakness of Bulgaria, and 
most importantly, he knows how to act with Balkan aggression to put the society in a 
modern European order. Following over the media the fall of Borisov from power in 
2013 and the current (summer 2014) political and economic crisis in Bulgaria, I get 
the sense that even such a close replica to Todor Zhivkov as Borisov has not managed 
to change the foundational metanarrative of nation-state Bulgaria which revolves 
around the gap, liminality, recursivity or incompleteness of the Balkan to modern 
Europe, the metanarrative that underlies the double voice of national pride countered 
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with national shame, which gave life to the literary hero Bai Ganio in the late 19th 
century and to the self-reflexive register of chalga music, a hundred years later.  
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